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Abstract  
This research explores the experiences of Chinese seafarers and bereaved families in the 
process of claiming compensation following workplace accidents. For a long time, issues 
regarding seafarers’ rights in such cases have failed to attract substantial public attention. 
International and Chinese studies indicate that seafarers may suffer higher risks of work-related 
injuries compared with land-based workers. Studies conducted in Australia, Canada and the 
United States show that claimants under workers’ compensation system may suffer extra 
psychological harm when claiming damages. However, there is little attention, in academic 
discourse, paid to the struggles of Chinese seafarers and/or bereaved families in the processes 
of claiming compensation following work-related casualties. 
This research aims to examine the procedures for compensation claims and to explore 
individual experiences of the claim process to determine whether Chinese seafarers suffer 
additional harm during claim processes. Two major qualitative research methods, documentary 
analysis and semi-structured interview, are applied in this research. The findings based on an 
analysis of legal claims process documents and records and interview data with the key 
informants, including claim handlers in shipping companies, maritime lawyers and maritime 
court judges in China, suggest that the compensation standards for occupational casualties of 
seafarers are chaotic and the current social welfare system does not provide effective assistance 
for the victims. The research results, therefore, show that Chinese seafarers and their families 
are most likely to suffer additional harm in the process, including intensive psychological 
pressures caused by the lack of procedural transparency and mental trauma resulting from claim 
suppression by their companies. Moreover, when resorting to public institutions, including 
labour administration and judicial authorities, Chinese seafarers are unlikely to receive timely 
and sufficient remedies. 
Key words: Chinese seafarers, Compensation claims, Workplace injuries and death, Seafarers’ 
rights 
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Introduction 
The aim of this research is to explore and understand the claim experiences 
of Chinese seafarers and their families following workplace accidents at sea. 
This research is a socio-legal study focusing on occupational health and safety 
in the shipping industry and the well-being of seafarer claimants in 
compensation processes. It intends (1) to identify the key players and socio-
legal relationships involved in managing maritime workplace accidents and 
claims; (2) to explore the experiences of claimants have when interacting with 
employers and social institutions; and (3) to consider whether there are any 
particular interactions which are harmful for the seafarers and their families 
in compensation processes.   
The research motivation is rooted in my experience of handling Chinese 
seafarers' claims. In one accident, a Panama-registered Bulk Carrier capsized 
and sank in the sea off southern Taiwan's Cape Eluanbi. One sailor died and 
twelve were missing. After six-months of negotiations, the surviving families 
reached agreements over the compensation amounts with the P&I Club 
correspondent. In observing the claim process, I felt that the surviving 
families had no better option than to accept the damages offered by the P&I 
club. This was because the surviving families could not afford the cost of 
lawsuits against the shipowner and interested parties. There were also limited 
precedents in which the court awards to claimants exceeded their awards. 
Accordingly, the claimants were unlikely to achieve damages significantly 
higher than the compensation offered by the P&I club via a process of 
litigation. I gradually realised it was a long, painful and disempowering 
process for the victims to claim damages in this legal environment. 
Seafarers’ compensation claims are a category of workers’ compensation 
claim. In the process of workers’ compensation claims, workers or their 
beneficiaries claim damages arising from work-related injuries and 
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deaths1.The damages include compensation for medical expense, sick pay, 
compensation resulting from death, disability and mental trauma and other 
costs arising from necessary claim activities2. In this compensation process, 
five groups of social actors interact: workers; employers; insurers; social 
security administrative institutions; and judicial institutions. Due to such 
interaction, compensation processes can be complicated. The adverse effects 
of compensation processes have been widely reported: the compensation 
system, instead of providing remedies, may exacerbate the harmful 
consequences of workplace injury, such as pain, insecurity, stress and anxiety 
(Lippel et al., 2007; Matthews et al., 2012). Most of these findings are from 
the studies focusing on land-based workers, such as construction, 
manufacturing and healthcare workers, but few studies concern the 
experiences of offshore workers. Moreover, these studies were mainly 
conducted in developed western countries, such as in Canada, Australia and 
the US. Less attention has been paid to workers from developing countries 
(Lippel, 2007; Roberts-Yates, 2003; Matthews et al., 2012; Quinlan and 
Mayhew,1999). Therefore, to fill this gap, this study will explore the 
experiences of seafarers, who attempt to obtain compensation for 
occupational injuries, in the largest seafarer supply state China (Ministry of 
Transport of the People's Republic of China, 2016; Zhu, 2002).  
The People’s Republic of China declares itself as a socialist country, and the 
ruling class of this country is supposed to be the working class, instead of the 
capitalist class (Howell and Pearce, 2002). However, through the Open and 
Reform Policies advanced by Deng Xiaoping in the earlier 1980s and 
developed by his successor Jiang Zemin, market economic regimes with neo-
liberal features have been established (Zhu and Dowling, 2002; Zhu, 2002; 
Zhu, 1996). The market economy regime has challenged the ruling class 
status of Chinese workers, and workers’ rights are no longer completely 
                                                 
1
 The occurrence of occupational diseases can lead to workers’ claims. 
Considering claims arising from occupational diseases are subject to different 
regulation system, this research does not cover occupational disease claims.   
2
 For example, expenses arising from disability appraisal, traveling and 
accommodation.  
  
3 
 
ensured by the Party and the government but are subject to the market 
competition (Lu, 2001). 
Referring to western social welfare regimes, Chinese legislators introduced a 
social security system, to provide social support for the workers in the 
relatively free market (Dimitrova and Blanpain, 2010). In 2004, a Chinese 
version of Workers’ Compensation system, the Work-related Injury 
Insurance Systems (WIIS) 3  and Labour Arbitration Tribunals (LAT) 
launched nationwide to provide remedies for the victims of workplace 
accidents. Concurrently, the tort liability system explicitly entitles these 
victims to remedies under civil law 4 . Therefore, Chinese seafarers’ 
compensation claims are subject to these two legal regimes.   
Following workplace accidents at sea, seafarers and their families become 
victims of physical and mental harm and financial loss. They are entitled to 
claim damages and obtain remedies either from employers and their private 
insurers or the Work-related Injury Insurance Funds (WIIF). Nevertheless, to 
obtain remedies, seafarers and their families have to initiate claims against 
employers and/or relevant institutions. The challenges and difficulties arising 
from this process are crucial considerations in both of the fields of industrial 
relations, labour law and maritime law.  
Precarious workers are more vulnerable in the compensation claim process 
compared to permanent employees (Quinlan and Mayhew, 1999; Underhill et 
al., 2011). Seafarers are the epitome of mobile workers employed under 
precarious, flexible and fragmented conditions. Seafarers are employed on 
‘very long, generally temporary, contracts and can be hired and fired at will’ 
(Sampson, 2013: 28). 46% of Chinese seafarers do not have long-term 
employment contracts and work on voyage-based contracts (Chen et al., 
2014). With the advantage of cheap crew costs, Chinese seafarers have 
                                                 
3
  Work-related Injury Insurance Funds were established according to the 
Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2003) 
4
 This entitlement was been explicitly confirmed by the Interpretation of the 
Supreme People’s Court of Issues Concerning the Application of Law for the 
Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury (2004) 
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become a significant labour force in the global maritime labour market (Zhao 
and Amante, 2005). Meanwhile, Chinese seafarers’ claims are a type of 
migrant worker claim. Therefore, Chinese seafarer claimants may be subject 
to dual vulnerabilities of precarious workers and immigrants (Zhao, 2005; 
Sun and Liu, 2014; Fudge, 2012; Guthrie and Quinlan, 2005). 
Exploring Chinese seafarers’ compensation claim experiences has three 
potential outcomes. The first one is the expansion of knowledge of the effects 
of the Chinese Workers’ Compensation System, which is at a relatively early 
stage of development but concerns the rights and welfare of the world’s 
largest population of workers. Secondly, from the industrial study perspective, 
this research can contribute to understandings of workers’ rights in a 
hazardous and adventurous sector, the shipping industry. Thirdly, Chinese 
seafarers are the epitome of precarious workers and therefore the social and 
legal impact of flexible employment and transnational labour relations can be 
analysed by considering their experience. 
1. Objectives and Research Questions  
The objectives of this thesis are: (1) to critically review the legal rights and 
entitlements of seafarers after workplace accidents in China; (2) to investigate 
the practice of management of workplace accidents and claims in the 
maritime industry; (3) to explore seafarers’ experiences of defending their 
rights, dignities and compensation during claim processes. 
The central research question of this thesis is whether Chinese seafarers and 
surviving families suffer additional harm as a result of existing compensation 
processes.  
To answer this, the following sub-questions concerning different aspects of 
the question will be addressed: 
(1) What are the compensation entitlements available for seafarers 
according to the Chinese Law? Are these entitlements sufficient to cover 
loss is arising from accidents?  
(2) How do companies manage workplace accidents and 
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compensation claims?  
(3) What are the challenges for seafarers/surviving families when 
negotiate compensation with their companies? 
(4) If the disputes cannot be solved within the organisational 
framework and the claims need to be addressed by the justice system, what 
are the challenges for seafarers/surviving families in seeking justice? 
(5) What are the implications of the above challenges for the 
social and economic life of seafarers and their families? 
2. The Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. Chapter One and Two present the 
literature review. Chapter One examines the high occupational risks at sea 
and illustrates the necessity and significance of researching the compensation 
systems for seafarers’ workplace injuries. Referring to the historical 
development of Workers’ Compensation, the author identifies two 
approaches to addressing workers’ claims: non-fault based compulsory 
Workers’ compensation system, including public insurance and private 
liability insurance, and fault-based tort liability damages regime.  
Chapter Two discusses workers’ experiences of compensation claims 
following workplace accidents. The workers’ compensation systems were 
firstly launched in western countries, and then widely adopted in many 
countries around the world. Empirical studies drawing on workers’ 
experiences to assess the effectiveness of this system in western countries are 
abundant. From a theoretical perspective, there are two well-established 
theoretical frameworks: capital-labour conflict theory and therapeutic 
jurisprudence, which are widely used to assess the effectiveness of the 
compensational systems. The current studies have provided empirical 
evidence showing that in Western industrialised countries, workers suffer 
various additional harm physically, financially, and psychologically, due to 
the conflict between capital and labour, and the deficiencies of the workers’ 
compensation systems.  
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Chapter Three explains and justifies the methodology of this exploratory 
study. It gives an outline of the different methods used in the fieldwork. The 
chapter provides a reflexive account of the fieldwork experience and 
highlights the ethical elements of the research. This research conducts 
interviews with Chinese seafarers and surviving families to understand the 
difficulties that they have met. Also, through interviews with the judges and 
legal professionals, the author examines the operation of the legal system in 
regulating seafarers’ occupational injuries and death in practice. Thirdly, the 
current relevant Chinese legislation and regulation is critically evaluated.  
Chapter Four introduces Chinese shipping industry reforms and current legal 
frameworks regulating seafarers' workplace injuries. This chapter identifies 
structural problems in relation to the civil tort law systems and maritime 
jurisdiction. These have increased the unpredictability and uncertainty of 
seafarers’ claims.  
Chapters Five, Six and Seven present an analysis of the empirical data 
collected during the fieldwork. Chapter Five presents the management 
practices of various organisational players in the shipping industry. This 
chapter examines pre-accident legal risk management and post-accident 
management of crew casualties by shipowners and crew agencies. It exhibits 
a variety of management strategies with regards to workplace accidents and 
seafarers' claims in the current changing legal and industrial environment.  
Chapters Six and Seven present the claim activities of surviving families and 
injured seafarers. Chapter Six reveals the struggles of surviving families 
following those workplace accidents which resulted in the death of a seafarer. 
Chapter Seven addresses injured seafarers’ personal ordeals following 
workplace injuries.  
Chapter Eight synthesises the main findings that emerge from the three 
preceding chapters. It engages in a discussion to identify the main 
sociological and legislative contributing factors to the challenges and 
difficulties Chinese seafarers and surviving families confront during the claim 
process.  
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Lastly, the concluding chapter highlights the main findings from the study 
and their theoretical implications. It then presents the limitations of the study 
and makes policy recommendations and suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter One: Workplace Accidents at 
Sea and Compensation Systems 
Introduction 
This chapter is the first part of a literature review, examining studies of the 
occupational risks relating to seafaring jobs and of existing compensation 
systems. The purpose of this thesis is to explore seafarers’ claim experiences 
in the context of current Chinese compensation schemes, so this chapter 
provides the industrial and institutional background to seafarers’ claim 
activities. Seafarers’ claims arise from workplace accidents at sea and may be 
subject to both general and special compensation systems. 
The first section of the chapter presents the occupational risks faced by 
seafarers, and is based on a body of literature on maritime health and safety. 
The second section explores international studies of the remedies for 
industrial accident victims. Two approaches to workplace damages are 
identified: non-fault based workers’ compensation systems and tort liability 
compensation system. To better understand the weaknesses and strengths of 
these two approaches, the historical origins and development of workers’ 
compensation systems are discussed. Furthermore, the contemporary 
challenges for the compensation systems, including trends of privatisation 
and globalisation, are examined. The third section addresses the relationship 
between seafarers and Workers’ Compensation Systems and special legal 
principles regarding maritime claims. In the fourth section, information about 
China and the development of the Chinese Workers’ Compensation System 
is reviewed. The features of Chinese seafarers’ claims are also examined.  
1.1 Workplace accidents at sea  
Seafarers’ compensation claims arise from the losses caused by workplace 
accidents at sea, which include two types of accidents: maritime casualties 
and occupational accidents. Maritime casualty arises from the collision, 
fire/explosion, foundering and capsizing of a vessel due to poor weather 
and/or rough seas. This type of major disaster can lead to the loss of many 
lives (European Maritime Safety Agency, 2015; Bhattacharya, 2009). 
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Occupational accidents refer to an individual seafarer, or a group of seafarers 
involved in work tasks who suffer injuries or loss of life due to hazards in the 
working environment, including chemical risks and physical hazards (Baur et 
al., 2015; Borch et al., 2012; Poulsen et al., 2014). Occupational accidents 
cause the majority of seafarers’ deaths (Roberts et al., 2014) (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The Trend in the fatal accident rate in British shipping, 1995–2012. 
Source: Roberts et al. (2014) 
The occupation of seafaring remains one of the most dangerous forms of work 
(Walters and Bailey, 2013; Alderton et al., 2004; Bloor, 2011; Liu et al., 
2007). The mortality rate at work in the shipping industry is significantly 
higher than in the general labour force. According to official statistics in the 
British merchant fleet (2003–12), the relative risk of workplace accidental 
fatalities (14.5 per 100 000) is 21 times greater than the general workforce, 
4.7 times that of the construction industry and 13 times that of manufacturing 
industry (Roberts et al., 2014) (See Table 1).  The surveillance of maritime 
fatalities in the Danish merchant navy (2002–2009) shows that seafarers are 
more than six times more likely to die from occupational accidents than 
workers ashore (Borch et al., 2012).  
  
10 
 
Table 1. Trends in the fatal accident rate in British merchant shipping, 1976–2012 
TIME 
PERIOD 
FATAL 
ACCIDENTS 
AT WORK 
POPULATION AT 
RISK (SEAFARER-
YEARS) 
FATAL ACCIDENT 
RATE (PER 1000 
SEAFARERS) 
RELATIVE RISK 
SEAFARERS: 
GENERAL 
WORKFORCE 
1976-1980 289 441,200 0.66 25.5 
1981-1985 124 288,000 0.43 20.1 
1986-1990 75 135,500 0.55 28.9 
1991-1995 19 118,419 0.16 12.8 
1996-2002 23 153,308 0.15 16.0 
2003-2012 49 338,203 0.15 21.0 
Source: (Adapted from Roberts and Marlow, 2005; Roberts et al., 2014) 
There is considerable underreporting of maritime occupational injuries 
(Hansen et al. 2002; Ellis et al., 2010). According to Hansen et al (2002), one 
in five accidents causing permanent disabilities have not been reported to 
maritime safety authorities. Through investigating reports to insurers and 
maritime authorities, Hansen et al. (2002) estimate that the accident rate 
causing more than a 5% level of disabilities is 3.4 per 1000 seafarers/year, 
which is 1.56 times higher than the rate for all shore-based industrial workers, 
which is 2.2 per 1000 workers/year. Drawing on self-completed 
questionnaires, Jensen et al. (2004) investigate 7,000 seafarers in 11 countries 
and find that 9.1 % of seafarers suffered an injury during their most recent 
tour of duty. Chinese seafarers are identified as the group with the second 
highest rate of injuries (See Table 2). 
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Table 2. Prevalence of injury among seafarers during the latest tour of duty 
NATIONALITY  ALL INJURIES NO. OF SEAFARERS 
N        % 
CHINA 79 14.4 549 
DENMARK 61 7.8 784 
UK 54 9.7 554 
INDONESIA 7 1.4 498 
PHILIPPINES 123 8.2 1500 
POLAND 20 6.6 302 
RUSSIA 17 5.1 335 
SOUTH AFRICA 25 14 178 
SPAIN 111 15.9 699 
UKRAINE 29 7.4 390 
TOTAL  526 9.1 5789 
 Source: Jensen et al. (2004) 
In China, studies regarding occupational fatalities and injuries among 
seafarers are far more limited, and available research is mainly conducted by 
state-owned enterprises, while nationwide surveys are not available. Zhang 
(2012) carried out a comparative study of work-related casualty rates in the 
shipping, logistics and shipbuilding sectors in a large Chinese enterprise in 
2005. He found that the occupational casualty rate of 4.090 ‰ of the shipping 
sector was about four times higher than the rate of the shipbuilding sector (see 
Table 3).   
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Table 3. The work-related casualty rate of the shipping, logistics and shipbuilding 
sector of a Chinese Enterprise 
 SHIPPING  
SECTOR 
LOGISTICS 
SECTOR 
SHIP BUILDING 
SECTOR 
OCCUPATIONAL 
INJURIES  
(INJURIES AND 
DEATH)‰ 
4.090 1.439 1.045 
OCCUPATIONAL 
MORTALITY ‰ 
0.364 0 0.18 
Source: (Zhang et al., 2012) 
In addition, compared with the fatal accident rate of 0.15‰ of British 
Merchant Ships (2003-2012), the occupational fatality rate of 0.364 ‰ faced 
by Chinese seafarers is 2.4 times higher than the rate on British Fleets.  
The above studies reveal that seafarers are exposed to higher occupational 
fatality and injury risks compared to shore-based workers. Among seafarers 
of different nationalities, the self-reported injury rate of Chinese seafarers is 
the second highest. The fatality risk exposure to Chinese seafarers on Chinese 
ships is estimated to be 2.4 times greater than in the British Merchant Fleet. 
Considering Chinese seafarers are exposed to a high workplace injury and 
fatality risk, examining whether their loss can be adequately remedied 
through the compensation system is crucial for the physical and financial 
well-beings of seafarers and their surviving families. 
1.2 Workers’ compensation systems  
Workplace accidents cause considerable physical, emotional and economic 
damage and loss to workers and their families (Krause et al., 1998). To relieve 
these losses, legislators entitle victims to claim damages from liable parties. 
Compensation systems have two legal approaches. One is the Workers’ 
compensation system whereby injured workers/beneficiaries can obtain 
limited non-fault based compensation from a public insurance fund or the 
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private insurers of their employers; the other is a tort liability system whereby 
victims are able to obtain full compensation from their employers if they can 
prove the accidents were caused by employer faults (Gunderson, 2000a; Cane 
and Atiyah, 2006; Gunderson, 2000b). However, in different countries, at 
different historical stages, these two systems have had different statuses and 
functions.  
In the United Kingdom, before the introduction of workers’ compensation 
system at the end of the 19th century, no specialised rules regulated work-
related injuries. Under the traditional tort law, the courts rarely awarded 
damages to victims. In most cases, workers had to suffer the accidental loss 
without compensation, since employer liability was hard to prove (Epstein, 
1981; Clayton, 1997; Cane and Atiyah, 2006). The first reason for this was 
that tort law provided strong defences for the employers to counterplead 
workers’ claims, including (1) common employment, (2) contributory 
negligence and (3) assumption of risk. The second reason was rooted in the 
social environment at that time: the general living standard and social welfare 
were at a low level; and at the initial stage of the Industrial Revolution, 
employment was regarded as a type of favour by employers, as it provided 
workers and their families with relatively secure incomes (Cane and Atiyah 
2006). Meanwhile, most members of society were living in poverty and 
suffering from diseases, injuries, accidents and other risks every day. 
Considering the ‘ordinary’ living conditions, judges seldom sustained 
workers’ claims, unless the victims could demonstrate the existence of 
employers’ faults successfully (Epstein, 1981). At the same time, in Germany, 
a traditional civil law country, the situation was different; should the worker 
die of work-related accidents, the employer was responsible for paying the 
wergeld5 (Perlin 1984). This was embodied in primitive Germanic law and 
could be considered as a shadow of the modern principle for caring for injured 
workers (Perlin, 1984). However, this traditional simplistic legal principle 
was far from sufficient to deal with the mass injuries that resulted from 
                                                 
5
 Wergeld is a German law term, referring to amount of compensation paid 
by a person committing an offense to the injured party or, in case of death, to 
his/her family (See Encyclopaedia Britannica).  
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massive industrial production, and injured workers were rarely awarded 
damages under this legal and social environment (Perlin, 1984; Kleeberg, 
2003-2004). In 1838, Prussian Liability Law, required railway companies to 
pay for the industrial injuries suffered by workers under a strict liability 
principle (Perlin, 1984; Kleeberg, 2003-2004). This was a trial in German law 
of a compensation model for mass injuries in modern industrial circumstances 
(Perlin, 1984). However, the scope of strict liability of employers was still 
limited, and traditional fault principles under tort law were still the main 
source used to ascertain liabilities in the case of industrial accidents. Thus 
before the 1880s, it was difficult for German workers to obtain adequate 
damages for industrial injuries (Perlin, 1984; Kleeberg, 2003-2004). 
1.2.1 The origins of workers’ compensation systems 
Workers’ compensation systems were first introduced in Britain and 
Germany (Watson and Valen, 1994; Clayton, 1997). The English Employers’ 
Liability Act of 1880  was a breakthrough, as it imposed a qualified form of 
negligence liability on the employers to restrict the scope of the doctrine of 
common employment6 as a common law defence (Epstein, 1981). In this 
statute, the maximum amount of compensation was set to three years of the 
worker’s wages (Cane and Atiyah, 2006; Epstein, 1981). Epstein comments: 
“it kept a general negligence standard and identified certain particular classes 
of injuries covered by the statute” (1981:797). The Workmen’s Compensation 
Act (1897) came into force, which reformed the traditional tort law principle 
that fault was the prerequisite for the establishment of liability. The 
compensation due according to this Act was also different from the full 
compensation principle under tort law. The amount provided by this Act was 
roughly half of the loss suffered by injured workers (Cane and Atiyah 2006). 
However, this act had the following limitations: (1) it only applied to 
“personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment” 
in the following industries: rail, factory, mining, quarry or engineering work 
and work that involved the construction of buildings; (2) the damages 
                                                 
6
 According to “common employment”, workers should bear the risks of 
being injured by their co-workers. 
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available for injured workers was low, about half of the total loss (Epstein 
1981; Cane and Atiyah 2006). This legislation still entitled employees to 
bring claims against employers if injuries originated from the employers’ 
fault (Epstein 1981; Cane and Atiyah 2006; Watson and Valen, 1994). 
The English model was a ‘historical compromise’ between labour and capital: 
exempt from the burden of proving the employer negligence, the injured 
workers were entitled to claim damages from industrial injuries; while 
employers did not need to compensate for the entire loss suffered by workers. 
The English model of the workers’ compensation system in this period 
complied with classical liberalism7 . As such, the English model did not 
provide measures for accident prevention and rehabilitation. As Clayton 
(1997:3) comments: “The English legislation was purely an amelioratory 
measure concerned with the provision of limited income support to 
compensate for wage loss as a result of industrial injury”. The English model 
has largely influenced the frameworks of Workers’ Compensation Systems in 
the United States (excluding Washington and Ohio which follow the German 
model), Australia, and New Zealand (Epstein, 1981; Clayton, 1997; 
Gunderson and Hyatt, 2000). 
Compared with the English model, the German model was a more 
comprehensive and independent regime including indemnity methods for 
work-related injuries and rehabilitation arrangements. Bismarck’s Imperial 
German Accident Law was enacted on 6th July 1884 and came into force on 
1st October 1885. The German model provided almost total support for 
workers suffering occupational injuries and diseases, and furthermore, it 
charged an extra ‘danger tariff’ to firms with poor records of industrial 
injuries, to achieve the aims of preventing occupational injuries and deaths 
and also promoting the social rehabilitation of injured workers (Clayton 1997). 
Employees were entitled to two-thirds of their salaries in indemnity or 
disability benefits with the disability conclusion made by doctors. Employers 
paid the costs of the workers’ compensation system. Some European states 
                                                 
7
 In the context of classical liberalism, government should refrain from the 
interference of free markets 
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adopted the German model including Austro-Hungarian Empire and Norway 
(Clayton 1997). 
The basic mechanism of workers’ compensation, as Gunderson and Hyatt 
(2000) note, is transferring money from capital to labour. In other words, 
employers need to contribute to mitigating the damages and losses suffered 
by employees caused by work-related injuries and occupational diseases 
(Cane and Atiyah 2006, p. 329). This distribution of liability between 
employers and employees on the damage of occupational injuries is a 
departure from the tort law principle that the liability must be based on fault 
(Cane and Atiyah, 2006). Rather than a natural development of the traditional 
civil law, the introduction of workers’ compensation systems declared that 
traditional tort law approaches were no longer appropriate for mass industrial 
injuries (Cooney, 1984; Clayton, 1997; Gunderson and Hyatt, 2000), and that 
independent and special statutes should be passed to compensate workers 
suffering occupational injuries. Furthermore, the emergence of workers’ 
compensation systems, both in Germany and in England, was a political 
compromise between labour and capital. 
1.2.2 The development of the workers’ compensation schemes after 
World War II 
After World War II, social security systems were widely established in 
western countries, and workers’ compensation systems were merged into the 
general social security system in some states (Williams, 1991). For example, 
in the United Kingdom, the workers compensation system, which was 
originally based on employers’ liability and the commercial underwriting 
industry, transformed into a public welfare system: the Industrial Injuries 
Scheme. In addition, more than 100 countries have established national 
schemes based on the no-fault principle (Williams, 1991; Clayton, 1997). The 
United States, Canada and Australia have not adopted unitary national 
schemes of workers’ compensation, but authorise state/provinces to constitute 
the legal frameworks for industrial injuries (Purse, 2009). This is because in 
these federal countries, it is the province or state which reserves legislative 
power regarding workers’ compensation claims. 
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In terms of their financial structure, there are four types of workers’ 
compensation schemes: (1) a unitary state fund providing indemnity for 
injured workers; (2) self-insurance, including industry funds, group self-
insurance and individual self-insurance; (3) private insurance and mutual 
insurance, especially in shipping industries and (4) co-operative insurance 
between self-insurance and private insurance (Clayton 1997). National funds 
or funds operated by state/provinces are still the main basis of workers’ 
compensation schemes. However, in some countries/regions, such as the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Singapore and Hong Kong, the private 
insurance industry has been involved in schemes (Clayton, 1997; Lippel, 
2003b; Li, 2014). In the countries where public funds are the main component 
of workers’ compensation schemes, private underwriting companies also act 
in supplementary roles. 
Having established workers’ compensation schemes, some countries, such as 
Germany and Canada, no longer entitle workers to sue employers under tort 
law (Hyatt and Law, 2000). While, in others, such as the United Kingdom, 
injured workers are still permitted to claim compensation under tort rules if 
they can prove the existence of negligence by employers (Haas, 1986-1987; 
Williams, 1991; Hyatt and Law, 2000). 
In the UK, the post war integration of workers’ compensation into the national 
social security system in 1946 has been a major achievement. Increasing the 
involvement of governments in workers’ compensation schemes has 
improved their reliability and stability. For example, before the mid-twentieth 
century in England, employers and private insurers were the responsible 
parties for industrial injuries, and the workers’ compensation claim processes 
were similar to the traditional tort litigations. Injured workers were still 
subject to enormous pressure from employers and therefore would accept 
employers’ lump sum settlement offers since the imbalance between labour 
and capital was so severe at that time that workers could not afford to wait for 
the final judgement of lengthy procedures (Cane and Atiyah 2006). The 
introduction of the national social security scheme removed the direct 
adversarial characteristics of workers’ claims, and injured workers could 
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obtain full benefits as defined by the statutes from the public fund, rather than 
directly from employers. As a result, the treatment of injured workers steadily 
improved in this period. 
1.2.3 Privatisation reforms of workers’ compensation systems 
Private employers’ liability insurance schemes are necessary components of 
workers’ compensation systems, in some states of the USA and Australia. In 
Brazil, the worker’s compensation system was originally operated by state-
owned institutions, however, under pressure to implement neo-liberal reforms, 
the government also permit private companies’ involvement in the workers’ 
compensation systems (Clayton, 1997; Purse, 2009).  
In terms of management of workers’ compensation systems, privatisation 
trials have destabilised workers’ rights to claim industrial injuries damages 
(Quinlan and Mayhew, 1999). Firstly, the introduction of free-market 
competition may cause the instability of workers’ compensation systems. In 
order to gain one proportion of the market, private companies usually adopt 
discount strategies to attract more clients. However, these lower tariffs 
schemes cannot reflect the real risk level. Once insurance accidents occur, 
and insurers would increase tariffs accordingly, which makes the whole 
workers’ compensation become unreliable and unpredictable. This happened 
in Australia and the United States in the 1980s, and the result was that private 
insurance companies either were bankrupted or refused to honour the 
compensation for workers’ injuries (Clayton, 1997; Quinlan and Mayhew, 
1999). Secondly, privatisation measures also increase administrative costs. 
For example, in order to lower the public administrative expense, workers’ 
compensation claims are outsourced to private management companies. In 
fact, this trial has proved to be even more costly, since the ambiguous 
principal-agent relationship between public workers’ compensation 
institutions and private insurance companies has caused more difficulties for 
workers during the claim process and created more tensions in the work-
related injuries claims management system (Purse, 2009). Thirdly, as Lippel 
(2003b) argues, privatisation of workers’ compensation systems is often 
related to the aggressive treatment of injured workers’ claims, which has been 
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proved in the North American and Australian examples (Lippel, 2003b; Purse, 
2009). 
1.2.4 Challenges imposed by globalisation 
Since the 1970s, globalisation has acted as a significant promoter for the 
spread of neo-liberal policies (Larner, 2000; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 
2002). Both the globalised market and the neo-liberal policies, to a great 
extent, have reconstructed the global economy and brought great challenges 
for labour markets (Arthurs, 1996; Gunderson, 2000a; Overbeek, 2003). 
Investors are no longer restricted by national boundaries, and 
multinational/transnational corporations can extend business beyond (Arthurs 
1996; Overbeek 2003). It is much easier for capital to escape from strict 
regulations from home countries and to seek a more “friendly” investment 
environment abroad with fewer obligations in terms of labour welfare and a 
low-cost labour force (Gunderson 2000; Overbeek 2003). Meanwhile, labour 
markets have also become globalised under the influence of international 
production (Overbeek 2003). A large amount of the low-cost labour force 
from developing countries have been involved in the global labour market 
(Frenkel and Peetz, 1998). As a result, the globalised market enables 
investment to become more mobile, which also helps employers avoid 
relatively strict labour regulations (Gunderson 2000). Meanwhile, neo-liberal 
policies in the last four decades have largely influenced the nature and forms 
of work, and flexible employment has become a trend weakening collective 
labour force (Arthurs 1996) and has brought new challenges to traditional 
workers’ compensation systems (Felstead and Jewson, 1999).  
Due to the deregulation of the labour market, employment in the service 
sector has become precarious and flexible (Arthurs 1996), which is different 
from the traditional definition of employment under workers’ compensation 
(Quinlan and Mayhew 1999). This means that workers under flexible 
employment relationships may not be covered by existing workers’ 
compensation systems (Quinlan and Mayhew 1999) because the definition of 
workers was designed according to the characteristics of traditional directly 
employed permanent occupations (Arthurs 1996).  In addition, considering 
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the limited financial budget and pressures originating from the capital escape, 
governments have become reluctant to include the new emerging flexible 
labour force into the workers’ compensation systems and to improve 
compensation standards. Furthermore, to reduce expenditure in welfare, some 
governments have become stricter awarding benefits to injured workers 
(Gunderson and Hyatt, 2000; Lippel, 2003b). Furthermore, privatisation 
reforms of workers compensation systems have been recommended by neo-
liberal economists in Brazil and Australia (Clayton 1997; Purse 2009) 
These changes greatly increase the imbalance of power between labour and 
capital. As Guthrie et al. (2006: 62) comments, 
The last two decades have witnessed increased conflict over workers’ 
compensation policy, and the focus of this conflict has been the issue 
of who should pay for the rising costs associated with work-related 
injury. 
The increasing adversarial features between capital and labour regarding the 
workers’ compensation systems, at the legislation level, are embodied as the 
continuous decline of benefits that employees are entitled to and the 
introduction of more stringent examining procedures for work-related injuries 
(Watson and Valen, 1994). At the operational level, the increasingly 
adversarial features cause additional harm to injured workers during the claim 
process, and sometimes, workers even give up the opportunity to claim 
damages under the workers’ compensation schemes altogether (Rosenman et 
al., 2000). 
Through reviewing the origin and development of workers’ compensation 
systems, it can be found that the emergence of these systems in the late 19th 
century was a result of the political strategy and historical compromise to 
reduce unrest in the working classes (Epstein, 1981; Clayton, 1997). With the 
establishment of the welfare state after World War II in the western world, 
compensation for industrial injuries became relatively stable and the 
adversarial features of systems were to some extent decreased (Williams, 
1991). However, with the formation of the global labour market and 
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privatisation reforms, the polarity between labour and capital has increased 
greatly and generated pronounced challenges for the workers’ compensation 
systems (Purse, 2000; Lippel, 2003a; Quinlan and Mayhew, 1999). As a 
consequence, workers’ vulnerability has increased during the claim process, 
and it is harder to obtain compensation from the workers’ compensation 
systems. 
1.3 Seafarers and workers’ compensation system 
Historically, shipping and seamen were subject to maritime customs that were 
independent from land based legal frameworks. The earliest codification of 
written maritime customs is the Rhodian Sea Code, which was a Byzantine 
creation, probably written in the 8th century. Legal regulation of seafarers’ 
injuries on board can be traced back to medieval maritime customs (Couper, 
2005). However, the medieval independent sea code tradition did not give 
seafarers substantial rights following workplace accidents. Later, when 
labour law and workers’ compensation developed in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, seafarers’ rights were not properly included in legislative labour 
protection frameworks (Couper, 2005).  
The use of Flags of Convenience has become pervasive, and maritime 
workers has been globally sourced since the 1970s. International seafarers’ 
compensation claims are subject to multiple jurisdictions, including Flag 
States and Seafarer Supply States (DeSombre, 2006; Couper et al., 1999; 
Bloor et al., 2006; Sampson and Bloor, 2007). According to the territorial 
jurisdiction principle, Flag States can regulate ships as their ‘floating islands’ 
and govern seafarers’ compensation claims. According to the passive 
personality principle of jurisdiction8, Seafarer Supply States can also regulate 
compensation claims raised by the seafarers of their own nationalities (Black, 
2000; Mandaraka-Sheppard, 2009). In addition, seafarers’ compensation 
claims can also be subject to a third state’s jurisdiction, if the accident occurs 
                                                 
8
 The passive personality principle allows states to claim jurisdiction to try a 
foreign national for offenses committed abroad that affect its own 
citizens. (See Encyclopedia Britannia) 
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in a third state’s territorial seas. For example, if the accident occurs in the 
territorial seas of the US, seafarers’ compensation claims can be subject to 
US admiralty jurisdiction and US law can be applicable.  
The tradition that seafarers are subject to maritime code and excluded from 
labour law still has a strong influence on current seafarers’ compensation 
claims. In some states, seafarers are excluded from social security laws for 
the general workforce. The United States is one example. Seafarers have a 
peculiar status in American law, and their workplace injuries are subject to a 
set of rules, Jones Act, 46 USC. SS 688, that are distinct from the general 
body of labour and tort law (Force et al., 2006; Norris, 1954). In this 
legislative context, seafarers’ access to social security remedies is not 
recognised by law and they have to pursue their compensation claims through 
special admiralty jurisdiction.   
In the late 20th century, some states made efforts to ensure seafarers’ equal 
access to social security in the labour law frameworks. In the UK, following 
the Social Security Act 1973 through special provisions, the non-fault based 
industrial injuries disablement benefits were extended to cover seafarers 
(Kitchen, 1980). In addition to the seafarers working on British Flag vessels, 
some British residents working on non-British vessels can also access the UK 
social security system9. British seafarers, who work in the UK or in any other 
EU country or Norway, once injured, are entitled to the industrial injuries 
disablement benefits from the UK National Insurance Fund10. In addition to 
the social security benefits, seafarers are still entitled to sue their shipowners, 
if they can establish fault-based compensation claims (Newdick, 2005). 
                                                 
9
 UK residents work: on a ship registered outside the UK, but your employer 
is based in the UK and your contract was signed in the UK; on a ship 
registered in Bermuda and owned in Bermuda, but that calls regularly at UK 
ports in UK inshore waters or between UK ports (with no visits to a foreign 
port in-between) in the designated UK sector of the Continental Shelf on a 
ship engaged in exploration or exploitation of oil or gas. 
(https://www.gov.uk/guidance/national-insurance-if-you-work-on-a-ship) 
 
10
 Legislation (13) - SS C&B Act 1992 sec 117 and Legislation (14) - SSB 
(PA) Regs 1975 reg 10c & 11  
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Seafarers working on British vessels and British seafarers working on certain 
non-British vessels have equal access to the social security system.  
Nowadays, in some regions and states, migrant seafarers have equal rights to 
local workers of the Flag states. For seafarers working on Hong Kong vessels, 
compensation claims are subject to the Employees' Compensation Ordinance 
1980 (Chapter 282), which is a no-fault, non-contributory employee 
compensation system for work injuries. As for other land-based Hong Kong 
workers, local and foreign seafarers working on Hong Kong vessels have 
equal rights to claim compensation from their employers (shipowners) 
following workplace accidents. In Singapore, seafarers’ compensation claims 
are subject to the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Labour Convention) Act 
(2014) and Work Injury Compensation Act 2009. Through special provisions, 
local and migrant seafarers are able to claim non-fault based compensation 
from their employers in Singapore. Hong Kong and Singapore are two large 
flag states in the global shipping industry11, and seafarers working on their 
fleets are entitled to non-fault based compensation according to the labour 
law. However, the workers’ compensation systems in Hong Kong and 
Singapore largely rely on private liability insurance of employers and 
seafarers cannot claim compensation from a public fund. As discussed above, 
in the private insurance oriented. workers’ compensation system, the 
relationship between employers and employees can be more adversarial 
compared to under the unitary state fund mode.  
Although in the jurisdiction of some flag states, migrant seafarers are entitled 
to equal rights in labour law, for injured seafarers, to enforce their rights in a 
foreign country is highly challenging. Considering this, Seafarers Supply 
States has also developed legal instruments to protect their citizens’ rights. In 
the Philippines, a major maritime labour supply country, overseas seafarers 
must be hired under the terms of the approved Philippine Overseas 
Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (SEC). 
                                                 
11 Hong Kong ranks four and Singapore ranks six in terms of registered Dead 
Weight Tonnage (DWT). 
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This contract is negotiated through tripartite consultation involving the 
seafarers and the private sector (Gancayco, 2005). In the case of workplace 
injuries, Filipino seafarers can obtain non-fault based compensation from 
shipowners according to the standards stipulated by the POEA-SEC.    
Compared to land-based workers, seafarers’ compensation claims have 
special characteristics: (1) seafarers’ compensation claims are subject to 
special admiralty law and jurisdiction in some countries; (2) the migrant 
status of seafarers renders compensation claims subject to various 
jurisdictions and different choices of applicable law. Therefore, seafarers may 
need to seek special admiralty and maritime legal service to enforce their 
rights in a certain jurisdiction, and they may also face complicated 
international private law issues before they proceed with their compensation 
claims. Special maritime jurisdiction and complicated choices in terms of 
applicable law increase the difficulties for seafarers in obtaining their 
remedies following workplace accidents.   
1.4 Workers’ Compensation System in China 
1.4.1 Transition of industrial relations after the 1980s 
The People’s Republic of China, the biggest existing socialist state in the 
world, was established by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. The Chinese 
Communist Party declared itself as a team of pioneers of the Chinese Working 
Class and the representative of the fundamental interests of the overwhelming 
majority of the people in China. From 1949 to 1979, both the political and 
economic regimes were socialist. The capitalist regime had been completely 
abolished and the working class became the ruling class in this country 
(Howell and Pearce, 2002; Taylor et al., 2003). Under the planned economy, 
all enterprises were state-owned or collective-owned, and usually urban 
residents were assigned permanent full-time jobs, i.e. the ‘iron rice bowl’ 
(Zhu and Dowling, 2002; Li, 2008). At that time, workers’ welfare was 
provided by government regulations and ensured by enterprises. In this 
context, states provided unitary compensation standards for work-related 
injuries and illness in 1957, and enterprises were the compulsory contributors 
to the payment of industrial injuries damages. Civil justice and tort liability 
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systems were abolished, and state-owned/collective-owned enterprises were 
the decision makers regarding the benefits for injured workers (Mao and 
Zhang, 2007). 
Under the planned economy, workers’ welfare, including pensions, health 
care and compensation for occupational injuries and death, were supposed to 
be fully provided by state-owned or collective-owned enterprises according 
to the standards set by the government (Mao and Zhang, 2007). However, 
continuous political movements, especially the Cultural Revolution from 
1966 – 1976, greatly disturbed the development of the economy, so that by 
the end of the 1970s most Chinese people lived in poverty (Yao, 2000). In 
1978, as a decision of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party, the Reform and Open policy was introduced (Zhu, 
1996). In 1992, the concept of the socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics was implemented (Zhu, 2002). These policies have profoundly 
changed the direction of the country as privatised property and market 
businesses have gradually been restored. 
The last three decades have witnessed the tremendous social and economic 
transformation of China: from a command economy to a relatively free 
market economy and from forbidding private business to encouraging private 
companies and foreign investment. At the same time, free workers and the 
labour market have come into existence, and traditional industrial 
relationships have changed greatly (Lu, 2001). The ‘Iron rice bowl’ is no 
longer the common employment form in the newly emerging labour market. 
Labour contracts are widely adopted to establish fixed-term employment 
relationships (Zhu, 2002). Enterprises can freely hire employees without too 
much intervention from central or local government in a relatively free labour 
market, and do not need to be completely responsible for the workers’ 
pensions, health care and work-related injuries (Wu, 2008). Previous socialist 
workers’ welfare rights protection regimes are no longer universally applied, 
and the new-born labour force, including migrant workers and college 
graduates, are not protected effectively by the previous welfare schemes (Mao 
and Zhang, 2007). 
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1.4.2 Introduction of the Western workers’ compensation system 
In the 1990s, labour welfare regimes in the socialist market economy had not 
been established, and contract workers’ rights and welfare were very 
ambiguous. In this situation, within private sectors, workers suffering 
occupational injuries were extremely miserable (Sun and Zhu, 2009). 
Although some legal regulations provided standards for benefit entitlement 
for injured workers, there are no effective measures forcing private employers 
to meet their obligations (Mao and Zhang, 2007). However, civil legal rules 
in terms of tort litigation at that time were problematic as well. Injured 
workers could neither receive defined compensation under the workers’ 
compensation system, nor could they claim sufficient damages through tort 
litigation. Furthermore, health care was paid from the patients’ budget in 
China12. In this circumstance, injured workers in the private sector became a 
huge burden on their families, since it was difficult for them to acquire 
compensation from employers or benefits from the social insurance fund (Sun 
and Zhu, 2009). 
Economic and social transformation demands the improvement of legal 
frameworks to ensure the stability of society and the sustainability of 
development (Zhu, 2002). In order to regulate the employment relationship 
and protect workers’ rights, the Labour Law (1994) was enacted and the 
Labour Contract Law was enacted in 2008 (Li 2008). In terms of occupational 
injuries, on 1st January, 2004, the Work-Related Injury Insurance Regulation 
(2003) came into force. This Regulation enlarges its application scope to 
include all categories of enterprises in mainland China and provides relevant 
procedural rules for the approval of occupational injuries, application for 
occupational injuries compensation, arbitration rules for labour disputes and 
appeal procedures (Mao and Zhang, 2007). According to this regulation, 
public occupational insurance funds have been established nationwide, and 
are managed by the provincial government (Li, 2008). Employers are obliged 
to purchase occupational injuries insurance for employees, while employees 
                                                 
12
 In China, the public medical care is not free and patients have to pay 
deposits before receiving any treatment. 
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do not need to pay the insurance tariff at all. If employers fail to purchase the 
occupational injuries insurance for employees, then in the event of work-
related injury, employers need to pay the full amount of compensation 
according to the standards provided by the Regulation13. 
1.4.3 Critics towards workers’ compensation system in China 
The Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2003) was legislated by the 
State Council as unified rules for work-related injuries throughout the country, 
apart from the two Special Administrative Regions, Hong Kong and Macao. 
However, enforcing this regulation and establishing the social insurance 
funds for workplace injuries in the thirty-two provinces of mainland China is 
a complicated task (Li, 2008). Although the Regulation provides unified 
standards for compensation amounts with regards to work-related injuries and 
deaths, the real power to award compensation to workers belongs to local 
governments. As a consequence of the imbalance in economic development, 
the coverage of work-related injuries and actual compensating standards are 
different in different regions. 
In addition, migrant workers cannot secure efficient protection against 
occupational injuries (Zhao, 2005). Until now, China has pursued the 
relatively strict household registration regime to restrict domestic migration. 
Migrant workers cannot usually acquire citizen identity in the cities where 
they work. However, the workers’ compensation system greatly depends on 
the regional budget, but the local government is not willing to spend extra 
money to protect the workers coming from another region. Therefore, a 
significant number of migrant workers in China cannot access the workers’ 
compensation from the government in the locality of their workplaces (Zhao, 
2005; Sun and Liu, 2014). 
Another problem is insufficient supervision over employers in the private 
sector. The regulation demands that all employers shall purchase social 
insurance for their employees against occupation injuries 14 , otherwise 
                                                 
13
 See the Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2011) Art. 62 
14
 See the Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2011), Art 2. 
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employers are obliged to pay injured workers compensation equivalent to the 
amount which is supposed to be paid by the WIIF. This seems to be an 
effective measure to ensure workers’ rights. However, in the Chinese market, 
with large amounts of surplus labour, private employers are able to use their 
positions of power to secure their own interests in order to exploit employees 
(Zhao, 2005; Sun and Liu, 2014; Sun and Zhu, 2009). Without effective 
supervision from the authorities, in an oversupplied labour market, it is 
extremely difficult for individual employees to gain access to the WIIF (Sun 
and Liu, 2014).  
Moreover, the Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2003) identifies 
two types of compensation liability: one is the WIIF’s liability to cover 
disability damages and medical expenses, and the other is employer’s 
liabilities to cover workers’ sick pay. Li (2014) criticises this regime as a 
mixed model of self-insurance and social security insurance, which reduces 
the compulsory feature of the Work-related Injury Insurance, since employers’ 
motivations are decreased if contributing to the insurance cannot exempt their 
compensation liabilities. In addition, the WIIF intentionally limit their own 
liabilities, which weakens the function of social security of the Work-related 
Injury Insurance. As a result, this institutional design makes Chinese workers 
have to face two liable parties, and both are eager to reduce compensation 
liabilities.  
Chinese trade unions are not active players in fighting for workers’ rights and 
welfare in the workers’ compensation system. As Chen (2003) argues, the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the unique legal trade 
unions in China which are under the control of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) cannot represent Chinese workers’ interests and rights under the 
reformed market economy regime.  As the official trade unions, the chief task 
of ACFTU is to support enforcement of the CCP’s policies, rather than 
promoting workers’ interests. Under this condition, little support can be 
provided by the Chinese official trade unions to assist workers in claiming 
damages for occupational injuries.  
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In the context of China, transiting from the planned economy to the market 
economy, the previous socialist workers’ welfare regime has been terminated, 
and a western-like social security system has been recently introduced as a 
trial to ensure labour rights and well-being in the market economy. Work-
related Injury Insurance is one of the core regimes of the new social security 
system. According to studies carried out in Western countries, the claims 
process for workers’ compensation brings some additional negative outcomes 
for injured workers. It is therefore valuable to explore whether in the Chinese 
context the introduction of a similar workers’ compensation scheme will 
cause additional harm to Chinese workers. So far, in the Chinese environment, 
the imbalance between regions, strict limits on domestic migration, and the 
lack of independent trade unions has already created considerable difficulties 
for the operation of this new workers’ compensation system.  
1.5 Chinese seafarers and workers’ compensation system 
This thesis will focus on seafarers’ experiences of the current Chinese 
workers’ compensation system. The special characteristics of the seafaring 
occupation are the main reasons why the author has selected seafarers’ 
experiences in China to explore the Chinese workers’ compensation system. 
The features of the seafaring occupation include the following: (1) the 
seafaring occupation is well recognized as a traditional adventurous and 
hazardous occupation (Bailey, 2003; Alderton et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2007; 
Bloor, 2011; Jensen, 2009; Jensen et al., 2004; Hansen et al., 2002; Roberts 
et al., 2014); (2) the common employment form of the shipping industry is 
precarious and insecure (Dacanay and Walters, 2011; Walters and Bailey, 
2013; Sampson, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; Chen and Hao, 2012; Wang, 2009); 
(3) seamen’s workplaces are usually outside their home countries’ 
jurisdiction and their claims may be subject to multiple jurisdictions (Mensah, 
2004; Couper, 2005; Dimitrova and Blanpain, 2010). Accordingly, seafarers 
are employed in an occupation with a high risk of injuries, while complex 
jurisdiction renders seafarers and their dependants even more vulnerable 
while they are making their claims for occupational injuries and death.   
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China is the major supplier of seafarers to the global shipping market. 
According to statistics from the Ministry of Transport of China, by the end of 
2014, there were 638,990 seafarers and 470,512 of them were international 
seafarers. 168,478 seafarers were involved in coastal transport (Ministry of 
Transport of the People's Republic of China, 2016). Chinese seafarers are not 
only the main workforce for the Chinese domestic transport industry, they are 
also the main labour force in the global shipping industry.  
In China, the compensation system for seafarers’ workplace injuries has 
adopted a mixed mode. From 1992 to 2013, seafarers involved in foreign-
related transport were subject to the Specific Provisions for Trials on Foreign-
related Personal Injuries and Deaths at Sea. During this period, the seafarers’ 
compensation system was independent from labour law and exclusively 
subject to maritime jurisdiction and admiralty law. The Work-related Injury 
Insurance Regulation came into force in 2004 and is applicable to all workers 
in the Chinese territory. Meanwhile, the Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court of Issues Concerning the Application of Law for the Trial of 
Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury (2004)15 came into force in 2004, 
which confirms employers’ liability for non-fault based compensation to 
precarious and temporary workers. Between 1992 and 2013, China provided 
different compensation regimes for seafarers involved in domestic transport 
and international transport. For seafarers involved in domestic transport, the 
Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation was applicable, as mobile workers 
in China, they also confront regional discrimination as other migrant workers 
mentioned above in China (Li 2008). Furthermore, seafarers working on non-
Chinese flag vessels were not protected by the Chinese workers’ 
compensation system, unless the employers purchased Work-related Injury 
Insurance voluntarily, which was rare in practice (Wu 2008). Therefore, 
Chinese seafarers involved in foreign-related transport had to claim their 
compensation from the ship-owners, managers, or operators under tort law 
Compared with the workers’ compensation system, this process was more 
                                                 
15
 Hereinafter referred as Judicial Interpretation on Personal Injury Damages 
(2004), 
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time-consuming and complicated (Zhang 2011). From July 1st, 2011, the 
Maritime Safety Administration required that all seafarers dispatched to 
foreign vessels must be covered by Work-related Injury Insurance. On 
January 1st, 2013, the Specific Provisions for Trials on Foreign-related 
Personal Injuries and Deaths at Sea was abolished. Therefore, Chinese 
seafarers’ compensation is currently at a transitional stage having been 
excluded from the social security system and being slowly covered by the 
Work-related Injury Insurance.  
As Mensah points out (2004: vi) “the existence of international and national 
rules and regulations cannot, in and of itself, prevent serious maltreatment 
and abuse of seafarers.” This critique also applies to the Chinese workers’ 
compensation system for seafarers. According to the analysis above of the 
Chinese workers’ compensation system, it could be found that this protection 
on paper is difficult to be implemented to protect the migrant workers due to 
the regional budget planning of the WIIF. One characteristic of labour in the 
shipping industry is its nationwide or even worldwide mobility. Therefore, 
under this system, the question arises of whether injured seafarers would be 
able to claim compensation. Regarding the dispatching of ocean-going 
seafarers, although the Maritime Safety Administration has recently made 
efforts to protect international seafarers equally to general workers16, the 
enforcement effects are still in question. In the transitional stage, there are 
still a large number of injured seafarers who have to rely on tort law rules to 
claim damages. Inevitably, the claim process based on tort law is much more 
complicated than the process under the workers’ compensation system. 
Moreover, once foreign employers are involved, the duration of legal 
procedures is extended due to the special procedural rules for foreign-related 
lawsuits, such as compulsory notarization of certain evidence produced 
outside China.  
Due to the mobile and international nature of seafaring jobs, seafarers’ claims 
have particular characteristics. Firstly, seafarers’ workplaces are off shore, 
                                                 
16
 See the Rules of Dispatching Chinese Seafarers on non-Chinese Vessels 
(2011) 
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and usually outside their home countries’ jurisdiction. If the accidents occur 
overseas, the seafarers’ claims may be subject to foreign jurisdictions and 
legal systems (Black, 2000; Wu, 2008). Secondly, fragmented and flexible 
employment relationships may impede the stable and long-term participation 
of seafarers and shipowners in the workers’ compensation system, which may 
weaken the coverage of social security for seafarers (Quinlan and Mayhew, 
1999). Thirdly, the shipping labour market is highly globalised (Dimitrova 
and Blanpain, 2010). Shipowners 17  and employees are commonly from 
different countries. Under this situation, seafarers need to claim against a 
foreign company in their countries of origin or bring lawsuits abroad. These 
foreign-related matters lead to the additional complexity of seafarers’ claims, 
such as special maritime jurisdiction, lengthy legal proceedings, complicated 
private international legal issues and difficulties in executing judgement 
against a foreign company (Zhang, 2011). Compared to the general workforce 
in China, Chinese seafarers’ claims can be further complicated due to the 
foreign-relatedness of their jobs and employment relations.  
Summary  
This chapter has reviewed the high occupational risks at sea and illustrates 
the necessity and significance of researching the compensation systems for 
seafarers’ workplace injuries. Referring to the historical development of 
workers’ compensation, the author identifies two approaches in addressing 
workers’ claims: non-fault based compulsory workers’ compensation systems, 
including public insurance and private liability insurance, and fault-based tort 
liability damages regimes. By reviewing the practices of different countries 
at the various stages, it can be noticed that Workers’ compensation system is  
                                                 
17
 Shipowner means the owner of the ship or another organisation or person, 
such as the manager, operator, agent or charterer, who has assumed the 
responsibility for the operation of the ship from the owner and who, on 
assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over the duties and 
responsibilities imposed on shipowners (See the Maritime Labour 
Convention (2006) Art 2 (j) and the Convention on Limitation of Liability for 
Maritime Claims (1976). 
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a product of the industrial revolution, seeking to remedy the physical 
and financial suffering of workers injured in the course of their 
employment, to provide protection for employees from costly 
litigation with potentially survival-threatening outcomes, and to 
achieve an amelioration of societal instability that might result 
without a coherent approach to addressing these problems 
(Gunderson and Hyatt, 2000: 1).  
Workers’ compensation systems are not simple legal frameworks regulating 
the award of benefits to the victims of industrial accidents. They constitute a 
legislative confirmation of political policies seeking to stabilise and 
harmonise industrial relations and to reduce the social antagonism between 
capital and labour.  
The necessity and advantages of non-fault based Workers’ compensation 
systems in reducing the difficulties for workers’ claimants and harmonising 
industrial relations are proved at the regulatory level. As maritime workers, 
seafarers’ access to the non-fault based workers’ compensation systems and 
rights to obtain timely remedies should be secured. However, subject to 
special maritime jurisdiction and law, in some countries, seafarers are not able 
to enjoy parity with general workers. Meanwhile, workers from developing 
countries, such as Chinese seafarers, may be subject to newly established 
“transplanted” compensation system, with limited coverage for mobile 
workers. Transitional social, economic and regulatory factors may also create 
further uncertainties for workers’ claim results and affect workers’ rights 
following workplace accidents. As a group of precarious, mobile migrant18 
workers, whether seafarers’ rights can be well protected following workplace 
accidents is also a significant question to be considered by the international 
and Chinese societies nowadays.  
China is undergoing a transition from the planned economy regime to the 
market economy regime, and job security has decreased sharply. With a 
                                                 
18
 Migrant workers refer to both international seafarers and Chinese domestic 
seafarers working across provinces. 
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young labour market and newly introduced workers’ compensation regimes 
from the west, the performance of the legal transplant is still open to doubt. 
Furthermore, Chinese local sources may also influence the effectiveness of 
this system. Chinese workers may receive benefits from this legal transplant, 
or may suffer similar or different troubles and harm during a claim process, 
when compared with their western counterparts. Therefore, it is interesting 
and valuable to explore Chinese workers’ experiences of the relative western 
style workers’ compensation System to evaluate whether this transplant is 
helpful or harmful in solving the occupational injuries indemnity problems 
among the world’s largest population. 
This research chooses Chinese seafarers as its focus, in order to explore the 
above questions.  The first reason is that Chinese seafarers are involved in an 
insecure, temporary and precarious relationship with high mobile features off-
shore, which can make them even more vulnerable in the occupational 
injuries claims system. Secondly, the Chinese seafarers’ compensation 
system is a mixed model: combining the newly established social security 
system with the civil law system that was gradually developed from the early 
1990s. Through the literature review, it can be found that this mixed system 
is limited in many aspects, including in relation to the conflict between 
regional budgets and migrant workers, lack of protection for dispatching 
labour, and the difficulties in the application of complex legal rules; relatively 
time-consuming procedures on foreign-related work-related injuries, and the 
lack of adequate legal support from society. At the same time, this mixed 
mode could also provide the opportunity to compare civil legal indemnity and 
the social insurance protection. Under the internal and external difficulties, 
whether the seafarers suffer additional loss and damages during the claiming 
process is also a valuable issue worthy of examination. 
However, through reviewing the literature, few studies are found that focus 
on the compensation system for workplace injuries in the shipping industry. 
Regarding Chinese Workers’ Compensation system in the shipping industry, 
there are some studies conducted by Chinese scholars that focus on the issues 
of seafarers’ claims. However, most of them are based on legal doctrinal 
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analysis, rather than empirical studies of the workers’ experiences and real 
feelings about the compensation system and  claiming process (Guo and Ma, 
2002; Zhang, 2002a; Zhang and Chen, 2011; Chen et al., 2014). 
Therefore, this research aims to fill this gap, to explore seafarers’ experiences 
during the process of claiming work-related damages in China and to examine 
whether seafarers suffer additional harm during these procedures. The next 
chapter will review the studies on workers’ experiences of the claim process 
in different countries and present the theoretical frameworks of capital-labour 
conflict and therapeutic jurisprudence in analysing workers ‘experiences. 
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Chapter Two: Workers’ Experiences of 
Compensation Claims 
Introduction  
Chapter One reviewed high occupational risks associated with seafaring jobs, 
two approaches to addressing workers’ compensation claims, and the 
integration of non-fault based workers’ compensation systems into social 
security systems after World War II. It also discussed the development of 
workers’ compensation in China and its relationship to Chinese seafarers.   
The main research question for this thesis is whether Chinese seafarers suffer 
additional harm in pursuit of compensation for occupational injuries. This 
chapter constitutes the second part of the literature review, which describes 
the available empirical evidence of the additional harm that may be suffered 
by workers during the compensation claim process.  
Non-fault based workers’ compensation systems were introduced to ensure 
therapeutic effects for workers, timely payment of remedies, and to harmonise 
industrial relations. However, these systems are now subject to various 
challenges and pressures as a result of neo-liberalism privatisation and 
globalisation. Drawing on empirical studies of workers’ experiences, this 
chapter will discuss the potential difficulties and challenges faced by victims 
during the claim process.  
This Chapter firstly presents, the theoretical frameworks commonly drawn 
upon in analysing workers’ experiences: capital-labour conflict theory and 
therapeutic jurisprudence. Secondly, drawing on the existing literature, 
different types of anti-therapeutic effects, i.e. harmful effects, arising from 
compensation claim processes are identified. Thirdly, a research gap 
regarding maritime workers is identified, and the value and significance of 
this research are discussed. 
 
  
37 
 
2.1 The capital-labour conflict theory and therapeutic 
jurisprudence 
Regarding compensation for injury/death, the interests of workers/surviving 
families and employers differ: ‘injured workers’ interests lie in obtaining 
income security and rehabilitation, while employers’ interests lie with 
efficiency and lower costs for workers’ compensation overall’ (Quinlan et al., 
2010: 397). Workers’ compensation systems exempt victims’ heavy burden 
of proof which is present under the tort liability system and they provide 
relatively quick remedies for workers. However, a non-fault based 
compensation system is not a panacea to cure all harm suffered by workers 
arising from work-related accidents. There are still unresolved conflicts 
between capital and workers embedded in the compensation scheme.  
This classical antagonism is embedded both in the legislative and reform 
process of the workers’ compensation system and the application of the legal 
rules to actual incidents (Ison, 1986; Hyatt and Law, 2000; Lippel, 2003b). 
There is no doubt that capital and its agents impose considerable pressures on 
official budgets for workers compensation schemes to lessen the burden on 
commercial operations (Ison, 1986). Even their goals cannot be completely 
met in battles in congress or parliament, investors still have opportunities to 
seek other ‘ideal’ environment with fewer obligations to workers in the global 
market. However, both governments and workers are reluctant to see the 
flight of capital, which may cause recession and decrease employment 
(Gunderson, 2000b). Therefore, to promote the local economy, states are 
under pressure to provide ‘friendly’ commercial circumstances. As a result, 
injured workers’ interests may be sacrificed.  
In addition to political conflicts at the institutional level, the conflicts between 
workers, employers and the workers’ compensation systems at the 
enforcement level have also attracted significant interest (Quinlan et al., 2010; 
Lippel et al., 2007). Therapeutic jurisprudence has been applied to analyse 
workers’ experiences of compensation claim process. Therapeutic 
jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary approach to explore the effects of the law 
on physical and psychological wellbeing (Wexler, 1997; Slobogin, 1995; 
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Wexler and Winick, 1996). From the perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence, 
the design and reform of law should aim at minimising adverse effects and 
promote positive effects on human wellbeing (King et al., 2014). The law is 
concerned with ordering human behaviour and should avoid potential harm 
arising from the process of legal activities (Winick, 1997). In the area of 
workers’ compensation claims, the value of therapeutic jurisprudence is 
significant in promoting harmonised industrial relations. Through empirical 
research on workers’ experiences, Lippel (1999) illustrated the anti-
therapeutic consequences of workers’ compensation systems on workers in 
Canada. Drawing on the spirit of ‘should strive first to do no harm’, the anti-
therapeutic effects (additional harm) suffered by worker claimants during the 
compensation process have been identified as critical issue threatening the 
effectiveness of workers’ compensation systems.  
Workers’ compensation systems have been shown to have the potential to 
cause negative outcomes or even further harm to the workers’ rights and 
wellbeing (Kirsh and McKee, 2003; Lippel, 2007; MacEachen et al., 2010). 
Many workers report additional physical damage due to delays in treatment 
caused by the low efficiency of claim processes, mental pressures resulting 
from the distrust displayed by workers’ compensation authorities, employers’ 
lack of good will and misunderstandings from co-workers, friends and 
families. 
Research on workers’ compensation systems has concerned workers’ 
dissatisfaction with both the claim procedures and the final amounts awarded 
by workers’ compensation authorities. Storey (2008) found that the 
examination processes of the workers’ claims were not transparent enough 
and that the workers were not able to appeal the decision made by the Workers’ 
Compensation Board in Canada. If the workers’ claims were not recognised 
as qualified workers’ compensation claims, or the workers were not satisfied 
with the final amount awarded by the authority, the victims would not be able 
to appeal. This is partly because the Canadian workers’ compensation system 
prevents workers from suing employers under tort law; workers’ 
compensation has become the unique and final relief for damages suffered by 
  
39 
 
injured workers (Hyatt and Law 2000). If injured workers cannot obtain 
compensation under this social security system, it is highly probable that they 
will have to suffer the total loss on their own. Although injured workers could 
be treated under the Canadian national health system, in the absence of a right 
to appeal, injured workers may be unable to receive the compensation that 
they are entitled to.  
Researchers also identified the ways in which injured workers were 
stigmatised as “malingers” and “welfare cheats”, thereby creating great 
mental distress for injured workers (Storey, 2008; Kirsh et al., 2012). This 
kind of systematic injustice resulted in a demonstration of around 3000 
workers before the Ontario Legislature’s Standing Committee on Resources 
Development in Toronto in 1983 (Storey 2008). As Storey (2008) argues, 
workers are no longer suffering injustice individually, but successfully 
transforming their private problems into public issues of the entire society 
(Mills, 2000; Storey, 2008).  
Various features of workers’ compensation systems result in worker 
dissatisfaction. The first one is rooted in the original purpose of these systems, 
which was not to provide complete and adequate damages for injured workers, 
but only to lessen their loss to some extent (Cane and Atiyah, 2006). The 
second reason is that the imbalance of power between the public authority of 
the workers’ compensation system and the individual claimants prevents 
workers from grasping the exact process of their claims, which causes them 
to mistrust the procedures under the workers’ compensation system (Kirsh 
and McKee, 2003; Kirsh et al., 2012; Storey, 2008). Thirdly, influenced by 
economic recessions from the 1970s, the government has become stricter in 
scrutinising workers’ claims to control the public budget, which makes it even 
harder for workers to acquire benefits under this system (Gunderson and 
Hyatt, 2000).  
The conflicts between labour and capital has direct and profound influences 
on workers’ experiences and feelings. For employers, claim management can 
be used to reduce the number and cost of workers’ compensation claims, and 
research has shown that low-wage firms are more likely to cut costs through 
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more aggressive claim management (Thomason and Pozzebon, 2002). The 
pressures, suppression and assaults from the employers’ claim management 
are significant sources of additional harm for workers during the 
compensation claim process. In Lippel’s research (2003b) conducted in 
Canada, employers used private surveillance against injured employees to 
collect evidence secretly to defend against claims for occupational injury 
compensation. The Compensation Boards in some provinces not only permit 
the evidence collected by employers through illegal and secret surveillance, 
but the authorities themselves also employ private detectives to gather 
evidence which is used to reject workers’ claims. This private surveillance is 
a violation of the basic human rights of injured workers and imposes huge 
psychological pressures on injured workers. Also, for fear of being recorded, 
injured workers have to restrict themselves at home and refrain from almost 
all activities, which is detrimental to their physical recovery (Lippel, 2003b). 
In Australia, Roberts-Yates (2003) found that workers felt stigmatised and 
blamed if they had registered occupational injuries with WorkCover, the 
Australian workers’ compensation scheme. Employees felt they were 
regarded by the employers as welfare cheaters, especially when injuries were 
invisible. With records of claiming occupational injuries, workers suffer 
discrimination when they are trying to find new jobs in the labour market 
(Purse, 2000). In the view of employers, claiming compensation for 
occupational injuries is regarded as a kind of ‘criminal record’ for job hunters. 
That sort of discrimination hinders workers’ rehabilitation and extends the 
length of their unemployment, which also increases the possibility of losing 
self-esteem and the substantial deterioration of living standards for injured 
workers (Purse 2000). 
After more than a century of development in the Western World, the workers’ 
compensation system still falls short of honouring initial commitments to 
provide effective and efficient benefits to vulnerable injured workers. 
However, this development is still subject to capital-labour conflict.  
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2.2 Workers’ claim process and secondary harm: the 
experiences of surviving families and injured workers 
Workers’ compensation systems and tort liability systems provide legal 
approaches for workers to claim damages and obtain remedies either from 
social security funds or from employers to attenuate the harm arising from 
industrial accidents, including physical damage, financial loss, and 
psychological distress (Lewis, 1987; Burton, 1988; Lippel, 1989; Butler, 
2002; Oliphant and Wagner, 2012). Some harm is the direct or indirect result 
of injuries, and should be compensated, at least to some extent, by the workers’ 
compensation system or the tort liability system. On the other hand, according 
to various studies conducted within the last two decades, secondary harm 
and/or additional damages occur to victims during the compensation claim 
process (Rosenman et al., 2000; Kirsh and McKee, 2003; Kirsh et al., 2012; 
Lippel, 2007; MacEachen et al., 2010; Matthews et al., 2012). The secondary 
harm refers to additional negative outcomes occurring to worker claimants 
during the compensation process. It includes further physical damage 
following the delay of treatment caused by obstacles existing in the claims 
process. The secondary harm can also be triggered by mental and 
psychological suffering originating from the distrust displayed by the workers’ 
compensation authority, employers lack of good will, misunderstandings with 
co-workers, friends and families as well as potential future discrimination 
from the labour market (Lippel et al., 2007).  
Compensation claims arise from workplace injuries and fatalities. However, 
due to the different identities of claimants, experiences can be quite different 
(Lippel, 2007; Matthews et al., 2012). In the next section, the literature 
regarding surviving families’ experiences is reviewed, and injured workers’ 
experiences are discussed.  
2.2.1 Surviving families 
Following workplace fatalities, surviving families are shown to be subject to 
secondary harm. The majority of the literature on traumatic bereavement 
address suicide, homicide and mass fatalities caused by war or terrorism. Few 
studies address work-related deaths directly (Matthews et al., 2012). A very 
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recent study regarding surviving families’ experiences was conducted by a 
group of Australian scholars (Matthews et al., 2012; Matthews et al., 2014; 
Matthews et al., 2016; Quinlan et al., 2015). Their findings firstly indicate 
that traumatic workplace death can cause negative impacts on the health, 
social and financial lives of surviving families. The health consequences 
include symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, and 
complicated grief and sorrow. Behavioural problems, such as drug and 
alcohol use, are also identified. The social consequences are complicated, 
including learning to seek social support, adapting to social role change, for 
example, and parental role shifts. The financial consequences include 
immediate earnings loss, difficulties in accessing workers’ compensation, and 
long-term pressure in maintaining mortgages (Matthews et al., 2012).     
Matthew et al (2012) argue that costs associated with claims for compensation 
are mostly ignored by policy makers. In a study which explored Australian 
institutional responses to traumatic death at work, Matthew et al (2014) found 
that after accidents occurred, the families were not able to obtain adequate 
timely information regarding accident investigation, and that available social 
support is limited. The staff of the Australian authority identified themselves 
as ‘regulators or enforcers, and not counsellors’, so they did not regard 
assisting surviving families as part of their job. These studies highlight the 
tensions that exist between surviving families’ needs and institutional 
responses (Matthews et al., 2016; Quinlan et al., 2015; Matthews et al., 2014).  
A further problem for families is identified by Quinlan et al. (2015) who 
highlight the frustration of surviving families of deceased precarious workers. 
Self-employed workers are excluded from non-fault based workers’ 
compensation systems, which imposes a significant burden on their surviving 
families. Quinlan et al. (2015) point out the huge procedural difficulties for 
surviving families in pursuing compensation using common law litigation, 
especially when surviving families’ rights to information is not respected.  
In some cases researchers have found that the long process of coronial 
investigation increases the financial difficulties and hardship for surviving 
families who are not eligible for non-fault based workers’ compensation and 
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need coronial findings to claim alternative financial remedies from 
superannuation or life insurance companies (Matthews et al., 2016) 
This accumulative body of evidence suggests that in addition to the direct 
earning loss arising from the fatality of a worker, social, financial and legal 
challenges exacerbate the loss and harm that families suffer following 
workplace accidents. The lack of information and institutional support 
prolongs grief and exacerbates mental pressures and financial difficulties.  
2.2.2 Injured workers 
Ineffective interactions between workers and the system 
Many claimants have reported the low efficacy of their interaction with 
compensation systems (Strunin and Boden, 2004). MacEachen et al. (2006) 
argue that the implied assumption underlying workers’ compensation 
procedural rules is that injured workers can understand legal statutes and 
follow legal procedures without difficulties. However, in practice, many 
workers cannot manage the claims on their own. For example, a qualitative 
study conducted in Wisconsin and Florida showed that claimants met two 
extreme situations, either not receiving any information about their claims or 
being provided with vast amounts of information which was beyond their 
understanding (Strunin and Boden 2004). Either scenario may negatively 
affect claim outcomes.  
In addition, claim evaluations are not transparent enough in the view of 
claimants. The function of the administrative examination of the 
compensation claims is to assess eligibility, and evaluate the amounts to be 
awarded. However, authorities in charge of workers’ compensation usually 
approve or reject claimant applications and decide on awards relying solely 
on the paperwork submitted by applicants. However, some injured workers 
complain the communication through paper instructions, telephone and letters 
is highly constrained, limiting opportunities to explain their situation fully 
(MacEachen et al. 2010). The inadequacy of communication causes 
unnecessary worries and psychological pressures for the injured workers. 
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Another problem for workers is the time taken to assess claims. 
Compensation claim assessments usually depend on medical decisions made 
by doctors, which are complicated and/or indeterminate (MacEachen et al. 
2010). Therefore, the examination process can be prolonged. Sometimes 
delays in making compensation decisions also relate to bureaucracy 
(MacEachen et al. 2010). In the views of many authorities, these problems 
cannot be avoided. However, for injured workers, procedural delays cause 
enormous financial pressures. In such cases, delays in justice may well end 
up as justice denied. 
Stigmatisation 
Moffatt (1999) argues that neo-liberal policies have stigmatised social 
welfare beneficiaries and have led public institutions to view them as ‘welfare 
cheats’. This argument may be a little over-stated, since the stigmatisation of 
a particular group of people is usually caused by various factors, such as a 
pre-existing social preconception. Nevertheless, neo-liberal policies indeed 
intensify the conflict between labour and capital (Lippel, 2003b), and as a 
consequence, injured workers who have received benefits may be stigmatised 
by employers and government agencies in some countries. This harms the 
self-esteem of injured workers, and may also produce further physical harm 
to injured workers (Lippel 2007). For example, due to the fear of surveillance, 
which is used by employers to record and challenge the degree of disability, 
injured workers have been found to restrict their activities, which physically 
inhibits their recovery and rehabilitation (Lippel et al., 2007; Lippel, 2003b). 
According to studies carried out in Ontario, Canada, around one-third of 
injured workers surveyed had a sensation of being punished during claim 
processes and among litigants, around half of them had the sensation of being 
punished (Kirsh and McKee, 2003). In another study conducted in Quebec, it 
was found that even workers who acquired compensation without argument 
felt they were being “treated like a criminal” or were uncomfortable with the 
imbalance of power in front of Workers’ Compensation Boards and also 
employers (Lippel, 2007). These experiences of being stigmatised have been 
reported in Australia and the United States (Roberts-Yates, 2003; Strunin and 
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Boden, 2004; Sager and James, 2005). Workers’ compensation claimants are 
sometimes described as ‘welfare cheats’ or ‘opportunists’, especially when 
work-related injuries are not obviously visible (Lippel, 2007; Lippel et al., 
2007; Lippel, 2003b).  
Discrimination 
Discrimination issues are crucial in the compensation claim process for 
injured workers (Guthrie and Quinlan, 2005; Lippel, 2003a; Storey, 2008). 
Forms of discrimination vary and are reported to include discrimination on 
the grounds of gender, ethnicity and nationality. Female claimants are not 
treated as equal to male applicants, for they are not regarded as the traditional 
main breadwinners (Lippel 2003a). Immigrant workers are not considered as 
equal to native applicants. For example, there was a blatantly implausible 
theory created by a Canadian doctor that Italian immigrants sustained injuries 
because Mediterranean people had weak backs (Storey 2008). Due to 
language and cultural barriers, immigrants usually cannot obtain effective 
access to the workers’ compensation systems (Storey, 2008; Premji et al., 
2010). It is also harder for precarious workers to be fairly treated during the 
compensation claim process, and blacks and non-union workers’ claims are 
more likely to be contested or rejected (Quinlan et al., 2015; Underhill et al., 
2011; Quinlan and Mayhew, 1999). 
A more common problem for all workers with compensation claim records is 
when they try to re-enter the labour market they find that many employers are 
not willing to hire a worker’s compensation claimant (Purse, 2000). This form 
of discrimination presents a significant obstacle to rehabilitation, which may 
also enlarge the loss suffered by injured workers. 
The vulnerability of precarious workers 
Deregulating the labour market and reducing the burden of labour welfare 
systems on enterprises are typically neo-liberal strategies for governments to 
promote domestic economies and to attract investment. In line with such 
strategies, traditional post-war ‘standard’ forms of employment in the western 
world have declined (Felstead and Jewson, 1999; Fudge, 2012; Underhill et 
al., 2011; Gottfried, 2009; Quinlan and Mayhew, 1999). Term contracts, 
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temporary jobs, agency jobs and self-employment have become the major 
features of the ‘new world of work’ (Gunderson, 2000b). In most developing 
countries, flexible employment relationships widely exist in the workplace 
and employers may lack occupational health and safety protection (Quinlan, 
1999). Many studies have indicated that those in precarious forms of 
employment experience adverse outcomes in relation to occupational health 
and safety measures (Quinlan and Mayhew 1999; Gottfried 2009). Workers’ 
compensation systems are not exempt from the impact of flexible trends in 
the labour market. This is because the growth of precarious labour has also 
brought new forms of employment beyond the original coverage of workers’ 
compensation systems, and the flexible nature of employment has also 
increased the difficulties of administrative supervision (Quinlan and Mayhew, 
1999). 
Precarious forms of employment, especially in agency work, have created 
blind spots for the traditional workers’ compensation administration. 
Research carried out in Sweden indicates that apparent improved 
performance in avoiding work-related injuries in the mining sector is actually 
the result of outsourcing strategies adopted by employers (Blank et al., 1995). 
Precarious employment helps to hide the real cost of occupational injuries and 
illness in some developed countries, which aids industry in avoiding paying 
the contribution they should make to the workers’ compensation system 
(Purse, 1998). This imposes a heavier burden on taxpayers and employees. 
According to a study carried out in Australia (Quinlan and Mayhew 1999), 
the growth in precarious employment restricts the Workers’ Compensation 
Systems’ coverage. For multi-job holders, it is difficult to identify which 
employer should be obligated to purchase occupational injuries insurance. For 
self-employed workers, the research shows they are more reliant on their own 
resources, including private insurance and public medical care (Quinlan and 
Mayhew 1999). According to this research, a high number of workers are not 
aware of their rights under the Workers’ Compensation Schemes and do not 
exercise on their rights. Once work-related injuries occur, precarious workers 
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are more willing to seek help from public health services and other social 
security systems (Quinlan and Mayhew 1999). 
In deregulated labour markets, precarious forms of employment have assisted 
employers in avoiding liabilities under workers’ compensation systems. 
Furthermore, workers involved in precarious employment are usually 
confused about their legal rights and become unwilling to claim their rights 
for industrial injuries benefits, while they tend to rely more on their own 
resources (Quinlan and Mayhew 1999). In terms of workers in advanced 
industrialised countries, public health services and other social security 
systems may bear the brunt of the costs of industrial accidents. Although it 
may be regarded as unfair to require the taxpayers to bear this burden, workers 
in these countries can at least obtain access to health care of a reasonable 
standard. However, for precarious workers in developing countries without 
comprehensive health care systems, the victims of industrial accidents are 
more vulnerable (Zhao, 2005; Mao and Zhang, 2007; Sun and Liu, 2014). 
This is because injured workers in these countries may not be able to afford 
the expense of medical services. 
According to the above discussion of extra harm experienced by workers 
during the process of compensation claims, it can be found that the origins of 
the harm are diversified (Lippel et al., 2007; Matthews et al., 2012; 
MacEachen et al., 2006). Influenced by neo-liberal policies, including 
privatisation reforms, it is argued that the adversarial features of the 
relationship between capital and labour are apparent in Workers’ 
Compensation Systems (Arthurs, 1996). In Canada, employers are not willing 
to provide assistance for employees’ application for occupational injuries 
benefits, and even create obstacles for injured workers (Lippel, 2003b). 
Considering the global economic situation and domestic cost-efficiency 
concerns, governments are reluctant to improve the benefits standards of 
workers’ compensation for fear of capital flight. Workers’ compensation 
authorities are also becoming stricter when scrutinising workers’ claims, 
which makes the injured workers’ situation even worse (Gunderson, 2000; 
Gunderson and Hyatt, 2000). The weakness of labour is also an important 
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factor contributing to a situation where workers suffer additional harm. 
Workers’ lack of legal knowledge and misunderstandings of legal procedures 
result in them becoming passive in the claims process (Kirsh and McKee 
2003). 
2.3 Chinese workers’ experiences of claim processes 
The establishment of public insurance for occupational injuries is new and 
still at an experimental stage in China. The victims of industrial accidents are 
no longer protected by the workers’ welfare regime of the planned economy 
era. This trial can be regarded as the “transplant” of Western models of 
workers’ compensation systems into the Chinese environment (Cooney, 2007; 
Cooney et al., 2002). As discussed above (see 1.2.3 and 1.2.4), the 
effectiveness of workers’ compensation systems in western countries seems 
unsatisfactory and in some circumstances, these systems create additional 
harm for workers. This raises questions about the institutional transplant of 
Western workers’ compensation Systems to China, and its widely 
effectiveness. 
Different political environments between countries may influence the actual 
outcome of institutional transplant. Political differences include ideological 
orientations, power distributions between institutions, and the relationship 
between power and other organized interests (Kahn-Freund, 1974). In these 
three aspects, China is different from western states. Although China 
currently adopts a market-oriented economic regime, it is still a totalitarian 
state. The power distribution between legislative power, judicial power and 
administrative power in China is divergent from the western check and 
balance structure (Diamant et al., 2005; Trevaskes et al., 2014). In China, the 
Chinese Communist Party is the actual leader of the country controlling the 
powers of legislation, jurisdiction and administration. Also, there is no 
judicial independence in a real sense in China, which means judicial 
departments can hardly act as supervisors for the administrative departments 
(Zhang, 2002b). Regarding the relationship between power and other 
organised interests in workers’ compensation systems, trade unions are the 
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principal organised interests. However, there are no autonomous trade unions 
independently representing labour’s interests in China (Chen, 2003). 
In addition, the Chinese household registration regime and the traditional 
perspectives towards risks may also restrict the performance of the “transplant” 
of work-related injury insurance (Zhao, 2005; Luo, 2006; Li, 2008). Due to 
the household registration regime, migrant workers usually cannot be 
recognised as residents in the cities of their workplaces and therefore cannot 
be covered by local social security schemes. While the occupational injury 
insurance fund is operated at the provincial level, local governments have not 
previously been willing to include migrant workers into insurance schemes 
(Li 2008). Currently, some provinces try to provide Work-related Injury 
Insurances to migrant workers, but the enterprises have become unsatisfied 
with this policy and avoid paying the tariff by providing false human resource 
information (Luo 2006). This phenomenon reflects attitudes amongst some 
employers towards risk in China. From the perspective of some companies, 
work-related injury tariffs are an actual cost of the business, while 
compensation payments for workers’ injuries may never be realised. 
Companies like to believe that workplace accidents will not occur and they 
act accordingly (Luo 2006). For workers, although they are exempt from 
payment for occupational injuries insurance, in practice, some employers may 
deduct the tariff they should pay from the workers’ salaries (Luo 2006). This 
makes workers dissatisfied with the government arrangements.  
According to research in Guangdong, migrant workers are not usually 
concerned about the Work-related Injury Insurance; they are more eager to 
earn certain amounts of money, and then return home to rural areas, and they 
regard their farmlands as their security protection (Zhao 2005). In an in-depth 
empirical study of migrant workers19’ claim process, Sun and Liu (2014) 
found that instead of making formal claims based on the Work-related Injury 
Insurance Regulation, most injured workers adopted informal claim 
approaches, including bargaining, negotiation, threats and violence, to 
                                                 
19
 Chinese migrant workers refers to rural residents who work in urban areas.  
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achieve compensation from employers. Their study revealed that only 21.8% 
of migrant workers were legally covered by workers’ compensation insurance. 
Following workplace injuries, many migrant workers chose to return to rural 
hometowns and continued self-medication. This is first because Chinese 
hospitals offer little daily care, there is no catering service for patients and 
only in their hometowns, can injured migrant workers have their family 
members take care of them. Secondly, migrant workers have to pay for 
medical treatment upfront, and most of them cannot afford the medical costs 
in the cities. In the compensation claim process, migrant workers’ status is 
entirely passive, considering all the insurance information is controlled by 
employers. In this situation, employers can conceal accidents and prevent 
workers from claiming compensation. Even if injured insured workers are 
aware of their legal rights, employers may aggressively suppress claims 
through bribing medical staff to delay the release of medical documents and 
also control the labour contracts and other relevant evidence that is necessary 
to establish workers’ claims. Sun and Liu (2014: 905) criticised the Chinese 
Work-related Injury Insurance system as being an “ornamental institution”, 
and suggested migrant workers seldom obtain compensation through formal 
claims. Many Chinese workers have to claim compensation through informal 
approaches such as bargaining with their employers, and payments can be 
delayed, may be significantly less than their entitlement or even denied. 
Workers’ compensation systems have existed for more than one hundred 
years in Western countries, and there have been many studies conducted 
examining the strengths and weakness of these systems and the relevant 
workers’ experiences of these systems (Purse 2000; Roberts-Yates 2003; 
Lippel 2007). Compared with the studies in western countries, the scale of 
studies focusing on Chinese labour issues seems to be far smaller (Luo 2006; 
Mao and Zhang 2007; Wu 2008). In terms of Chinese workers’ experiences 
of Chinese Workers’ Compensation Systems, the studies are even more 
limited (Sun and Liu, 2014). However, the transplant of Western Workers’ 
Compensation Schemes into China has significantly influenced the largest 
amount of workers in the world. Also, due to the social, political, economic, 
geographical and cultural background of western countries, Chinese workers’ 
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experiences of the Workers’ Compensation Systems are probably different 
from their counterparts in advanced industrialised nations. Chinese workers 
may suffer similar or different troubles and harm during the claim process for 
occupational injuries benefits. Therefore, it is necessary and important to 
explore Chinese workers’ understandings and experiences of the relatively 
newly-introduced western style Workers’ Compensation Systems. 
2.4 Chinese seafarers: vulnerable migrant workers  
2.4.1 The employment relation reform in the shipping industry 
Before the enterprise reforms in the late 1980s, Chinese seafarers were 
permanently employed by shipping companies and were assigned to certain 
ships to carry out tasks (Zhao and Amante, 2005). Under the impact of 
market-oriented economic reforms, the employment basis for seafarers has 
become more varied. Traditional permanent forms of employment (iron rice 
bowl) have gradually decreased with the retirements of ‘old seafarers’ and the 
employment relationships for ‘new seafarers’ have become fixed-term, agent 
employed and free-lance (Wu and Beaverstock, 2013; Zhao, 2011; Wu, 2008; 
Zhao and Amante, 2005; Wu, 2004). Wu et al (2006: 36) divides Chinese 
seafarers into three types: state-owned enterprise employed seafarers, agency 
employed seafarers and “freemen”. The latter two categories represent the 
major proportion of Chinese seafarers as the result of both competition in the 
global labour market and freight market and domestic economic 
transformation (Wu, 2008; Wu et al., 2006; Wu and Morris, 2006) . 
According to a survey conducted by Chen et al. (2015), only 54.08% of 
Chinese seafarers have long-term employment contracts, and employers are 
inclined to recruit seafarers on voyage based labour contracts. Another 
tendency is for lower rank seafarers to be hired on voyage-based temporary 
contracts. The survey shows that 68.01% of officers have long-term labour 
contracts while only 43.91% of ratings have long term contracts. The survey 
also shows that 54.91% of seafarers’ labour disputes are with their crew 
agencies.  
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Agency work relations usually create difficulties in Occupational Health and 
Safety regulation, such as (1) the overlapping responsibilities between 
agencies and principal employers cause confusion for the employees and 
make blame-shifting easier between two parties; (2) under pressure of 
litigation or prosecution, small agencies will probably close down and escape 
from liabilities (Johnstone and Quinlan 2006). 
In China, these weaknesses are evident during seafarers claim process for 
work-related injuries. Only 41.55% seafarers are covered with Work-related 
Injury Insurance (Chen et al 2015). Although the Labour Contract Law (2008) 
provides that under agency employment relationships, both agencies and 
principal employers should bear joint liability for workers’ compensation in 
practice, once seafarers are injured, agencies usually deny their liabilities and 
assert that they are not capable of providing the compensation (Wang, 1995; 
Zhang, 2011; Chen et al., 2014). This fragmented employment relationship 
makes it difficult for seafarers and surviving families identify the responsible 
parties following workplace accidents. 
2.4.2 Vulnerable migrant workers  
Fifty-eight percent of seafarers are not covered by the Work-related Injury 
Insurance of the social security system (Chen et al 2015, Wu 2008). In terms 
of work-related injuries, being excluded from Work-related Injury Insurance 
schemes means seafarers may have to collect evidence to prove the employers’ 
negligence, file tort litigations in court, and wait for an extended period of 
time for a civil decision. Even when seafarers are awarded the judgement in 
their favour, if employers do not make payments accordingly, another set of 
complicated procedures of enforcement need to be initiated. This can be 
extremely challenging and time consuming for seafarers. 
For seafarers employed by state-owned enterprises, employers may help them 
purchase social insurance, while for the agency-employed seafarers and 
freemen, the situations are entirely different (Wu, 2008). Regarding the 
seafarers serving on foreign vessels owned by foreign shipping companies, 
there are certain barriers to the direct application of the Labour Contract Law 
(2008) and the Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2003 and 2011). 
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Although governments require agencies to arrange Work-related Injury 
Insurance and purchase Chinese private life insurance for seafarers in these 
situations,20 Chen et al (2014) shows that 58.45% seafarers are not covered 
by the Work-related Injury Insurance, and 45% seafarers are not covered by 
Chinese private life insurance purchased by agencies. Accordingly, there are 
a significant number of seafarers who are not covered by Chinese social 
security insurance or private life insurance. Once workplace accidents occur, 
many Chinese seafarers have to claim their compensation either through 
negotiation with employers or bringing tort, and/or foreign-related litigation.  
Wu (2008) attributes seafarers’ vulnerability to the Chinese two-tier labour 
market, which artificially creates different treatments between national and 
foreign sectors. Due to the prohibition of foreign companies’ direct 
employment in mainland China, agencies have become another exploiter of 
Chinese “exported” seafarers. However, this explanation may not be entirely 
persuasive. Even if the two sectors were unified, transnational seafarers’ 
employment relationships might still be difficult to be regulated in China. An 
alternative solution to this problem is to provide specific regulations for 
dispatched seafarers’ workplace injury compensation (Zhang and Chen, 2011; 
Zhang, 2002a). 
2.4.3 Ill-protected claimants in civil procedures 
For seafarers involved in the domestic shipping trade, although there are 
certain practical obstacles for them to be covered by the Work-related Injury 
Insurance (see 1.4.3 on page 27), their legal entitlements are relatively clear. 
However, for the dispatching seafarers 21 , especially “freelancers”, the 
situation is more ambiguous. This employment relationship is not fully 
covered by the Chinese domestic social security regime, and the legal 
                                                 
20
 See  the Rules of dispatching Chinese seafarers on non-Chinese Vessels 
(2011) 
21
 Dispatching seafarers refer to Chinese seafarers involved in the 
international trade line and who serve on foreign vessels. 
  
54 
 
frameworks fail to ascertain alternative non-fault based remedies in China 
(Zhang, 2011). 
The lack of legal rules makes the judges uncertain about judicial decisions in 
relation to the claims of dispatching seafarers (Zhang 2011). According to the 
civil principle of fairness22, seafarers suffer pain from work-related injuries 
and should be compensated; however, without clear legal instruments, 
Chinese judges are not entitled to make decisions purely at their own 
discretion (Chen and Xu, 2012). As a result, judges will often prefer to 
mediate the dispute between the seafarers, agents and the employers23, and 
encourage them to reach an agreement. In the context of this judicial 
mediation culture, seafarers may be persuaded by judges to reduce certain 
compensation claims to achieve a settlement, which may have long-term 
adverse effects on workers’ rights. In addition, judicial mediation may not be 
regarded as voluntary and in some cases workers accept mediation because 
they have no other choice (Chen and Xu, 2012). Moreover, the foreign-related 
factors make the judicial proceedings more complex, since more procedural 
requirements, such notarization of evidence collected overseas, become 
compulsory24. Furthermore, in China, lawyers usually are not often willing to 
represent workers in labour disputes, for the capability of workers to pay legal 
fees is in doubt (Michelson, 2006).  
Through reviewing the current literature, it could be concluded that, 
compared to other groups of industrial workers, Chinese seafarers have to 
face more challenges when they claim work-related injury damages due to 
the following: (1) difficulties in identifying liable employers due to the 
fragmented employment relationships; (2) the low coverage of the non-fault 
based Work-related Injury Insurance and private insurance; (3) 
disempowerment caused by the lack of explicit legal instruments, the judicial 
medication culture and the lack of legal assistance in the civil procedures  
                                                 
22
 See the General Principles of Civil Law (1986) Art. 4 
23
 In maritime litigation, the liability insurers of employers (shipowners), P&I 
Clubs, usually provide legal representative service for the employers. 
24
 See the Civil Procedures (2012) 
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Although the current literature has presented these problems at the regulatory 
level, few empirical studies have been found of Chinese seafarers’ 
experiences of work-related injuries compensation claims and it is this that I 
wish to focus upon in this thesis. 
Summary 
The first part of the literature review (Chapter one) discussed high 
occupational hazards in the shipping industry and emphasised the importance 
of compensation systems for seafarers’ rights’ protection. It presented the 
origin and development of the non-fault based workers’ compensation 
systems, and discussed the advantages of workers’ compensation systems in 
remedying workers’ loss and harmonising industrial relations; and the 
challenges faced by the Workers’ Compensation Systems from globalisation 
and neo-liberalism reform.   
The second part of the literature review (Chapter Two) discussed workers’ 
experiences of compensation claims following workplace accidents. Workers’ 
compensation systems were firstly launched in western countries, and then 
widely adopted in many countries around the world. Empirical studies 
drawing on workers’ experiences to assess the effectiveness of these systems 
in western countries are abundant. From a theoretical perspective, there are 
two well-established theoretical frameworks: the capital-labour conflict 
theory and therapeutic jurisprudence, which are widely used to assess the 
effectiveness of the compensation systems. Current studies have provided 
empirical evidence showing that in Western industrialised countries, workers 
suffer various additional harm physically, financially, and psychologically, 
due to the conflict between capital and labour, and the deficiencies of the 
Workers’ Compensation systems.  
However, similar empirical studies regarding the “transplant” of Workers’ 
Compensation systems to developing countries are far more limited. Most 
existing studies focus on land-based workers. Mobile transport workers, 
especially seafarers are largely ignored. A significant research gap exists and 
empirical studies regarding workplace injury compensation claims in 
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developing countries and workers from the shipping industry are largely 
missing from the current research landscape. To fill this research gap, this 
research selects Chinese seafarers’ experiences of workplace injury 
compensation claims to explore the research question of whether Chinese 
seafarers or surviving families have suffered additional harm in the 
compensation claim process following workplace accidents. 
To study Chinese’ seafarers’ compensation claims experiences will firstly 
contribute to the empirical knowledge about the effectiveness of the 
compensation systems in China according to therapeutic jurisprudence. 
Secondly, exploring seafarers’ interactions with employers can add to the 
knowledge of capital – labour conflict in the global/Chinese local shipping 
industry. Thirdly, through examining the challenges faced by Chinese 
seafarers in seeking remedies from public institutions, potential deficiencies 
of Chinese government can be identified.    
In this research, a qualitative approach is adopted to explore Chinese seafarers’ 
experiences of compensation claims. The reason why the author adopts a 
qualitative approach to explore these issues is based on the consideration of 
the nature and aim of this research which constitutes an exploratory empirical 
study of claimants’ experiences. The qualitative interview research strategy 
is appropriate for this research, allowing the researcher to explore the 
behaviours, communication and interaction between different actors by 
observing, inquiring and listening carefully to the people involved in these 
issues (Rubin and Rubin 2005 :2). The research design of this study will be 
presented in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Three: Research Design and 
Methods 
Introduction 
The aim of this research is to explore and understand the claim experiences 
of Chinese seafarers and their families following workplace accidents at sea. 
The research question of this thesis is whether Chinese seafarers and 
surviving families suffer additional harm during compensation processes. 
There are three interrelated factors which need to be considered in addressing 
this question: the legal entitlements and rights available to victims, the 
management policies and practices of companies and the experiences of claim 
activities by seafarers and surviving families.    
To fill the research gap on Chinese maritime workers’ compensation claim 
experiences and to address the research question effectively, it is crucial to 
select and apply an appropriate methodological approach. In this Chapter, I 
will present the research design of this study.  
3.1 Research Design 
3.1.1 Research methods adopted in previous studies 
Previous studies have tended to address workers’ compensation claims from 
two perspectives: a legal doctrinal and historical analysis and the empirical 
analysis of claimants’ experiences (Van Hoecke, 2011). From the legal 
doctrinal perspective, scholars examine the structures of compensation 
system and legal entitlements and rights of workers (Burton, 1988; Clayton, 
1997; Butler, 2002; Dimitrova and Blanpain, 2010; Oliphant and Wagner, 
2012; Lippel and Lötters, 2013; Quinlan et al., 2010) In terms of empirical 
work, researchers have usually explored the experiences of workers and have 
identified the negative and harmful outcomes of compensation systems 
(Lippel et al., 2007; Quinlan et al., 2015; Purse, 2000; Roberts-Yates, 2003; 
Sun and Zhu, 2009; Matthews et al., 2012).  
Legal doctrinal research is concerned with the formulation of legal ‘doctrines’ 
through the analysis of legal rules, and through collecting normative and 
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authoritative sources25 to build up a system of legal findings and theories 
(Chynoweth, 2008; Van Hoecke, 2011). One example is Clayton (1997): 
through comparing and analysing historical and contemporary legal sources 
from jurisdictions including England, Germany, Australia and the United 
States, he develops four models of Workers’ Compensation Funds: state fund, 
self-insurance, co-operative fund and private insurance. Through further legal 
analysis, Clayton identifies the lack of inherent connection between the social 
insurance law and occupational health and safety law in the private insurance 
model, and then he argues this model of legislation is deficient in respect to 
injury prevention. Another example is an edited work by Oliphant and 
Wagener (2012): drawing on the legal sources from 13 states regarding the 
scopes, funding systems, administration and adjudication of claims and 
employers’ liabilities, they criticise the two-layer model of workers’ 
compensation and tort liability system as it imposes a double burden of 
administrative costs on society. On the contrary, drawing on Canadian legal 
sources, Hyatt and Law (2000) argues that the workers’ compensation one-
layer only system needs to be reformed to ensure and expand workers’ rights 
to initiate tort actions. Legal doctrinal research usually addresses debates 
regarding weaknesses and strengths of a compensation system from a 
systematic perspective drawing on legal sources rather than empirical data 
based on participants’ experiences. 
Empirical studies of workers’ claim experiences contribute to a critical 
sociological analysis of the effects of compensation systems in several 
developed countries. Lippel et al. (2007) conducted six collective interviews 
with injured workers’ representatives and 85 individual interviews in Quebec 
and identified that additional harm occurred during the compensation system 
to workers’ physical and mental health. This research also explored factors 
contributing to the harm, such as employers’ surveillance and stigmatisation 
of welfare claimants and immigration status. Matthews et al. (2012) 
conducted in-depth interviews with seven surviving families of construction 
                                                 
25
 Normative sources refer to statutes, treaties, generally principles of law, 
customary law, binding precedents. Authoritative sources include cases law, 
if they are not binding precedents, and scholarly legal writings.  
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workers to explore the victims’ families’ experiences following traumatic 
workplace death in the construction industry. Drawing on the surviving 
families’ accounts, Matthews et al. (2014) and Quinlan et al. (2015) claim 
that lack of support from authorities is a common problem for surviving 
families. Sun and Liu (2014) conducted 33 in-depth interviews with injured 
migrant workers and eight employers in China to critically assess the effects 
of the Work-related Injury Insurance in practice. Through this qualitative 
study, they made a claim that Chinese Work-related Injury Insurance is an 
ornamental institution, and migrant workers could barely obtain 
compensation through this insurance. Drawing on the recent empirical studies 
regarding workers’ claim experiences, the qualitative interview is commonly 
used by the researchers (Lippel, 2003b; Lippel, 2007; Lippel et al., 2007; 
Strunin and Boden, 2004; Matthews et al., 2012; Matthews et al., 2014; 
Quinlan et al., 2015). Matthews et al. (2014) justify the use of qualitative 
methods by emphasising their value in exploring complex phenomena and 
providing insights into the experiences and views of people with different 
stakes and perspectives. Qualitative research methods also allow researchers 
to evaluate legal systems and public policies drawing on the experiences and 
viewpoints of those who are affected by specific public issues and policy 
(Sofaer, 1999; Ritchie and Spencer, 2002). Strunin and Boden (2004) justify 
the use of qualitative research methods by arguing that ethnographic 
interviews can provide in-depth details through narratives of situations, 
events and interactions. Also, they emphasise the socially constructed nature 
of reality and how social experience is created and given meaning 
(Needleman and Needleman, 1996; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003).  
3.1.2 Research methods in this study 
In this study, I will use qualitative research methods to explore the claim 
experiences of injured Chinese workers and surviving families following 
workplace accidents. With the advantages of the qualitative research methods, 
I will be able to explore the in-depth details of the claim activities including  
(1) the stages of a compensation claim process; (2) the stakeholders and key 
players in managing seafarers’ claims (3) the feeling and experiences of 
victims during the claim process; (4) victims’ opinions regarding their legal 
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rights and entitlements available from the compensation system, employers’ 
claim management policies and practices and remedies from public 
institutions (Creswell, 2009). To address the research question whether 
Chinese seafarers and surviving families suffer additional harm during 
compensation processes, I will examine harm as a socially constructed 
concept and experience, and adopt victims’ narratives of their experiences 
and feelings as a major source of data to identify whether they have suffered 
additional harm and what kinds of additional harm they have suffered.   
As a socio-legal study, it is necessary here to consider the legal rights and 
entitlements available for injured seafarers and surviving families following 
workplace accidents, considering that many challenges during the claim 
process are caused by the insufficiency of legal rights and procedural supports. 
The compensation system, including statutes, regulations, the basic concepts, 
categories and meanings of legal procedures are constructed by the law 
(Cotterrell 2006).Therefore, I have conducted a legal doctrinal study to collect 
and analyse both normative and authoritative legal sources regarding the 
rights and entitlements of injured seafarers and surviving families and 
conduct a critical evaluation of the current Chinese compensation system (See 
4.3).   
Compensation claim activities, which are human behaviours and social 
phenomenon related to law, are more complex than ordinary daily social 
phenomenon (Cotterrell 2006; Dworkin 1998). Seafarers’ claim activities 
have a particular structure, complex operation and application process, which 
usually involves professional assistance. There are various social actors 
involved in claim activities, including claimants (seafarers or surviving 
families), liable employers (shipowners and crew agencies), claim 
administrators of the Work-related Injury Insurance, adjudicators (judges or 
arbitrators), and relevant third parties (lawyers and representatives of liability 
insurers). Claim activities are also varied: in addition to litigation, informal 
negotiations are also widely reported as dispute resolution measures, which 
are subject to the soico-economic power difference between victims and 
employers (Sun and Liu, 2014; Engel 1994; Ross 1980). Even in the formal 
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legal action, socio-economic factors may influence the power of balance 
between claimants, employers and adjudicators, which cannot be described 
by numerical quantitative methods. Considering the complexity of claim 
activities, qualitative observation methods are appropriate to obtain data 
containing a richer picture of the whole process of seafarers’ claims.  
3.1.3 Secondary harm, human experience and qualitative research 
methods 
Gert (2004) construes harms as pain, death, disability, loss of ability or 
freedom or loss of pleasure. Harm can also be broadly divided into physical 
and emotional harm. In the cases of seafarers’ claims following workplace 
accidents, the primary harm is death or physical pain, while the additional 
harm seafarers might suffer during the claim process is secondary. This 
research aims to identify whether such additional harm occurs to victims 
during the claim process. Although this secondary harm is not recognised as 
loss and damages by law so far, it is proved to impose negative physical, 
emotional and financial effects on victims following workplace accidents 
(Best and Barnes, 2007). This additional harm may also involve different 
relationships, such as stigmatisation and discrimination, which damages the 
dignity, self-esteem and confidence of workers (Goffman, 2009; Lippel, 
2003b; Lippel, 2007). These harmful relationships can be constructed during 
the interaction between injured workers, employers and public institutions. 
The capital-labour conflict is identified as a contributor to the harmful 
relationships of suppression, discrimination and stigmatisation (See 2.1) 
(Quinlan et al., 2010; Lippel, 2003b; Lippel et al., 2007).  
According to Giddens (1984), human experience is the real material of social 
analysis. Accurate representation is the prerequisite to increasing people’s 
knowledge (Smith and Hodkinson, 2005). To address the research question 
whether Chinese seafarers and surviving families suffer additional harm 
during compensation processes, qualitative research methods are selected as 
the primary research instruments. This is based on the selection criteria 
whether the research instrument can collect an accurate, comprehensive and 
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rich representation of the experiences seafarers have during the claim process. 
A quantitative survey is not suited when studying the experiences of injured 
seafarers and surviving families, as it is not able to provide insight into in-
depth experiences of  (Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2009). Qualitative methods 
are more appropriate instrument helping me to collect data to address my 
research question (Bryman and Burgess, 1999; Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; 
Creswell, 2009; Denzin and Lincoln, 2008; Huberman and Miles, 2002; King, 
1994; Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Referring to literature discussed in previous 
chapter, I have found most of the studies on injured workers adopted 
qualitative research methods, including interviews, focus group and 
participatory action research methods (Lippel et al., 2007; Purse, 2009; 
Matthews et al., 2012; Quinlan et al., 2015; Strunin and Boden, 2004) and 
quantitative research methods are rarely found. 
In addition, considering the nature of a socio-legal study, legal doctrinal 
research is necessary to understand the entitlements and rights for injured 
seafarers and surviving families and then based on these legal findings, a 
critical analysis regarding law and policy can be achieved.  
3.2 Data collection strategies 
3.2.1 Semi-structured in-depth interviews 
Qualitative methods include case studies, participant observation, life story 
interviews, visual methods, focus groups and semi-structured interviews 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). Furthermore, there are various innovative 
technologies adopted by different institutions and researchers (Travers, 2009). 
Qualitative research methods are flexible instruments, each of which could be 
used separately or together, to assist researchers to record and explore real 
social life (Scott and Marshall, 2009).  
I have adopted semi-structured in-depth interviews as the data collection 
methods in this study. As discussed in Chapter Two, the claim process is time-
consuming, and takes months or years to complete. In contrast, an interview, 
as a conversation between a researcher and participants, can capture an 
understanding of a long claim process and focus on the difficulties, obstacles 
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and harm confronted by the seafarers. As a questions-led conversation, the 
interview is an intensive way to collect the appropriate information without 
interrupting victims’ lives and claim processes too much. I have chosen one-
to-one based interviews instead of group interviews or focus groups, because 
the interviewees live in different cities, and the confidentiality of a one-to-
one interview is also easier to manage than group interviews. 
3.2.2 Legal doctrinal research and documentary analysis 
Legal doctrinal research is a kind of documentary analysis drawing on legal 
sources to obtain documentary evidence to support and validate statements 
(Fitzgerald, 2007). As discussed in 3.1, the author conducts legal research 
using normative and authoritative legal sources, including statutes, 
regulations, judicial interpretations of the law, administrative policies, 
judicial precedents and judges’ commentaries. In carrying out the research for 
this thesis, I have collected statutes and regulations from the State Council 
the People’s Republic of China website: www.gov.cn; judicial interpretations 
are collected from the website of Chinese Supreme People’s Court: 
www.court.gov.cn; maritime judgements and judges’ commentaries 
regarding seafarers claims from the website of Chinese Foreign-related 
Commercial and Maritime Trials: www.ccmt.org.cn and  directly from 
maritime courts I visited. Administrative policies were gathered from the 
websites of ministries of state councils, in particular, the Ministry of 
Transport and the Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security. Based 
on these legal sources (legal documents), I have identified and critically 
analysed all the instruments available for injured seafarers and surviving 
families.  
In addition, companies’ organisational management policies, crew 
management agreements between crew agencies and shipowners, and the 
employment contracts of seafarers are all relevant documents stipulating 
when considering workplace injuries and fatalities. Claim files and records 
from insurance companies and law firms are also important documents 
recording the process and activities involved in seafarers’ claims. With 
permission, I have collected these documents from shipping companies, crew 
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agencies, law firms, insurance companies and agencies, and seafarers by 
photocopying and photo-taking. These data have become valuable sources in 
studying the organisational management strategies of workplace accidents 
and seafarers’ compensation claims.  
3.2.3 Sampling strategy and participant recruitment 
Research participants were recruited based on theoretical sampling strategy. 
Theoretical sampling is the process of choosing a research sample to extend 
and refine a theory, and this sampling strategy is driven by specified concepts 
and features (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003; Corbin and Strauss 2008). The 
research question is whether Chinese seafarers and surviving families suffer 
additional harm during compensation claim processes. Accordingly, the 
characteristics of the population studied in this research are: (1) seafarers or 
families of seafarers, (2) victims of workplace accidents and (3) 
compensation claimants. Considering the population is a specific group 
affected by workplace accidents and relevant compensation systems, 
purposeful theoretical sampling is the most appropriate strategy.  
Also, little is known about the nature of companies’ responses to Chinese 
seafarers’ claims and studies regarding judicial institutions’ responses are 
also rare. Therefore, to explore these responses and their potential 
implications on seafarers, shipping company managers, and insurance claim 
handlers, maritime lawyers and maritime judges were also selected as 
research participants to explore the business and public management practices 
of seafarers’ claims. 
There are no official records regarding the identity information of the victims 
of workplace accidents at sea which was a significant barrier to participant 
recruitment and similar problem was also found by a previous study in the 
construction industry (Matthews et al., 2012). Matthews et al. (2012) sought 
help from several voluntary support groups composed of families of deceased 
workers and successfully recruited eight participants (surviving family 
members). With the benefit of a long cooperation with non-profit 
organisations advocating injured workers’ rights, Lippel (2007) recruited 85 
injured workers in Quebec. Referring to these two studies, to recruit injured 
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workers and families is extremely challenging. Furthermore, in China, there 
are no independent trade unions representing seafarers, which makes the 
participant recruitment further challenging, so I have developed multiple 
recruitment strategies to overcome this obstacle.  
I firstly explored several cyber communities of seafarers in April 2013. As 
Tang et al. (2016) find, online rights defence has become a popular trend on 
the Chinese internet. Through web search, I have found five cases of death, 
disappearance and injury. Through replying to their posts and sending 
community messages, I obtained contacts with three family members of 
deceased and disappeared seafarers in June, 2013. Through searching for the 
key words on Weibo (Chinese twitter), I identified a colleague of a deceased 
seafarer but failed to obtain contact details of the family members. However, 
this colleague recommended another friend, who is also an injured seafarer. 
By the end of September 2013, the claimant of the last case replied to my 
message and I successfully recruited four interviewees through web search.  
Secondly, I contacted the administrators of three cyber communities of 
seafarers. One administrator appointed me as their online legal counsel for 
seafarers on voluntary base. I posted my research information and recruitment 
notice with my E-mail and QQ26 on the home page of the cyber community. 
Later on, many seafarers contacted me regarding their labour disputes. 
However, only four of them were injured seafarers and agreed to accept my 
interviews. 
Thirdly, I visited four maritime courts. According to the records of the court, 
I mailed letters to 42 seafarers who filed claims, but only received one reply 
from an injured captain. I visited six law firms who have handled seafarers’ 
claims before. With their references, I successfully recruited a further six 
interviewees.  
Fourthly, I visited four shipping companies (owners and operators) and nine 
crew agencies. With their recommendation, 14 seafarers agreed to interviews.  
                                                 
26One popular online instant messenger app in China 
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Fifthly, with assistance from two maritime colleges and informal support 
from my friends who are active marine insurance and management 
professionals, another 12 victims agreed to attend interviews.   
Through the above five recruitment approaches, on one hand, I have 
successfully recruited a certain amount of participants and on the other hand, 
the bias of this sample was minimised. One methodological critique regarding 
recruiting worker participants only through employer gatekeepers is that the 
participants can be filtered by employers and then the findings could be 
affected, while in this research, participants were accessed through five 
different approaches, therefore the bias caused by gatekeepers’ selection of 
participants has been minimised (Arcury and Quandt, 1999).  
3.3 In the field  
Phase 1: Pilot study (July 14th – September 16th, 2013) 
After the ethical approval of this research was given by the School Ethical 
Committee on May 28th, 2013, and in order to test the feasibility of the 
research design, I undertook a two-month pilot study (Kim, 2011; Sampson, 
2004; Van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2002). In the pilot study, I conducted 
three face-to-face interviews with injured seafarers, one interview with a 
surviving family member, and other interviews with a ship operating manager 
(offshore support vessels), a crew manager (manning company for ocean-
going vessels), a claim handler of P&I Club correspondent agent, two 
maritime judges and two lawyers. Telephone appointments were made before 
meetings, and I travelled around Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and Shandong 
provinces. Meeting points were usually at public tea houses or offices, with 
one exception at my hotel room with the widow of a deceased seafarer.  
The pilot study was conducted and guided by five sets of semi-structured 
interview schedules designed for (1) the victims, (2) the shipping and crew 
managers, (3) the P&I Club claim handler, (4) maritime lawyers and (5) 
maritime judges. The interview schedule with the victims focused on their 
experiences of the accident, experiences of claim processes, and the impact 
on their social life and health. With my knowledge and expertise as an 
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assistant maritime lawyer, I designed the interview schedules for the 
professional interviewees according to their different roles in managing 
seafarers’ claims. The schedules for professional interviews covered the 
major aspects of organisational policy, procedures of claim management and 
their responses to current Chinese compensation legal systems. With my 
professional knowledge, I was able to establish an effective conversation with 
my interviewees to explore their claim management practices in-depth. When 
I had finished an interview, I assigned myself 3-4 days transcribing, reflecting 
on the interview process, and revising the interview questions. 
Through the pilot study, I obtained an understanding of both victims’ 
experiences and the management of the workplace accidents and seafarers’ 
claims (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; Seidman, 1998). Through analysing and 
comparing three victims’ interview accounts, I was gradually made aware of 
three potential stages in the claim process (see Figure 2), and a claim may 
either terminate at any stage or move on to next stage. Within the current legal 
framework, Stage 3 (judicial remedies) is the last resort for victims.  
 
Figure 2: An overview of the claim process 
In the previous literature, the majority of the discussion concerns victims’ 
experiences of workers’ compensation systems, which are equivalent to 
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seeking remedies from administrative institutions (Stage 2 in Figure 2). In the 
work by Chinese legal scholars, the focus is usually the discourse of maritime 
jurisdiction (Stage 3 in Figure 2).  However, in the pilot interviews with 
victims, I found that large parts of their accounts were related to 
compensation negotiation with crew agencies, and one claimant did not file 
her claim to any public institutions. This type of worker claimant was 
excluded by previous studies since such cases are not recorded formally. In 
my research, I found several seafarers simply withdrew from the claiming 
process, because of obstacles they could not overcome and the results of claim 
were unpredictable. This is another important effect of the harm existing in 
claim procedures and is often ignored by legal scholars due to the silence and 
invisibility of these seafarers.  
In addition, there is little literature discussing organisational management of 
seafarers’ compensation claims. In the pilot study, I found this management 
process included (1) on-site management including mainly emergency 
medical service arranged by the shipowners’ agents and (2) follow-up 
management including further treatment in the seafarers’ home country, 
assessment of disability and compensation procedures. The following-up 
management stage usually involves four parties, seafarers or surviving 
families as claimants, manning companies as coordinators27, shipowners as 
compensators and P&I Clubs as employers’ liability insurers. According to 
the accounts of claim handlers, shipping and crew managers, most 
compensation claims are settled by negotiation and very few claims were 
finally filed to the court.  
According to these findings in the pilot study, I made certain changes in my 
interview schedules: (1) in addition to the questions regarding formal claim 
experiences with public institutions of Work-related Injury Insurance and 
maritime courts, I added questions to provide more opportunities for victims 
                                                 
27
 Sometimes, seafarers regard manning companies as direct obligators for 
the compensation together with the shipowners. About the manning 
companies’ status, there are many controversies in the context of China, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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to describe their negotiation experiences with their crew agencies and 
shipping companies; (2) considering the “waiving” experiences of victims, 
another interview question was added: why did they give up pursuing 
compensation.  
At the end of my pilot, I refined my participant recruitment strategies. My 
initial plan was to access these seafarers using the records of law firm and 
maritime courts. This plan did work, but the performance was limited. Then 
I decided to apply five multiple strategies (see 3.2.4) to recruit my research 
participants, including establishing contacts with several administrators of 
seafarers’ cyber communities, contacting manning companies, and inquiring 
for injured seafarers’ information from my friends working in the shipping 
industry. The outcomes of a combined sampling strategy turned out to be 
satisfactory. 
The acceptability of audio-recorded interviews to seafarers and surviving 
families was good. However, some claim handlers and managers refused the 
use of audio recording, which meant I had to take notes during and after the 
interview as soon as possible to minimise the loss of the data. Documentary 
collection requests, such as employment contracts and compensation 
agreements were acceptable by most seafarers during the pilot study. Some 
case files and legal judgements were collected based on my promise of 
confidentiality and anonymity. I applied computer assisted qualitative data 
analysis (CAQDA) with Atlas.ti software to process the pilot data.  
The benefits of the pilot study were that: (1) semi-structured in-depth 
interviews were proved to be a feasible and efficient research instrument in 
this study; (2) I was able to talor my interview guides to include victims’ 
experiences of negotiation with companies and why they decided to waive 
the claim; (3) through the pilot study, the participant recruitment strategies 
were improved significantly; (4) the pilot study also enhanced my confidence 
as a social science researcher, and improved my communication skills with 
seafarers and other shipping professionals 
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Phase 2: Fieldwork (Nov 16th, 2013- Jan 16th, 2014) 
At Phase 2, I started my fieldwork in Fujian and Guangdong. I selected these 
two provinces because (1) Fujian, and Guangdong has large communities of 
seafarers, ranking in the top 4 and 5 places for seafarer supply provinces 
(Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic of China, 2016); (2) the two 
provinces have three world Top 20 ports, Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Xiamen, 
so crewing service businesses are active (World Shipping Council, 2016); (3) 
I worked in Fujian previously and established a good network with maritime 
law firms, maritime courts, and shipowners’ liability insurance agents. These 
three factors enabled me to identify the organisations and research 
participants effectively. Furthermore, with my ex-colleagues’ references, I 
successfully negotiated accesses with five local crew agencies, one shipowner 
company, two shipowners’ liability insurers, two maritime courts, and three 
law firms. With access to the claim files, and the references of several 
managers, I contacted 13 injured seafarers, and 12 accepted my interview 
invitations. Based in Xiamen and Guangzhou, I travelled to Fuzhou, 
Quanzhou, Huian, Jimei, Quangang, and Zhaoqing to conduct interviews with 
injured seafarers. All meeting points were selected at public coffee shops, tea 
houses and restaurants.  
In mid-December 2014, I travelled to Jiangsu via Hefei. In Hefei, I 
interviewed one victim I recruited online. In Jingsu, based in Nanjing and 
Nantong. I visited two crew agencies, one maritime college and one lawyer. 
With assistance from the maritime college, I conducted four interviews with 
injured seafarers on campus. By the end of 2013, in Xuzhou and Qingdao, 
through friends’ who had handled seafarers’ claims previously, I contacted 
another 10 victims and eight of them agreed to interviews. At this stage, I 
gradually found the sampling was being saturated since new data was rarely 
identified (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).  
In total, I conducted 42 interviews with injured seafarers and surviving 
families and 33 interviews with ship and crew managers, claim handlers, 
maritime judges and lawyers (see Table 4 and 5). All interviews with victims 
were recorded, and the interview length ranged from 50 minutes to 4 hours, 
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with the average length about 90 minutes. The participants were from 18 
cities in 12 provinces in China. Referring to past similar studies and general 
qualitative research recommendations, with 75 interviews, I felt my research 
should be persuasive (Guest et al., 2006; Gerson and Horowitz, 2002; 
Matthews et al., 2012; Lippel et al., 2007).  
Table 4: List of participants (victims) 
Surviving family members 
(N=8) 
N=5 Seafarers were killed/disappeared on 
ocean-going vessels 
N=3 seafarers were killed/disappeared on 
coastal vessels 
Injured seafarers (N=34) N=20 ocean-going seafarers 
N=14 coastal seafarers 
 
Table 5: List of Participants (professionals) 
Sector  Representative  
Shipping companies (n=4) Senior managers  and Claim managers  
Crew agencies/manning 
companies (n=10) 
Deputy directors, senior managers and 
junior managers 
Shipowners’ liabilities insurers 
(n=3) 
Director, claim handlers 
Maritime courts (n=9) Maritime judges 
Maritime law firms (n=7) Maritime lawyers. 
 
3.4 Data Processing and Analysis 
All interviews were conducted in Chinese. Transcribing was undertaken in 
Chinese to ensure the speed and accuracy of the interview content. I 
transcribed half of the recorded interviews and then I found it was too time 
consuming and so I decided to hire transcribers. With a confidentiality 
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agreement, a professional transcribing company helped me to finish the 
transcribing of remaining audio recordings. I conducted a double check of 
their transcripts to correct errors and typos to ensure the quality of the 
transcripts for analysis. Through this assignment, I strengthened my 
understanding of the data by transcribing; and using a professional 
transcribing service helped to save lots of time for my analysis and writing 
up.  
Coding was conducted in English to facilitate the English writing-up process. 
Regarding the translation of quotes, I have worked as translator previously. I 
decided to translate the quotes by myself: one reason is to maintain the 
accuracy and coherency of the translation with the consideration of the 
interview contexts. If I had employed several translators to help me conduct 
the translating work, different translation results may have caused confusion 
in the analysing and writing process. In addition, I have professional 
translating experience in legal-related areas, so I was confident that the 
translation work was of a reasonable quality. Another reason for me to 
conduct the translation myself is a common one among PhD students, a 
limited research budget. 
I applied thematic analysis to the empirical data collected in the field to 
identify the challenges, difficulties and harm arising from different stages of 
their claim activities when they interacted with companies, insurers, lawyers, 
judges and staff of workers’ compensation systems. I set up four CAQDA 
projects with both Atlas.ti.8 and Nvivo 10: one project for all legal sources, 
one for professional interviews and the other two for surviving family 
members and injured seafarers. The reason I applied two software 
programmes is because with Atlas.ti, I could conduct comparative analysis 
more easily since it has the function to show two or more transcripts together. 
However, the weakness of the Atlas.ti. is that it does not fully support the 
Chinese language, for example, I could not run a frequency count of certain 
themes, so I had to process data in Nvivo 10 when I needed certain functions, 
such as running a Chinese word frequency query. Initially, I processed all 
victims’ transcripts in one project, but later I noticed that surviving family 
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members’ experiences and injured seafarers’ experiences had significant 
structural differences, so I decided to process them as two CAQDA projects.  
3.5 Ethical consideration 
The emotional distress which may be caused by qualitative interviews has 
been brought to the attention of social science researchers in recent years, 
especially regarding sensitive topics and the vulnerable participants (Corbin 
and Morse, 2003; Hewitt, 2007). Researchers have to be extremely careful to 
manage the potential harm on participants, in particular with sensitive issues. 
“Sensitive issues” are variously defined, and sometimes terms such as 
emotive topics and participants with problem experiences are used 
interchangeably. Sensitive research refers to “research which potentially 
poses a substantial threat or risk to those who are or have been involved in it” 
(Lee and Renzetti, 1993) 
In this research, exploring the experience of compensation claims has the 
potential to cause some emotional distress as result of asking the participant 
to recall difficult memories. The participants were fully notified that they had 
free will to decide whether to answer my questions or not. In the recruitment 
process, there were several victims who did not agree to interviews and one 
withdrew half way due to her mental health situation. However, in the course 
of the fieldwork, due to the unsatisfactory results of their claims, I found some 
victims were willing to use websites to share their stories to obtain other 
people’s concern and recognition. In these cases, I became an active listener 
to their concerns and recognised the difficulties and challenges they met 
(Smith et al., 2014)  
I provided a detailed information sheet for participants clearly indicating this 
research needed them to recall their experiences and feelings during the claim 
process of occupational injuries, and if they felt uncomfortable with the 
conversation, they could stop and/or withdraw from the research at any time. 
Regarding the potential emotional pressure which may be caused by the 
interview, I considered providing psychological consulting service 
information for my participants. However, in China, professional 
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psychological consulting services are not usually accessible. Also, it still is 
not common for Chinese people to seek help from psychological services. 
Most people still think contacting a psychological consultant is shameful, 
especially in small cities and rural areas. It might be inappropriate for me to 
recommend psychological counselling services to my Chinese research 
participants. Accordingly, before I asked any question about their feeling of 
the claim process, I always emphasised that they could interrupt my question 
or stop talking at any time if they felt uncomfortable with the conversation, 
and they could withdraw from the research.  
Self-protection strategies cannot be ignored in this research. As a junior 
qualitative researcher, I would not underestimate possible emotional and 
physical harm in this research. Although most Chinese people are friendly, I 
did a full risk assessment with my supervisors before my pilot study and 
fieldwork. 
In order to protect the research participant’s privacy and encourage them to 
provide information without hesitation, one-to-one interviews were adopted 
in this research. However, one-to-one interviews between a female researcher 
and a male participant could be risky to some extent, so I conducted all 
interviews with males in public areas, such as offices, coffee shops and 
restaurants to avoid unnecessary harm.  
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, I have discussed several aspects of methodology and methods 
in this research, including my theoretical perspectives, the nature of the data 
I am aiming to collect to answer my research question, research design and 
research instruments. Then I presented the two phases of my data collection, 
my data processing strategies and ethical issues in this research. In this 
chapter, I firstly addressed how to select the right research method to collect 
the necessary data to answer my research question, and secondly I conducted 
some reflective thoughts regarding researching experiences in field work.  
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Chapter Four: Shipping Industry, 
Regulation and Seafarers’ Rights in 
China 
Introduction 
In Chapters One and Two, workers’ compensation systems and the challenges 
of neo-liberalism and pressures due to global competition were discussed. 
Similarly, I described the pervasive use of precarious employment contracts 
and their impacts on protection for workers. China is a nation state actively 
promoting neo-liberal reforms and participating in global competition. 
Industrial relations in the context of the Chinese shipping industry have been 
transformed. Alongside with the tremendous social and economic reforms, 
Chinese legal systems have reformed and developed rapidly. For example, a 
western style workers’ compensation system, known as the Work-related 
Injury Insurance System, has been transplanted to China and civil law, 
maritime and judicial procedures have been restored to serve the development 
of the market economy. Accordingly, fleet ownership, crew management 
strategies, employers’ liabilities (including both shipowners and crew 
agencies) and seafarers’ rights have undergone substantial transformation 
since the late 1970s. 
This chapter describes the current industrial and legal background to seafarers’ 
compensation claims in China. It is organised into three sections. The first 
section addresses the reformed ownership of fleets in the Chinese shipping 
industry to identify different groups of seafarer employers. The second 
section addresses the current recruitment approaches and the operation of 
third party crew management practices in the shipping industry in China. 
Crew agencies are also identified as an independent party in employment 
relations. The third section reviews currently applicable regulations under 
Chinese law, for employers’ liabilities and seafarers’ rights following 
workplace accidents: one is the Work-related Injury Insurance System, the 
other is the civil tort liability system. The chapter describes the liable parties 
in connection with compensation claims as well as the scope and coverage of 
Work-related Injury Insurance compensation schemes. Drawing on the 
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empirical findings, the limitation of the Work-related Injury Insurance is 
analysed and discussed. The chapter also describes the civil tort liability 
system and the special maritime jurisdiction regarding workplace injuries at 
sea. It specifies the shipowners’ liabilities, compensation standards, 
procedural entitlements of seafarers and special maritime jurisdiction and 
additional procedural issues regarding foreign-related cases. Drawing on the 
interviews with maritime judges, lawyers, claim handlers and seafarers, the 
current civil tort liability system is critically evaluated with particular focus 
on the liability regime and enforcement of maritime lien. By comparing legal 
entitlements of general workers and seafarers. The discussion at the end of 
the chapter draws attention to some key findings that will be further explored 
in Chapter Eight.  
4.1 The employers in the shipping industry 
In China, seafarers work for employers in three sectors: ocean-going trade, 
coastal trade, and river trade (Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic 
of China, 2016). During the planned economy era, employers were solely 
state-owned enterprises or collectively owned enterprises across these three 
sectors. However, following the enforcement of the Open and Reform policy 
in 1979, the shipping industry has undergone privatisation and fleet 
ownership has become diversified. Foreign shipping companies are permitted 
to compete in the ocean-going sector, and domestic private investors are 
encouraged to participate in all three sectors. In 2013, foreign shipping 
enterprises moved more than half of the foods transported in the ocean-going 
sector (Guo, 2013). Meanwhile, as a result of state-owned enterprise reform 
since the 1990s, private fleets have increased rapidly. To encourage further 
privatisation, in 2014, the State Council promulgated Some Opinions 
regarding Promoting the Development of the Shipping Industry, aiming to 
attract more private and foreign investment into the Chinese shipping industry. 
The structure of shipping employment has reformed significantly. By the end 
of 2012, among the top ten ocean-going companies, there are three that are 
privately owned (see Table 6: Top 10 Chinese Ocean-going Fleets). In 
contrast with the industry monopoly of state-owned enterprises before 2000, 
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the increase in the private shipping capacity is significant. The employers of 
Chinese seafarers are no longer restricted to state-owned enterprises and 
foreign shipping companies as claimed by previous studies, Chinese private 
shipowners have become significant employers in the labour market.  (Wu 
and Morris, 2006; Wu et al., 2006; Zhao, 2002; Zhao, 2011).  
Table 6: Top 10 Chinese Ocean-going Fleets (2012) 
Rank 
Company Ownership 
Total Shipping capacity 
No. of 
vessels 
Dead Weight 
Tonnage
（1000 
tonnes） 
1 China Ocean Shipping (Group) 
Company 
State-owned  663 50,187 
2 Sinotrans & CSC Holdings 
Co.,Ltd 
State-owned  223 13,951 
3 China Shipping (Group) 
Company 
State-owned  134 12,878 
4 Hebei Ocean Shipping (Group) 
Company 
Private owned 39 6,511 
5 Zhejiang Ocean Shipping Co., 
Ltd 
State-owned  13 2,280 
6 Fujian Guohang Ocean Shipping 
(Group) Company 
Private owned 26 1,732 
7 Fujian Guanhai Shipping Co., 
Ltd 
Private owned 18 1,626 
8 Shanghai Time Shipping Co., 
Ltd 
State-owned  25 1,600 
9 Guangdong Yuedian Shipping 
Co., Ltd 
State-owned  20 1,443 
10 Fujian Provincial 
Communication Transportation 
Group Co., Ltd 
State-owned  33 1,121 
Source: Adapted from Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic of 
China (2013) and Shanghai Shipping Exchange (2013) 
In addition, many Chinese shipowners choose to flag out their vessels and 
thereby transform themselves into “foreign” employers. The size of Chinese-
flagged fleet has gone down but the fleets size of Flags of Convenience 
controlled by Chinese owners has increased rapidly (CEIN, 2008). By 2013, 
more than half of Chinese-owned vessels were registered overseas (Quan, 
2014; UNCTAD, 2014). The change of corporate “nationalities” produces 
artificially fragmented employment relationships. Chinese seafarers serving 
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on non-Chinese vessels, although controlled by Chinese enterprises, are 
treated as dispatched seafarers to foreign countries, and must be recruited 
through licensed crew agencies28. The essential domestic direct employment 
relationship is transformed into a foreign-related fragmented employment 
relationship via third parties. 
In the coastal trade, only Chinese flagged vessels are permitted to operate 
transport between domestic ports29. These coastal vessels must be owned by 
Chinese enterprises, either state-owned or privately owned. Accordingly, 
state-owned enterprises and private companies are the two types of shipowner 
in the coastal shipping sector. The scale of private ownership in shipping has 
increased over the past ten years. Between 2001 and 2005, the central state-
owned enterprises, China Ocean Shipping Group, China Shipping Group, and 
Sinotrans-CSC Holdings Co., Ltd, controlled over 50% of the coastal 
dry/bulk carrying capacity, but by the end of 2011, this percentage dropped 
to below 20% (Maritime Bereau, 2012). Private-owned shipping companies 
have become the core contributors to the increase in the coastal shipping 
business (Maritime Bereau, 2012). By 2012, nearly half of the top 15 coastal 
fleets were privately owned (See Table 7: Top 15 Chinese Coastal Trade 
Fleet). Consequently, more private shipowners have become employers of 
Chinese seafarers. 
Traditional permanent employment relations between state-owned 
shipowners and seafarers are decreasing. Many seafarers serving on Chinese 
vessels have also become flexible workers in the free maritime labour market 
(Maritime Safety Administration, 2010). 45.92% Chinese seafarers do not 
have long-term employment relations, and more shipowners sign temporary 
voyage agreements with seafarers (Chen et al., 2014). Meanwhile, crew 
agencies have become important recruitment channels between Chinese 
shipowners and seafarers (Wang, 2009). Some crew agencies have gradually 
developed into specific third party labour supply companies. In the coastal 
                                                 
28
 See Rules of Dispatching Chinese Seafarers on non-Chinese Vessels (2011) 
29
 See China Maritime Code (1992) Art 4. 
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shipping sector, employment relations are becoming agency-led, and more 
seafarers are becoming flexible workers. 
Table 7: Top 15 Chinese Coastal Trade Fleet (2012) 
Rank Company 
 
Ownership 
Regime 
Total Shipping capacity 
No. of vessels 
Dead Weight 
Tonnage 
(1000 tonnes) 
1 China Shipping (Group) Company State-owned  264 12,001 
2 
China Ocean Shipping (Group) 
Company 
State-owned  
76 3075 
3 
Fujian Guohang Ocean Shipping 
(Group) Company 
Private owned 
43 2476 
4 Shanghai Time Shipping Co., Ltd 
Private owned 
39 2183 
5 Deqin (Group) Company Private owned 91 1875 
6 Sinotrans & CSC Holdings Co.,Ltd 
State-owned  
91 1580 
7 Guangdong Yuedian Shipping Co., Ltd State-owned  20 1405 
8 
Fujian Provincial Communication 
Transportation Group Co., Ltd 
State-owned  
52 1971 
9 Guangdong Lanhai Shipping Co., Ltd Private owned 19 1160 
10 Ningbo Marine Co., Ltd State-owned  34 1098 
11 Shanghai North Sea Shipping Co., Ltd 
China-Hong Kong  
Joint Venture 
11 729 
12 Jiangsu Huahai Shipping Co., Ltd Private owned 52 693 
13 
Tianjin Changming Shipping (Group) 
Co., Ltd 
Private owned 
10 622 
14 Hainan Fanyang Shipping Co., Ltd 
Private owned 
23 615 
15 Shanghai Ruining Shipping Co., Ltd 
State-owned  
Joint Venture 11 563 
Source: Adapted from Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic of 
China (2013) and Shanghai Shipping Exchange (2013) 
In the river trade, and as part of the continuous reform of state-owned 
enterprises, most state-owned river shipping enterprises have been privatised 
or reorganised (Li et al., 2009). As a result, permanent labour relationships 
between state-owned enterprises and seafarers has been dismantled. Chinese 
river seafarers today have become a flexible and individualised labour force 
(Li et al., 2009).  
In previous studies, the Chinese shipping industry was shown to be dominated 
by state-owned enterprises, and the power of private companies was very 
limited (Zhao, 2011; Zhao, 2002; Wu et al., 2006). However, by reviewing 
industrial development in the three sectors, this research finds a rapid 
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privatisation trend. Unlike the traditional central planned economy, where 
seafarers were allocated to permanently secured jobs, now Chinese seafarers 
have become the human resources accessible to all kinds of shipping 
companies, regardless of nationality and ownership. 
4.2 Crew management: the development of third party crew 
supply 
Cost reduction is a key feature of the corporate drive to achieve competitive 
advantage. One associated corporate strategy is to set up specialised 
subsidiaries (Klikauer and Morris, 2003). Through this business division, 
crew recruitment and management is separated from other activities and 
“outsourced” but to companies that remain under the parent “umbrella”. An 
alternative measure is to contract with independent crew agency/manning 
businesses for the supply of labour from developing countries, which may be 
seen as a kind of “offshoring” (Sampson, 2013). Chinese state-owned 
shipowners usually take the first measure. With large fleets, the establishment 
of specialised crew management services can improve the management 
efficiency (Zhao, 2011). Foreign and private shipping companies usually take 
the second measure, which is a preferable practice when crewing needs do 
not reach a considerable size.  
However, companies may also “hire out” their own seafarers and offer 
shipowners such third party seafarer supply helps shipowners avoid 
unnecessary human resource costs when they do not need seafarers on board. 
As a result, crew agencies have become an important institution in the 
employment relations of seafarers; and seafarers have become flexible labour 
force for shipowners.  
The development of third party crew agencies produces multi-angled and 
fragmented employment relationships for seafarers as opposed to direct 
employment (Wang, 2009; Chen and Hao, 2012). The involvement of crew 
agencies facilitates business operation, but obligations and liabilities are 
rendered ambiguous in the current legal framework. This is addressed in the 
next section. 
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4.3 Chinese systems of compensation and liability 
There are two legal instruments protecting seafarer victims of occupational 
accidents: one is the Work-related Injury Insurance System (WIIS), and the 
other is the tort compensation system.  
The WIIS is a part of Chinese social security system, which is supposed to 
apply to workers with an employee identity. Under this system, crew 
agencies/manning companies who have signed a labour contract with 
seafarers are liable to contribute to the social security scheme but the 
shipowners who have recruited seafarers are not directly liable to pay social 
security insurance premiums. Once a workplace accident occurs, seafarers 
should be able to seek compensation from the Work-related Injury Insurance 
Fund, if they are insured by their crew agencies/manning companies.  
The tort compensation system is part of the maritime legal system, which has 
a special jurisdiction over seafarers. Usually, this regime applies to any 
seafarer suffering workplace accidental loss. This legal system stipulates that 
the owners, managers and/or operators of ships are liable to any loss arising 
from personal injuries at sea. Therefore, seafarers without employee status, 
who cannot identify their employers, are entitled to seek compensation 
according to tort law.  
4.3.1 Work-related Injury Insurance 
The WIIS enables Chinese workers to claim no-fault based compensation 
from the Work-related Injury Insurance Fund and against their employers. 
Meanwhile, the WIIS also imposes obligations on all Chinese employers to 
pay the social insurance premium for their employees. This regulation came 
into force in 2004. In 2010, the National Congress Standing Committee 
further promulgated the Social Insurance Law (2010), which has confirmed 
the Work-related Injury Insurance regime. In 2011, the Work-related Injury 
Insurance Regulation was revised to widen the coverage of workers to protect 
precarious labour, in particular migrant workers from rural areas.  
In terms of seafarers, especially “agency seafarers” or “freelancers”, the 
application of WIIS has been controversial for many years. Many maritime 
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manning companies and/or crew agencies have argued that agency seafarers 
and freelance seafarers should not be categorized as employees under WIIS. 
In 2007, the State Council promulgated the Regulation of Seamen (2007), 
stipulating that employers shall arrange social insurance, including Work-
related Injury Insurance, for seafarers. But this Regulation failed to explicitly 
impose this obligation on manning companies and/or crew agencies towards 
the agency seafarers and freelancing seafarers serving on foreign ships. In 
2011, the Chinese Ministry of Transport demanded that manning 
companies/crew agencies should ensure that seafarers they sent to serve on 
foreign vessel are protected by labour contracts in China. This means 
manning companies should make sure seafarers working abroad are covered 
by Chinese Work-related Injury Insurance30. According to this regulation, 
Chinese seafarers, whether working on Chinese ships or foreign ships should 
be covered by the Work-related Injury Insurance.  
1. Scope of work-related injuries, compensation standards 
and sources of payment 
According to the Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2011), in order 
to qualify for compensation, workers’ injuries must fulfil one of the following 
three conditions. Firstly, in principle, the injury should be relevant to work 
content, including pre-work preparations, post-work conclusions, and 
business trips. Secondly, the injury should happening at the workplace or 
death should occur within a limited period due to a sudden disease. Thirdly, 
the injury is caused by protecting the public interest or during military 
service31. The following situations are clearly excluded from the scope of 
work-related injuries: 
                                                 
30
 The Rules of Dispatching Chinese Seafarers to Foreign Vessels (2011), 
Article 24. 
31
 Art. 14 and Art. 15 of Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2011). 
The scope of workplace injuries:  
(1) Injuries suffered during work hours and within the workplace, when 
the worker is the victim of violence or suffers an unexpected injury 
whilst carrying out their duties 
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1) Those incurred while the employee is drunk or under the 
influence of illegal drugs. 
2) Those incurred while the employee is knowingly committing 
a crime. 
3) Cases in which the employee deliberately self-harms or 
commits suicide.32 
The definition of work-related injuries in WIIR is a broad concept. Unless the 
injuries are caused by workers’ own illegal, criminal behaviour or purposeful 
self-harm, any injuries relevant to work and injuries occurring at the 
workplace or on the way to or from home qualify to be judged as work-related 
injuries under WIIR.  
2.  Compensation standards and sources of payment 
                                                 
(2) Accidental injuries suffered before or after formal work hours and 
within workplace, due to activity considered preparation for work or 
conclusion of work.  
(3) Injuries suffered in an accident when the employee is on a business 
trip or assigned to work outside of the work place, including cases 
where the body cannot be found.  
(4) Injuries suffered while on the way to or from work due to an accident 
that was not worker’s fault.  
(5) The onset of a sudden illness during work hours that leads to death 
within 48 hours. 
(6) Injuries sustained while doing emergency or relief work, such as 
preparing for a flood or a storm, and injuries sustained while 
protecting the interests of the public or the country.  
(7) The relapse or recurrence of injuries sustained during military service, 
providing that a military injury certificate has been obtained by the 
soldier concerned. 
32 Art 16 of Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2011). 
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Once a workplace accidents occurs, the employer should immediately report 
the accident to the local Social Insurance Administration for an official record. 
Within 30 days, the employer should submit a workplace injury recognition 
application to a local Social Insurance Administration. If the employer fails 
to apply, then the Social Insurance Administration will reject Work-related 
Injury Insurance claims from the employer. In this situation, injured workers 
have to apply for workplace injury recognition on their own. This should be 
done within one year of the workplace accident to be compensated by the 
Work-related Injury Insurance Fund (WIIF).  
a. Compensation for work-related injuries 
Once workers’ injuries have been recognised as work-related injuries by the 
local Social Insurance Administration, the employer, employee or his/her 
close relatives need to file an application for work capacity assessment to the 
Work Capacity Assessment Committee (WCAC). Within 90 days, the WCAC 
comes to a conclusion about the work capacity loss from Grade 10, the least 
severe, to Grade 1, the most severe. According to the work capacity 
assessment conclusion, the worker is entitled to a certain amount of 
compensation, from both WIIF and the employer, including payments for 
medical treatment and rehabilitation. If the injury is assessed as a disability, 
according to the degree, a lump sum disability payment, monthly disability 
allowance and/or nursing allowance should be paid by WIIF. For disability 
Grades 5 – 10, if the worker requests to terminate the employment contract, 
or for Grades 7 – 10, if the employment contract expires, the worker is entitled 
to a medical subsidy from the WIIF and disability employment subsidy from 
the employer. For disability Grades 1 – 4, the Work-related Injury Insurance 
Regulation (2011) entitles workers to withdraw from the position, and receive 
70% - 90% salary from the WIIF until the time of workers’ retirement. For 
disability Grades 5 – 6, employers are not allowed to terminate the 
employment relationship even if the fixed-term labour contract is expired. 
Under this circumstance, the employer is obliged to arrange another position 
for the injured worker. If the employer fails to arrange another position, the 
worker is still entitled to claim 60% - 70% salary from the employer every 
month. However, if the worker requests a termination of the employment 
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relationship, the worker has the right to claim a lump sum employment 
subsidy from the employer (see Tables 8 ~ 10). 
Table 8: Payments for Medical Treatment and Rehabilitation 
Costs 
Standard for Payment 
Calculation 
Schedule of 
Payment 
Source of 
Payment 
Fees for hospital registration, 
hospitalization, medical 
treatment and medicine 
Work-injury 
Insurance Diagnosis 
and Treatment 
Catalogue of Fees 
Reimbursed 
according to 
standard, as 
needed 
Work-
injury 
Insurance 
Fund 
Transportation costs, 
including meals and housing 
Same standard as cost 
reimbursements for 
business trips 
Employer 
Cost of meals while 
hospitalized 
Same standard as cost 
reimbursements for 
business trips 
Prosthetics, Rehabilitation 
equipment (such as 
wheelchair/crutches), 
rehabilitation fees 
National Regulations 
Reimbursed 
according to 
standard, as 
needed 
Work-
injury 
Insurance 
Fund 
Nursing during rehabilitation As needed As needed 
Employer Wages while undergoing 
treatment and rehabilitation 
Workers’ original 
wages and benefits 
Monthly 
Source: China Labour Bulletin (2008) and the Work-related Injury Insurance 
Regulation (2011) Art. 30 to Art. 3 
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Table 9: Standards for Disability Payment 
 
Source: China Labour Bulletin (2008) and the Work-related Injury Insurance 
Regulation (2010) Art. 34 to Art. 37 
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Table 10: Severance Payments for Employees 
 
Source: China Labour Bulletin (2008) and the Work-related Injury 
Insurance Regulation (2011) Art. 38 
Apart from the above payments for treatment, payments for rehabilitation, 
and disability payments, a worker who suffers a work-related injury is also 
entitled to a period of suspension of work but a continuation of salary for a 
maximum of 12 months, which should be paid by the worker’s employer. 
In addition to paying the Work-related Injury Insurance premium (0.5%-2% 
of workers’ salary), Chinese employers also have to contribute to workers’ 
medical treatment, rehabilitation cost, disability payments and severance 
payments to some extent. Therefore, Chinese employers, even having 
purchased the Work-related Injury Insurance, will still be reluctant to help 
their employees to claim social insurance compensation.   
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b. Compensation for work-related death 
If an employee dies at work or from a work-related injury, his/her close 
relatives or dependants 33  can apply for a funeral subsidy, pension for 
dependants and death compensation (see Table 11). This compensation 
scheme also applies to the situation where a worker disappears due to an 
accident occurring during his/her business trip or when dealing with an 
emergency or natural disaster. Three months after the accident, his/her close 
relatives can apply for compensation according to the work-related death 
compensation scheme.  
Table 11: Payments to close relative dependants of deceased workers in work-related 
accidents 
 
Source: China Labour Bulletin (2011 - 2014) and WIIR (2011) Art. 39 to 41 
Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2014) provides specified and 
practical work-related injuries recognition requirements, compensation 
                                                 
33
 Referring to Chinese Civil Procedures (2012) and Administrative 
Procedures (2014), close relative dependants refers to spouse, parents, 
children, siblings, grandparents, grandsons and other persons who has 
established civil support relationship with the deceased person.  
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standards, and claim approaches for victims of work-related accidents. If 
employers failed to arrange Work-related Injury Insurance for employees, 
employees are entitled to claim equivalent compensation amounts from 
employers. Furthermore, the Social Insurance Law (2010) stipulates that in 
situations when employers fail to arrange employees’ work-related insurance 
and refuse to make the compensation payments, employees are entitled to 
apply to WIIF to make payments in advance. Then the WIIF has a right to 
claim the payment from the employer concerned34.   
3.  Seafarers’ rights under Work-related Injury Insurance 
System 
Chinese Work-related Injury Insurance is criticised as “ornamental”, 
implying the regime does not adequately help workers suffering work-related 
injuries (Sun and Liu, 2014). In this research, the empirical data also shows 
that the protective capability of Work-related Injury Insurance is limited for 
Chinese seafarers in terms of insurance coverage, compensation standards, 
and enforcement of compensation payments. 
Firstly, the Work-related Injury Insurance coverage rate is low among 
seafarers. 58.45% seafarers are not covered by Work-related Injury Insurance 
(Chen et al. 2015, Wu 2008). In the context of fragmented employment 
relationships, i.e. employment through crew agencies/manning companies, 
the Work-related Injury Insurance is not compulsory for shipowners. 
Shipowners of non-Chinese vessels can argue that they are not the “employers” 
as defined by Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2003 and 2011). 
The manning companies/crew agencies, as the parties who employ/send 
seafarers to serve shipowners, should arrange Work-related Injury 
Insurance35.  
                                                 
34
 There was a survey one year after the Social Insurance Law (2010) was 
introduced that showed the vast majority of local governments were refusing 
to issue advance payments. http://www.clb.org.hk/.../local-governments-refuse...  
35
 See Rules of Dispatching Chinese Seafarers on Non-Chinese Vessels.  
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Work-related Injury Insurance (premium rate 0.5% - 2% of the wage) cannot 
be purchased separately, and must be purchased together with pension 
scheme, medical insurance, maternity insurance, and unemployment 
insurance, which means the company must pay an extra 30% - 40% of the 
employees’ wages as a social insurance premium. In this research, some 
companies expressed great unwillingness to arrange Work-related Injury 
Insurance for seafarers and would only pay the social insurance premium 
based at the lowest level, which is 60% of the average local income (see 5.1.1).  
Secondly, the inaccessibility and low compensation standards discourage 
seafarers’ incentives to claim from the social insurance scheme. The Work-
related Injury Insurance Funds are managed/coordinated at the city. That is 
the city of the domicile of the manning company, which usually is different 
from the seafarers’ cities of domicile. This regulatory approach to social 
insurance funds has increased the difficulties for seafarers to claim benefits 
(see 7.2.2).  
The disability payment and subsidies are calculated according to average 
local salary, not according to seafarers’ actual wages (see Table 8, Table 9 
and Table 10). As mentioned above, manning companies tend to pay the 
social insurance premiums based at the lowest level, which is 60% of the 
average local income, so the final compensation for seafarers from public 
funds is restricted. Taking a Second Engineer (SF_QZ_W) as an example, he 
lost his right thumb and index finger, which was assessed as a Grade 8 
disability (30% work capacity loss). Based on the company’s contribution for 
the insurance, he was entitled to claim about CNY 25,000 in disability 
payment from the public fund. At the time of his injury, in 2012, his monthly 
salary was USD 6600 (about CNY42, 240), which is much higher than the 
lump sum disability payment awarded by the WIIF. Had the company paid 
the social insurance premium according to the WIIR, at 300% of local average 
income (about CNY 11,516) for this Second Engineer (see Table 9), the 
disability payment awarded to this seafarer would be CNY 126,676, about 
five times of the disability payment he actually got paid, and equivalent to his 
wages of three months on board. Therefore, seafarers’ income renders the 
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compensation standards set by the regulation insufficient to compensate 
seafarers for actual earnings loss. Furthermore, the manning company’s 
underpayment of social insurance premiums makes the benefits available 
from public funds lower still. 
Thirdly, the time bar of Work-related Injury Insurance claims is short. The 
regulation provides only a one-year time bar counting from the second day of 
the workplace accident, and this period cannot be extended for any reason. 
For seafarers who have been injured abroad, the time bar is tight, considering 
the repatriation, and further medical treatment in China. For some seafarers, 
when their situations become stable and they start to claim compensation, 
they just realise their claims are time-barred (see 7.3.2). The short time-bar 
regime makes seafarers’ claims for Work-related Injury Insurance 
compensation even more challenging and encourages manning companies to 
use delaying strategies to escape their obligations. With the one-year time bar 
regime, the workers’ compensation institution is also able to reject seafarers’ 
compensation claims and reduce their payment liabilities.    
Fourthly, when involved in legal disputes over workers’ compensation, 
judicial opinions regarding the nature of seafarers’ employment agreements 
and manning companies’ obligations are vague and obscure, making seafarers’ 
claims unlikely to be fully supported by the courts. Unlike other labour 
disputes under the jurisdiction of the Labour Arbitration Tribunals, seafarers’ 
disputes are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Chinese Maritime Courts. 
Thus the opinions from judicial authorities can determine whether seafarers’ 
claims are established. When disputes between seafarers and manning 
companies regarding Work-related Injury Insurance contribution and 
compensation enter into judicial review, due to the variety and flexibility of 
seafarers’ recruitment approaches (Zhao and Amante, 2005, Wu, 2008, Wu 
and Beaverstock, 2013), the status of Chinese seafarers in Chinese law has 
been controversial. According to the Work-related Injury Insurance 
Regulation (2003), enterprises must purchase work-related injury insurance 
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for all their employees or hired labourers36. The employees refer to those who 
have entered into labour contracts or who are in an actual labour relationship 
with enterprises, companies or other organisations. However, regarding 
seafarers employed by manning companies/crewing agencies, their services 
on board are usually regulated by dual contractual relationships: one is the 
contract relationship with manning companies/crewing agencies, and the 
other is the voyage contract/agreement with shipowners/bareboat charterers37. 
Under the contractual relationship with shipowners/bareboat charterers, 
shipowners/bareboat charterers are not recognised as employers according to 
the Chinese law, who are obligated to contribute or pay Work-related Injury 
Insurance for seafarers. Regarding the contractual relationship with crew 
agencies/manning companies, the Ministry of Transport has made some 
efforts to define this contractual relationship as a labour contract relationship, 
which means imposing the obligation of arranging social insurance for 
seafarers on manning companies/crew agencies 38 . Nevertheless, in the 
industrial practice, many seafarers serving on vessels through 
‘recommendation’ by crew agencies/manning companies are not entered into 
any labour contract, and not covered by Work-related Injury Insurance.  
The issue of whether the labour contract relationship can be established or 
recognised between seafarers and manning companies/crew agencies has 
been debated extensively in judicial practice. For example, in 2011, the 
Supreme People’s Court provided a judicial reply to Tianjin Maritime Court’s 
query on the nature of the contract between a bosun and a Beijing manning 
                                                 
36
 Art.2 of Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2003) 
37
 Bareboat charterer is a party hiring unmanned ship from the shipowner 
within an agreed period, and the charterer needs to employ/hire seafarers on 
its own. 
38
 According to The Rules of Dispatching Chinese Seafarers to Foreign 
Vessels (2011) by Ministry of Transport and Communication stipulates that 
the licensed manning companies/crewing agencies to export seafarers on 
foreign vessels must ensure the seafarers sent to work on foreign vessels 
having labour contract with one of the following institutions: (1) the licensed 
manning company/crewing agency; (2) foreign shipowner; (3) Chinese 
shipping companies or other similar enterprises. 
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company. In this case, the bosun was sent to work on a vessel owned by an 
Israeli shipping company, and the bosun argued that the Beijing manning 
company should purchase his social insurance, but the Beijing manning 
company denied being the responsible employer and refused to pay the bosun 
social insurance premium. This dispute was firstly filed to Tianjin Maritime 
Court, and the Tribunal regarded the relationship between the bosun and the 
manning company as a factual labour relationship. In which case the manning 
company would be obliged to arrange social insurance for the bosun. 
However, the Supreme People’s Court later overruled this decision and 
decided that the contract be subject to the freedom contract39. Accordingly, 
there was no such clause stipulating the crew agencies’ obligations to 
contribute to the seafarer’s social security schemes, so the manning company 
was not liable to compensate the bosun.  
At the administrative regulation level, the Ministry of Transport has made 
efforts to oblige manning companies/crew agencies to arrange social 
insurance for seafarers themselves or through other shipping companies. 
However, in the judicial review process, the Supreme People’s Court’s reply 
dismisses the obligation of manning companies/crew agencies as employers 
defined in Chinese labour law. As a consequence, the judicial opinion 
undermined protection from administrative regulations. Thus seafarers’ rights 
as stipulated by the administrative rules are not enforceable in court 
proceedings.  
This questionable legal status of Chinese seafarers is peculiar compared with 
other Chinese workers. In terms of land-based workers in the situation of 
agency employment, the Labour Contract Law stipulates that in cases of 
work-related injuries, agencies are jointly liable for compensation. If agencies 
and principal employers fail to sign written labour contracts and arrange 
social insurance for workers, once workplace injuries occur, agencies and 
companies must take joint liabilities for workers’ compensation. This 
principle is strengthened by the Interim Provisions on Labour Dispatch (2014) 
                                                 
39
 See Yang Haishui v. Beijing Xinyusheng Shipping Management Company 
[the People’s Supreme Court (2011) MSTZ No.4] 
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promulgated by the Ministry of Human Resources & Social Security, 
However, the Interim Provisions on Labour Dispatch (2014) explicitly 
exclude the application on seafarers. The seafarers’ legal status rights and 
obligations of manning companies are still obscure, which increases the legal 
risks for seafarers’ claims. 
To sum up, the protective capacity of Work-related Injury Insurance for 
seafarers is extremely limited regarding coverage, compensation standards 
and procedural assistance. Chinese government departments, including the 
State Council and Ministry of Transport, make certain efforts through 
regulations and policies to increase the Work-related Injury Insurance 
coverage among seafarers. However, in industrial practice, considering the 
high expense of social insurance as a whole, manning companies are resistant 
to the social insurance, or just insure a few seafarers at the lowest insurance 
level. Thus, for many seafarers, Work-related Injury Insurance is just 
“ornamental”. Also, once companies refuse to pay compensation, seafarers’ 
claims are easily expired. The considerable legal risk due to the controversial 
opinions regarding the obligations of manning companies and/or shipowners 
is also another barrier for seafarers who seek remedies in the non-fault based 
workers’ compensation system. The low compensation standards, short time-
bar and uncertainty of judicial opinions are three impediments to Chinese 
seafarers’ obtaining sufficient compensation in the context of the social 
security system. 
 4.3.2 Civil Tort Liability System  
Aside from Work-related Injury Insurance, victims of workplace accidents at 
sea are entitled to claim compensation according to civil tort law. Claims are 
pursued through maritime courts. The burden of proof is stricter, and the 
procedure is more time-consuming, compared to the Work-related Injury 
Insurance System.  
If an injured seafarer finds the contract either with the manning 
company/crew agency or shipping company is so ambiguous that s/he is 
unlikely to claim work-related injury insurance compensation successfully, 
the victim is entitled to seek compensation directly from the owner of the ship 
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he serves. Shipowners, regardless of nationality, are liable to compensate 
their crew for losses arising from workplace accidents, under civil tort 
liability. 
The applicable legal instruments include (1) Interpretation of the Supreme 
People's Court of Some Issues Concerning the Application of Law for the 
Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury (2004) (hereinafter 
referred to as Interpretation on Compensation for Personal Injury) (2) Tort 
Law (2010) (3) Specific Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court for Trials 
on Foreign-related Personal Injuries and Death at Sea (1992-2012) 40 
(hereinafter referred to as Specific Provisions on Foreign-related Personal 
Injuries and Deaths at Sea).  
In relation to seafarers’ compensation claims, the core legal issues are (1) how 
to establish the liability of shipowners; (2) what compensation standards 
should apply; (3) how to obtain financial security from shipowners to ensure 
future judgements are enforceable. Also, considering shipping is a globalised 
industry, foreign-related factors affect the procedural entitlements of both 
shipowners and seafarers. 
1) Tort liabilities of the shipowner 
Before 2010, according to the Interpretation on Compensation for Personal 
Injury (2004), if a hired worker41 suffered injuries arising out of and in the 
course of service, the employer bore non-fault compensation liability. As a 
maritime judicial custom, injured seafarers were regarded as the hired 
                                                 
40
 This Supreme People’s Court judicial interpretation has been abolished on 
January 1st, 2013, in the middle of this research, about 6 months before my 
data collection. Although it is no longer effective, considering its great 
influence on seafarers’ injuries on foreign vessels during past 20 years, this 
thesis includes this legal instrument.  
41
 The worker defined in this judicial interpretation is different from the 
definition of employee in Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2011), 
which refers to the flexible employment relationship and the employer and 
worker do not have stable and long-term employment relationship. This 
employer-worker relationship clearly excludes the employer-employee 
labour relationship regulated by the Work-related Injury Insurance 
Regulation (2011).  
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workers by shipowners, and they were entitled to compensation regardless of 
shipowners’ fault (Wu, 2014).  
In 2010, Tort Law came into force, relating to hired workers’ injuries incurred 
during service. The new law provides that hired workers and their employers 
should share the loss based on the extent of their negligence42. This challenges 
the no-fault liability principle stipulated in the Interpretation on 
Compensation for Personal Injury (2004), since the Tort Law (2010) is a 
higher and later legal source than the Interpretation on Compensation for 
Personal Injury (2004). As one maritime judge commented:  
‘Tort Law (2010) has become a barrier for us to apply non-fault liability for 
seafarers’ compensation claims. Although there was a legislation gap 
regarding seafarers’ injury compensation, by interpreting the Interpretation 
on Compensation for Personal Injury (2004) Art. 13, we were able to award 
non-fault based compensation to injured seafarers. However, now, we have 
to apply the Tort Law (2010) to apply fault-based liability. We know this 
increase the difficulties for claimants, but we cannot make judicial decisions 
against the law. (MJ_GZ_X)’ 
Unlike the situation before 2010, now the seafarer claimant must provide 
evidence to show that shipowners were at some fault in relation to workplace 
accidents. As a result, the burden of proof for seafarers has become heavier43.  
2) Compensation Standards 
Specific Provisions on Foreign-related Personal Injuries and Deaths at Sea 
(1992-2012) and Interpretation on Compensation for Personal Injury (2004) 
provide different compensation levels. Specific Provisions on Foreign-
related Personal Injuries and Deaths at Sea (1992-2012) provided 
compensation standards based on seafarers’ actual incomes, while 
                                                 
42
 Tort Law (2010) Art. 35  
43
 In Ningbo Maritime Court, Justice Wu Shengshun has published an article 
appealing to exclude the application of the Art 35 of the Tort Law (2010) to 
the cases of workplace injuries of seafarers.  
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Interpretation on Compensation for Personal Injury (2004) sets the average 
income for the area of court as the base number.  
Between 1992 - 2012, Specific Provisions on Foreign-related Personal 
Injuries and Deaths at Sea (1992-2012) applied to workplace accidents of 
Chinese seafarers occurring on board in foreign territories, on foreign vessels, 
or caused by a collision with foreign ships. Interpretation on Compensation 
for Personal Injury (2004) applied to Chinese seafarers’ casualties occurred 
on Chinese vessels, within Chinese territory, or casualties caused by a 
collision between Chinese ships. However, in judicial practice (see Table 12), 
the Interpretation on Compensation for Personal Injury (2004) was also 
applied to seafarers involved in foreign-related seafarers’ casualties (see 
Table 13). This was mainly because the Specific Provisions on Foreign-
related Personal Injuries and Deaths at Sea (1992-2012) set up a limit for 
compensation liability of CNY 800,000 (about GBP 80,000). In some 
situations44, medical costs exceeded this amount makes the limit of CNY 
800,000 unfair. 
                                                 
44
 See Yu Xiaohong VS Paris Spring (1999) Ningbo Maritime Court. . In this 
case, the maritime court first broke the limit of CNY 800,000 in the case of 
personal injury at sea. 
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Table 12: Compensation Standards for Death according to Specific Provisions on 
Foreign-related Personal Injuries and Deaths at Sea (1992-2012)45 
Items Coverage Calculation Formula 
Earning loss 
caused by death 
Loss of income caused by seafarers’ 
death 
(70% ~ 75%)* X Annual 
income of seafarer X(Age of 
retirement** – Age of death) 
+ 
Annual income after 
retirement*10 years 
Medical fee Costs of medical treatment and nursing (if there is any before death of seafarer) 
Actual expense occurred 
 
Funeral Expenses Costs of corpse transport, cremation, 
ash box, and tomb 
Actual expense but within the 
limit of 6 months incomes of 
deceased seafarers 
Compensation for 
mental damage of 
close relatives 
Not specified Not specified 
Other necessary 
costs 
Costs of searching corpse, expenses of 
close relatives’ travelling and 
accommodation, and their earning loss 
occurred during coping with seafarer’s 
death. 
Actual expense occurred 
Notes:  
* 20%~25% is deducted as seafarers’ annual living cost 
** Age of retirement in China is 60 
*** The total compensation amount is limited to CNY 800,000. 
Table 13: Compensation standards of Death in Interpretation on Compensation for 
Personal Injury (2004) 
                                                 
45
 See Section 3 and Section 4 of Specific Provisions on Foreign-related 
Personal Injuries and Deaths at Sea (1992) 
Heads Coverage and calculation formula 
Medical fee Actual expense occurred, need to be evidenced by hospital’s invoices 
Funeral expectnses 
Six months x local average employee’s salary* of the area where the court 
entertaining the claim 
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Notes:  
* Local employee’s average salary is published by Local Statistics Bureau. Take Shanghai as 
an example, the average salary of 2012 is CNY 4,692 (about GBP 460).    
** All the statistics for per capita disposable income, consumption expenditure is 
ascertained by the Local Statistics Bureau of the area where the court is entertaining the 
claim. 
                                                 
46
 If the dependant is able to be supported or raised by any other person, the 
obligor to compensation may only compensate the proportion that the victim 
shall bear in accordance with the law; if there are more than one dependant, 
the accumulative annual compensation amount in total shall not exceed the 
amount of per capita consumption expenditures of urban/rural residents of the 
last year 
47
 If the dependant is older than 60, the formula is: Per capita urban 
consumption expenditure×[20-（actual age - 60）]. If the dependant is older 
than 75, the formula is Per capita urban consumption expenditure X 5 
48
 If the dependant is older than 60, the formula is: Per capita rural 
consumption expenditure × [20-（actual age - 60）]. If the dependant is older 
than 75, the formula is Per capita rural consumption expenditure X 5 
Death 
Compensation 
Urban 
Resident 
20 years x annual disposable income per capita of the urban area 
where the court entertaining the claim 
Rural 
Resident 
20 years x pure annual income per capita of the rural area where 
the court entertaining the claim 
Dependent is living 
allowance46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urban 
Resident 
Dependant < 18 years old 
Per capita urban consumption 
expenditure x (18 - actual age) 
Dependant > 18 years old,  
but with no Work Capacity 
and no income 
Per capita urban consumption 
expenditure x 20 years47 
Rural 
Resident 
Dependant < 18 years old 
Per capita rural consumption 
expenditure x (18-actual age) 
Dependant is older than 18 
years old but with no Work 
Capacityand no income 
Per capita rural consumption 
expenditure x 20 years48 
Damages for 
emotional distress 
According to the situations of tort, local living expense and the compensation 
capacity of fault party, the judges’ discretion, the amount is ascertained by 
judge’s discretion. 
Other property 
damages 
The amount is ascertained by judge’s discretion according to evidences 
providing by claimant. 
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*** If the victim is a rural resident, but the claimant can prove that he/she has resided in 
the urban area for more than one year, the compensation amounts can be ascertained 
according to urban calculation standards. 
Table 12 and Table 13 show the two sets of compensation standards for 
seafarers’ work-place fatalities within the Chinese tort legal system between 
1992 -2012. Aside from funeral expense, the compensation standards for 
injuries have similar items. Regarding workplace injury compensation, the 
injured seafarers are entitled to Earning loss caused by injuries/Disability 
compensation correspondingly. The calculation method is using the disability 
ratio49 ascertained by Judicial Assessment Institution multiplies the Earning 
loss caused by Deaths/Death compensation. In 2013, considering the long-
standing conflicts between the above two sets of compensation standards, the 
Supreme People’s Court decided to abolish Specific Provisions on Foreign-
related Personal Injuries and Deaths at Sea (1992). From then on, the 
compensation standard in Interpretation on Compensation for Personal 
Injury (2004) has become the sole standard for seafarers’ workplace 
casualties in Chinese tort law system.  
3) Seafarers’ claims and ship arrests 
According to Maritime Law (1992), workplace accidents trigger seafarers’ 
entitlements to maritime liens50. With this legal privilege, seafarer claimants 
are entitled to apply to arrest the ship on which their accident occurred51. 
Shipowners are then requested to provide sufficient financial guarantees to 
cover with compensation claimed by seafarers before applying for ship 
release. However, in reviewing an application, the tribunal may order the 
seafarer claimant to provide financial security for the arrest52. The amount of 
                                                 
49
 Disability ratio is corresponding to disability grades: Grade 10 ~ 10%, 
Grade 9 ~ 20%… and Grade 1 and death ~100%. 
50
 A maritime lien is the right of claimant to take priority in compensation 
against shipowners, bareboat charterers or ship operators with respect to the 
ship which gave rise to the claim. 
51 Special Maritime Procedure law of P. R. China, Article 21.  
52 In judicial practice, the amount of security is about two-week hire loss of 
the ship under arrest. 
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security is usually about two weeks loss hire for the ship involved, which is 
generally not affordable for seafarers. In 2015, the Supreme Court 
promulgated the Interpretation of Some Issues Concerning the Application of 
Law for the arrest and auction of Ships (2015). In this interpretation, to 
remove the procedural barrier for workplace accident victims, Art 4 stipulates 
that the tribunal may exempt the financial security obligations of the victims. 
After entertaining seafarers’ applications, within 48 hours, the court should 
make an order. If the order approves the application, then the court should 
arrest the involved ship forthwith. In the course of the arrest of a ship, if the 
shipowner/bareboat charterer fails to provide financial guarantees in 30 days, 
then the seafarer claimant is entitled to apply to auction the ship once the 
litigation proceeds in the maritime court.    
To secure workplace injury compensation claims, applying for a ship arrest 
is the most straightforward and efficient method of imposing pressures on 
liable shipowners in the maritime jurisdiction. If claimants can find out which 
Chinese ports a ship is calling at, and submit an application to the maritime 
court with jurisdiction, then their claims would be successfully preserved. 
However, in practice, this approach is not frequently used by seafarers. 
Among the 42 cases involved in this study, in only one did, the victims apply 
and achieve the ship arrest. In this research, I interviewed maritime legal 
professionals to understand why ship arrest is so little used53.  
Before 2015 when the Interpretation of Some Issues Concerning the 
Application of Law for the arrest and auction of Ships (2015)  came into force, 
there were some maritime judges with the opinion that seafarer claimants 
should provide security, which made this judicial procedure inaccessible to 
seafarers. One maritime judge explained her unwillingness to help seafarers 
arrest the ships: 
‘The value of the ship is very, very huge, so it is not reasonable to 
arrest or auction a ship just for one seafarer’s injury claim. If a 
                                                 
53
 For seafarers’ accounts, please see 6.3.4 
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seafarer applies to arrest the ship, then he must provide security.’ 
(MJ_TJ_L) 
Based on his rich experience of handling seafarers’ claims, a claim handler 
for a corresponding agent on behalf of P&I Clubs, explained the 
underutilisation of ship arrest among Chinese seafarers: 
‘In my opinion, 95 seafarers’ claims in 100 are settled by negotiation. 
Is there any seafarer applying arrest of the ship? I think maybe 1 in 
100. The legal cost of applying arrest of the ship, to be frank, is not 
high. However, firstly, seafarer claimants have no knowledge. 
Moreover, secondly, Chinese maritime lawyers may not be willing to 
arrest the ship on behalf of seafarers and then displease P&I clubs. If 
a seafarer claimant hires a labour lawyer, that lawyer will not know 
how to arrest ship through maritime court. Therefore, for seafarers, 
even with lawyers, it is still tough for them to arrest ships successfully.’ 
(CH_BJ_W) 
This claim handler pointed to lack of legal knowledge and professional legal 
assistance as two barriers to seafarers’ applications for ship arrests.  
Judges’ opinions and lawyers’ skills may also influence the outcomes of ship 
arrest applications. A maritime lawyer explained that judges’ sympathy for 
seafarers is crucial for arresting ships successfully:  
‘According to my experience, in some circumstances, the court will 
sympathise seafarers, and exempt security requests if seafarer has 
difficulties in preparing that money. However, it depends on, different 
courts, different judges hold different opinions. Last time, I applied 
arrest of the ship on behalf of a seafarer, the judge was not willing to 
approve and insisted that the seafarer needs to provide security, but I 
stayed there to try my best to persuade the judge. Finally, the judge 
issued the order in favour of the seafarer.’ (ML_QD_C) 
Another maritime judge explained their attitude towards seafarers’ 
application for ship arrests as follows: 
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‘Previously, in our court, when seafarer came to claim salaries or 
workplace casualties’ compensation, we would approve the 
application for the exemption of security. However, just from last year, 
I noticed that my colleagues started request security in these cases. 
This is possibly because the recent depression of shipping industry 
and so many claims filed to our courts. We are not able to deal with 
that many ship arrest applications. (MJ_GZ_D) 
Seafarers confront many uncertain factors in the civil tort liability system, 
including the burden of proof to establish shipowners’ fault liability, and the 
different opinions of maritime courts towards ship arrest applications. The 
litigation risks for seafarers are therefore high under tort law system.  
4) Special jurisdiction over seafarers’ claims 
In China, seafarers’ workplace injury claims are categorized as maritime 
claims. Maritime courts are special judicial authorities with jurisdiction over 
all maritime disputes. There are ten maritime courts in total in China54. If 
seafarers need to resolve a work-place injury dispute through litigation, they 
have to bring their claims to the maritime court with jurisdiction, which could 
be a maritime court near their residence, the port where they signed on or 
signed off, or the port where the accident occurred. Selecting the proper 
maritime court is crucial, in that it could determine the success of claims and 
compensation amounts. In addition, compared to the simplified claim 
approach of WIIS, maritime litigation requires strong professional knowledge 
of litigation techniques, which means that, without a maritime lawyer’s help, 
seafarers cannot access justice by themselves. (see 7.3.3.3) 
Seafarers are the only group of workers who are not subject to Labour 
Arbitration Tribunals and grassroots People’s Courts. The advantage of 
adopting this peculiar maritime jurisdiction is that alongside workplace 
injuries damages claims, seafarers are also able to arrest ships and impose 
                                                 
54
 Chinese Maritime courts are established in the following port cities: Dalian, 
Tianjin, Qingdao, Wuhan, Ningbo, Shanghai, Xiamen, Guangzhou, Beihai 
and Haikou.  
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pressure on shipowners through the maritime court. However, on the other 
hand, this peculiar jurisdiction makes the legal process too complicated for 
seafarers to understand and follow.  
For maritime judges, it is challenging to entertain and hear seafarer workplace 
injury disputes efficiently. One deputy head judge of a maritime court 
suggested uniting the jurisdiction over seafarers and other workers:  
‘Seafarers’ claims for workplace injuries damages, to be frank, would 
be better regulated by the Labour Arbitration Tribunals, which could 
provide workers’ simple and quick claim approach. Twenty years ago, 
the claims brought to maritime courts were rare, so the Supreme 
People’s Court put seafarers’ claims under the maritime jurisdiction. 
But now, we have too many maritime commercial disputes to hear. 
Seafarers’ claims involve vulnerable worker, which are not easy to 
address and increase the workload of our judges. We can entertain 
seafarers’ claims today. Seafarers prefer to bring claims to us rather 
than to the Labour Arbitration Tribunals, since they may believe we 
are more professional. However, on the other hand, bringing claims 
to our court also means a long litigation process awaits seafarers. We 
also conducted many studies on how to improve the trial efficiency of 
these claims, and we do not want seafarers to suffer lengthy litigation. 
We believe it should be better to unify the jurisdiction over seafarers 
and other workers.’ (MJ_GZ_Z)     
 
The special jurisdiction on seafarers’ claims for workplace injuries damages 
may provide a relatively professional trial, which may award fair and 
reasonable compensation for seafarers. Nevertheless, the lengthy and 
complicated procedure of litigation is a considerable barrier which should not 
be ignored. How to balance the professionalism of judicial review and 
convenient access for seafarers is a core question for jurisdiction reform 
regarding maritime labour disputes. 
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5) Special requirements for seafarers’ claims with foreign-
related factors  
In the shipping industry, Flags of Convenience (FOC) are common, and 
Chinese shipowners nowadays are inclined to take advantage of flagging-out 
(see 4.1). As a result, more and more Chinese seafarers are now working on 
non-Chinese flag vessels. Once these seafarers have claims arising from 
workplace accidents, their disputes contain foreign-related facts, and special 
procedural requirements may apply regarding the service of litigation 
documents, a period of presenting evidence, forms of evidence, and a time 
limit of trials. These special requirements are designed to ensure the papers 
are served to the right overseas defendants accurately and protect these 
defendants’ due procedural entitlements, but may create a tremendous 
challenge for seafarers (see 7.3.3.3).  
Also, in foreign-related cases, the periods for submitting bills of defence and 
presenting evidence for defendants are twice as long as the periods in 
domestic cases, which are 30 days counting from the day the defendant is 
served with the plaintiff’s bill of the claim55. Furthermore, the defendant, the 
shipowner/manager, is entitled to apply for several extensions to prepare for 
litigation. Considering the defendant is abroad, power of attorney should be 
notarized overseas, and then be authenticated by the Chinese Embassy, so the 
maritime court usually approves defendants’ extension applications 56 . 
Meanwhile, the court may also require the evidence presented by the 
defendant to be notarized and authenticated. As a result of these combined 
litigation preparation periods, seafarer claimants may need to wait for months 
or even years. Unlike domestic judicial trials, foreign-related maritime trials 
are not subject to the time limit of the trial, which is six months. For one of 
my participants this resulted in a litigation in which started in 2010 and was 
still unfinished in 2013. 
4.4 Summary 
                                                 
55
 Civil Procedures (2012) Art. 268. 
56
 Civil Procedures (2012) Art. 264. 
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The Chinese shipping industry has been transformed as private owned and 
foreign shipping companies have become the employers of Chinese seafarers. 
Meanwhile, third party crew supply has become a common practice for 
shipowners. As a consequence, industrial relations in the Chinese shipping 
industry have changed and created new challenges for the law and regulation 
regarding employer liabilities. As a result of neoliberal reform, working 
opportunities have increased for Chinese seafarers, but jobs have become 
flexible and precarious. In the previously planned economy, workers’ injury 
compensation schemes were all arranged by state-owned shipping enterprises. 
However, now, in the industrial context of the rapid growth of private and 
foreign shipping companies and crew agencies, research finds 45.92% 
Chinese seafarers do not have long-term labour contracts, and 58.05% are not 
covered by Work-related Injury Insurance schemes (Chen et al., 2014).  
Alongside the rapid reform in the shipping industry, the Chinese legal system 
has been transformed as well. From 1992 when Specific Provisions on 
Foreign-related Personal Injuries and Deaths at Sea (1992-2012) came into 
force, the debate regarding seafarers’ compensation claims has been ongoing. 
During this period, in 2004, the Wok-related Injury Insurance system was 
introduced, and non-fault liability compensation for precarious workers was 
established through the Interpretation on Compensation for Personal Injury 
(2004). Two legal approaches addressing seafarers’ workplace casualties in 
China were gradually established: one is Work-related Injury Insurance 
Regime as a social security protection, and the other is civil tort law approach 
under maritime jurisdiction.  
The relationship between seafarers and the Work-related Injury Insurance 
Regime is still being debated in legal spheres and judicial practice. The legal 
status of seafarers in this system is ambiguous. The coverage of this social 
insurance among seafarers is low: more than half of Chinese seafarers are not 
covered. Both crew agencies and seafarers do not find this social insurance is 
worth arranging. In the absence of Work-related Injury Insurance, seafarers’ 
entitlements are largely different from other groups of workers. This 
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inequality between seafarers and other groups of workers will be further 
discussed in Chapter Eight. 
Structural problems in civil tort law systems and maritime jurisdiction have 
also increased the unpredictability and uncertainty of seafarers’ claims. First 
of all, the legislation regarding seafarers’ claims for work-related casualties 
is unstable and has been continuously changing during the last twenty years, 
in particular, the Tort Law (2010), which undermines the fundament no-fault 
principle of seafarers’ workplace injury claims. This makes it difficult for 
seafarers to understand their rights and follow proper legal procedures, which 
also increases the unpredictability of their claims. Secondly, compensation 
standards are over complicated. The maritime court is required to take a 
neutral position between the seafarer claimant and shipowner/ship 
manager/manning company. Therefore, if a seafarer cannot choose the right 
compensation standards him/herself, the court may dismiss the seafarer’s 
compensation claim amounts. This presents seafarers with high risks. Thirdly, 
foreign-related factors complicate claims. Seafarers may suffer longer trials, 
more complicated procedures, and more unpredictable results. 
It can be concluded that the protection of seafarers’ rights under the current 
Chinese legal framework is difficult and complicated for seafarers. The 
following chapters will present empirical data regarding the organisational 
management of seafarers’ claims. Seafarers’ experiences of claims for 
workplace casualties’ compensation will be further described to illustrate the 
difficulties, and even harm, suffered by seafarers during claim processes.  
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Chapter Five: The Organisational 
Management of Workplace Accidents 
and Seafarers’ Claims 
Introduction 
The previous chapter showed the growth of non-state-owned shipowners and 
third party labour suppliers (crew agencies) in the shipping industry. Chapter 
4 also explained employers’ liabilities and Chinese seafarers’ rights following 
workplace accidents according to Chinese law. It identified several barriers 
and challenges in this legal framework which may negatively affect seafarers 
in securing their rights.  
Although the legislation and regulation have provided seafarers with certain 
entitlements and rights following workplace accidents, successful claims still 
depend on whether shipping companies fulfill their obligations. In terms of 
organisational management, shipping companies 57  are in charge of pre-
accident management of workplace casualties, on-site rescue and emergent 
treatment and post-accident compensation claim handling. The companies’ 
decisions in these three stages can considerably influence seafarers’ health 
and safety, welfare and treatment during recovery periods. Therefore, 
companies’ attitudes and choices in the management of workplace risk, 
accident and claims are important.  
This chapter examines a range of corporate legal risk management strategies 
regarding liabilities to seafarers. The chapter draws on interview data 
collected from fieldwork conducted with 22 managers and organisational 
documents from six shipping companies, nine manning companies and two 
insurance companies. 
The analysis will explore company practices in managing seafarers’ 
workplace accidents and claims. The presentation of findings is organised in 
two parts. The first section 5.1 addresses management strategies relating to 
                                                 
57
 Shipping companies include owners, managers and operators of ships.  
  
109 
 
risk transfer through insurance. These measures aim to ensure that seafarers 
are insured against the risks of workplace accidents, on the one hand; and 
what the companies agree to do to mitigate the loss to seafarers and their 
dependents once an accident occurs, on the other hand. The analysis goes 
further to highlight the different types of cover which shipping companies can 
opt for by using a comparison of seafarers working on ocean-going vessels 
against their colleagues engaged on coastal ships as well as comparisons 
based on type of corporate ownership. Section 5.2 addresses management 
strategies after workplace accidents, including controlling and scrutinising 
medical costs, ascertaining disability degree, setting up damages caps in 
disputes and claim settlements. In the analysis, some seafarers’ feedback and 
the IMO’s Corporate Social Responsibility guideline will also be referred in 
order to evaluate the conduct of shipping companies in China. 
5.1 Pre-accident legal risk management strategies  
The pre-accident legal risk management practices discussed represent 
companies’ responses to their potential liabilities arising from workplace 
accidents (Rose, 2012; Billah, 2014). The data from this research show that 
the strategies of different companies vary with ownership and business area. 
Ocean-going shipping companies and coastal shipping companies usually 
have different insurance coverage. In addition, shipping companies and crew 
agencies take different measures to control their liability, according to their 
different relationships with seafarers.  
Variations in legal risk management strategies can affect the level and 
adequacy of compensation available to seafarers disproportionately when 
accidents happen. For example, shipping companies may have insured their 
liabilities differently, and if a workplace fatality occurs, the company with a 
higher level of cover is more likely to offer high compensation than the one 
with a lower insurance cover level. Another complexity raised in the analysis 
in this section is the assignment of liabilities between shipowners and crew 
agencies. This complexity arises because of the growth of recruitment 
through crew agencies (see 4.2). While shipowners are liable for seafarers’ 
injuries primarily, crew agencies being third-party suppliers of crews, also 
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have certain responsibilities in managing legal risks, accidents and claims, 
including arranging social security and/or life insurance for seafarers, 
assisting seafarers’ access to medical treatment, and collecting evidence of 
expenses to assist shipowners to claim compensation from insurers. But crew 
agencies are only one of several important intermediaries between 
shipowners and seafarers in matters of workplace accidents and compensation 
claims. The involvement of marine insurers may also add to the complexity 
of the claim management process. For example, marine insurers can control 
compensation amounts either by handling claims directly via their 
correspondents or control the reimbursable amount for shipowners. This 
section addresses the variety of legal risk management strategies and 
discusses different business actors’ influences on the outcome of seafarers’ 
claims. The management strategies of ocean-going shipping companies will 
be introduced and will be followed with a consideration of, coastal trade 
shipping companies and manning companies.  
5.1.1 Ocean-going vessels’ legal risk management practice: liability 
cover and P&I Club’s memberships 
The 13 member insurers of the International Group of P&I Clubs provide 
liability cover for approximately 90% of the world’s ocean-going tonnage (IG 
P&I, 2016). Drawing on the interviews with the managers of ocean-going 
vessels, P&I Club liability cover is reported as a major measure to manage 
liabilities arising from crew injuries and fatalities. 
P&I club liability cover 
P&I insurance covers shipowner’s liability for all deaths, personal injuries 
which occur on board, including death or injury to crew, passengers, 
stevedores, pilots and visitors to the ship (Skuld, 2015). This insurance cover 
includes hospital, medical, funeral and repatriation expenses in respect of 
injured crews (Caesar et al., 2015; Skuld, 2015; North of England P&I 
Association, 2012). P&I clubs do not only cover costs and compensation 
arising from crew injuries/claims risks (Arnould and Gilman, 2008), but also 
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provide overseas claim-handling services for shipowners (Hazelwood and 
Semark, 2010).  
Unlike profitable insurance companies selling insurance products via 
contracts, P&I Clubs apply a member entry regime. Entry is effected once the 
name of the vessel is registered with the club (The Britannia Steam Ship 
Insurance Association Limited, 2015.; Hazelwood and Semark, 2010). All 
members share the loss arising from compensation liabilities to third parties 
by making an annual contribution (i.e. the calls) to the club fund (Hazelwood 
and Semark, 2010). When workplace accidents occur, the loss, compensation 
and relevant expenses to shipowners can be claimed from their clubs (Skuld, 
2015; Gard AS, 2008). 
With assistance from P&I Clubs’ global offices, it is possible for shipowners 
to control their loss and liability reasonably (Hazelwood and Semark, 2010). 
A chief claim manager of a state-owned shipowner company explains the 
advantages of P&I liability cover for her company:  
Most of our ocean-going vessels have been entered into the IG P&I 
Clubs. Firstly, the terms and conditions are humanistic. As long as we 
can justify our expenses for seafarers, they will recover our payments. 
Secondly, for our global lines, the worldwide P&I clubs’ 
correspondents and lawyers can provide us excellent services in 
handling accidents and claims for us. Thirdly, the transport cost of 
corpse and family overseas visits are all covered.  We find this liability 
insurance is reliable and humanistic and provides our seafarers 
additional security. (Ref: Shipowner_CA)  
Accordingly, P&I Clubs not only provide financial insurance cover, but also 
assist shipowners in claim handling and litigation management with their 
insurance and legal experts.  
Different liability insurance coverage of shipowners 
The limits of coverage and deductible amounts for seafarers’ casualties are 
various in different shipowners’ P&I mutual insurance schemes. Shipowners 
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can establish different compensation standards for their seafarers in crew 
management rules with their crew management companies. Correspondingly, 
these standards are usually confirmed as primary insurance coverage in the 
individual agreements (certificates of entry) between the club and member 
shipowners. The table below is a comparison of different shipping companies’ 
insurance schemes for their liabilities to seafarers (see Table 14)
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Company Name Responsibility period Pre-accident insurance Insurance amount 
limit 
Coverage of medical 
treatment 
Salary standard and 
limitation during 
medical treatment 
period 
Exclusion 
 
CA 
State-owned 
Service period on 
board 
Confirm all seafarers 
are covered by Work-
related Injury 
Insurance 
 Shipowner’s liability 
insurance from P&I 
Clubs 
CNY 539,100 (WIIR) 
(USD 87,374.4) 
CNY 1,000,000 (P&I) 
(USD 161,600)58 
Until recovery or 
permanent disability 
ascertained 
Average salary 
calculated according to 
12 months’ income 
before accident. 
Until recovery or 
permanent disability 
ascertained, usually 
cannot exceed 24 
months 
Injuries caused by 1) seamen’s’ 
wilful criminal conducts; 2) 
abuse of alcohol and drugs; 3) 
suicide and wilful self-injury 
conducts. 
 
SDX 
Non-state owned 
Service period on 
board 
Shipowner’s liability 
insurance from P&I 
Clubs 
USD 30,000 ~USD 
60,000 
Until recovery or 
permanent disability is 
ascertained, but 
cannot exceed 2 years 
Basic wages until 
recovery or permanent 
disability ascertained 
but cannot exceed 365 
days 
Injuries caused by seafarers’ 
negligence, including suicide, 
abuse of alcohol and drugs, 
fighting with others, 
disobeying orders and 
disciplines on board. 
SB 
(SG-U) 
Foreign   
(Asian) 
The duration of 
employment. 
Work-related Injury 
Insurance for agent-
employed officers and 
engineers; 
Shipowner’s liability 
insurance from P&I 
Clubs 
USD 140,000 for 
Master and C/E 
USD 125,000 for 
trainee master/CE, 
officers and engineers 
and cadets 
USD 100,000 for 
ratings 
Until seafarer is 
declared fit or the 
degree of disability has 
been established but 
cannot exceed two 
years 
Basic wages 
(Ranging from 
Ordinary Seaman USD 
461 to Master USD 
2087) 
Until recovery or 
permanent disability 
ascertained, but 
cannot exceed two 
years 
1) injuries caused by wilful 
neglect, fault or misconduct; 
2)chronic diseases contacted 
before the employment; 3) 
venereal diseases or AIDS 
TC 
(TW-X) 
Foreign  
(Asian) 
The duration of 
employment. 
Shipowner’s liability 
insurance from P&I 
Clubs 
USD 89,100 
(USD 17,820 for each 
child below 18, but 
four children at most) 
Until the seafarers is 
recovered or the 
degree of permanent 
disability has been 
assessed by the 
company designated 
physician, but cannot 
exceed two years 
Basic wages. 
Until the termination 
of medical treatment, 
but cannot exceed 2 
years. 
1)dental, optical appliances; 2) 
medical treatment for sexual 
disease, fighting, excessive 
consumption of alcohol and 
misuse of drugs 
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TD 
(TW-X2) 
Foreign 
(Asian) 
The duration of 
employment. 
Shipowner’s liability 
insurance from P&I 
Clubs 
USD 159,914 (Top 4) 
USD 127,932 (Other 
officers and engineers) 
USD 95,949 (Cadets 
and ratings) 
Until the seafarers is 
recovered or the 
degree of permanent 
disability has been 
assessed, but cannot 
exceed one year. 
Basic wages 
Until the termination 
of medical treatment, 
but cannot exceed 90 
days. 
(Data not available) 
UE 
(UK-Z) 
Foreign shipowner 
(European) 
Employment service 
period on board and 
traveling period 
from/to the gathering 
place and the vessel 
Shipowner’s liability 
insurance from P&I 
Clubs 
USD 80,000 (Officers) 
USD 60,000 (ratings) 
Plus USD 5000 for a 
child up to the age of 
21, but with the limit 
of three children. 
Until the seafarers is 
declared fit for duties 
or permanent disability 
is declared and 
assessed 
Basic wages. 
No more than 120 days 
from the date of sign-
off the vessel. 
(Data not available) 
TF 
(TW-S) Foreign 
shipowner 
(Asian) 
 
*ITF-CBA 
The duration of 
employment. 'Accident 
whilst in the 
employment of the 
company regardless of 
fault, including 
accidents occurring 
while traveling to or 
from the ship' 
The shipowner should 
pay contributions to 
the ITF Seafarers' 
International 
Assistance, Welfare 
and Protection fund. 
And 
Shipowner’s liability 
insurance from 
reputable P&I Clubs 
USD 159,914 
(Senior Officers) 
USD 127,932 
(Junior Officers) 
USD 93,154 (Ratings) 
Plus 
USD 19,190 
To each dependent 
child (maximum 4 
under the age of 18) 
As long as such 
attention is required or 
until the seafarer is 
repatriated. For 
sickness, up to 130 
days, company need to 
pay the medical 
attention after 
repatriation; for injury, 
as long as medical 
attention is required or 
permanent disability is 
determined. 
The basic wages shall 
be paid until the 
injured seafarers has 
been cured or until a 
medical determination 
is made concerning 
permanent disability. 
Permanent disability due to 
wilful acts 
 
Table 14: The comparison of different ocean-going shipowners’ insurance compensation schemes for seafarers’ workplace injuries  
Data Source: The crew management contracts collected by the author. 
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Different attitudes between state-owned and non-state-owned 
shipping companies 
The interviews with managers reveal that insurance schemes provide 
shipowners with different levels of compensation for seafarers (see Table 13). 
A major difference between state-owned company CA and other companies 
can be identified, which is that CA requires all seafarers serving on their 
vessels to be covered by Work-related Injury Insurance. Although Company 
CA has subcontracted the crew management to its sibling company, and no 
longer directly employs seafarers, Company CA still requires their sibling 
manning company to arrange social security insurance for the seafarers 
working on their ships. In addition, the liability insurance limit is CNY 
1,000,000 (USD 161,600), which is also the highest compared to all the other 
shipping companies’ schemes as far as this research is concerned. According 
to the chief manager of CA’s claim handling department, the current 
insurance scheme has recently been reformed. In this reform, not only was 
the liability insurance limit increased but also the changes also ensure that 
seafarers are protected by Work-related Injury Insurance according to the 
labour law. Her explanation for why the company decided to improve their 
financial risk management for seafarers’ workplace casualties is: 
As a state-owned company, we have to consider maintaining social 
stability as our political tasks. The previous CNY 200,000 standard 
for seafarers’ death accidents is far from enough today. Victims’ 
families will not accept that anymore, so we proposed a plan to 
increase our liability insurance limit to CNY 1,000,000 and then this 
standard was approved by our headquarters as a standard for all 
shipping companies in our group. About eight years ago, we hired a 
seafarer. His head was hit on board in Japan. As a result, he was 
reduced to a persistent vegetative state. He was not covered by social 
insurance and we could not find out which agency should be 
responsible for him. He was only 23. What a loss for his family! We 
had to take all the compensation liability eventually. Since then, we 
have been very strict about social security coverage of our seafarers 
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and will never accept any agency workers without social insurance, 
because none of us is able to take this huge liability for victims. 
Furthermore, once the headquarters start to investigate the accident, 
they would find we have not arranged the social insurance for 
seafarers. There would be an internal disciplinary punishment 
awaiting us. (Ref: Shipowner_CA) 
According to this manager’s account, the two major concerns for her 
company are 1) a political task for state-owned enterprise to maintain social 
stability; 2) to avoid their liabilities and potential disciplinary punishment 
because of breaking the Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation. In 
addition, safety production and social security law compliance are two crucial 
indices to evaluate state-owned enterprises’ performance by the government59. 
For non-state owned shipowners, there is not as much political obligation as 
State-owned enterprise in China, so their attitudes towards social insurance 
are different. A manager of a private shipping company explained their 
different concerns:  
We are different from state-owned companies. They have to control 
the rate of accidents and claims and follow the law as a fine example 
because that is their political task. We do not need to worry about this 
kind of political task too much. We can report all of our seafarers’ 
casualty claims to P&I Clubs. However, we cannot have Work-related 
Injury Insurance arranged for all seafarers due to the high cost, 
considering our profit margin is already very limited. As you know, 
the shipping economy has not recovered, our business is very difficult. 
To maintain our manning company’s license, so we have to arrange 
this Insurance for 100 of our seafarers. But even for these 100 
seafarers, we cannot pay the premium according to their wage as law 
required. We arrange the lowest social insurance premium for them, 
about 60% of the local average income.  (Ref: Shipowner_SDH) 
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Commission and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
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According to this account, this private shipowner mainly relies on P&I Club 
liability insurance as a pre-accident financial risk management measure, and 
declines to arrange adequate Work-related Injury Insurance due to the cost. 
According to the two different accounts above, it can be found that the state-
owned company’s financial risk management considers political 
ramifications more, whereas the greater concern of the non-state owned 
company is about their costs and their motivation for arranging seafarers’ 
insurance is mainly to maintain their license.  
The challenges of enforcing different shipowners’ compensation 
standards  
For managers on behalf of shipowners, compensation standards established 
“pre-accident” should help their crew managers to settle claims with seafarers 
efficiently with fewer disputes. This can work well in some shipping 
companies, for example, Company CA. A crew manager on behalf of 
Company CA explains how this definite compensation standard helps his 
claim management work:  
If a seafarer refuses our compensation offer. We could show him the 
company rules, and explain to him: “It is not necessary for me to cheat 
you, and I do not need to pay the money myself.” If we did not have 
these internal standards, I would really worry how to settle these 
claims and it would be extremely hard to persuade seafarers to accept 
our compensation offer since they might not trust us. (Ref: Ship 
management CA) 
For Company CA, with a large state-owned fleet, to enforce a definite 
compensation standard can be efficient and effective. However, for the crew 
managers in charge of Chinese seafarers working for different foreign 
shipowners, to enforce their shipowners’ compensation standards can be 
challenging. According to the Table 13, foreign shipowners have different 
internal compensation standards. The insurance limits range from USD 
60,000 to USD 159,914. The sick payment periods vary from 90 days to two 
years. The treatment period limits vary from one year, two years or until the 
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accidental injury is cured or a medical determination is made concerning 
permanent disability degree. Unlike the other four companies, the Company 
TF has not limited the medical treatment period for seafarers’ accidental 
injuries, this is possibly because the Company TF applies an International 
Transport Workers Federation Collective Agreement for Chinese seafarers, 
while the other four companies have not incorporated the ITF version 
completely into their employment agreements with their Chinese seafarers.  
Foreign shipowners need their crew agencies to execute their compensation 
standards with their Chinese seafarers. A manning company can have 
cooperation with several overseas shipping companies. To negotiate with 
their seafarers with different shipowners’ standards can be problematic. A 
crew manager on behalf of Companies TC, TD and UE explains the problems 
of enforcing different shipowners’ compensation standards to the seafarers: 
This European company UE only provides USD 60,000 insurance 
limit for ratings, much lower than the two Asian companies TC and 
TE. We sent our seafarers to different shipowners, but they usually 
have different compensation standards. These different standards 
make it very hard for us to negotiate with our seafarers. Company TE 
only give 90 days of basic wages as sick pay, while TC can give at 
most two years. We have a seafarer now who feel the 90 days’ sick 
pay limit is unfair because this is much lower than some other injured 
seafarers’ welfare. He still refuses to sign the Receipt and Release 
with the Shipowner TE. Even though we have shown the crew 
management contract to him and informed him of all the information. 
However, he still cannot accept this standard. As a crew manager, I 
wish the compensation could be higher for the seafarer but the 
shipowner wouldn’t agree. (Ref: Manning Company XH) 
This manager’s account indicates that it is difficult to enforce different 
shipowners’ compensation standards, since their seafarers can compare 
different standards with their colleagues and reject the TE’s lower standard.  
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Shipowners’ insurance compensation schemes and Chinese legal 
compensation standards 
It is a common strategy to employ P&I Clubs’ liability insurance to cover 
shipowners’ liabilities arising from seafarers’ workplace injuries. 
Nevertheless, unlike the compulsory employers’ liability insurance in some 
countries, such as the UK (Tyler, 2007), this liability insurance is not 
compulsory in China, so it is possible for shipowners not to adopt it. In this 
situation, without insurance cover, shipowners’ compensation capability and 
motivation may be decreased and making it more difficult for seafarers to 
claim compensation.  
Ocean shipping companies who enter their vessels into P&I clubs, can choose 
their compensation schemes for seafarers differently. Whether the 
compensation scheme shipowners have arranged pre-accident covers their 
highest legal liabilities to seafarers in China has become a crucial question. 
In this research, state-owned company CA had the highest insurance 
compensation amount among the eight companies, CNY 1,000,000 plus 
Work-related Injury Insurance. Among the other seven non-state owned 
companies, the TF Company had the highest insured amount, USD159, 914 
(CNY 987,253.07) for senior officers, according to the ITF version collective 
bargaining agreement. Company SDX had the lowest insurance limit, USD 
30,000 (CNY 185,209.5), among the eight companies. In non-state owned 
companies, insurance compensation ranged from USD 30,000 (CNY 
185,209.5) to USD 159,914 (CNY 987,253.07). 
According to Chinese Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation, one-off 
domestic work-related death compensation (non-fault based) was CNY 
539,100 (USD 87,374.4) in 2013 (See Chapter 4). According to 2003 Judicial 
Interpretation on Personal Injuries and Death, which is now regulating 
foreign-related seafarers’ casualties, the highest death compensation can only 
be CNY 858,88060 (USD 139,202.6). According to Chinese law, shipowners’ 
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compensation liability can be no less than USD 87,374.4 and for foreign 
shipowners, compensation liabilities can be even higher. Therefore, for 
Companies SDX and UE, their insurance coverage as stipulated in their crew 
management contracts is not sufficient to cover their liabilities in China. For 
Companies, TC, TD and SB, their contractual compensation schemes may 
not be able to cover their liabilities in some cases, if other expenses occur, 
including child supports, medical fee and funeral fee. In addition, TD 
Company’s limit of sick pay period to 90 days is shorter than the Chinese 
statutory sick pay period for work-related injuries: 12 months to 24 months. 
Consequently, some shipowners’ P&I insurance scheme cover is lower than 
Chinese statutory compensation standards, so they cannot cover their 
liabilities to workplace injury victims comprehensively. In some cases, P&I 
Clubs promise a second level insurance coverage, i.e. the higher shipowners’ 
liabilities arising from proper law rather than contractual crew compensation 
schemes. To break the primary contractual compensation schemes, the 
shipowners need to prove they are “legally bound to settle according to the 
law” (COE_B: a shipowner’s certificate of entry issued by his P&I Club). In 
this case, in order to bind shipowners to settle according to the law, the victim 
seafarer usually needs to initiate formal legal negotiation with a maritime 
lawyer’s help or initiate maritime litigation, and usually this is time 
consuming and costly.  
5.1.2 Coastal vessels’ financial risk management: liability insurance, 
personal life insurance and affiliation 
According to Chinese Labour Contract Law (2008), all shipping enterprises 
should employ their seafarers with formal labour contracts and contribute to 
their social security insurance. If a shipping enterprise recruits seafarers 
through a crew agency, then it becomes the agency’s liability to arrange social 
insurance for seafarers. If the crew agency fails to do so and workplace 
accidents occur, then shipping enterprises and crew agencies should take joint 
compensation liability for the victims. However, the legislative social security 
coverage for coastal seafarers cannot be fulfilled completely in practice. In 
many seafarers claims for occupational casualties, according to the maritime 
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courts’ investigation, the victims are not covered by Work-related Injury 
Insurance (for example, maritime judgements: (2014) GHFCZ No. 81961, 
(2011) GHFCZ No. 480, (2008) GHFCZ No. 395 and (2008) GHFCZ 
No.457). Coastal shipowners’ failure to arrange Work-related Injury 
Insurance has become a common trial issue by maritime courts (Ningbo 
Maritime Court, 2014). The Ningbo Maritime Court’s Annual Judicial Report 
2013 explains why seafarers’ workplace injuries claims are often challenging 
for judicial trials: 
The shipping market management is in disorder, and the crew bear 
greater risk. Regular shipping companies, to avoid the costs of 
training, pension, Work-related Injury Insurance, housing, are 
reluctant to employ long-term crew and turn to on-call precarious 
seafarers. […] Correspondingly, the seafarers’ security is not 
adequate, the regulation of crew agency is not satisfactory, and the 
seafarers’ recruitment market is chaotic. Once the crew labour 
dispute occurs, crew agency often argues that they are intermediaries; 
there is no labour contract between them and their crew. (Ningbo 
Maritime Court, 2014) 
According to the findings from judicial practice, this research finds that 
coastal shipping companies’ financial risk management practice can deviate 
from employers’ legal obligations. The question of how the coastal shipping 
companies manage their risks of crew workplace casualties needs to be 
further explored in the context of the Chinese shipping market.  
(1) Liability insurance 
There is a clear difference in the crew management contracts for ocean-going 
vessels and coastal vessels. Shipowners adopt different insurance strategies 
to control risks arising from workplace accidents, with owners of coastal 
vessels opting for commercial insurance rather than the P&I Club liability 
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cover that ocean going vessel owners select. For example, a clause in a Crew 
Management Contract for ocean going vessels provides: 
The PRINCIPAL shall arrange for full Protection and Indemnity 
Coverage for all the SEAFARERS employed under this Agreement 
with a reputable P&I Club, particularly in regard to the payment of 
compensation for death or personal injury …whilst serving on board 
or traveling from/to the gathering place and the vessel. (CMC_EMC: 
Crew Management Contract for Ocean-going vessels) 
In contrast, a crew management contract for costal vessels stipulates: 
Whilst the seafarers serve on board, the Party A (the shipping 
company) shall purchase commercial insurance for the seafarers 
supplied by Party B (the manning company), and the insurance 
coverage in regard to death compensation shall not be lower than 
CNY 550,000. (Ref: CMC_THS: Crew management contract for 
coastal vessels) 
Joining IG P&I Clubs’ mutual insurance scheme is not common for coastal 
shipping companies in the maritime industry (North of England P&I 
Association, 2012). One reason is the marine risks in coastal waters are 
usually lower than in deep-sea areas. For example, in the coastal area, piracy 
is not a concern for shipowners in China. Thus, IG P&I Clubs’ comprehensive 
and expensive insurance coverage may not be appropriate for Chinese coastal 
vessels and they can choose fixed-rate commercial insurance to cover their 
liabilities arising from ship operation, including crew casualties. They also 
prefer commercial insurance to contributions to the Work-related Injury 
Insurance. A maritime lawyer on behalf of the coastal shipowner explains the 
reason why they decide to adopt liability insurance rather than Work-related 
Injury Insurance:  
Coastal shipowners usually do not have the Work-related Injury 
Insurance for their seafarers. This is because to purchase it is more 
complicated than commercial liability insurance for the shipowner 
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and troublesome for seafarers as well. Seafarers are flexible and 
temporary workers and they may work for one ship for several months 
and then jump to another ship and another company. (Ref: Maritime 
Lawyer_GZ_L)  
Another coastal shipping manager also verifies this arrangement:  
We would like to arrange commercial liability insurance for the 
vessels under our management, because the liability insurance can 
reduce the risks for shipowners and us. For the private shipowners, 
usually there is no Work-related Injury Insurance for their seafarers 
and we usually think liability insurance will be enough to cover 
shipowners’ compensation liabilities. (Ref: Ship Management 
Com_NJ_Y) 
These accounts reveal the phenomenon that some coastal shipping companies 
replace the compulsory Work-related Injury Insurance with commercial 
liability insurance. However, such liability insurance is generally insufficient 
in terms of their potential liability for compensation arising from crew 
casualties? Unlike P&I Clubs’ mutual insurance schemes, which have a 
second layer to cover shipowners’ actual legal liabilities, commercial 
insurance coverage is capped with a one-layer limit, such as CNY 300,000 ~ 
CNY 550,000 (Ref: Insurance Contract_FJ, Insurance Contract_CS), which 
is lower than Chinese legal workplace death compensation standards (see 
Chapter 4). If a shipowner’s negligence is deemed to cause crew casualties, 
then tort liability is constituted, and commercial insurance cannot cover the 
shipowners’ liabilities comprehensively (see Chapter 4).  
Commercial insurance against seafarers’ injuries claims is not compulsory for 
coastal shipowners either by law or by commercial customs62. Therefore, to 
minimise the cost, some shipowners may choose not to arrange such 
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insurance. They may arrange low insurance cover to minimise the cost of 
premiums. As one coastal ship manager explained: 
We usually help the private shipowners to arrange their hull and 
liability insurance. But they are not willing to pay the premium and 
would like save every penny. In one case, we recommended to them 
the insurance amount of CNY 600,000, but they reduced it to CNY 
400,000. Eventually, the family of the victim would not accept it and 
as management company, we offered an extra CNY 250,000 to settle 
the claim. (SMC_NJ_Y)  
A private shipowner SD_SO_X explains his unwillingness to purchase 
insurance as follows:  
‘we don't want to have the insurance anymore. The insurance 
company is not reliable and is always evading their compensation 
liabilities. They asked us to provide a lot of evidence, which was 
troublesome for us. I am one of the shipowners and the captain. I think 
that serious marine accidents are rare. Property loss occurs more 
frequently than personal injuries, so we do not worry too much about 
workplace injuries. The so-called social security insurance is usually 
useless for us. We are working at sea, so we cannot enjoy those 
benefits like those people staying at home.’ (SD_SO_X) 
According to the two accounts above of the shipping manager and the private 
shipowner, in the Chinese coastal shipping industry, in some cases, the 
private shipowners do not recognise the necessity of liability insurance and 
may reserve the risk on their own. Without insurance cover, the loss must be 
borne either by shipowners or victims seafarers, which exacerbates conflicts 
between shipowners and seafarers.  
(2) Group life insurance  
Coastal shipowners may purchase group personal life insurance instead of 
liability insurance to cover their compensation liabilities for seafarers’ 
injuries (Ref: Manning Company_NJ_D, Maritime Lawyer_GZ_L). 
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According to Chinese law, this insurance cannot replace liability insurance 
and should be regarded as seafarers’ extra welfare rather than the coverage of 
shipowners’ liability, nevertheless, group life insurance is still widely adopted 
by coastal shipowners aiming to avoid their compensation liabilities. There is 
a concern with life insurance as a financial risk management measure. This 
concern relates to the need for seafarers to be personally named in order to be 
covered by the insurance. Therefore, in order to provide proper insurance 
coverage for all seafarers on duty, the shipowner must update the information 
held about the crew on board frequently; any delay can cause the insurance 
contract to be invalid. Taking a maritime casualty in 2013 as an example, 12 
seafarers were killed when a coastal vessel sank. The shipowner had 
purchased personal life insurance for his 12 seafarers, but he failed to update 
the information relates to the seven seafarers who had recently signed on. As 
a consequence, the insurance company refused to pay the death compensation 
for these seven seafarers63. The shipowner remained the direct legally liable 
party for the seafarers’ death compensation even though the insurance 
company refused to make the payment. However, in this case, the 
shipowner’s attitude towards compensation had become negative in the 
negotiation after realizing that the insurance company would not compensate 
for the death of his seven seafarers. As reported by a claimant, after 
communicating with the insurance company, the shipowner withdrew from 
the compensation negotiation with the victims’ families (Ref: SF_HNNY_Y). 
This case illustrates that once the insurance company refuses to cover 
seafarers, their families may struggle to secure alternative compensation.  
This improper arrangement may be caused by shipowners’ misunderstanding 
of the two types of insurance. Coastal shipowners usually are not experts in 
marine insurance. The shipowner in the case above reported to the media: 
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When I purchased the insurance, the insurance company promised 
they would compensate me if an accident occurred, but never told me 
that it was necessary to update the crew list.64  
In the coastal shipping industry, such misunderstandings are common 
problem.  A maritime lawyer who acted on behalf of Chinese coastal 
shipowners explains this problem as following:  
Most of my clients cannot understand why the personal life insurance 
cannot cover their liabilities. They thought if they had not purchased 
the group life insurance for the seafarers, then the seafarer could not 
obtain the insurance compensation, so the insurance compensation 
should contradict their liabilities. However, according to the law, life 
and health is invaluable so there is no fixed financial insurance value 
limit for the death compensation.  The shipowners misunderstood the 
nature of personal insurance and wrongly regarded it as liability 
insurance. If they want to cover their liabilities to crew claims, 
commercial liability insurance is the right type of insurance’ (Ref: 
Maritime Lawyer_GZ_L).  
Shipowners’ misunderstanding of two types of insurance will cause not only 
legal risks and financial pressures for themselves but also increase the 
difficulty of negotiation for the victims since their claims are not secured by 
any kind of insurance. 
(3) Coastal vessel’s affiliation 
Private shipping capital has contributed significantly to the increase in 
Chinese domestic fleet (See 4.1). However, this increase causes challenges 
for maritime safety administration. In 2001, the Ministry of Transport 
announced the Notice Regarding Regulating and Standardising the 
Operation and Management of Ships Owned by Private Individuals (2001). 
This notice points out: 
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 http://www.ship.sh/news_detail.php?nid=11168 
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Due to the limited capability of private shipowners, and the lack of 
proper safety management measures, private transport vessels, in 
particular passenger ships and liquid chemical carriers, have become 
significant safety hazards. Meanwhile, to escape administration, 
private shipowners adopt the ‘affiliation’ management model, which 
causes obscurities in legal liabilities and unfair competition in the 
shipping market 65.  
In the shipping market, the reputation of private-owned ships is also a concern 
for suppliers of crews. A state-owned manning company manager 
commented on individual private coastal shipowners as follows: 
We would never supply our seafarers to private coastal trade vessels. 
These shipowners, are not dedicated to safety management and our 
seafarers cannot obtain adequate insurance protection from this kind 
of vessels. One captain told me that he soon resigned from a private 
company, because there was no safety equipment on board at all. He 
learned the insurance for workplace death was only CNY 60,000 and 
he would not risk his life on these private-owned coastal vessels (Ref: 
Manning Company_QZ_S)  
In judicial practice, coastal vessel affiliations have become a considerable 
challenge in ascertaining legal liabilities and executing effective judgements 
(Shanghai Maritime Court, 2011).  
In the Notice Regarding Regulating and Standardising the Operation and 
Management of Ships Owned by Private Individuals (2001), the Ministry of 
Transport requires that privately-owned vessels must entrust a licenced and 
qualified ship management company with the conduct of safety management 
on board. This ship management company must bear joint and several safety 
liability for the entrusted vessels. The purpose of this government measure is 
to require privately-owned vessels to operate under the effective safety 
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761.html 
  
 
 
128
management of qualified shipping enterprises, in order to improve financial 
risk management. However, some management companies charge a 
management fee to private shipowners but do not conduct effective safety 
management supervision on affiliated vessels (Xu, 2013; Hu and Han, 2015). 
Although the Ministry of Transport and the People’s Supreme Court require 
the management company and private shipowner to take joint liability in 
relation to safety accidents, management companies usually refuse to take 
this liability. The common defences by management companies in maritime 
court hearings are as follows: (1) the defendant is only the affiliated ship 
management company, so the private shipowners should be the only 
responsible parties; (2) according to the affiliation management agreement 
between the company and shipowners, the management company should not 
have any liability to injured/killed seafarers (Judgements (2006) YNMCHZ 
No.551, (2011) GHFCZ No. 287). Interviewees from ship management 
companies explained how it was improper for them to be regarded as liable 
in such situations, one explained that: 
The private shipowner affiliated his vessel to our company, and we 
help him to arrange relevant insurance and help him to establish 
safety management according to National Safety Management System. 
But the daily management is in the control of the private shipowner. 
He recruited his seafarers on his own. We do not know whether he 
signed labour contracts with his seafarers or not. The sinking of the 
vessel was caused by the shipowner’s order of overloading of sand, 
not caused by our fault. (Ref: SMC_NJ_Y)  
These duplicate relationships between management companies and private 
shipowners have caused liability with regard to crew casualties to be 
controversial. If a workplace injury accident occurs on this type of vessel, the 
two parties are not willing to shoulder their responsibilities to victims. On one 
hand, private individual shipowner’s compensation capability is limited, 
because the vessel involved is usually the only executable property, and it 
may be seriously damaged in the marine casualty (Shanghai Maritime Court, 
2011). In some cases, private shipowners were themselves killed in the 
  
 
 
129
marine casualty and were therefore not in a position to pay compensation. 
Obtaining compensation from deceased shipowners’ beneficiaries is difficult, 
because the inherited property may not cover the shipowners’ liabilities 
sufficiently (Zhang, 2008). On the other hand, management companies will 
reject any responsibility in court hearings because they were not involved 
with the ship’s actual operation (Judgements: (2006)YNMCHZ No.551, 
(2011) GHFCZ No. 287) . Claims for damages by seafarers working on this 
type of ship can therefore be extremely difficult in both negotiation and 
litigation.  
To sum up, insurance is a major financial risk management measure for 
shipping companies with regard to seafarer casualties. The contribution of 
insurance has improved shipowners’ compensation capability. However, 
examination of the different financial risk management practices of ocean-
going vessels and coastal vessels reveals that some problems still remain, 
including inadequate insurance coverage and improper insurance selection. 
In addition, in the Chinese coastal shipping market, the negative impact of 
privatisation reform cannot be overlooked. The affiliated management 
practices relating to privately-owned coastal vessels also increases the 
difficulty of securing compensation for seafarers in maritime courts.  
5.1.3 The financial risk management of manning companies before 
accidents: Work-related Injury Insurance and personal life insurance 
(1) Increasing risks encountered by manning companies  
Unlike shipping companies, whose legal liabilities to seafarers are direct and 
obvious, manning companies’ liabilities are more opaque and controversial 
as discussed in Chapter 4. When manning companies recruit seafarers on 
behalf of shipowners, then shipowners’ insurance arrangements should cover 
their seafarers. In such cases, it should not be necessary for manning 
companies to have independent financial risk management strategies. In this 
research, most of the interviewees from manning companies held this opinion 
and insisted that they did not have any independent liability in the event of 
seafarer injury/death. However, the cost of living in China has been 
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increasing significantly, and more regulatory obligations have therefore been 
imposed on crew agency/manning companies in order to protect Chinese 
seafarers. For example, manning companies supplying seafarers on foreign 
vessels, according to the Rules of Dispatching Chinese Seafarers to Foreign 
Vessels (2011), should formulate formal labour contract relationships with at 
least 100 seafarers and ensure that all seafarers supplied to foreign vessels are 
covered by social security insurance. In addition, they need to arrange extra 
commercial life insurance for the seafarers they supply abroad. According to 
Labour Contract Law, if crew agencies supplying seafarers on domestic 
vessels fail to contribute to seafarers’ social security schemes, once 
workplace accidents occur, they must accept joint liability with shipowners. 
Because of this regulatory reform, crew agencies and manning companies 
now confront higher legal liabilities than before.  
According to interviewees from manning companies, societal and economic 
change have considerably increased the needs of victims following an 
accident. The cost of living in urban areas has risen and created huge bubbles 
in the residential real estate market. However, increases in shipowners’ 
liability insurance lags behind these rises. All manager interviewees 
described the pressure they are under due to the tremendous growth of living 
cost in China today. For example, a manager complained about the limitation 
of shipowners’ liability insurance:  
One of our shipowners only provides USD 60,000 at most for injury 
and death compensation, which is far from enough to persuade any 
victim’s family to accept this amount. If the shipowner is unwilling to 
contribute more, the situation will be very embarrassing, because we 
have to cover the gap to fulfil the victims’ claim. (Ref: MC_XM_L) 
This concern indicates there is a gap between the shipowners’ liability and 
the victim’s increasing need. This gap presents manning companies with 
more pressure and greater risks from seafarers’ claims. From the manning 
companies’ perspective, another significant factor that increases victims’ 
expectations is the increasing compensation standards in relation to public 
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safety accidents (e.g. Wenzhou Bullet Train Accident (2011) and Xiamen Bus 
Rapid Transit fire accident (2011)). In such accidents, compensation amounts 
paid to the surviving families can be as high as CNY 1,000,000. Therefore, 
victims’ expectations from death and disability compensation have increased. 
However, the foreign shipowners’’ liability insurance cap is usually below 
this compensation amount, roughly between USD 60,000 (CNY 372,456) to 
USD 140,000 (CNY875, 063)66. Thus, the compensation scheme provided by 
overseas shipowners cannot fulfil claimants’ expectations, and victims regard 
the manning companies as another source of compensation. As said by 
another manning manager: 
The seafarers cannot fight with the shipowner abroad, so they will 
come to fight with us. The shipowners’ compensation standard is 
lower than that for the victims of Wenzhou Bullet Train Accident 
(2011) and Xiamen Bus Rapid Transit fire accident. The relatives of 
the victim felt it was unfair for them, so they kept fighting with us. 
They were very troublesome. To cater for them during the negotiation 
was very costly. Now it is hard for us to recruit a seafarer, and once 
an accident happens, it will cause us endless costs and trouble. (Ref: 
MC_XM_H)  
Manning companies can still term themselves middle men instead of 
employers and argue with workplace accident victims that they should not be 
responsible for compensation. However, in reality, manning companies are 
on the frontline in negotiating compensation with victims. The accusation of 
irresponsibility by victims can result in confrontations and even attacks. The 
manning manager MC_XM_H described the negotiation situation like this:  
Sometimes the relatives of seafarers can be mad at us, and they would 
never listen to any of our explanations. They may gather all their 
relatives, friends and fellows to occupy our office and even smash our 
computers and furniture. It has become more and more challenging 
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 Data source: crew management contracts collected in the fieldwork 
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for us to settle disputes, since the cost of living has risen so 
dramatically in recent years. Seafarers are more unwilling to accept 
solely shipowners’ compensation schemes, gradually claiming more 
compensation from us, and therefore we are now encountering more 
liabilities. This kind of business has now become so difficult. (Ref: 
MC_XM_H) 
Manning companies face direct pressures from the families of victims, and 
negotiations can get out of control when victims’ families regard the 
compensation amount which is offered as partial or inadequate. Desperate 
and wrathful families may even resort to violent attacks on the property or 
staff of the manning company (see Chapter 6). As a result, manning 
companies are exposed to increasing risks arising from the disputes, 
especially with families of deceased seafarers.  
In addition, the promulgation of the Labour Contract Law (2008) has 
increased Chinese labour’s awareness of law and workers’ rights. New 
graduates from maritime universities or navigation colleges have a stronger 
belief that their rights should be protected and they are more entitled to social 
insurance than other, land-based, workers (Ref: MC_QD_Y and MC_NJ_Z). 
Some of them have submitted arbitration applications to the local Labour 
Arbitration Committee to claim their rights in cases when the manning 
company refuses to contribute to their social insurance schemes (including 
Work-related Injury Insurance). This has created stress for manning 
companies. As one manager explained:  
It is no longer news that we are sued at the Labour Arbitration 
Committee. The awareness of legal rights of seafarers, especially 
university graduates, has increased. As an enterprise, we have 
encountered an increasing amount of pressure from seafarers’ 
requirement for social security.” (MC_QD_Y). 
With seafarers’ growing awareness of rights, manning companies have had 
to reconsider their legal liabilities. 
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Therefore, the gap between shipowners’ liability insurance and seafarers’ 
growing financial need in mainland China, the increasing obligations 
imposed by the regulations, and the growing legal awareness of workers, have 
made manning companies realise the importance of taking independent 
financial risk control measures.   
(2) Work-related Injury Insurance and life insurance 
To control the aforementioned increasing risks, Chinese manning companies, 
in particular those who supply seafarers for foreign shipowners, have begun 
to adopt relevant financial risk management measures before workplace 
accidents. According to the interviewed managers’ accounts, they have 
various insurance schemes for different types of seafarers. As the manager 
MC_QD_Y said:  
We have purchased social insurance for university graduates who 
have formulated a long term labour contract relationship with us. For 
the freelancing seafarers sent to foreign vessels through our company, 
we will purchase a temporary life insurance policy. (MC_QD_Y)  
The insurance coverage that is arranged is different for different types of 
seafarers. The manager MC_QD_Y added:  
We have insurance coverage of CNY 350,000 for seafarers formally 
employed by us, considering they already have social insurance. For 
the freelancing seafarers, considering they don’t have social security 
we have coverage of CNY 550,000. If the worst death accident 
happens, together with shipowners’ P&I insurance coverage, we can 
have over CNY 1,000,000 for victims’ families and this amount is 
acceptable in China so far.  
Another manager MC_XM_L explained why they have different insurance 
arrangements for different ranks of seafarers as follow:  
“For officers and engineers, they already have social security 
protection through our company, so we arrange the insurance 
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coverage of CNY 350,000 for them. For ratings who do not have 
social security protection, we arrange CNY 550,000 for them. In 
addition, the shipowners’ P&I insurance schemes usually compensate 
officers higher than ratings, so we have to prove a higher life 
insurance coverage for our ratings to make the compensation offer 
much more acceptable to the rating victims and their families. We are 
trying to accumulate money from different sources to offer victims a 
more acceptable compensation amount, because shipowners’ P&I 
club insurance coverage is no longer enough, especially in the case 
of workplace death.” (MC_XM_L) 
The two quotes above indicate that the manning companies apply social 
security insurance and commercial life insurance to their seafarers employed 
on a long-term basis, but for flexible/precarious seafarers, the companies 
apply commercial life insurance only. Nevertheless, to reduce the inequality 
between the employed seafarers and freelancing seafarers, especially in the 
case of death compensation, the manning companies insure freelancing 
seafarers and ratings at a higher level.   
The combination of Work-related Injury Insurance and commercial life 
insurance is a compromise between governments, manning companies and 
seafarers. The compulsory social security insurance, as discussed in Chapter 
4, has confronted strong resistance from manning companies because it 
increases the human resource cost. In addition, the bureaucratic atmosphere 
of the public administration institution makes both manning companies and 
seafarers frustrated and disappointed when they need to make a compensation 
claim. However, without this coverage of compulsory social insurance, 
manning companies are exposed to serious legal risks and pressures from the 
claimants. Therefore, to avoid a significant increase in the human resource 
cost and to provide higher compensation for seafarers, commercial life 
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insurance has become a compromise replacement for compulsory Work-
related Injury Insurance67.  
(3) Evaluation of manning companies legal risk management 
strategies 
As discussed above, manning companies’ pre-accident legal risk 
management is diversified in the complicated social and legal environment. 
Applying work-related injury insurance and/or commercial life insurance, in 
addition to shipowners’ P&I clubs’ liability insurance, the manning company 
can provide another source of compensation for their seafarers after the 
accident. However, these financial risk management measures still have some 
weaknesses.  
First, the coverage rate of Work-related Injury Insurance is insufficient. Due 
to the resistance from manning companies (see Chapter 4), the regulatory 
effort to make social security for seafarers compulsory turns out to be a 
compromise in practice, since manning companies are still able to categorise 
their seafarers as “on-call” workers. Many manning companies still regard 
themselves as the “middle men” for shipping companies. They insist that they 
have only signed contracts with seafarers on behalf of shipping companies 
rather than formed employment relationships with the seafarers. The manning 
companies believe the workplace for seafarers is not under their control, so 
they should not be liable for the purchase of social insurance for seafarers. 
The Ministry of Transport and Communication requires that manning 
companies must form employment relationships with at least 100 seafarers. 
Compared with the actual amount of seafarers, the number of seafarers who 
can benefit from this regulation is limited. Most of them are high ranking 
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 Taking Nanjing as an example, to cover a seafarer with Work-related Injury 
Insurance, the manning company need to pay at least CNY 851/month to the 
social security scheme (including pension, medical care, work-related injury, 
unemployment and maternity). But CNY 26/month is attributed to the Work-
related Injury Insurance. In contrast, to cover a seafarer with commercial life 
insurance (CNY 500,000), the manning company only need to pay CNY 
37.5/month.  
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officers and engineers, but ratings cannot usually enjoy these benefits. As a 
manager from a foreign-related manning company pointed out:  
It is not financially realistic for us to formally employ all seafarers. It 
would dramatically increase our human resource cost and the 
employers’ responsibilities are too strict. What we can do now is to 
just fulfil the minimum regulatory requirement: 100 employed 
seafarers at most. (Ref: MC_SH_W)  
Although the government makes regulatory efforts to standardize seafarers’ 
employment forms and regulates manning companies as domestic employers 
for seafarers, the effects of their efforts are insufficient in the face of 
companies’ financial concerns.  
Secondly, personal life insurance cannot be regarded as reliable security for 
victims. Manning companies have the decision-making power on whether to 
contribute to the life insurance, the insurance amount covered and the 
insurance period. However, seafarers cannot usually participate in this 
process. Since the aim of the insurance is to help the manning company to 
settle the compensation disputes more easily (Ref: MC_XM_L), manning 
companies can choose insurance schemes voluntarily, and they have no civil 
liability in law if they fail to arrange the insurance. In addition, manning 
companies can shift the cost of this insurance to their seafarers by requiring 
them to contribute to the insurance scheme. In this sense, the fact is that the 
seafarers contribute to their own insurance, but the manning company can 
take advantage of the insurance to cover their liabilities. Furthermore, 
seafarers cannot claim insurance compensation directly from the insurer 
because they do not have their own individual policies, and all they can do is 
rely on manning companies’ assistance in compensation claims. If the 
manning companies refuse to assist seafarers to claim this compensation, the 
seafarers have no evidence at hand to prove the existence of any cover relating 
to them. 
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Thirdly, there is no punishment for manning companies if they fail to 
purchase commercial insurance for seafarers. Unlike public compulsory 
social insurance, commercial insurance is a profitable business. This means 
that if the insurance companies identify that seafarers’ accident rates are 
higher than estimated, they can either increase the premium or refuse to renew 
insurance contracts. Therefore, whether commercial insurance can provide 
workplace accident victims with timely and stable compensation remains 
questionable.  
To sum up, the manning company’s insurance arrangement provides another 
source of compensation for seafarers, but the limited coverage of Work-
related Injury Insurance, the unpredictability of life insurance for seafarers, 
and the lack of government supervision over manning companies’ behaviour, 
altogether call the effects of manning companies’ financial risk management 
into question. 
5.2 Post-accident management of seafarers’ 
casualties/claims 
Managing crew casualties is challenging and costly for shipowners, 
especially because accidents can occur anywhere in the world, including in 
remote overseas ports or even on the high seas. In some regions of the world, 
medical treatment and resources may not be accessible or are limited so that 
the care for seafarers’ injuries is unsatisfactory. Workplace accidents on 
Chinese coastal vessels are comparatively easy to manage, because in 
Chinese ports, medical treatment is much more accessible and seafarers have 
no communication difficulties in a Chinese hospital. However, for many 
Chinese seafarers working on ocean-going ships, the situation could be more 
complicated as language barriers can make communication with healthcare 
personnel attending them difficult.  
This section will examine the management of workplace accidents and the 
management of claims. The ocean-going shipping companies’ management 
process is selected as an example to explain shipowners’ common 
management strategies. This is because the management process of ocean 
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shipping companies is more complex than that of coastal shipping companies. 
The discussion in this section considers management practices within ocean-
going companies and then how this compares with practices in the coastal 
shipping sector. In analysing the different management practices, the 
discussion will highlight the nature and extent of additional harm suffered by 
seafarers and their dependents after an accident has occurred.   
Once a workplace accident occurs to a Chinese seafarer, a prudent shipowner 
will usually inform their P&I Club immediately. Then the P&I Club will 
inform the nearest agent to assist the shipowner. This support normally 
includes arranging medical treatment and/or repatriation of the victim on 
behalf of the shipowner. After emergency medical treatment, if the seafarer 
is fit for a journey, the agent will repatriate the seafarer to China. In that case, 
the manning company will be informed to arrange further treatment for the 
seafarer after repatriation. Meanwhile, the personal injuries and death claims 
handling team of the P&I Club will be on standby to monitor the process and 
control treatment costs (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: The management flow of workplace accidents at sea 
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In cases of injuries, first aid at sea, emergency treatment and repatriation are 
controlled by the shipping companies. As a principle, once the seafarer has 
been repatriated, the shipowner’s responsibility pauses, and the manning 
companies start to arrange transport, medical treatment, and disability 
assessment (if necessary). Before repatriation, all the services needed for the 
injured seafarer should be arranged and paid for by shipowners and their 
agencies. After repatriation, manning companies, the Chinese P&I clubs’ 
correspondence agents will be involved in following up seafarers’ further 
medical treatment, to adjust the loss and compensation and eventually to 
settle the claim. 
5.2.2 Managing the transport of remains after workplace fatalities 
In the case of a seafarer’s death, if the International Transport Workers 
Federation-International Bargaining Forum Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (ITF-IBF CBA) applies to the Chinese casualty, or where the 
shipowner has promised repatriation of the body in the crew management 
contract, the shipowner must transport the body to the seafarer’s home at the 
families’ request. Shipowners would pay the cost of transport and burial 
expenses (Ref: ITF-NCSU Collective Agreement 2012, EMC-Crew 
Management Contract). However, transport of the body is not always covered 
for all Chinese seafarers. For example, in the case of one Chinese state-owned 
shipping company, a “no body transport” policy applies:  
The body of a seafarer should be cremated at the local port, and the 
company will not arrange bereaved families’ international trips to 
attend the cremation ceremony. (Ref: QCS_Crew Management Rules)  
Therefore, in terms of Chinese seafarers’ death, the practice where 
shipowners deprive the seafarer’s family of their human right to attend the 
cremation ceremony overseas may cause further psychological harm to the 
bereaved families (see 6.2.1).  
According to crew managers in this study, the normal practice is to negotiate 
death compensation after the funeral (see Figure 3). One manning company’s 
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chief manager XM_MC_S explained that the preference of many shipowners 
to enter into negotiations after the funeral is a result of a desire to prevent the 
cost implications arising from delays in transportation caused by seafarers’ 
family: 
Transport of the body can sometimes be a bargaining instrument. If 
the family is not satisfied with the compensation amount offered by 
the shipowner, they will refuse transport of the body, since they 
believe longer care of the body overseas may create extra cost for the 
shipowner.’ (XM_MC_S)  
However, the negotiation of death compensation claims can in fact begin 
prior to transport of the body and cremation. The bereaved wife SF_TJ_Z, 
whose husband worked for another shipowner, recounts: “The manning 
company asked me to accept the compensation offer first. Otherwise, they 
would not transport my husband’s body back.” (SF_TJ_Z)  
The contrast between the two accounts reveals that the process of handling 
seafarers’ death and accident compensation claims is antagonistic. Transport 
of the body can have opposite implications in different negotiations; it can be 
used in the favour of the shipowner’s party or of seafarers’ families. However, 
for the bereaved family, it is often a desperate choice to refuse transport of 
the body or cremation. Another bereaved seafarer’s wife SF_NJ_C explained 
that she used the refusal of cremation for her deceased husband to ask for 
more compensation in the interest of their daughter’s welfare:  
It sounds like I was brutal when I rejected the company’s proposal to 
cremate my husband as soon as possible. But at that moment, thinking 
of the unsatisfactory compensation amount, thinking of the future life 
of my 5-year-old daughter, I had to fight with the company and that is 
the only way that I could put pressure on the company. My father 
advised me that if I gave up fighting for a higher compensation or just 
forgave the company, I would put the future of my daughter at a great 
financial risk.” (SF_NJ_C)  
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In the case of a seafarers’ death, cremation and the complexity of transporting 
the remains is a challenge for both the seafarer’s family and their employer. 
Due to the different concerns of the different parties, the transport and 
cremation of the body can have complicated implications in the claims 
management process. 
5.2.3 Management of medical treatment and compensation claims after 
seafarers’ repatriation 
Once an injured seafarer has been repatriated, manning companies and P&I 
Clubs’ agents will help to arrange further medical treatment for them and 
consider any compensation claim arising from the accident. After the period 
of medical treatment has elapsed, the seafarer may be declared to have 
recovered or to be permanently disabled. 
The role of P&I Clubs through their claims handlers is to assist the shipowner 
in determining their liability (amount payable) arising from the accident. 
Based on their investigation, claims handlers may offer a compensation 
amount to the injured seafarer according to the receipts submitted by the 
seafarer through their manning company. Claims for medical expenses and 
towards the cost of transportation will be reimbursed according to any 
receipts and invoices presented. The sick pay and disability compensation 
amount is usually calculated according to the seafarers’ employment contract 
with the shipowner, the crew management contract between the manning 
company and shipowner and Chinese law. If the seafarer disagrees with the 
compensation offered, then the claim will become a dispute, which needs to 
be resolved by further negotiation or litigation. In this case, the P&I Club will 
usually recommend a maritime lawyer to handle the case on behalf of the 
shipowner. 
P&I Clubs typically cover all the costs incurred as a result of the injury or 
death of crew members, including the expense of ambulance services at sea, 
expenses of body transport, necessary medical treatment costs, disability and 
death compensation to seafarers. Additionally, the Clubs cover seafarers’ 
claim handling expenses, including lawyers’ fees. In order to secure this 
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coverage, shipowners must obtain P&I Clubs’ approval before making any 
payments to an injured seafarer. Accordingly, P&I Clubs have become 
dominant in the whole accident and claim handling process. The attitudes of 
P&I Clubs and their agents inevitably influence and may even determine the 
complexity of the compensation claims process and the final compensation 
amounts for ocean-going seafarers.  
Interviewees identified four important steps in handling seafarers’ claims 
after repatriation: (1) adopting a time limit for the medical treatment of 
seafarers, (2) scrutinising the medical costs and compensation claims, (3) 
choosing compensation standards most favourable for shipowners 
(Hazelwood and Semark, 2010), (4) settling the claim with proper legal 
techniques to avoid further liabilities. 
1. Limitation of medical treatment period  
To limit the duration of the medical treatment is a common approach to 
control expenses resulting from seafarers’ medical needs. This limitation can 
also help P&I Clubs to close insurance claims down quickly and avoid the 
additional workload caused by lengthy medical treatment. Some employment 
contracts, in particular collective bargaining contracts approved by ITF68, 
stipulate that if a seafarer is injured due to work-related reason, the shipowner 
is obliged to cover seafarers’ sick pay and medical treatment until the seafarer 
is fully recovered. However, in practice, there is a claim-handling rule that no 
matter how serious the injury is, the treatment period should not exceed two 
years. Sometimes, there are no formal clauses in the crew management 
contracts indicating this rule, but many seafarers and manning companies are 
informed that any cost accrued after two years from the day of the workplace 
accident will not be reimbursed. In this research, P&I Clubs’ representatives 
                                                 
68
 Although there is no Chinese seafarers’ union is permitted by the 
government to be affiliated with ITF (International Transport Workers 
Federation), in some jurisdictions, including Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Singapore, when Chinese seafarers work for shipowners from these area, the 
ITF approved Collective Bargaining Agreements can be applied to Chinese 
seafarers if their shipowners are required to apply CBA as standard 
recruitment contracts. 
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deny that they have implemented this rule to limit insurance compensation. 
Nevertheless, several manning companies admitted that their seafarers should 
be bound by this rule because their client, the shipowners, required this. 
According to several manning company managers’ accounts (Ref: 
MC_XM_H, MC_XM_L, MC_QD_Y,MC_XM_A), the aim of this rule is to 
complete the claim management and discharge shipowners’ liabilities 
relatively quickly, and the shipowners’ insurers aim is to limit their liabilities. 
The manager MC_XM_L pointed out:  
The longest medical treatment permit is two years. The shipowners 
informed us so, if the treatment is longer than two years, they would 
have trouble in claiming compensation from their insurers. Anyway, 
it is not reasonable for shipowners to wait more than two years for 
one seafarer’s recovery. It is a kind of industrial custom and tradition 
according to my experience. (MC_XM_L) 
However, from the perspective of seafarers, if they are not fully recovered 
within two years and require further treatment such as surgery, their situation 
will be difficult. An able seaman explained his dilemma caused by this rule: 
I also wish to finish all the treatment within two years and would 
recover well. But the doctor said I needed further treatment. The 
shipowners have reimbursed my sick pay and medical fee occurring 
within the first two years. You see, I cannot work now, and I really 
need further medical treatment, but my manager said I could not ask 
for more money and I had to pay the medical treatment on my own 
(Ref: SF_ZZ_S).  
Different workplace accidents cause different injuries and produce various 
medical needs for seafarers. However, in order to control the length of claims 
and amounts of compensation, shipowners and their insurers choose to limit 
their liabilities by imposing a time limit for medical treatment. This suggests 
that in situations where long-term care and follow-up medical treatment is 
required, seafarers may not be adequately compensated and have to deal with 
the extra burden of health care expenses and an undeclared incapacity to work.  
  
 
 
144
2.  Scrutinising medical costs and ascertaining the extent of 
disability   
As liability insurers, P&I Clubs need to investigate the genuineness of 
shipboard accidents to avoid insurance fraud or other unjustified costs. To 
control medical costs closely, P&I Clubs usually supervise the medical 
treatment process. The following is a P&I Club’s guideline relates to the 
monitoring of seafarers’ medical treatment: 
It is important that the medical condition and treatment of the crew 
member is monitored closely to make sure that the most effective care 
and attention is being given. The P&I clubs should also be kept 
informed so that any necessary action can be taken to protect the 
shipowner’s legal interests and ensure that the seafarer receives the 
most professional and cost-effective treatment. Costs of specialist 
care are covered if required and confirmed by medical advice. An 
independent doctor appointed by the P&I club’s local correspondent 
should preferably reconfirm such advice. Large hospital invoices 
should be submitted to the P&I club or its representative before being 
paid. In some countries there are companies which specialise in 
auditing such bills and if justified possibly reducing them. (North of 
England P&I Association, 2012: 54)  
The above quote reveals that the P&I Club controls the seafarers’ medical 
costs strictly and the club inclines not to trust the evidence without additional 
investigation: not only does the specialist care need to be doubly confirmed 
but all invoices need to be audited if possible.  
In addition to medical costs, the establishment of degree of disability as the 
outcome of a seafarer’s injury is another crucial element in determining 
seafarers’ disability compensation. However, establishing disability 
following workplace accidents can be controversial due to the multiple 
standards enforced by different authorities. In China, two institutions are 
qualified to issue degree of disability assessments: one is the labour capability 
assessment committee and the other is the judicial assessment committee. The 
labour capability assessment committee specialises in ascertaining the degree 
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of disability degree caused by workplace injuries. The judicial assessment 
committee ascertains the degree of disability resulting from injuries covered 
by tort, such as disabilities caused by traffic accidents. Theoretically speaking, 
seafarers’ workplace injuries should be assessed by the labour capability 
assessment committee according to the Standards for Disability Degree 
caused by Work-related Injuries and Occupational Diseases (GB/T 16180-
2006). However, in many cases, seafarers cannot access this Work Capacity 
Assessment Committee, if they cannot provide evidence of an existing labour 
contractual relationship (see section 7.2.3). Furthermore, manning companies 
do not register freelancing seafarers for Work-related Injury Insurance Fund, 
since they have not purchased the Work-related Injury Insurance. The labour 
capability assessment committee operates strict time limits in order to control 
the amount of cases it deals with. If the workplace accident occurred longer 
than one year ago, then the committee will not assess the disability degree for 
the seafarer involved (Wu, 2008). In this situation, many seafarers must have 
their disabilities assessed by the judicial assessment committees under the 
standard Disability Appraisal for the Injured in Traffic Accidents (see Table 
15). Shipowners’ crew management contracts may also attach ITF-IBF 
standards for the appraisal of seafarers’ injuries and disabilities. A P&I club 
claim executive provides a table to compare the difference between the three 
standards as follows: 
Table 15: A Comparison on the Compensation Level for seafarers’ Injuries 
 
Standards 
Injury Type 
ITF 
standard 
Disability Appraisal for 
the Injured in Traffic 
Accidents 
Standards for Disability 
Degree caused  
by Work-related Injuries 
and Occupational 
Diseases 
 
Loss of one eye 20% 50% 60%  
Index finger fracture healed wit
hout dysfunction 
0% 0% 10%  
Loss of one leg 65% 60% 70%  
Source: (Ju, 2012) 
  
 
 
146
Under the current system, the compensation level for one type of injury can 
have three results (see Table 15). This complicates the claim management 
process and different P&I clubs deal with the situation in different ways. One 
claim manager described how the procedure in her club was clearly 
established. She said:  
The legal practice clearly shows that the assessment for the injury 
subject to the labour law contract should use the Work Capacity 
Assessment; and the claim against foreign Shipowners should use the 
Traffic Accident Injury Assessment. When a member as a foreign 
shipowner decides to have the Chinese crew evaluated in Chinese 
Judicial Expertise Centres, the member is advised to ask the manning 
company to assess the crew according to the Traffic Accident Injury 
Assessment as this is the right regime under Chinese law. (Ju 2012) 
However, some other P&I claim executives had different opinions, and they 
insisted that seafarers’ workplace accidents should be assessed using the 
work-related injury assessment. As another P&I correspondent claim 
manager BJ_CH_W commented: 
Previously, one P&I Club wrote a paper, arguing that the claim 
against foreign shipowners should use the Traffic Accident Injury 
Assessment. But now when the seafarer applies disability assessment 
in a judicial assessment committee, the committee will also apply 
Work-related Injury Assessment to them, because they regard 
seafarers as workers. (Ref: BJ_CH_W)  
The examination of court records indicates that some seafarers’ claims are 
decided indeed according to Traffic Accident Injury Assessment, but some 
are decided according to Work Capacity Assessment. Without access to 
consistent disability assessment standards, seafarers suffering the same 
injuries may have different levels of compensation because of their claim 
handlers’ different approaches. The application of double standards for 
disability compensation not only increases the claim handlers’ workload, but 
may also result in different compensation outcomes for injured seafarers.  
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3. Addressing different compensation standards 
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, there are two sets of 
compensation standards for seafarers’ injuries. One is Chinese legal standards, 
and the other is shipowners’ contractual compensation standards. Within each 
set, the compensation standards are complicated. In the claims handling 
process, claims handlers have to make choices between different 
compensation standards (Ju 2012). If seafarers are satisfied with shipowners’ 
contractual compensation standards, then the compensation will be directly 
settled between shipowners and seafarers via manning companies. If seafarers 
have disputes with shipowners’ standards, then the case will be referred to 
P&I Clubs’ correspondent agents to handle. As one claim handler CH_XM_L 
said: 
The normal situation is that a seafarer submits his claim to his 
shipowner via the manning company, then the shipowner report it to 
his P&I club, then the seafarer can obtain compensation. However, if 
disputes occur in this process, and the shipowner is overseas, then the 
P&I Club will forward the case to us to handle” (Ref: CH_XM_L)  
Seafarers’ employment contracts have to be approved by Clubs before 
liability insurance starts. However, shipowners may have different 
compensation limits and deduction agreements with their clubs and this 
information is not usually disclosed to seafarers due to the confidentiality of 
member agreements. The compensation available for seafarers from 
shipowners’ liability insurers depends on shipowners’ agreements with their 
Clubs. In the seafarers’ contracts collected by the author, the compensation 
clause is ambiguously stipulated as “all compensation standards must be 
subject to the agreement between shipowners and the P&I Club.” (Ref: 
Contracts: SEC_XM_W, SEC_XM_H, SEC_HZ_C, SEC_QZ_L) However, 
these seafarers’ contracts fail to include any detailed compensation standards 
and insurers’ information. In this situation, seafarers do not have access to the 
so-called insurance compensation standards agreed between shipowners and 
their insurers. A claimant, who is the brother of a killed able seaman 
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explained the difficulty of obtaining insurance compensation standards in 
these circumstances. He said: 
The shipowner and manning company never let us have a look at the 
insurance policy, so we didn’t have any clue to calculate the damages. 
Until the end of the negotiation, we had no idea of the insurance 
compensation amounts at all. (Ref: SF_FJ_Z)  
Another claimant, who was the wife of a killed chief officer reported a similar 
situation:  
The manning company told me the compensation insurance is USD 
120,000 at most. I was not satisfied with this offer, so I asked them to 
give me the insurance compensation standards in the contract, but the 
manning company did not permit me to have them, and they said the 
standards were commercial secrets. (Ref: SF_TJ_Z)  
This practice was confirmed by a P&I Club claim handler’s account:  
If the seafarer or his family do not accept our compensation offer and 
raise a dispute, we will ask them to raise a compensation amount on 
their own. We truly have no obligations to disclose contractual 
insurance compensation standards to them, because we are working 
on behalf of shipowners’ interests. (Ref: CH_XM_L)  
In addition, a maritime lawyer described their similar practice in this situation:  
Obviously, due to the conflict of interests, we cannot disclose any 
useful information to seafarers. If the seafarer is happy to accept the 
damages offered by us, we will select a lower standard for him from 
the legal standards or contractual standards. As you know, this is also 
the civil law’s principle, it is the claimant’s duty to justify his own 
claims, and as lawyers on behalf of shipowners, we are not permitted 
by our professional ethics to remind seafarers of their rights (Ref: 
ML_GZ_Y). 
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According to the accounts of the claim handler and lawyer on behalf of 
shipowners’ interests, the insurance compensation standards are regarded as 
internal rules of the shipowners’ interests group and should be secret from 
seafarers.  
When seafarers have disagreements with the compensation amounts offered 
by shipowners, they have to raise a compensation amount themselves 
according to Chinese law. Usually, the claim handlers will further ‘bargain’ 
with the seafarers. As the P&I claim handler CH_BJ_W commented:  
Seafarers are usually not familiar with the law and they may just raise 
a number, sometimes randomly. In any negotiation, we must prepare 
a bottom line and a cap beforehand and then bargain with the 
claimants. As the claim handler, we have calculated a range of 
compensation ourselves. If the seafarer asks for a lower amount than 
our expectation, then both the seafarer and our clam handlers can 
have a happy result. If they ask for a higher amount than our cap, then 
we will further bargain with them to achieve a settlement within our 
acceptable range.”  
In the claims management process after the accident, the existing different 
compensation standards make the management process complicated. The 
manager CH_XM_L explained how his team make the choice from different 
compensation standards:  
To handle the dispute, we need to re-evaluate the different 
compensation standards, including Chinese civil law, the contractual 
compensation standards and sometimes even flag state law, for 
example, Hong Kong law or Panama law. We need to evaluate the 
compensation amount claimed by the seafarer according to different 
compensation standards. Chinese law is changing, so our strategy 
and advice for shipowners and Clubs are also flexible. There are no 
fixed rules and we need to handle the claims case by case, depending 
on our clients (P&I clubs) instructions.  
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The manager CH_BJ_W also emphasised the importance of negotiation skills 
in the management of seafarers’ claims:  
Seafarers’ awareness of rights become stronger but their knowledge 
about law is limited, so the negotiation is not fully rooted in law. To 
handle seafarers’ claims, negotiation skills and techniques are more 
important than professional legal knowledge sometimes. 
The above accounts show that the process of handling claims is uncertain and 
unpredictable for both seafarers and shipowners’ claim agents. Instead of 
legal knowledge, negotiation skills are more valued by the claim handlers. 
Although seafarers and claim agents may both confront uncertainties during 
the claim process, claim agents are at an advantage, because of their 
experience and knowledge. In contrast, injured seafarers or bereaved families, 
suffering traumatic harm or the loss of their loved ones, usually cannot be as 
calm and rational as their opponent claim handlers/lawyers. The lack of legal 
knowledge also limits seafarers’, and their families’, negotiation skills. At the 
inferior status of the negotiation, to achieve a favourable compensation 
amount is extremely difficult for seafarers and their families. If the negotiated 
compensation amount is less than their financial requirements for family 
maintenance, the rehabilitation of the seafarers and the future for the bereaved 
families will present considerable challenges. 
4. Settlement of Claims 
Following negotiation between the victim seafarers and shipowners and/or 
their claim agents, if they can achieve an agreement in terms of compensation 
standards and amounts, shipowners and their representatives will ask 
seafarers to sign an agreement of settlement and a confirmation of receipt and 
release.  
According to the accounts of claim handlers and crew managers, medical fee 
and sick pay are usually paid after the settlement of claims, which means that 
during the treatment period seafarers cannot obtain a monthly income and/or 
reimbursement for their medical fees. The crew manager MC_XM_L 
explained:  
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Generally speaking, seafarers’ workplace injuries compensation is a 
once-and-for-all lump sum payment. Seafarers cannot claim several 
payments during the treatment, and they can only raise the claim 
through us until they are fully recovered or their disability is 
ascertained. To obtain the compensation, the shipowners will ask the 
seafarer to sign a Receipt and Release confirmation, promising that 
he will not raise any relevant claim in the future. If the seafarer agrees 
to sign, then his medical fee, sick pay and disability compensation will 
be paid afterwards. In this situation, before the settlement of claims, 
seafarers may not access any formal benefits and medical cover from 
the shipowners and the P&I Clubs during the treatment period. 
Without timely medical payments, Chinese hospital can stop the 
treatment, which may cause permanent damage for the seafarers’ 
health. (Ref: MC_XM_L) 
In the settlement agreement, certain legal techniques will be adopted in order 
to release shipowners completely from further liability to seafarers. For 
example, the following quote is from a Receipt and Release adopted in the 
case of Chinese seafarers’ death compensation: 
In consideration of the above 69 , the undersigned 70  irrevocably 
confirm that all the disputes of whatsoever nature between the persons 
or entities interested in M/V “ABC” (including the owner, manager 
and manning company.) arising from the accident mentioned in the 
Settlement Agreement have been finally and fully settled. In this 
regard, the undersigned hereby forever release and discharge you, 
M/V “ABC” and her owners, bareboat charterers, charterers, 
associated owners, operators, managers, insurers, P&I clubs of 
owners, agents, master, crew or other servants or any other persons 
or entities interested in M/V “ABC” (hereinafter collectively referred 
                                                 
69
 Referring to the facts of the workplace accidents, the loss arising from the 
accident, and the agreed contractual compensation standards. 
70
 Referring to the claimant(s). 
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to as “persons or entities released from liabilities”, no matter their 
names are pointed out or not) and their predecessors and successors 
from any and all liabilities, claims, demands, actions and proceedings 
whatsoever arising from and/or in connection with the subject matter. 
Otherwise, the undersigned shall jointly and severally bear the 
liability for all the losses arising therefrom that are sustained by the 
persons or entities released from liabilities, including all of the costs 
incurred for defence. ”[Ref: Law Firm Case_XM 2012] 
In 2001, in order to promote global shipping companies’ social 
responsibilities in seafarers’ compensation claims, IMO provided a model 
settlement agreement through the Resolution A.931 (22). In the exemplary 
Receipt and Release Form for Contractual Claims, the clauses are drafted 
rather differently as follows: 
I, [Seafarer] [Seafarer's legal heir and/or dependant] hereby 
acknowledge receipt of the sum of [currency and amount] in 
satisfaction of the Shipowner’s obligation to pay contractual 
compensation for personal injury and/or death under the terms and 
conditions of my/the Seafarer's employment and I hereby release the 
Shipowner from its obligations under the said terms and conditions.  
The payment is made without admission of liability of any claims and 
is accepted without prejudice to my/the Seafarer's legal heir and/or 
dependant's right to pursue any claim at law in respect of negligence, 
tort or any other legal redress available and arising out of the above 
incident. 
Comparing the agreement clauses used to settle a Chinese seafarer’s death 
case and the recommended clauses by IMO, three differences can be observed. 
Firstly, the scope of liable parties is different. In the former Receipt and 
Release, the claimant is required to settle the claim with all persons who have 
or may have interests in the accident, including the owners, managers, 
insurers, crew agents, and claim agents. Once the seafarer signs the agreement, 
all these persons’ further liabilities should be exempted. The IMO version 
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only mentions the Shipowner’s obligation under the employment contract is 
fulfilled and this payment cannot cover other liable parties’ obligations. 
Secondly, the former forbids the seafarers’ legal heirs and dependants to raise 
any further claim, no matter what the nature of the claim is. However, the 
IMO clauses inform the claimant they still have a potential right to pursue 
shipowners or other liable parties in respect of negligence and tort. Thirdly, 
the former clauses in the Chinese case imposed a punishment clause on the 
deceased seafarer’s heirs, i.e., if they raise a further claim, against the 
shipowner or other interested parties, they have to compensate the shipowner 
the loss arising from their legal claims, including all costs incurred for 
defence.  
The wording of the agreement [Ref: Law firm documents XM] is drafted 
completely in favour of the shipowner and aims to diminish all liabilities to 
the victims of workplace accidents. To strengthen this effect, the agreement 
also includes a punishment clause for the victims. If the victim raises a further 
claim for further legal entitlements, they are bound to compensate the 
shipowners.  
From the perspective of claim handlers, the wording of the agreement [Ref: 
LFC_XM] is necessary. As the claim handler CH_BJ_W said:  
At the end of the case, we need to sign the Receipt and Release with 
the seafarer claimant on behalf of the shipowner. In the Receipt and 
Release, we need to release all the liabilities of the shipowner, the 
P&I club, manning company and us, the claim agents. This may be 
inconsistent with law and theory, but this is current industrial practice 
(Ref: CH_BJ_W).  
Accordingly, releasing all the liabilities of shipowners, manning companies 
and other agents is a common condition for victims obtaining compensation 
in China. 
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5. Manning companies’ roles in the post-accident management of 
claims 
When workplace accidents occur, some manning companies firstly inform 
seafarers and/or their families that they are not responsible for any 
compensation and all they can do for seafarers is to help them claim 
compensation from shipowners. This attitude by manning companies may 
create an adversarial atmosphere for seafarers and their families. The wife of 
a fatally injured chief engineer described her experience with the manning 
company as follows:  
At the beginning, the manning company refused to negotiate 
compensation with me and told me they would not pay any 
compensation and the only damages I could seek was the shipowner’s 
insurance for crew member’s personal injury and death. I was 
irritated instantly. My husband was dispatched by your company and 
now you told me his death had nothing to do with your company. This 
is shameless! (SF_TJ_Z)  
However, some manning companies argue that they are innocent in the 
disputes, as one manning company head manager explained:  
We have signed the contract on behalf of shipowners only, and 
seafarers don’t work for me. If there is any liability that we should 
take, it can only be that we need to assist seafarers to claim 
compensation from shipowners as a humanitarian obligation. 
(MC_QD_Y) 
Another manager of a state-owned manning company said:  
We can only help seafarers to collect and categorize the invoices of 
medical fee and other expense. Then we can transfer the evidence to 
the shipowner. It is the shipowner’s insurer who should decide how 
much compensation the seafarer can receive.” (MC_XM_L) 
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A private manning company’s head manager denied his liability even more 
straightforwardly:  
What we do is to provide work opportunities for seafarers and 
seafarers should be aware of their identities as freelancers. They 
should take care of themselves and purchase insurance themselves. 
The Ministry of Transport defines us as domestic employers for 
seafarers in the regulation, which is not fair for us, and the 
government just want to seize us to take liabilities.” (SF_TJ_C) 
The two comments from the viewpoints of manning companies are consistent 
and they both refuse to admit they have direct liability for seafarers’ 
workplace injuries. Although these opinions are not consistent with 
government regulation, they are commonly expressed by manning company 
managers. Such attitudes create an irresponsible image of manning 
companies in seafarers’ eyes. Consequently, an adversarial relationship 
between seafarers and manning companies is formed, and may create an extra 
barrier for seafarer claimants. The brother of a killed able seaman verified 
this saying: 
The most difficult and challenging part for our claimants is the 
irresponsible attitude of the manning company. They denied their 
responsibilities completely and refused to provide us any clues to 
claim the compensation.” (SF_FJ_Z) 
 Manning companies’ self-recognition as agents can make the claim progress 
complicated and difficult for seafarers, in particular in relation to 
compensation for death.  
However, it is important to recognise that in workplace injury cases, some 
manning companies can be supportive to seafarers, to some extent. As the 
crew manager MC_XM_L said:  
If I have long term stable cooperation with the shipowner, in the 
workplace injury case, our company can lend seafarers some money 
  
 
 
156
to cover their medical fee, since it is our responsibility to take care of 
these seafarers. We can only lend seafarers money according to the 
invoices of medical fee. The seafarers may also have other financial 
problems, but we cannot help with that. This is because the final 
compensation from the shipowner is fixed; we also need to deduct the 
amount we paid to seafarers from this fixed amount. If the seafarer 
finds the final compensation available for them is mostly deducted to 
pay their debts to our company, then he will probably refuse to sign 
the Receipt and Release. (MC_XM_L)  
There are some manning companies that would like to support their seafarers 
during the treatment period. However, the availability of this support depends 
on the relationship between the manning company and the shipowners. In 
addition, the financial support from the manning company is usually only 
limited to medical fees, and sick pay is not usually covered. 
Commodification of seafarers’ claims is another problem in China. The 
management practice of Chinese seafarers’ claims indicates that the 
compensation process is complicated and involves many parties, including 
shipowners, manning companies, P&I clubs, and their claim handlers. 
Seafarers cannot usually access the contractual compensation standards set 
up by shipowners, and almost all contact and enquiries must rely on manning 
companies’ assistance. This information asymmetry between seafarers and 
shipping companies raises the possibility of manning companies actually 
making a profit from seafarers’ injury claims.  
In the research, the maritime lawyer ML_QD_C mentions that some manning 
agents purchase claims at a low price from seafarers who are unable to 
conduct claims themselves and then make money from the claims against 
shipowners. Some manning companies in China have a tradition to regard the 
compensation claims by Chinese seafarers against foreign shipowners as a 
profitable business. To solve this problem, the Ministry of Labour 
promulgated a notice to forbid manning companies withholding 
compensation to seafarers from foreign shipowners in 1992 (LXZ 1992, 
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No.16) 71 . This is because in earlier times the Chinese economy was 
undeveloped and the compensation offered by the foreign shipowners was 
much higher than the domestic workplace injuries compensation standards, 
so the manning company only wanted to pay the domestic standards for 
injured workers and bereaved families and the compensation difference was 
regarded as manning companies’ profits. With the rising living cost in China, 
this kind of phenomenon has reduced because shipowners’ compensation is 
no longer sufficient to fulfil victims’ actual needs. However, this problem still 
exists today in some cases. In interviews with one seafarer and his manning 
agent (Ref: SF_NJ_LH and MC_NJ_D), this practice of deduction was 
apparent. The manning agent reported they had obtained CNY 70,000 from 
the insurer, but merely gave the seafarer CNY 40,000, because the manning 
agent believed the seafarer did not deserve the complete compensation and 
the seafarer should be partially responsible for his injury. The rationale of this 
deduction is that, from the manning company’s perspective, their assistance 
for seafarers to claim insurance compensation should not be free, and their 
time and effort should be covered by the final compensation (Ref: MC_NJ_D).  
5.2.4 Coastal trade shipping companies’ management of workplace 
injury claims 
Compared to ocean-going shipping companies, coastal trade shipping 
companies’ management of seafarers’ claims share the main steps mentioned 
earlier. Commercial insurance companies also establish a two-year limit for 
shipowners to submit the claim (Ref: Insurance Contract_GZ). Regarding the 
invoices of medical costs, transport costs and other expenses, the commercial 
insurance company also scrutinises invoices to deduct any expenses that do 
not seem reasonable to the insurance company. In terms of settlement of 
claims, shipowners will also ask victims to sign a receipt and release. Coastal 
                                                 
71The Ministry of Labour’s reply regarding the injury, disability and death of 
dispatched Chinese workers 
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trade receipt and release documents also incorporates a clause to suppress 
further claims from victims:  
The shipping Company CA has fulfilled all liabilities according to the 
Crew Hire Contract’. The seafarer promises: I, and all of my family 
members, shall not raise any further claim request against the 
Company CA in terms of the workplace injury accident mentioned 
above. (Ref: RR_GZ_CIC) 
However, there are also some differences between coastal trade shipping 
companies’ management of workplace injury claims and those of ocean-
going shipping companies’.  
Firstly, coastal trade shipping companies’ management usually only involves 
domestic legal issues. Unlike foreign ocean-going shipowners, coastal trade 
companies are Chinese companies, so Chinese seafarers can have direct 
communication and negotiation with their Chinese shipowners. The foreign 
shipowners can have P&I clubs’ claim agents and their manning companies 
as a protective screen, but domestic shipowners usually have to confront 
direct pressures from their seafarer claimants. As the manager of a domestic 
shipping company, SO_NJ_Y said,  
When the marine casualty occurred on our company’s vessel, we went 
to the site of the accident instantly. The families of the deceased 
seafarers attacked us violently, and my colleague’s clothes were torn. 
The families called me day and night, and never stopped, asking us 
for a higher compensation offer. (Ref: SO_NJ_Y)  
Unlike the P&I club, domestic shipowners’ liability insurance companies are 
less active in directly participating into the claim handling process. As a 
manager of insurer, IC_GZ_K said, 
In the claim handling process, the shipowner is at the frontline. Once 
they have achieved an agreement, the shipowner will report the 
compensation amounts to us and forward all the evidence of medical 
expense invoices and disability assessment. For serious marine 
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casualties, we will also send a representative or a lawyer to monitor. 
In most cases, it is the shipowner’s responsibility to handle the claim 
at the frontline. (IC_GZ_K) 
Thus it can be observed that in domestic workplace claim, unlike foreign 
shipowners, domestic shipowners usually have direct communication with 
their injured seafarers or bereaved families. 
Secondly, compensation standards are relatively clear and definite. For 
foreign-related ocean-going shipping companies, the issue of how to deal 
with different compensation standards is controversial. P&I clubs’ handlers 
and maritime lawyer have different opinions regarding how to select the 
appropriate disability assessment standards and legal compensation standards 
for the injured seafarer in the Chinese legal context. For domestic workplace 
accidents, Standards for Disability Degree caused by Work-related Injuries 
and Occupational Diseases (GB/T 16180-2006) is the widely accepted 
assessment standards for seafarers’ disabilities. The Work-related Injury 
Insurance Regulation is also regarded as the appropriate compensation 
scheme for seafarers, shipowners and insurance companies. The Maritime 
Court’s opinion is also explicit, if there is a genuine labour contract 
relationship between the shipowner and the seafarer when the accident occurs, 
then the Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation should be applied 
(MJ_GZ_W). Therefore, compared with foreign-related workplace accidents, 
the disability assessment standards and compensation standards are much 
easier to select and to understand offering greater consistency in practice. 
Thirdly, although the relationship between injured victims and coastal 
shipping companies is direct and the compensation standards are relatively 
explicit, coastal shipping companies’ post-accident management is not 
simpler or easier than ocean-going shipping companies’. The ship affiliation 
relationship may cause responsibility to be ambiguous in the post-accident 
management of seafarers’ claims (see 5.1.2 (3)). These duplicate relationships 
between management companies and private shipowners have caused 
controversy in liabilities to crew casualties. On one hand, the private 
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individual shipowner’s compensation capability is limited, because the vessel 
involved is usually the only executable property, and may be seriously 
damaged in the marine casualty (Wu, 2008; Zhang, 2008). On the other hand, 
the management company will reject any responsibility in the court hearing 
with the excuse that they were not involved with the ship’s actual operation 
(Judgements: (2006) YNMCHZ No.551, (2011) GHFCZ No. 287).  
Fourthly, seafarers’ claims for injury damages occurring on coastal private-
owned vessels can be difficult in both negotiation and litigation, according to 
the accounts of the victims (Ref: SF_HNNY_Y, SF_HB_L), maritime 
lawyers (Ref: ML_QD_C) and judges (Ref: MJ_GZ_W, MJ_XM_C). A 
difficult situation can be caused by the limited financial capability of coastal 
shipping companies after marine casualties. As the claimant, SF_HNNY_Y, 
reported:  
My nephew died on the coastal vessel, but the company does not have 
enough money to compensate our bereaved families. Last Friday, the 
company told us, if you accept CNY 500,000 as the final offer, then 
we could sign the agreement. We refused, and today the company 
disappeared and abandoned our claimants at the hotel. 
(SF_HNNY_Y). 
The maritime lawyer ML_QD_C explained the difficulty of a dispute 
between a seafarer and a coastal shipping company:  
This coastal shipping company is bankrupt and no longer exists, so 
now there is no way for this seafarer to claim any compensation for 
his work-related disability.” (Ref: ML_QD_C).  
The maritime judge MJ_GZ_W explained another problem regarding victims’ 
disputes with coastal shipowners: 
“Most of the disputes entertained by our court are with coastal ships. 
If it is a private-owned ship, the shipowner is probably the captain 
and killed in the casualty as well. It would be almost impossible in this 
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situation to ask the private shipowner’s family to compensate the 
dependents of the killed hired seafarer” (Ref: MJ_GZ_W). 
Fifthly, the insufficient compensation amount insured by private shipowners 
(see Section 5.1.2 (1) and (2)) may also increase the difficulties for post-
accident claim settlement, especially in workplace death accidents. The 
commercial insurance coverage is capped with a one-layer limit, such as CNY 
300,000 ~ CNY 550,000 (Ref: Insurance contracts: IC_FJ, IC_CS), which 
can be lower than the Chinese legal workplace death compensation standards 
(see Chapter 4). In the post-accident claim handling process, insufficient 
insurance is a significant barrier for both shipping companies and seafarers in 
settling claims. As the claimant, SF_HNNY_Y, said: 
My nephew is just 25 this year and the only child of the family. His 
parents are unable to work due to disability and illness. The company 
told us the insurance compensation is CNY 500,000 at most. We either 
take it or leave. Considering living costs nowadays, this insurance 
compensation amount is far from enough to support his parents’ 
future life. There is no possibility for us to accept this compensation 
amount. (SF_HNNY_Y) 
To sum up, for coastal trade shipping companies’ post-accident management, 
compared with ocean-going shipping companies, major problems exist in 
vessel affiliation relationships, limited compensation capability of some 
private shipowners, and insufficient insurance.  
5.3 Summary  
This chapter has examined pre-accident financial risk management by ocean-
going and coastal shipowners. By analyzing the interviewees’ accounts from 
the shipping industry, it is found that for ocean-going shipowners, P&I 
liability insurance is largely regarded as the financial risk management 
measure. Nevertheless, different shipping companies usually have different 
insurance coverage. Furthermore, some shipowners’ P&I liability insurance 
scheme does not meet the increasing legal compensation standards for 
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workplace casualties, which means sole P&I liability insurance is no longer 
an effective financial risk management measure today in the Chinese context. 
Similarly, coastal shipowners’ spontaneous financial risk management 
measures do not provide reliable financial security for the victims of maritime 
workplace accidents. The improper use of life insurance to cover shipowners’ 
liabilities and the indistinct attribution of liability resulting from “affiliation 
management” practices are two prominent problems in the Chinese coastal 
shipping industry. Furthermore, the indefinite liabilities of manning 
companies in law and industrial practice render companies’ financial risk 
management full of uncertainty. 
In the post-accident management process of seafarers’ casualties/claims, 
limiting the medical treatment period and scrutinizing medical costs are 
common claim management measures by shipowners’ insurers to control and 
reduce costs and compensation arising from seafarers’ workplace accidents. 
In addition, the inconsistencies of disability degree standards under Chinese 
law and ITF contracts, and the differences in compensation standards in 
Chinese law, in crew management agreements and in seafarers’ employment 
contracts have made the claim handling process even more complex, which 
also makes it possible for the shipowners and their representatives to select a 
standard favourable to their interests but unfavourable for seafarers. 
Furthermore, with the existence of the IMO model contractual claim 
settlement agreement (2001), there are still many shipowners choosing to take 
advantage of terms and conditions to destroy the claim rights in civil law from 
Chinese seafarers. In addition, manning companies’ practices, especially 
those which can be deemed as immoral, such as seizing or deducting seafarers’ 
compensation, compromises the transparency and fairness of this claim 
management process. 
The whole picture of managing seafarers’ workplace accidents/claims is 
complex and complicated. The management of accidents/claims is not a 
simplified, linear process but involves multi-angled and multi-level activities. 
The parties involved are various: shipowners, manning companies, P&I Clubs 
and insurance companies are the prominent players. If their agents and 
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lawyers are also included, then victim claimants have to encounter a huge 
interest group, whose knowledge and business capability are much higher 
than their own.   
In addition, the different management practices of ocean-going shipping 
companies and coastal trade shipping companies have confronted injured 
Chinese seafarers with a more complicated and complex scenario. 
Considering seafarers can be flexibly employed on different types of vessels, 
they may have different entitlements in law and encounter different treatment 
following workplace accidents. Therefore, there is no so-called fixed and 
unique compensation scheme for Chinese seafarers. What they encounter 
after workplace accidents is a variety of complex compensation schemes 
provided by different types of shipowners, manning agents and insurance 
companies. 
The qualitative findings from this research have limitations and cannot be 
used to generalise about all management practices relating to workplace 
accidents and claims by different shipping companies. However, the issues 
and problems addressed in this chapter are representative, to some extent, in 
the context of Chinese law and business environment. The development of 
Chinese Work-related Injury Insurance and reform of maritime tort law has 
changed the landscape of liabilities between shipowners and manning 
companies in China. Different commercial participants, especially manning 
companies, are adjusting their financial risk management strategies in this 
changing legal environment. However, there are still some business principles 
that have not been shaken or changed by legal reforms. Ocean-going vessel 
owners are still adopting the traditional P&I liability insurance and some are 
reluctant to increase their liability insurance amounts or adopt extra risk 
control strategies, no matter how Chinese statutes are changed and 
compensation standards increased.  
It appears that many shipping companies are not currently meeting their legal 
obligations or Corporate Social Responsibilities completely. In the next 
chapter, the experiences and stories of seafarers and their family members 
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will be presented to explore how these practices impact on the real victims of 
workplace accidents at sea. 
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Chapter Six: The Claimants’ Experiences 
of Work-Related Death/Disappearance 
Compensation  
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, seafarers’ claims were examined in the context 
of the regulatory framework but also from a ship management perspective. 
The analysis of the legal framework in China found that current regulations 
fail to provide comprehensive and sufficient protection for seafarers who 
suffer workplace injuries. These difficulties are exacerbated by the 
management practices primarily concerned to reduce financial loss and 
control legal risks rather than seafarers’ rights and welfare. This chapter sheds 
light on the experiences of claimants and explores bereaved seafarers’ 
families’ experiences following incidents of death or disappearance at sea. 
The accounts reported in this chapter are mainly based on the interviews with 
the bereaved family members in eight separate incidents of death or 
disappearance at sea. 
The first section of the chapter looks at communication between companies 
and bereaved families after accidents have occurred. Section two examines 
the negotiation stage, and section three discusses the stage of settlement and 
payment. In each section, claimants’ requests and company responses will be 
analysed to understand the conflicts between them and the implications of 
these conflicts for the bereaved families. The analysis also demonstrates how 
claimants addressed the conflicts with companies and how they sought help 
from online communities, from public institutions and organised activities. 
Finally, by drawing on the interviewees’ reports, the impact of accidents and 
claims on their physical and mental health is considered. 
6.2 Communication between companies and bereaved 
families after accidents  
Workplace accidents at sea, including marine casualties, piracy attacks and 
traumatic workplace accidents on board, can result in the death or 
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disappearance of seafarers. The first stages of communication between 
companies and victims after workplace accidents happen, are crucial because 
they may fundamentally influence victims’ emotions, psychological 
conditions and their attitudes towards the company during the negotiation 
process. In this section, communication between victims of workplace 
accidents and companies will be examined in cases of death and of 
disappearance.  
6.2.1 Fatal Accidents 
Families’ requests to attend the site of accidents   
Shipowners usually give notice of fatal accidents to seafarers’ families 
through their manning companies/crew agents. Family members described 
how they usually found it difficult to believe the news that their loved one 
was dead. Naturally, they wished that they could attend the accident site to 
“say” a farewell to their loved one and they expected shipowners and crewing 
agencies would respect their requests and provide support for their journey. 
However, in many cases, shipowners and crewing agencies are unwilling to 
provide such support, leaving the families dissatisfied. One bereaved 
interviewee SF_TJ_Z gave the following account: 
I requested the (manning) company to let me go abroad to take my 
husband’s remains back. The company showed me a policy of the 
1980s, and it said that families should not to go abroad to take the 
worker’s body in principle. The company told me that if I wanted to 
go abroad yourself, they needed to be approved by a higher level 
manager. I trusted them. The company agreed at the beginning, but 
later told me I was not permitted to go abroad to take my husband’s 
remains back. (SF_TJ_Z, a widow of a Chief Engineer who served on 
a Marshall ship) 
Without the company’s support, some families still want to go abroad to 
attend the accident sites at their cost. However, the families cannot obtain 
visas and travel on by themselves without supporting documentation from the 
company. The interviewee SF_TJ_Z explained this problem like this:  
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I determined to go to Poland even on my own. The Exit and Entry 
Administration staff was very kind and issue my passport just in two 
days. However, I had no clue how to obtain the visa. I called the 
Chinese embassy, and they told me that an invitation letter issued by 
the company was necessary to apply for the Polish Schengen visa. I 
was very disappointed then. 
In the Chinese traditional culture, there is an important saying that ‘fallen 
leaves should return to the root’. This represents an important belief, which 
is that deceased people must be returned to their origins and buried with their 
ancestors. If a seafarer is killed overseas, in order to guide their souls to their 
journey home, close relatives must accompany the body. Bearing this 
traditional value in mind, to travel abroad and accompany their beloved home 
has significant meaning in Chinese culture. Therefore, grieving families were 
often left upset in situations where companies refuse to cooperate. SF_TJ_Z 
said,  
I thought the company is a state-owned enterprise and would keep 
their promise, but they just broke their promise and never helped me 
to travel abroad. I was so disappointed with them.’ 
Preservation and transport of bodies 
In China, proper preservation of a deceased seafarer’s body is important to 
the dignity of both the deceased and surviving relatives. A failure to preserve 
the body is considered disrespectful and humiliating. In this context, the 
interviewee SF_TJ_Z described how improper treatment of her husband’s 
body created psychological trauma for her: 
My husband died in Poland in March, but at the end of September, the 
remains were returned. When I opened the coffin, my heart was like 
to be cut into pieces – the company failed to do any antiseptic 
treatment at all, and my husband was as black as the coal! […] The 
rotten body of my husband made me extremely irritated and upset. I 
could not calm down at that time. What the company had done to my 
husband and me is cruel and unacceptable! I was so irritated that I 
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even determined to perish together with the manning company. I tried 
a lot of psychological self-counselling according to the book, but it 
did not help at all. 
6.2.2 Disappearance of seafarers 
Unlike many fatal shore-based accidents, the disappearance of seafarers is 
complicated by the fact that their bodies may be lost at sea. The facts of death 
are explicit if remains can be found, and families are entitled to death 
compensation. However, the facts of disappearance only indicate that whether 
the seafarer may be dead or alive. The “missing” status of the seafarer is 
difficult to accept for many families. Regarding the families’ requests to 
conduct an investigation with other seafarers alive on board, shipowners are 
unlikely to cooperate. An interviewee described his experience when his 
cousin disappeared at sea: 
The company (manning company) said my cousin disappeared on 
board. We could not accept it at all. We requested to go on board to 
ask my cousin’s colleagues what had happened. The company did not 
agree and only told us there was no way to investigate at all. If we 
wanted to negotiate compensation, it would be okay, but never think 
about the investigation. We tried to seek help from the government, 
such as the Department of Foreign Affairs, Maritime Safety 
Administration, but they all ignored us. Finally, we gave up and 
‘calmed down’ as expected by the company. (SF_NJ_C, the cousin of 
a third officer disappearing on a vessel of Panama)  
If the seafarer disappeared in a marine casualty, due to the concerns of costs, 
shipowners are usually unwilling to conduct salvage works. The different 
attitudes towards salvage causes tension between shipowners and surviving 
families. One man explained how frustrated he was in this situation:  
The ship sank in Taiwan Strait, and my brother’s body was missing. 
The manning company said it was not their business to salvage, and 
then referred us to staff from shipowner’s insurance company (a P&I 
Club’s correspondent). We requested that all the bodies should be 
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found, but he said it was expensive to do so, and it was almost 
impossible to find the body in the high sea. If we insisted that the 
bodies should be found, all the cost must be deducted from the final 
death compensation. As you already know, the death compensation is 
800,000 at most, so we had to give up our requests. (SF_FJ_Z, a 
brother of an able seaman) 
Under the threat to reduce the death compensation amount, the bereaved 
families had to give up their requests to search for remains. However, giving 
up these requests does not always mean that they can have access to death 
compensation. A much more complicated procedure of death declaration is 
the next problem for the families. The compensation entitlements cannot be 
established on the facts of a disappearance. Only after a judicial examination 
with no evidence of survival having emerged in the three months following 
the accident, will the court declare the presumed death of the seafares. After 
this, families are entitled to claim death compensation. In this process, 
bereaved families reported confronting barriers from Chinese public 
institutions. The interviewee SF_NT_C explained how he overcame one such 
barrier: 
The maritime court asked us to submit the statement of disappearance 
sealed by the police station, but the police station refused to give me 
this seal because they would not like to take any responsibilities. 
However, without this seal, the court would not make the declaration 
of death and the insurance company would not pay compensation. I 
had no other options, so I bought a fake seal. I understand it was 
illegal to do so, but both the court and the police station were shirking 
responsibilities so there was no other choice for us.’ 
It is a common problem in China that different public institutions shift 
responsibilities onto each other and request various proof letters that citizens 
have no way to obtain. In 2015 April, the Prime Minister Li Keqiang quoted 
a story that a citizen was asked to prove that ‘his mother is his mother’ at the 
Exit and Entry Authority. The Prime Minister used this story to criticise the 
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current administrative institutions as highly bureaucratic and placing a heavy 
burden on the citizenry (Song, 2015). In the case of seafarers’ disappearance, 
the proof that there is no probability of survival is a crucial step for 
establishing declared death and ultimately enabling the dependants to claim 
compensation. However, the irresponsible attitudes of the police and 
maritime court can place a seafarer’s family in a helpless situation. 
6.3 Negotiating compensation  
6.3.1 The initiation of negotiation 
From the bereaved families’ perspectives, negotiating compensation is not 
their priority, but a proper transport of remains or a thorough search of 
missing body following a maritime casualty and appropriate funerals are 
often their primary concerns. However, due to concerns of economic costs, 
shipowners are not usually willing to fulfil seafarers’ requirements. 
Companies are keen to begin negotiations and persuade the surviving families 
to sign an agreement. Due to these conflicting interests, families’ requests, 
including a desire to see the body of their deceased loved one, to take part in 
a search for a missing seafarer or to hold a memorial ceremony, are usually 
rejected. The daughter of a captain killed by the pirates in Africa described 
her despair:  
We were too sorrow to eat and to sleep then, but the shipowner was 
trying to initiate negotiation through his insurance company. The 
place of negotiation was selected unilaterally by them in Shanghai. It 
was inhumane for them to start negotiation then. They completely 
ignored our grief and feelings and even asked us to travel to Shanghai. 
We were so offended by this proposal that we decided to ignore them. 
(SF_NT_F) 
A claim handler on behalf of the P & I club explained the common strategy 
to deal with the rejection of negotiation by the surviving families as following: 
Usually, in the beginning, the family members are very agitated, and 
request to salvage of bodies, refuse to negotiate death compensation. 
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These requests are not realistic at all, and we can only negotiate the 
amount of damages. It is tough for us to calm them down, so we just 
leave them alone. Once they realise their requests cannot be fulfilled, 
they would come back to negotiate with us. (CH_XM_L) 
The interviewee SF_FJ_Z explained how he changed the mind following this 
kind of stalemate:  
We request the company to salvage the body, but they said it was not 
possible and then left us alone. We were at a standstill for many days, 
but I also had to take care of my business. I could not keep requesting 
to find the body. They are companies, who are much stronger than we 
are, so it is hard for me to stay in the stalemate for long. Then we 
agreed to start compensation negotiation and give up the request of 
finding the bodies.’ (SF_FJ_Z) 
Shipowners and their representatives often ask surviving families to nominate 
one or two negotiation representatives. In the cases involved in this research, 
the representative can be the wife, brother, uncle, aunt, daughter or nephew 
of the deceased seafarer. Although uncle, aunt and nephew are not legal heirs, 
the bereaved family may entrust these relatives as their negotiation 
representatives. The reason, as explained by SF_FJ_Z, is the lack of abilities 
of the closer relatives, such as in his case. The deceased seafarer was divorced, 
and the parents were too old and the children too young to participate in the 
negotiation. The seafarer’s brother was selected as the representative. The 
common features of the chosen representatives in this study were that they 
were educated, middle-aged adults with rich social experience.  
Professional legal representatives are formally nominated only in three cases. 
In the case of SF_GD_X, the victim decided to seek justice regardless of cost, 
so she selected a top maritime law firm. SF_TJ_Z hired a maritime lawyer at 
the beginning to collect evidence but then fired the lawyer because of his lack 
of knowledge in maritime law. The lawyer worked in the case of SF_NT_F 
was the classmate of the deceased captain and provided free legal service for 
the bereaved family. The families of the other five victims tried to seek help 
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from lawyers to some extent. Nevertheless, for various reasons, they decided 
not to hire lawyers to participate in negotiations on their behalf. The most 
common reason they mentioned is the cost of lawyer. However, they also 
described problems finding lawyers with specialist knowledge of maritime 
law. The third reason for lawyers not being appointed was that the lawyer 
concerned was not willing to accept the power of attorney. Through this 
phenomenon, it can be noted that Chinese people today realise the importance 
of a lawyer in the legal dispute, but both the cost and the lack of maritime 
lawyers in the market hinder them to hire a lawyer to protect their rights.  
Shipowners and their representatives initiate negotiations, but it is rare for 
shipowners to attend negotiation. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
manning companies, P&I club correspondents and maritime lawyers usually 
represented shipowners. However, bereaved families found this arrangement 
unacceptable both emotionally and psychologically. This was because the 
seafarer was killed at a workplace, and they felt that the employer was morally 
responsible for sending a face-to-face condolence. The interviewee SF_NT_F 
expressed her anger at being ignored by the shipowner:  
My father was killed in the pirate attack on his duty for the sake of the 
shipowner, but the shipowner had never appeared in the negotiation 
to express any sympathy. Our mentality was disturbed seriously. We 
received no condolence and solicitudes. The money negotiation and 
the mental loss are entirely two issues. They never treated us as 
human beings. They regarded my father as a tool. The shipowner 
would not care for the loss of a tool, so the shipowner asked his 
insurer to attend the negotiation. For the insurance company, we are 
just one of their business issues, and they did not care about our 
feelings at all. They were very impolite and offensive.’  
The other interviewee SF_FJ_Z explained how his request to meet the 
shipowner was rejected by the manning company:  
The manning company told us the shipowner was too busy to meet us, 
and they could not contact the shipowner. They just prohibited us from 
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contacting the shipowner, and never told us the name of the shipowner. 
We were enraged then and furious at that moment. My brother was 
dead in the casualty, but the manning company refused to tell any 
information of the shipowner. Even if I wanted to sue them, I had no 
idea who should be the defendant!’ 
The non-attendance of the shipowner in the negotiation was infuriating for 
bereaved families. They described receiving no message of sympathy, 
solicitude and condolence, which made them feel they were ignored by 
shipowners. Moreover, their requests to meet with shipowners in the 
negotiation were rejected, which created an additional mental harm for them. 
Not only were their feelings as humans ignored, but their rights to know 
which company owned the ship their loved one had served on was also 
disregarded by manning companies as well.  
6.3.2 The negotiation of compensation amounts 
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, compensation standards under Chinese law 
and the employment agreements of seafarers are inconsistent and even 
conflicting. It is also the case that different companies also have different 
internal standards. In this complicated situation, how the bereaved families 
approach negotiations for reasonable and acceptable compensation is crucial 
to the outcome of the claim. In any negotiation, not only do they have to 
suggest a compensation amount, but also they need to justify it and fight it.   
1.How do bereaved families assess their compensation entitlement? 
As discussed in Chapter 5, due to conflicts of interests, ocean-going 
shipowners’ representatives usually do not disclose details of compensation 
standards. If family members disagree with the amount they are offered, they 
will be required to suggest an amount on their own. For the bereaved family, 
to find out a standard and justify it in law is their first task in the negotiation. 
The interviewee SF_TJ_Z described her experience of this problem:  
The manning company told me the compensation is only the P&I 
insurance, about USD 100,000. We had a CNY 500,000 mortgage of 
our flat, so it was not enough for my daughter and me to survive in 
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the future. Even in China, the death compensation is more than USD 
100,000 today. When I rejected this offer, the manning company asked 
me to raise an amount myself. I had no knowledge of the law. How 
could I raise that myself? 
Then she explained further how she found clues of death compensation 
calculation: 
Our whole family travelled to Beijing again and found the seafarer’s 
union72. A staff told me that I could calculate my husband’s wage and 
retirement age to calculate the death compensation. I could also 
consider the salary increase annually. She drew a table for me and 
listed a formula. I asked the lawyer to calculate according to this 
chart. To be honest, this lawyer knew little about this kind of case 
although he advertised that his expertise covered maritime claims. 
The result was more than CNY 8,000,000. I thought this could not be 
possible, and the manning company could not accept this amount, but 
I only knew this one calculation method. I told the company this result. 
The manager criticised my request is exorbitant. It was this manager 
who asked me to calculate the death compensation myself, and I used 
all my resources to learn this standard, but he blamed me for claiming 
too many damages later. 
Another interviewee SF_FJ_Z described a similar experience. He explained:  
I had no idea about how to calculate the compensation amount, and I 
was completely lost in the beginning. They wanted to compensate us 
according to the rural living cost standard, and the compensation was 
about CNY 200,000-300,000. Our parents and his son need his 
financial supports. This amount could not afford ten square meters 
flat in our hometown now. How could our family survive with so little 
compensation?’  
                                                 
72
 The seafarers’ union mentioned here is a government office not an 
independent trade union.  
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Then he described how he acquired the legal knowledge that enables him to 
claim a higher compensation:  
Someone from another family argued that this case was foreign 
related. Some of our claimants were seafarers and they knew some 
legal knowledge about compensation. They told me that we should 
claim according to the foreign-related death compensation. Then I 
learned there was a law in 1992 entitles us death compensation of 
CNY 800,000. 
Following coastal fatal accidents, bereaved families reported meeting even 
worse situations. The daughter of a captain, SF_GD_X shared her experience 
of raising claims:  
After the accident, I was helpless and knew nothing. I had no idea how 
to claim compensation. The two shipowners were killed in the 
collision. Their sons and the shipping companies denied their 
liabilities. I had no other choice but to hire a lawyer in my town to sue 
them. However, even I hired the lawyer, he was not professional in 
maritime law and wasted me two years in a wrong judicial system. 
Until I met the maritime lawyer H and his colleagues in Guangzhou, 
about three years after the accident, I started to know the right 
compensation standard for my father as a captain and I should bring 
the litigation to the maritime court. 
The aunt of an ordinary seaman, SF_NY_Y explained how she learned about 
compensation amount:  
The shipowner came to negotiate with us. No matter how many 
dependents we have. They just said CNY 650,000 in total as a unified 
price. If we could accept, then they would sign an agreement with us. 
If we reject, then they leave us there to think twice. When we decided 
to agree on this amount, they would negotiate with us.’ 
As discussed above, it is not common for seafarers’ families to nominate a 
lawyer as their negotiation representative due to the concern of costs involved. 
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Nevertheless, the accounts of interviewees demonstrate that even for those 
families who had hired a lawyer, the quality and professionalism of their legal 
representatives was far from satisfactory. SF_TJ_Z initially hired a lawyer, 
but she learned how to calculate due compensation from another source, the 
seafarers’ union but not from her lawyer. The SF_GZ_X decided to sue the 
shipping company, but her lawyer misled her to a wrong jurisdiction, the 
grassroots civil court, which made her claim drag on for more than five years. 
In these circumstances, it may seem surprising that families are not 
represented by lawyers with better knowledge of the maritime context of 
claims. However, the research reveals that maritime lawyers are not always 
willing to represent family members as this would jeopardise their chances of 
future lucrative work from P&I Clubs and shipowners. A maritime lawyer 
(ML_QD_C) said:  
We can represent bereaved families if there are no conflicts of 
interests, which means we are not representing the shipping company 
at the same time. However, as a professional maritime lawyer, to 
handle too many personal injuries on behalf of the bereaved will 
influence our firm’s reputation in the circle. Anyway, the majority of 
our clients are P&I Clubs and shipowners and they can afford a stable 
and decent hourly-based lawyer fee. However, to represent the 
bereaved, the lawyer fee is a lump sum contingent fee. We cannot rely 
on these cases to maintain our business.’  
This account clearly explains why professional maritime lawyers are not 
always available to assist seafarers’ families. P &I Clubs and shipowners have 
something of a ‘monopoly’ over their services, and seafarers’ families can 
only seek help from less experienced legal professional with little hope of 
making a successful claim.  
In terms of death compensation, damages should ideally be calculated 
according to the proper law, which is challenging for surviving family 
members without legal expertise. An alternative approach is to calculate 
damages according to employment agreements and crew management 
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agreements. To achieve this, surviving family members require access to 
seafarers’ contracts. These are not usually available however as one 
interviewee SF_FJ_Z described:  
We did not have any written form evidence from the manning company. 
We were even worried that one day the manning company denied the 
fact that they sent my brother to this vessel. In that case, we would 
have no chance to obtain any compensation. Just today, I suddenly 
realised his wages were not paid, and we had no idea how much of 
that. He worked for a month on board, but who seized the salary? The 
shipowner did not pay or it was seized at the manning company. I had 
no idea!  
The interviewee SF_TJ_Z explained her experience of asking for 
compensation standards from the company:  
I asked the manning company for a copy of the crew management 
agreement. They replied that it was the commercial secret and could 
not show me. No matter what information I asked, it would be a 
commercial secret. It was extremely difficult and annoying which 
beyond your imagination. I had to hire a lawyer to send lawyer letters. 
Afterwards, they permitted me to read the agreement. I took a 
translator and a lawyer to help me understand the English crew 
management agreement. We had no knowledge of the crew 
management agreement. When the company gave us an incomplete 
agreement, we could not tell, so I failed to learn the compensation 
standards then. They did not provide us with the detailed appendices. 
No photocopying, photo taking and video recording were permitted. 
We had to copy it by handwriting. We did not obtain any useful 
information due to the company’s obstruction.’  
From these accounts, it is apparent that assessing the appropriate level of 
compensation is almost impossible for bereaved families because they do not 
have enough knowledge and access to professional legal assistance.  
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2. Disputing compensation standards in the negotiation 
Since the bereaved do not usually have legal information and assistance, the 
compensation amounts raised by them can be challenged by shipowners and 
their representatives easily. As mentioned in Chapter 5, claim handlers often 
refuse to disclose compensation information to victims, but they nevertheless 
challenge the compensation amounts raised by victims. Claim handlers 
reported that seafarers’ families were usually ignorant of the law and difficult 
to satisfy. One claim handler CH_BJ_W commented:  
The victims [families] have no legal skills and they usually asked for 
a number without any proper legal basis. It is very common that they 
demand exorbitant price in death compensation negotiation.  
A manning company chief manager MC_XM_S expressed a similar opinion 
arguing that seafarers’ families were often reluctant to accept any offer made 
by the company:  
The problem is not about the lack of standards. The bereaved family 
never accept our compensation calculated according to the 
shipowner’s P&I insurance coverage and the law. They asked for a 
higher compensation than their legal entitlements.’  
Another manning company manager MC_TJ_C described the bereaved 
families’ claims as a means to make money: ‘They just want to make money 
from the dead.’  
Once a claim for compensation has been raised by families, disputes and 
conflicts often escalated. Some bereaved families chose to conduct further 
legal research to support and justify the amount they claimed. One 
interviewee SF_TJ_Z approached justifying her compensation amount in this 
way:  
I checked the law and regulation day and night on the internet. There 
was a regulation of Ministry of Transport said that the dispatched 
seafarer are entitled three securities: the work-related injury 
insurance, shipowner’s P&I club insurance and commercial life 
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insurance. I used this to ask for work-related injury insurance and 
commercial life insurance from the manning company. I had no idea 
about the amount of the life insurance, so I went to a local insurance 
company to ask whether they had this insurance for international 
seafarers. They said yes and told me the insured amount was CNY 
350,000. I claimed this amount and the manning company recognise 
it. Combining these three parts, I justified CNY 1,770,000 as my claim 
amount. 
Among the claimants, SF_TJ_Z’s capability and determination were 
outstanding: with her own efforts, she justified the legality of her 
compensation claim. However, the experience of other seafarers’ family 
members was different. As one daughter (SF_NT_F) described she 
confronted a significant legal barrier in the negotiation, but managed to 
overcome this with advice from her deceased father’s friends: 
Considering my father was killed in the West Africa by pirates, we 
firstly asked for USD 400,000 according to the ITF agreement. But 
they argued that CNY 800,000 was the liability limitation for the 
shipowner. They insisted that the compensation should not be more 
than CNY 800,000. Through many efforts of my father’s friends, we 
achieved an amount of CNY 1,500,000. It was a significant step from 
CNY 800,000 to 1,500,000. Without my fathers’ classmates’ help and 
encouragement, we could not be determined and confident enough to 
achieve this compensation. The CNY 800,000 limitation was set up in 
1992. Now the shipowner still took advantage of it. 
SF_NT_F’s father had friends who were active Maritime lawyers and 
Maritime Safety officers in China. Following his death, the Maritime Safety 
Administration published the story and constructed a hero image of the 
deceased seafarer. The voice of public media provided considerable support 
for the seafarer’s family and put pressure on the shipowner. However, the 
liability ceiling of CNY 800,000 was still a significant obstacle for the family 
to overcome. SF_NT_F’s family would not have achieved a higher 
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compensation amount without support from the deceased seafarer’s social 
network. As shown in the case files, an official of the Ministry of Transport 
had called the manning company to impose political pressure to urge the 
shipowners’ interests to settle the compensation dispute responsibly. The 
lawyer also warned the foreign shipowner about a potential political risk for 
their future business in Chinese ports if they insisted on compensating the 
bereaved family with a lower amount.   
However, other bereaved seafarer families were not so fortunate in receiving 
strong social and political support. In their cases, they were often compelled 
to accept the compensation offered by companies. One interviewee SF_NT_C 
described his experience of accepting the company’s offer as follows:  
We raised a compensation amount CNY 1,300,000 according to the 
law. However, they had better lawyers but our lawyer was not as 
dedicated and loyal as theirs was. In the negotiation, we could not 
achieve more and we just wanted to solve this quickly and did not 
want to immerse ourselves too much in this dispute and grief. We 
accepted the company’s compensation of about CNY 800,000 
eventually.’ 
3. The ordeal suffered by seafarers’ families during negotiations 
In claim processes, in addition to the uncooperative attitudes and behaviours 
of shipowners and their representatives, occasionally seafarers’ families 
received attacks from companies. These attacks constitute a strategy to divide 
the seafarer’s family members by stigmatising claimants and misusing law 
enforcement agencies to force the claimant to give up the further right of 
defence. 
Discrimination against widows 
Discriminating against widows’ rights is commonplace in Chinese culture. In 
the early times, a husband’s family could expel a widow and exploit her rights 
to inheritance. Although in modern China, a widow is in the first order of 
heirs, in many cases their rights are still not respected and are infringed by 
their husband’s relatives.  
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It was frequently reported by the widow interviewees that their relatives (in-
laws) attempted to split their rights to compensation. The parents of the 
deceased seafarers were easily incited to fight against their daughters-in-law. 
SF_NJ_C described her experience:  
My sister-in-law urged my mother-in-law to ask for money from me. I 
was helpless then, so I cried and knelt down in front of my parents in 
law to beg them to have some mercy on my daughter and me. 
Although she eventually obtained her right, she had to make a promise to her 
husband's family that all the compensation should be given to her daughter if 
she re-married.  
The widow (SF_JN_X) without kids had to deal with an even harder situation. 
Her brother-in-law did not permit her to be involved in the compensation 
negotiations, and her parents-in-law refused to share the compensation with 
her. Online searches uncovered the relatively widespread nature of such 
issues. One widow’s message on the MSA website read:  
My husband was killed in the sink of M/V XLZ. I was pregnant then, 
but my sister and father in law attended the compensation negotiation. 
They kept the money and did not give me any. May I ask a payment 
evidence from the MSA so that I could claim my share?73  
This message indicates that the widow’s rights to her husband’s death 
compensation were infringed by her sister and father in law.  
In this context of a cultural background where widow’s rights are not 
respected, manning companies can incite domestic conflicts to reduce 
claimants’ power with relative ease. The strategy to divide bereaved seafarer 
family members usually proves ‘cost effective’ for companies because it can 
                                                 
73 www.msa.gov.cn/Message/LeaveMsgView/00000000-0000-0000-0000-
040000000001/a/4c47be44-308e-4957-b1ce-de1babc2e4b5 
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reduce the power of the seafarer’s family significantly. Another widow 
SF_TJ_Z described the harm caused by this strategy with regards to her claim: 
My husband’s brother did not help us in the right defence, but this 
time, he came. Once learning his identity, the manning company 
discussed with him secretly several times. When we negotiated about 
the payment method, the manager suddenly asked whether the money 
should be paid to two separate accounts. I kept silent and thought it 
would be okay. But the company then asked brother-in-law whether 
should he had CNY100,000. I was irritated. You see, my brother-in-
law asked money for himself from me. That money should be the 
compensation for my father in law, about CNY 40,000. Now the 
company instigated him to ask more from me. I told my brother-in-
law straight forward that he invaded my daughter’s interests. I was 
so disappointed with my brother-in-law. He thought I would no longer 
be a member of their family, so he did so. The company was trying to 
create our internal conflicts. If we fought with each other, their 
pressures can be reduced. It is shameless of the company to incite my 
brother-in-law to ask compensation from me.’  
Political Stigmatisation 
Stigmatisation is another common attack strategy pursued by companies upon 
surviving families when families raise compensation claims. The following 
example illustrates this type of stigmatisation: 
This (compensation) amount was advised by the ‘Seafarers’ Trade 
Union’ (government subsidiary association), and I did not make up 
this. I sent it to him (the manning company’s manager) and he replied 
‘you demand an exorbitant price as a greedy lion’, and then hung up 
the phone rudely. […] The police officer came to visit me before the 
18th National Congress of the Party. At that time the negotiations were 
in a deadlock. The police officer’s eyebrow was straight (truculent) 
and said ‘I heard you are involved in dispute’. […] Then the police 
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officer told me the company reported to them that I was a socially 
unstable element. (SF_TJ_Z)   
The stigma of being a ‘socially unstable element’ relates to Weiwen (social 
stability maintenance) activity. In China, if a person defends his/her civil 
rights for a long time and tries to attract public attention to solve a problem, 
the government may label him/her as a socially unstable element threatening 
Chinese political stability. Therefore, in the case of SF_TJ_Z, the company 
took advantage of political stigmatisation pressures to force the widow to 
compromise during the negotiation. The company’s strategy can be 
dangerous for the family because in the current Chinese political environment 
those deemed as a ‘socially unstable element’ can be imprisoned in a Labour 
Re-education Camp without any judicial examination. Through this strategy, 
the seafarer’s family member may give up claiming damages, or just accept 
the compensation amount offered by the company to free themselves from 
stigma. Political stigma is dangerous. Being labelled as greedy does not 
involve the political power of the government, and the adverse effect on 
seafarers’ families is limited to economic loss and psychological pressures. 
On the other hand, political stigma involves the potential use of state power 
to punish seafarers’ family members. The political stigma of civil claimants 
is a special phenomenon of the Chinese social environment, which can 
threaten seafarer claimants’ freedom in civil compensation claim processes.   
6.3.3 The petition, online defence and protests of claimants in 
negotiation  
The bereaved families of deceased or missing seafarers are often in a 
vulnerable and weak position during negotiations, despite their knowledge, 
capability, time and finance. They are passive and even suppressed by 
shipowners’ representatives. Considerable grief and anger can build up in the 
negotiation process. To defend their rights and fight against the injustices and 
unfairness they are confronted with, some affected seafarers’ families choose 
to report offences or infringements to competent authorities.  
SF_FJ_Z explained their experiences of petition:  
  
 
 
184
The manning company just ignored our compensation claims, so we 
called the police. It was useless. The police said the marine casualty 
was beyond their jurisdiction. Then we went to the petition office of 
our provincial government. They sent a message to the manning 
company, and the company agreed to negotiate with us but it was not 
helpful. The so-called legal representative knew nothing and could 
not make any decision. All these measures were useless.’ 
SF_NT_C described how he used petition system to attract attention from the 
central government:  
The police station said they could not help because my cousin 
disappeared not in China. We went to the whistleblowing office of the 
Ministry of Transport. They did not allow us to enter the gate. We 
went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A civil servant told me quite 
straightforward: “your cousin’s death was not a big deal that worthy 
to be solved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We were grown up in 
the environment that the state and government never prioritise 
ordinary people’s life. It is always like that. Our industry is developed 
with the price of pollution, and there is no so-called humanitarian 
spirit. Therefore, I could be angry, but I could not challenge the Party 
and society, right?  
SF_HN_Y described her experience when sought help from the local 
government: 
The shipowners negotiated with us last week and told us to have the 
negotiation again on Saturday morning, but they cheated us and 
checked all the hotel rooms out. We asked help from the government 
investigation group, but they would not give us any information. 
Everybody is clear: the civil servants sat on the side of shipowners. 
They told us the shipowners would not come to the negotiation again. 
Some interviewees reported resorting to the web to assist with claims. They 
wrote down their experiences on websites, such as Tianya, Sina Blog and 
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Weibo (China’s equivalent of Twitter). In doing so, they hoped to attract mass 
media’s attention to make their petitions known to the public so that the 
government would take their requests seriously and support their cases. 
SF_TJ_Z wrote posts on Tianya online community and Sina Blog. However, 
these posts were deleted three times by the website administrator. She said:  
The manning company had the money to bribe the website 
administrator to delete my right defence posts online but unwilling to 
improve the compensation a little bit. 
SF_HN_Y also tried to post comments on a news to attract public intention 
to her nephew’s death on board:  
There was news on the shipping website regarding the disputes 
between the shipowners and their insurance companies. I attached my 
nephew’s story as a comment on that news, hoping more people can 
pay attention to it. 
SF_NT_C wrote a post in a seamen’s online community to seek help for his 
cousin’s disappearance. However, these efforts did not assist any participants 
in this research with their claims. 
Demonstrations, sit-down protests, and occupation protests were also 
reported by family members as the resistance to inadequate compensation 
offer and unfair treatment in negotiation. After the failure of one round of 
negotiation, SF_TJ_Z dressed in mourning and exhibited her banner in front 
of the manning company to register the company’s unfair treatment of her 
family publicly. She purchased paper money and burned it to commemorate 
her husband in front of the company. The company called the police to stop 
her demonstration. SF_NJ_C adopted a sit-down protest at the manning 
company. She and her parents dressed in mourning and sat down quietly at 
the manning company. She said,  
We just sat there quietly every day. No fight. No complaint and no 
noise. We did not disturb their business violently so they could not 
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call the police. All seafarers coming to the company would know our 
petition. We imposed immense pressure on the manager. 
When driven into a corner, not all resistance was so calm and rational be 
adopted. Occupation protest was adopted in the case of SF_FJ_Z because 13 
seafarers had been killed in the casualty. About 40 relatives of the seafarers 
gathered at the premises of the manning company. SF_FJ_Z described how 
these relatives became irritated occupants:  
At the beginning we were trying to negotiate with the company calmly. 
However, they denied all their responsibilities and all knowledge of 
the shipowner, and always fooled us. The police and provincial 
government’s efforts could not help much. Some of us were so mad 
that smashed the table and chair of their company. From my point of 
view, compared to the loss of 13 lives, this protest was reasonable.’ 
The analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrated that manning companies worried 
about attacks from the victims. Some managers regarded them as 
troublemakers. However, through analysing the accounts of victims, we can 
note that the victims tried to take so-called reasonable measures, including 
seeking help from police, local and central governments. Nevertheless, these 
public institutions were often either unwilling to intervene in their petitions 
or the assistance they provided was so limited that it could not help. Thus, 
conflicts with manning companies were escalated into demonstrations and 
protests.  
These protests were helpful to the victims’ right of defence to some extent. 
The victims in the case of SF_FJ_Z were able to access the P&I club claim 
handler after the occupation protest. However, their solidarity collapsed after 
it. The claim handler asked to change the negotiation venue to another city 
and asked them to keep the individual negotiation content and compensation 
offers secret. The families of the 13 seafarers were no longer able to protest 
together in the negotiations with the P&I club claims handler. SF_NJ_C 
claimed two million damages for his husband’s death following the sit-down 
protests. The company agreed to pay CNY 1,990,000, that is 10,000 less the 
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amount of her claim. SF_NJ_C explained why the company made the 
deduction: 
They accept my request generally, but they told me the seafarer’s 
death compensation in the market cannot exceed two million now, so 
they deducted 10,000 on this purpose.  
SF_TJ_Z’s result of demonstrating was complicated. The company promised 
her that the compensation would be CNY1,770,000. Nevertheless, another 
manager broke this promise. Furthermore, the company reported to the police 
that she was a ‘social unstable element’ as mentioned earlier.  
The effects of protests were limited due to the costs and time involved for 
family members, mostly time and financial means in some cases. The victims 
mentioned that they all had jobs or business to attend to so they could not 
continue the protest for long. SF_FJ_Z said:  
One of our claimants is a business person and in those three days his 
manufacturing factory just stopped. He said he might lose a million 
because of this. I had a photography business with friends, but I could 
not take care of it, so I just sold it, which caused a considerable loss 
to me. We could not have unlimited occupation protests.  
SF_TJ_Z’s family members were the main contributors of her protest. They 
were farmers, so they had more time compared to urban citizens. Nevertheless, 
their protest was also terminated in the summer because all the family 
members had to harvest wheat. SF_FJ_Z commented on the cost of seafarers’ 
family members’ protests:  
‘No matter how big your family could be; you cannot sustain the 
protest. The company can always use delay strategy and forced you 
to accept their compensation offer. We had to continue our work and 
business. It was not possible for us to have unlimited time to resist 
their offer and fight for more damages. Once we were exhausted, we 
had to take their offer.’  
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Eventually, family members would stop their protests and decide to accept 
the compensation scheme offered by shipowners’ interests, although they 
would do so grudgingly.  
6.3.4 Litigation 
Initiating litigation to claim compensation is challenging for victims. To 
secure their claims, surviving families need to apply ship arrests, but as 
mentioned by maritime legal consultants, successful applicants are rare. In 
this research, only one victim successfully arrested the ship to enforce the 
claim. She said:  
It was not me who find the lawyer and apply the ship arrest. All these 
legal procedures were taken care by my father’s maritime college 
classmates. I have no idea about the ship arrest. I was not able to do 
anything at moment when I lost my dad, not mention prepare a legal 
application. Without the supports of my father’s friends, without this 
ship arrest, we could not obtain this compensation. (SF_NT_F) 
This account reveals a barrier for seafarers to engage with litigation, the grief. 
Maritime litigation requires high skills and rational thoughts. However, it is 
almost impossible for victims to manage claims calmly. The design of 
maritime procedures overlooks the assistance victims’ special needs. 
In addition, special maritime jurisdiction creates another barrier for surviving 
families: the jurisdiction conflict between grassroots People’s courts and 
maritime. Many judges from grassroots People’s courts may not have special 
maritime law knowledge, so they may entertain seafarers’ injury cases by 
mistake, which prolongs the litigation period and causes more financial and 
emotional pressures for victims. One victim said: 
The local court in my hometown accepted my claim for my father’s 
death compensation, and made a wrong judgment according to a 
wrong law, which caused me to waste years correcting it. The local 
court should have told me they could not deal with my claim at the 
first place. After receiving the final judgment from our city 
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intermediate court, I went to the high court of our province to apply 
for another review of my claim. No one replied. Finally, I found a 
maritime lawyer online, and he helped me to appeal previous 
judgments and re-submit my claim to the Maritime Court. If anybody 
had told tell me that the maritime court was the right place to go in 
the first place, I would not have been that desperate and helpless for 
these four years. (SF_ZQ_X) 
6.4 Settlements and payments of compensation 
Compensation settlements vary (see Chapter 5), compensation standards can 
be varied by shipowners. In the cases studied in this research, the settlement 
amounts were differentiated by year, by nationality of the vessel, and by the 
position of the deceased seafarer. Agreed compensation for seafarers killed 
on foreign vessels is higher than domestic vessels (see Table 15). This is 
because China flag vessels usually belong to coastal shipping companies with 
inadequate insurance.  
The year 2012 is a turning point for the compensation claims. In two foreign-
related cases before 2012, families were compensated with CNY 800,000, but 
after 2012, the compensation amount increased significantly. This was mainly 
attributed to the abolishment of the liability limit of CNY 800,000 in 2013 
January. However, for the accidents happening in 2012, shipowners still 
attempted to limit their liabilities. In SF_NT_F’s case, the piracy attack 
occurred in February 2012. Therefore, the shipowner argued that CNY 
800,000 was the limit of liability, which increased the difficulty of claims for 
the bereaved families considerably. With assistance from friends, the family 
of the deceased seafarer applied to arrest74 the vessel involved through a 
maritime court and requesting USD 500,000 or equivalent financial guarantee. 
SF_NT_F said if they did not arrest the ship, they would not receive the 
compensation.  
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 See Chapter 4.  
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Table 16: The settled compensation amounts of the eight cases 
Name of 
claimant 
Relationship 
with the 
deceased 
seafarer 
Year of 
the 
death 
accident 
Nationality 
of Vessel 
Position of  
killed 
seafarer 
Agreed 
compensation 
SF_FJ_Z Brother 2010 Panama Able 
Seaman 
CNY 800,000 
SF_NT_C 
(Disappearance) 
Cousin  2011 Liberia Cadet CNY 800,000 
SF_NT_F Daughter 2012 Panama Captain CNY 
1,550,000 
SF_TJ_Z Wife 2012 Marshall 
Islands 
Chief 
Engineer 
CNY 
1,770,000 
SF_NJ_C Wife 2012 FOC C/E CNY 
1,990,000 
SF_GD_X Daughter 2005 China Captain CNY 280,000 
SF_QD_W Nephew 2010 China Cook CNY 600,000 
SF_HN_Y Aunt 2013 China A/B CNY 700,000- 
Usually the compensation is paid in the form of a lump sum, but in the case 
of SF_QD_W, the compensation was paid by instalments. He said,  
The total compensation for my aunt was CNY 600,000 and the first 
instalment of CNY 150,000 was paid instantly. Now two years passed, 
the compensation has not been paid completely.  
The payment of compensation by instalment makes the performance of 
settlement unpredictable. Therefore, seafarers’ family members may be 
prepared to sacrifice some compensation in exchange for instant lump sum 
payment, as SF_NJ_C said,  
I could not trust the company, and undue delay may bring troubles. 
Therefore, even if they had promised a higher compensation by 
instalments, I would ask them to pay me cash instantly. 
In Chapter 5, the analysis showed that the wording of settlement agreements 
was drafted in favour of shipowners’ interests, with the sole aim of 
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minimizing any liabilities. SF_NT_C expressed her anger towards the 
settlement agreement:  
The terms and conditions were unfair. They only wrote down things 
favourable for themselves and harmful to us. I was so angry that I did 
not want to sign it at all.’  
SF_FJ_Z explained his feeling of helplessness when he signed the agreement:  
It was a bullying agreement. However, if I did not sign it, we could 
not get the compensation, so I had no choice. 
The practice whereby manning companies deduct their own expense from 
seafarers’ compensation as demonstrated in the analysis in Chapter 4 causes 
further harm to the seafarer’s family. Increasingly, manning companies have 
been reported to deduct their “expenses” from the claimant’s death 
compensation leaving the seafarer’s families short-changed. SF_FJ_Z said, 
‘after the deduction of the manning company, the CNY 800,000 became CNY 
650,000. Is it enough to raise my brother’s kid? It is impossible to pay the 
child education and support the parents. To save the money in the bank, the 
interest rate today cannot catch the inflation rate.’  
This evidence suggests that even when agreeing compensation seafarers’ 
family member have to deal with unfair terms and conditions and unexplained 
deductions from manning companies. Moreover, in situations where 
compensation is agreed to be settled in instalments, full payments may never 
be secured. 
6.5 Impact on the health of claimants 
The findings discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter show that the 
claim and negotiation process can be fraught with oppression and conflicts. 
As humans, the loss of a loved one causes one of the most serious sources of 
grief. Seafarers’ family members are usually facing the hardest time of their 
lives following the news of death or disappearance of their loved one at sea. 
Moreover, families have to overcome the legal barriers, and other obstacles 
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set up by shipowners and/or their representatives, to defend their rights and 
to fight for a reasonable financial security for the seafarer’s dependants. In 
this situation, the physical and mental health of family members making a 
compensation claim can be extremely fragile.  
SF_TJ_Z described her physical change:  
During that period, it was impossible for me to sleep at all. When 
thought of his corrupted remains, I just felt like that my skins were cut 
into pieces and my whole heart were fried in a pot. I felt myself were 
not a human at that time. My weight was reduced from 65 kg to 45 kg. 
You cannot imagine how I survived this period.  
She further explained how the negotiation affected her families’ health:  
When our negotiation was in the deadlock, my sister’s blood pressure 
was too high to be controlled. No medicine could help. Except my two 
young cousins, the whole family was ill and my father and my sisters 
were admitted to the hospital. Our family were constituted of the old 
and sick.’ 
SF_NT_C said that his aunt had a heart attack during the negotiation at the 
manning company. SF_NT_F just gave birth to a baby when her father was 
killed by the pirates. In the Chinese culture, she should be confined for a 
month to recover. However, she had to give up the recovering rest and started 
to negotiate with the shipowner. Her mother also refused to eat and drink, and 
the family had to call doctors to set up transfusion line at home to protect her 
health. 
Long-term psychological effects on claimants were also reported. SF_NT_C 
said his mind was continuously disturbed by the disappearance of his cousin 
and the unsatisfied settlement. He said:  
I felt my cousin should not be treated like that. No formal police 
investigation and no one was liable. I always think I should find the 
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crew on that vessel then to know the truth of my cousin’s 
disappearance. Sometimes I just cannot calm myself from this thought. 
SF_NT_F’s mother, SF_NJ_C and SF_TJ_Z could not control their emotions 
and could not help crying during their interviews. Although at least two years 
passed following the incident, the psychological harm was still felt by this 
interviewee. SF_FJ_Z said until the day of the interview, he could not accept 
the facts that the rights of seafarer were extremely ill-protected in China. For 
several other claimants, who refused to participate in the research, the most 
common reason for their refusal was that the claim experience was so hurting 
and they did not want to mention it at all. One victim told me that he could 
give me all the materials of his brother’s accident he had, but he just could 
not bear telling the experience. 
No victims had received professional psychological counselling. 
Psychological harm was not valued and recognised properly both by 
shipowners and the Chinese law. SF_TJ_Z sought help for her psychological 
issues through self-counselling with books she purchased online. However, 
she said the psychology knowledge did help for the extent of harm she had 
suffered. Then she tried to seek peace through Buddhism, then converted to 
a Buddhist. She blamed all her misery on fate eventually: 
‘I have burned incense, prayed and mused for a long time. […] My 
husband was dead in an accident, so he must go to the destiny of devil. 
I pray every day to accumulate charitable deeds for my husband to 
save his soul from the hell. […] My fate is bad, and all these are 
determined by fate. My husband in his previous life might be a person 
with crime records, so he was killed at an early age. I might not be a 
good person in my previous life, so I have to experience the 
mistreatment and unfairness. Although I am not a bad person, the 
destiny led me to fight with the manning company and the shipowner 
for my rights. I never thought my marriage would be terminated like 
this. All these are determined and caused by my bad destiny.’ 
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After experiencing the loss of their loved ones, the unfair treatment received 
by seafarers’ families from shipowners’ interests, and the inability of the 
affected families to access justice from public institutions, many family 
members suffered long-term health impacts. Their accounts reveal that how 
the physical ill-health and psychological stress arising from difficulties 
experienced by families while making a claim can cause further harm. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has explored the experiences of seafarers’ families following the 
death or disappearance of their loved one working at sea. By analysing the 
nature of contact and rapport maintained between the companies and the 
seafarers’ families after accidents, this chapter has highlighted that the 
requests of families based on Chinese tradition and culture are typically 
disrespected by shipowners and interested parties due to the concerns about 
cost. It is further evident from the analysis that in the negotiation of 
compensation amounts, the absence of shipowners in foreign-related 
accidents causes considerable resentment amongst victims.  
The limited liabilities of shipowners suppressed family members’ higher 
claims for compensation until a review was conducted in 2013. The rationale 
of liability limits was to protect the development of shipping industry. 
However, the limit of CNY 800,000 was set in 1992, and rapid inflation has 
subsequently diminished its value. The evidence of this chapter illustrate how 
weak the position of bereaved families is as compared to commercial 
organisations.  
The weak protection offered to claimants provided by the Chinese 
government also encourages shipowners’ interests act recklessly from the 
perspectives of victims. Without independent trade unions, voluntary 
organised resistance largely relies on relatives and friends. The power of this 
kind of informal resistance is too limited to create any significant continuous 
pressure and in many cases, it cannot be sustained because the lives of family 
members must go on. Although in some cases, through resistance, the 
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claimants obtained more compensation, which was still far from the loss they 
suffered.  
The obvious power imbalance between shipowning interests and victims has 
infringed seafarers’ rights and created significant and irrecoverable harm to 
their physical and mental health. Furthermore, the negative attitudes of the 
authorities in regulating and mediating these disputes enable the irresponsible 
shipowners’ interests to erode the social justice.  
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Chapter Seven: The Seafarers’ 
Experiences of Workplace Injury and 
Compensation Claims 
Introduction 
This chapter will move on from a consideration of compensation in cases of 
workplace fatal accidents to compensation made to injured seafarers. Unlike 
the claimants in fatal accident cases, who are the bereaved families, the 
claimants for injury damages are usually the injured seafarers themselves. 
This chapter begins by examining seafarers’ experiences of first aid, 
emergency medical care and repatriation. It then goes further to look at the 
follow-up of medical care and sick pay. Afterwards, the problems and 
obstacles confronted by seafarers in the process of obtaining recognition of 
long term disability will be explored. In the final section, seafarers’ 
experiences of compensation negotiation and dispute resolution, including 
litigation, will be discussed.  
7.1 Medical care for seafarers after workplace accidents 
Medical care for seafarers can develop in the following two stages: 
emergency port medical care, and further medical treatment after repatriation. 
Medical expenses constitute an important part of most compensation claims 
because payment or non-payment can determine whether occupational 
injuries are treated appropriately. The Maritime Labour Convention (2006) 
requires shipowners to provide timely medical assistance to injured seafarers. 
Regarding Chinese coastal vessels, where international conventions cannot 
be applied, the Chinese government requires shipowners to arrange medical 
care for injured seafarers in time75.  
7.1.1 Emergency medical services in ports: attitudes and practices of 
shipowners 
                                                 
75
  See the Regulation of Seamen (2007). 
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Shipping companies’ attitudes towards seafarers’ medical needs are different. 
Some shipowners arrange medical care instantly. For example, when 
SF_TJ_L (ordinary seaman)’s foot was mutilated on board, his shipowner, a 
state-owned enterprise (oil drilling), helped to arrange prompt medical care 
for him. He said: 
The captain called the company immediately after the accident and 
sent me to the nearest hospital immediately. He also gave me some 
money. In the hospital, I received surgery at the first time. When I 
woke up, three people came to enquire me about the details of the 
accident. One is from our shipping company; one is from my crew 
agency, and the other is from the oil company. Afterwards, I was 
transferred to a better hospital back to Tianjin, and our company 
arranged transport for me.’ 
Unlike the above state-owned shipowner, private coastal shipowners’ can be 
irresponsible and negligent. Such is the case of SF_HH_W (Captain) who 
suffered a tailbone injury following an accident on a privately owned coastal 
vessel (200 tonnes). He explained how he was ignored and cheated by his 
shipowner:  
I felt my back was hurt, so I called the shipowner and asked him to 
permit me to sign off from the vessel. There should be three seamen 
on this small ship, but the owner only employed me as a captain and 
another seaman. I could not leave the ship at that moment. I waited 
on board and called the owner many times. Three days later, the 
owner arranged me to go to the hospital in port. The shipowner 
cheated me that no fracture was diagnosed and asked me to go back 
to work for him on board. When I came back on board, I could not 
stand, so I went to the port hospital again, and they referred me to the 
hospital in town. Until then, I was permitted to sign off from the vessel.  
By comparing two seafarers’ experiences on Chinese coastal vessels, it can 
be noted that the seafarer working for the state-owned ship received 
emergency medical care in a timely fashion while the one working for a 
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privately-owned ship met additional barriers in accessing medical care. 
SF_HH_W was forced to work with his injury because his shipowner failed 
to find a replacement.  
Seafarers working on international ships are not able to seek medical services 
abroad independently. Due to language barriers and immigration controls, the 
access to medical service is controlled by their shipowners. Such is the case 
of SF_FZ_L (Second Engineer) who suffered an injury to his ribs on an FOC 
vessel controlled by a Chinese private shipowner in Indonesia. He was forced 
to stay on board until the vessel called at a Chinese port in Hainan. He 
described the considerable obstacle he faced when he tried to access medical 
treatment abroad: 
I asked the company to sign off and repatriate me back to China for 
medical care. But the company could not find a second engineer to 
replace me. Without my certificate, the ship could not navigate. You 
know, if we stayed in the port for another day, the company had to pay 
an extra USD10,000-20,000 to the port, so the company persuaded 
me to continue my duty. I understood the company’s concern, so 
although I felt painful, I still kept working. […] Later, when we called 
a port in Hainan, I finally could go to the hospital on my own. The 
doctor told me my fracture could be fatal. But the company said they 
could not find another person to replace me, and still asked me to keep 
working on board, so I had to work an extra 41 days after my accident. 
[…] It is a horrible feeling when I think about those days now. I think 
I was so lucky that I did not die on board. 
SF_FZ_L’s experience is similar to the account of SF_HH_W referred to 
earlier in this section. Both were not allowed to seek medical treatment 
because their shipowners were unable to find replacements for them. This 
problem highlights the crewing practices among private shipowners and 
across some sectors of the shipping industry, where voyage contracts are 
preferred. Because these companies do not retain seafarers as regular 
employees, they cannot replace their injured crew in time. Instead of 
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suspending vessel operations following a shipboard injury which affects 
staffing requirements, these shipowners prefer to persuade their injured crew 
members to continue with their duties until they can find a replacement to 
avoid incurring further costs.  
Unlike privately-owned shipowners, state-owned companies appear to be 
more responsive to their seafarers’ medical emergency needs following a 
workplace injury. SF_QZ_L’s (Pump man) shin bone was broken on an FOC 
vessel controlled by a Hong Kong shipowner. He was recruited by a Chinese 
state-owned crew agency. His experience of accessing medical care was more 
satisfactory than SF_FZ_L. He said:  
The captain took my injury very serious and immediately informed the 
shipowner and my crew agency. I was sent to a Guangzhou hospital 
soon after the accident and received surgery. I worked for a state-
owned company, anyway. They were quite responsible and took me to 
hospital instantly. The shipowner sent a person to pay the entire 
medical fee and sent a message of sympathy and solicitude. I did not 
worry much then, and I knew both the shipowner and my crew agency 
had insurance for workplace accidents.  
The experiences of ocean-going seafarers described above suggest that 
differences in company attitudes when responding to seafarers’ injuries on 
board can be significant depending on whether the shipping company is 
privately owned or state-owned. One possible explanation is that private 
shipowners do not often have a stable reserve of seafarers and highly rely on 
the supply of freelance seafarers in the labour market. Meanwhile, the state-
owned or large foreign-owned shipowners have their crewing agency 
providing a sustainable labour supply. Also, domestic private shipping 
companies in China have been in business for a shorter time when compared 
with their state and foreign-owned competitors who have greater reserves. 
However, by putting profit and other commercial considerations before the 
well-being of injured crew, shipping companies are undermining the health 
and safety of seafarers in their employment.  
  
 
 
200
7.1.2 Attitudes towards following-up medical treatment of shipowners 
When injured seafarers are fit to travel, they are usually repatriated. Although 
for injured seafarers, further medical care is still crucial and necessary, for 
the shipowners, repatriation means they are no longer responsible for paying 
medical expenses directly and only obliged to reimburse lump sum medical 
expenses afterwards. The lack of shipowners’ direct payment becomes a 
financial pressure for seafarers. SF_QZ_L explained how they had to give up 
further medical treatment under this financial pressure: 
The crew agency always delayed the medical payment. All three 
following up surgeries were paid by my family, and the crew agency 
failed to reimburse us a cent. This pressure was tremendous. My 
father did not get sick pay, so all the family had to support my dad’s 
medical treatment. We had to work to make money, take care of my 
dad, and travel several hours to the company to negotiate medical 
expense reimbursement. Later, they refused to pay explicitly and told 
us after a certain time point, and the insurance company would not 
cover any further medical payment. But my father’s eye could not be 
treated half-way. Without further medical fee reimbursement, my 
father decided to give up the treatment and his situation is still not 
stable and becoming worse. 
In China, medical services are not free, and if patients fail to make payments, 
hospitals will stop medical services and discharge patients. If shipowners 
refuse to make timely payment for seafarers’ medical treatment, seafarers 
have to give up their ongoing treatment, something which can result in a 
permanent disability.   
7.1.3 Sick pay 
Sick pay is another important part of the compensation package for seafarers. 
This research finds that seafarers’ sick pay varied according to their 
employers and to their employment status. For example, SF_TJ_L, a seafarer 
serving on the state-owned supply vessel, who was employed through his 
crewing agency, received monthly sick pay. However, SF_XZ_Z, a mariner 
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serving on the state-owned vessel, who was not formally employed by his 
crew agency, did not receive regular sick pay. He said,  
The crew agency told me they would pay me basic wages and once I 
recover, they would negotiate compensation with the state-owned 
enterprise for me. However, from Jan 14th, 2013, when I was injured, 
until now (Jan 2014), they only paid me four months’ basic wages. 
They stopped my payments then. I asked the crew agency why I did 
not receive any money. They told me it was a long period after my 
injury so the shipowner decided to stop paying me. I felt so upset and 
cheated by the company. I am suffering work-related injury, but they 
refused to pay me a basic salary. 
SF_NT_G, a third officer working on a private Chinese vessel reported a 
worse situation than the one of SF_XZ_Z that after his injury: the shipowner 
refused to pay any wages to him. His employment contract with his shipowner 
was only verbal. He said,  
I find jobs through different agencies, but neither shipowner nor 
agency would sign a formal labour contract with me. They do not 
arrange any social insurance for me. Therefore, I had no sick pay at 
all. 
In the Chinese coastal shipping industry, this precarious employment is not 
uncommon. These seafarers’ entitlements to sick pay are ignored by their 
shipowners and crewing agencies. State-owned shipping companies are 
believed to be more responsible than their privately-owned counterparts in 
China. However, by comparing the aforementioned experiences of SF_XZ_Z 
(Able Seaman) and SF_TJ_G (Ordinary Seaman), it can be noted that 
although they both work for state-owned vessels, without formal labour 
contracts, SF_XZ_Z could not obtain timely sick pay. Seafarers in precarious 
employment, be it with state-owned or private-owned shipowners, are 
unlikely to receive adequate monthly sick pay than their colleagues in formal 
employment contracts.  
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Figure 4: The three liability stages of shipowners and crew agencies 
Sick pay for international seafarers is even more complicated than it is for 
Chinese coastal seafarers. As discussed in Chapter 4, to work on an FOC 
vessels, Chinese seafarers are legally required to be placed by licensed 
crewing agencies. This means that Chinese seafarers cannot enter into a 
formal direct employment relationship with FOC shipowners in any way. 
Chinese labour laws are only enforceable to domestic crewing agencies but 
cannot bind foreign shipowners. As the analysis in Chapter 5 has shown, FOC 
shipowners and domestic crewing agencies jointly coordinate the 
management of workplace accidents. After the repatriation of injured crew 
members, the shipowners’ responsibilities can be temporarily shifted to the 
local crewing agencies. Shipowners make lump sum sick payment when 
claims are settled; that is when the medical treatment is complete, disability 
degree conclusions have been issued and disability compensation amounts 
ascertained. Therefore, as indicated by the chart in Figure 4, there remains a 
gap of FOC shipowners’ responsibilities of wages in the process, which is a 
Stage 1: Emergency 
treatment in port: 
wages and medical 
expenses are paid by 
shipowners.
Stage 2: Following-up 
treatment after 
repatriation: 
Seafarers receive no 
wages and direct medical 
expenses paid from 
shipowners, but may 
receive some living 
allowances from crew 
agencies.
Stage 3: Settlement of 
claims: 
Seafarers receive lump 
sum disability 
compensation, sick pay and 
other costs.
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highlighted problem in Stage 2: many international seafarers report they have 
not received regular monthly sick pay from shipowners at Stage 2.   
A Second Engineer SF_XM_W explained why he decided to terminate his 
medical treatment before it was complete in order to obtain his lump sum sick 
pay quickly. He said:  
At the beginning, the manager told me there would be a sick pay for 
me, but never told me the standard and time limit. The manager just 
said I should not worry about that and focus on my recovery first. I 
received four surgeries after the accident. After each surgery, the 
doctor suggested that I should have a three-month recovery period. 
But I always urged the doctors to conduct next operation earlier 
because I was not sure how much the company payment would be. The 
longer I stayed at home, the more I worried about my future career. 
At my 30s, staying at home, employed but unpaid, it was stressing, 
disappointing and painful. After one year, I could not wait to claim 
my compensation. I told my manager that I would like to terminate my 
employment relationship, and then my manager agreed happily. He 
submitted my claim to the shipowner and then the P&I club paid me 
the medical cost, disability compensation and my wages. By then I 
was told my sick pay was USD 1000 per month. The company were 
quite happy to know that I would like to resign. I asked my manager 
why he did not tell me my sick pay amount. They explained in 
ambiguous words, but the main idea was because they fear that if I 
had been told the amount earlier, I would prolong the treatment 
period on purpose. Without monthly payment, the financial difficulty 
just accumulated day by day, and reaching a point that I could not 
bear. Then I had to terminate medical treatment in advance and 
resign from the company to claim compensation soon otherwise I 
could not continue my normal life. Now I am thinking maybe the crew 
agency retain my wages because they were trying to force me to resign.  
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SF_XM_W’s account suggests that crew agencies may: (1) shorten medical 
treatment period to reduce sick pay; (2) delay compensation payments to 
encourage seafarers to resign ‘voluntarily’. The crewing agency linked the 
sick pay, disability compensation and seafarer’s ‘voluntary’ resignation 
together. SF_XM_W was a formal agency-employed seafarer, so when he 
was diagnosed as Grade Eight disability, the crew agency was forbidden to 
dismiss him by law unless he submitted ‘voluntary’ resignation (see Chapter 
4). Nevertheless, for an international seafarer suffering a Grade Eight 
disability, it is impossible to pass a physical examination and continue his 
career at sea. Thus, it is not worth the crew agency retaining him. Being left 
employed but unpaid, SF_XM_W had no choice but to resign and then claim 
his compensation. In essence, the crew agency’s strategy was constructive 
dismissal of SF_XM_W to avoid liability relating to rehabilitation.  
For seafarers suffering workplace injuries, further medical treatment after 
repatriation may be necessary and crucial for their recovery and rehabilitation. 
However, they experience difficulty in obtaining the medical care and 
reasonable sick pay which they are entitled to. Chinese seafarers working on 
state-owned coastal vessels were in a better position in terms of access to 
assistance during medical treatment and regular monthly sick pay.  
7.2 The recognition of work-related injury and disability 
assessment  
 7.2.1. Work-related Injury Recognition: crew agencies’ attitudes  
The recognition of work-related injury is the administrative precondition to 
obtaining Work-related Injury Insurance compensation. Once workplace 
accidents occur, the shipowner/crew agency involved should submit an 
“application of ascertainment” within 30 days to a local Labour Bureau. Once 
the seafarer’s injury is recognised as a work-related injury, social insurance 
compensation can be claimed. However, if the company refuses to apply, then 
the seafarer cannot obtain payment from the Work-related Injury Insurance 
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Fund 76 . In the shipping industry, seafarers may be “exchanged” among 
different crew agencies and shipowners. The company who has purchased 
Work-related Injury Insurance for the seafarer is usually different from the 
company which places the seafarer. In this scenario, both companies have 
opportunities to evade their obligations. For example, SF_HF_G, who is the 
wife of a cook, faced these difficulties in obtaining the official recognition of 
work-related injury for her husband. Her husband’s eardrum was burned 
following an engine room fire accident on an FOC vessel owned by a Hong 
Kong shipowner in South Africa. He was employed by a Nanjing crew agency 
(state-owned) then dispatched by a Shanghai crew agency (state-owned)77. 
Regarding the ascertainment of his work-related injury, both companies 
managed to evade their liabilities. SF_HF_G described the experience of 
interacting with these two crew agencies:  
We tried to contact the Shanghai Company to ask for the disability 
ascertainment certificate, but the HR manager told me that they were 
not liable for my husband’s workplace injury because my husband 
was employed by their Nanjing Company. They said they just 
borrowed my husband, just like borrowing a car, and now they have 
returned him back to Nanjing Company already. At the beginning, 
they promised that my husband’s injury was work-related, and they 
would help us to arrange all the following up procedures, but they just 
changed the tune completely after two years. Afterwards, I contacted 
Nanjing Company, but they said they had nothing to do with this 
accident and Shanghai should be liable for the injury. I was driven 
mad by their tricky excuses. 
                                                 
76
 An injured seafarer is entitled to apply the ascertainment on their own 
within one year after the accident, but the seafarer applicant may not be able 
to provide adequate evidence to establish a factual employment relationship.  
77
 These two crew agencies are sibling state-owned companies. They 
exchange their seafarers when necessary. In this case, the seafarer signed 
labour contract with the Nanjing Company. The Shanghai Company 
‘borrowed’ him to fill a position of cook for a voyage only.  
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From the above account, we learn that the Shanghai Company compared 
dispatching the seafarer to ‘borrowing a car’, indicating their rationale that 
seafarers are ‘commodities’ or ‘instruments’. When the ‘instrument’ was 
broken, the Shanghai Company just ‘returned’ it (i.e. the seafarer) to his 
employer and had no liabilities to the ‘broken tool’ (injured seafarer). The 
practice of ‘borrowing’ and ‘lending’ seafarers is common amongst Chinese 
crew agencies. In the event of a seafarer being injured on board, the ‘lending 
company’ and ‘borrowing company’ can both deny their liabilities. Although 
SF_HF_G had Work-related Injury Insurance, without the company’s 
assistance, her husband could not obtain compensation from Work-related 
Injury Insurance Fund.  
7.2.2 Work-related injury recognition 
When crew agencies refuse to apply for work-related injury recognition and 
compensation on behalf of seafarers, seafarers are entitled to seek remedies 
through labour authorities. Nevertheless, the mobile, precarious and 
international nature of seafarers’ employment relationships make it difficult 
for seafarers to access timely justice. The municipal government manage 
Work-related Injury Insurance and relevant disputes. Hence, seafarers can 
petition a local municipal Labour Bureau or government petition office. 
However, if workplace accidents occur overseas, then local government’s 
administrative jurisdiction may be challenged. Taking the case SF_HF_G’s 
husband as an example, when she tried to seek help from the Shanghai 
municipal government’s online whistleblowing system, the government 
replied they had no administrative jurisdiction over her petition because the 
injury was foreign-related and occurred abroad. SF_HF_G’s wife expressed 
her confusion of the government decision: 
We could not understand the government’s reply and felt so 
disappointed. We have the dispute with the Shanghai Company, but 
how could it become a foreign-related dispute? The civil servant told 
me that they contacted the Shanghai Company. The company claimed 
that our dispute was foreign-related, and the Shanghai government 
had no power to intervene this dispute. The civil servant then told me 
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that I should settle this dispute with the company on my own. The 
government’s suggestion was useless to me.  
SF_SQ_Z also had a similar experience with SF_HF_G when he tried to seek 
help from local Labour Administrative Authority in Tianjin. He said:  
The labour authorities were not helpful at all. When I tried to seek 
help from the labour arbitration tribunal, they referred me to the 
Labour Bureau. Then the Labour Bureau said my workplace injury 
dispute is foreign-related and asked me to go back to the arbitration 
tribunal. They just pushed me to each other and refused to accept my 
petition. 
Jurisdiction is a fundamental issue in seeking any legal remedies. Without 
clearly established administrative jurisdiction, seafarers cannot be protected 
by Chinese labour law. The labour authorities may not recognise their 
responsibilities, which means they allow crew agencies to continue ignoring 
and infringing seafarers’ rights. From the perspective of seafarers, their 
employment contracts are signed with Chinese crew agencies and it is the 
Chinese crew agencies who arranged social insurance (if any) for them. 
Therefore, they believe that their local labour authorities should protect their 
rights. However, when the administrative authorities denied their jurisdiction 
and ignored their claims, seafarers are exploited from the access to timely 
remedies from governmental authorities. This negative attitude of labour 
authorities serves to reinforce crew agencies’ refusal to recognise seafarers’ 
accidental injuries as Work-related injuries and unwillingness to assist 
seafarers when seeking Work-related Injury Insurance compensation.  
 7.2.3 Assessments of workplace injuries and disabilities  
a. Work Capacity Assessment Committees 
Appraisals of workplace injuries and disabilities are a core part of seafarers’ 
claims because they determine disability compensation amounts. Therefore, 
assessments must be issued by certain authorities or licensed appraisal 
institutions. Work Capacity Assessment Committees are the public funded 
work-related disability appraisal agencies affiliated to local Labour Bureaus. 
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Their assessment conclusions have the highest legal effectiveness. However, 
without Work-related Injury Recognition, Work Capacity Assessment 
Committees refuse to assess disabilities for seafarers. For many seafarers, 
especially freelance seafarers, their requests for a workplace injury appraisal 
are usually rejected by Work Capacity Assessment Committees. An ordinary 
seaman SF_QD_H described his experience of being rejected by several 
Labour Appraisal institutions: 
I tried many Work Capacity Assessment Committees, but all of them 
refused to assess my disability. I was introduced by a Beijing 
Company to a Dalian Company, which sent me to work on a Hong 
Kong Flag vessel. The accident occurred in Shanghai. I first went to 
an assessment institution in my hometown, but they said I was not in 
charge of their jurisdiction. Then I went to Dalian; they argued that I 
should go to Shanghai for the assessment because the accident 
occurred there. In Shanghai, they said I should go back to Dalian 
because the company was in Dalian. I was almost driven crazy. I was 
not fully recovered then, so my health situation did not permit me to 
travel across China. Later, I raised my courage again and tried 
another institution somewhere, but they still refused me because I did 
not have a proof letter issued by the company. I hired a lawyer and 
paid him CNY 1000 just wanted to obtain a disability assessment but 
the lawyer only took the money, and my disability is still not assessed. 
It is a hard time for me and I feel hopeless in making any progress in 
my compensation claim. Before you contacted me, I did not want to 
mention this to anyone. I just isolated myself in the village.’ 
SF_QD_H’s account reflects a common but complicated problem confronted 
by freelance seafarers in China. They are not formally employed by any crew 
agency and the company is not willing to obtain Work-related Injury 
Recognition for them, because by doing so, the company admit they have a 
factual employment relationship with seafarers (See Chapter 5). In this 
situation, Work Capacity Assessment Committees refuse seafarers’ disability 
appraisal requests, because these seafarers are not classified as employees.  
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Work Capacity Assessment Committees also refuse to assess any workplace 
injury which occurred more than one year ago. This strict limitation rule 
increases the difficulty for seafarers in obtaining their disability appraisal 
conclusions from public funded institutions. SF_QZ_Z explained why his 
disability appraisal request was rejected:  
As suggested by my lawyer friend, I went to the Assessment Committee 
in Xiamen. When they found my accident occurred one year ago, they 
would not issue the disability appraisal conclusion for me. At that 
moment, I felt so disappointed with the government and somehow 
being cheated by my agency, who just did not disclose this time 
limitation rule to me on purpose. 
Many seafarers’ injuries are excluded from the scope of official ‘work-related 
injury’ (Figure 5). Only formally employed seafarers’ workplace injuries can 
be recognised as Work-related Injuries by law. The workplace injuries of 
freelance seafarers are excluded and cannot be appraised by public funded 
Work Capacity Assessment. In addition, seafarers’ injuries, which have 
occurred over one year, will not be accepted for appraisal by social insurance 
institutions.  
For those seafarers whose crew agencies are willing to recognise their work-
related injury status, their experiences with Work Capacity Assessment 
Committees can still be harmful. SF_XM_W complained about the Work 
Capacity Assessment Committee’s practice:  
They were terrible and unreasonable. The surgeon left a metal device 
into my hand to help my hand function well. But the assessment 
committee said that metal device inside they could not appraise my 
disability and asked me to take that out. I consulted my doctor, and 
the doctor said it would harm if the metal device were taken out. Then 
the assessment committee asked me to sign an agreement to promise 
if there were any further disputes regarding the disability degree, it 
would be purely my fault. 
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Another Chief Officer SF_XZ_H described the loneliness of seafarers at the 
assessment committee:  
All the workers I met there were accompanied by the personnel of 
their companies. However, only our seafarers have to take care of 
ourselves without any colleagues to support us at the public 
committee. The committee staff were always asking for different 
documents. For those with their company representatives, the 
representatives can contact the company to prepare relevant 
documents in time. But our seafarers have to always ‘commute’ 
between our companies and the public committees to prepare and 
submit paperwork on our own. 
These accounts indicate that obtaining disability assessments from the Work 
Capacity Assessment Committee can be challenging, and that interaction with 
the public assessment committee can be frustrating as well because of the lack 
of support from crew agencies. When seafarers’ disability assessment 
requests are rejected by public committees, they have to have their disability 
appraised in a licensed private judicial assessment institution, which 
addresses all categories of disabilities arising from personal injury accidents.  
b. Judicial Capacity Committees 
Unlike public Work Capacity Assessment, the fee to obtain a disability 
assessment from Judicial Capacity Committees is usually charged to seafarers. 
The appraisal fee of Judicial Capacity Committees is much higher than by 
public Work Capacity Committees. For example, in Xiamen, the public 
assessment cost is CNY 32078, but the private judicial assessment fee is CNY 
800-120079 . The latter one is 2.5 – 3.75 times of the former one. Some 
                                                 
78 http://www.xm.gov.cn/bszn/bmfl/rlzyshbzj/srlzyhshbzj/ggfwsx/201205/t2
0120507_492451.htm 
79
 http://zhengtai.ezweb1-
3.35.com/fayilinchuangsifajiandingshoufeibiaozhun-203380.html 
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seafarers believe it is unfair for them to pay the assessment fee. SF_XM_H 
expressed his dissatisfaction towards this payment:  
My crew agency gave me an address of the Judicial Capacity 
Committee and asked me to obtain a disability assessment there. […] 
They did not issue any reference letter for me and told me that I should 
apply this application in my name and I had to pay the assessment fee. 
[….] I asked my agency why I should pay the assessment fee myself. 
They told me this was the insurance company’s rule because the 
insurer would not cover the assessment fee. When I learned that the 
foreign shipowner requested that I should pay the disability 
assessment myself, I did swear and curse the company in my heart: 
how mean and unfair they were and even forced me to pay this fee 
myself.’ 
As discussed in Chapter 5, there are different disability standards (GB/T 
16180-2006 and GA35-1992) applied in disability assessment. In some cases, 
interviewees reported they believed that they received a lower grade 
according to GA35-1992 (The Disability Appraisal Standards for the Injured 
in Traffic Accident) than according to GB/T 16180-2006 (The Standards for 
Disability Degree caused by Work-related Injuries and Occupational 
Diseases). SF_HF_G described her experience of obtaining the Judicial 
Appraisal Assessment for his husband:  
‘Our local labour bureau first told me that without the recognition 
certificate of Work-related injury, they would not assess my husband’s 
disability. Then they said that we could only apply judicial appraisal 
according to the traffic accidental disabilities standards, but the 
grades would be less favourable for workers than the work-related 
injuries standards. We understood that we would suffer additional 
loss by applying judicial appraisal because of stricter traffic accident 
standard, but we had no other choices. Otherwise, we would not have 
enough evidence to claim the compensation.’  
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Judicial appraisal is regarded as less effective than Work Capacity 
Assessments, so crew agencies and shipowners frequently challenge judicial 
assessment conclusions to evade their compensation liabilities (This occurred 
in the cases of SF_HF_G and SF_FZ_L). This creates a vicious circle: 
crewing agencies’ reluctance to obtain recognition of work-related injuries 
forces seafarers to arrange judicial disability appraisal for themselves, but 
then shipowners’ representatives deny the legal effectiveness of a judicial 
disability appraisal; finally, seafarers’ claims reach an impasse.  
Figure 5: The vicious circle of interaction between seafarers, crew agencies, and 
shipowners regarding disability appraisal conclusion 
 
For instance, SF_HF_G husband’s crew agency challenged the effectiveness 
of his judicial disability assessment. She said: 
The crew agencies challenged the effectiveness of my judicial 
disability assessment in the court hearing, which was shameless. We 
argued that because of their objection we were not able to obtain 
Injured seafarers cannot 
obtain disability 
assessment from public 
institutions as per GB/T 
16180-2006 and have to 
apply through private 
judicial appraisal 
institutions as per GA35-
1992.
Crew agencies/shipowners 
challenge and deny the 
effectiveness of judicial 
assessment conclusions.
Crew agencies refuse to 
apply Work-related Injury 
Recognition for their 
injured seafarers from 
Labour Bureaus.
Crew agencies and 
shipowners refuse to take 
responsibilities of seafarers’
disability compensation
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Work Capacity Assessment. We had no other choice to have the 
judicial assessment as our evidence. Another seafarer SF_FZ_L 
shared a similar story: ‘the shipowner’s insurance company 
distrusted my judicial disability assessment result and asked me to be 
re-assessed by a committee they appointed. They just picked bones 
from the egg. What a trouble I had!’ 
7.3 Compensation, Disputes and Resolutions  
7.3.1 The transparency of compensation standards and P&I Clubs’ 
approval 
As discussed compensation standards for seafarers are varied and inconsistent. 
In many cases, the social insurance regime of the Work-related Injury 
Insurance Regulation is not enforced. In many instances, shipowners apply 
different compensation standards which are adopted by crew agencies. 
However, for seafarers, such agreements are not transparent. According to the 
employment agreements collected from the respondents in this research, only 
one agreement detailed the compensation scheme. Most compensation 
clauses are drafted as  
During the duty on board, the shipowner will insure the Party B 
(seafarer). All workplace injury, disease or death will be compensated 
subject to the agreement between Party A (crew agency) and 
shipowner. 
Most of the interviewed seafarers described how their crew agencies had not 
informed them about the compensation standards they applied beforehand. 
Some were only told which standards applied after they finished the medical 
treatment. For example, SF_XM_H explained how he was informed about 
the compensation standards: 
 My manager showed me a contract with compensation standards. My 
manager said this standard is legal and reasonable. But I did not 
know this agreement before because I had never signed this contract. 
The contract he showed to me was signed between the foreign 
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shipowner and my crew agency. It could be forged: he printed some 
standards and got some seals. I could not tell whether it was true or 
not because I had no idea when the contract was signed. I decided to 
accept this standard because I had no time and energy to argue with 
my agency. 
Some seafarers were criticised when they tried to ask for details of 
compensation standards after their accidents. SF_QD_H explained his 
family’s experiences:  
‘The doctor told us that surely I would have permanent disability due 
to this injury, so my elder sister worried about me and inquired the 
company about the compensation standards. The company was mad 
and said, she should concern my recovery only, and compensation 
was one-off. My sister told the company that I was the only son of the 
family, what if I had a permanent disability and later we could not 
find any liable person to claim damages. The company shout at my 
sister that it was our family’s fault to allow me to work at sea. I worked 
hard on board but the company’s attitudes deeply hurt me. I am so 
disappointed with shipping. The company’s terrible attitudes cause a 
lot of mental harm and pressures for me, so now I fear to call them to 
ask for compensation. I cannot predict how the company will treat me, 
so I find it extremely challenging to communicate with them.’ 
Seeking compensation is stigmatised as ‘extortion’ by some companies. 
SF_SQ_Z told his story:  
I have some basic knowledge of law and rights, and I know that they 
should pay me compensation. But the crew agency just wanted to 
evade his liability. Every time I asked for compensation, they blamed 
me that I was extorting them by my disability. 
His crew agency chief manager SF_TJ_C made a comment in the interview:  
The injured seafarers, if they were still willing to work at sea, they 
would not care about these damages because they can earn the money 
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back quickly at sea. Those who decide to quit the career at sea would 
always cause troubles for us and claim compensation aggressively 
because they wanted to make as much money as they could.’ 
The manager’s adversarial attitudes towards seafarers’ injuries and 
compensation claims are based on the assumption that seafarers’ salaries at 
sea are significantly higher than on land, so seafarers should earn their loss 
themselves by working at sea. Holding this opinion, the manager stigmatised 
seafarer claimants as greedily extorting, lazy and unwilling to go back to work 
at sea. The manager’s bias upgraded the dispute and irritated the seafarer. The 
SF_SQ_Z explained how he would respond to his manager’s attitudes:  
With my friend’s support and encouragement, I decided to sue him. 
Not matter how much it will cost and how long it will take, I just want 
to obtain a fair and just treatment in my case. 
P&I Club approval can be used as an excuse for shipowners to limit their 
liabilities in the contract: ‘All benefits given are subject to the approval of 
P&I club of the vessel. The company shall endeavour to obtain approval from 
the P&I club.’ SF_FZ_L confronted this barrier in his claim process:  
When I was discharged from the hospital, I had to collect all the 
invoices and medical records to report my medical fee. I had 
submitted all these evidence to my company and they would address 
the compensation with the insurance company (P&I Club). But the 
insurance company dawdled on my claim, and ignored me. We 
submitted all the evidence according to their requirements but the 
insurance company always refused to pay compensation. [...] My 
company and the insurance company could not achieve an agreement. 
[…] It was time-consuming and I had to stay at home and could not 
work. I asked my company whether they could pay me first. They said 
no and only the insurance company approve then I could be 
compensated.’ 
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SF_FZ_L’s account confirms the abovementioned clause in a seafarer 
contract that unless P&I clubs approve seafarers’ claims, the shipowner will 
not pay seafarers damages accordingly. If the P&I Club and the shipowner 
have disputes, seafarers’ claims will be delayed and obstructed.  
7.3.2 Work-related Injury Insurance Compensation 
The research findings regarding compensation standards in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 show that the compensation amounts available to seafarers are 
influenced by their employment status or contract, so that seafarers with the 
same degree of disability may receive different compensation. Freelancing 
seafarers receive less compensation and lower welfare than employee 
seafarers do. SF_XM_H explained the damages that he received:  
‘China is not a developed country. I don’t mean that our country is 
not developed enough, but our seafarers cannot have a humane and 
decent treatment. It is impossible for the company to provide me 
lifelong care. If an employee seafarer is injured, the company will 
provide them long term living allowance. However, for us, non-
employed seafarers, they just compensate us lump sum shipowner’s 
damages only. I consulted my manager why could not I have the long-
term Work-related Injury Insurance benefits. He told me that because 
I was not a formal employee so I could not have that part of 
compensation.’ 
Although some freelancing seafarers have served the crew agency for a long 
time, they are still regarded as temporary workers. SF_QZ_Z expressed his 
discontent of this discriminatory treatment:  
‘I have worked for this company since the early 1990s. When Filipino 
seafarer refused to navigate to the Gulf, we were risking our lives to 
earn foreign currencies for the company. I always recognised myself 
as a formal employee. I was so dedicated to navigation and this 
company. However, when I was injured, I started to realise I was only 
compensated as a temporary worker. After 20 years’ service, all I 
have received is a temporary worker’s benefit standards, which is far 
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from enough to cover my loss. All staff regard me as a ‘god of plague’ 
when I visited the company to claim some more compensation. I am 
upset about the company.’ 
SF_QZ_Z is a carpenter who worked on a bulk carrier. In his company, 
ratings cannot have employee status, so they cannot obtain social insurance 
compensation.  
Employee seafarers can obtain Work-related Injury insurance, but the 
premium paid by many crew agencies is a minimum standard (see Chapter 5). 
As a result, when employee seafarers claim their compensation from public 
social insurance funds, they are only entitled to the state minimum damages. 
SF_XM_W explained the limited compensation he obtained from social 
insurance:  
‘I only received CNY 10,000-20,000 from social insurance and it was 
low. I think the Chinese social insurance just provided a minimum and 
lowest welfare money. In my case, according to my company’s 
contribution, they could only pay me according to the lowest standard. 
What was worse, the public Work Capacity assessment of my injury 
was just Grade 9. The bone of my finger is missing and my index finger 
loss largely reduces the function of my right hand. [...] It was 
unnecessary to go through this process for so little compensation, and 
it was completely up to the social insurance authority. This 
compensation amount is unreasonably low compared to my severe 
injury and my earning loss. I even felt I should not have contributed 
to this social insurance scheme at the beginning. I have paid this since 
1998, but the compensation was too small to cover my loss.’ 
In addition to the problem of a minimum compensation, geographical barriers 
obstruct seafarers’ social insurance claims. SF_XM_W complained about this 
issue:  
A big problem of social insurance is the disconnection of different 
provinces. All the social insurance contribution the company and I 
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made in Guangzhou was useless, when I started to work in the Xiamen 
Company. Eight-year social insurance contribution suddenly became 
useless and I have to start again in Xiamen. It was said 3.8 million 
workers quite social insurance online. I guess these people are mobile 
workers as me because we cannot enjoy the benefits from the social 
insurance if we moved to another province. I would like to have a 
higher salary rather than the social insurance contribution.’  
In this research, many employee seafarers are not the residents of the cities of 
their crew agencies. When they leave their current jobs, it is difficult for them 
to collect their social insurance savings. In addition, work-related injury 
compensation may be lower than P&I Club’s insurance compensation. For 
example, in the case of SF_XM_W, the social insurance compensation was 
about CNY 20,000, but the P&I Club’s compensation was about CNY 
200,000. All his medical care expenses were covered by P&I Club’s 
compensation, because these expenses could not be reimbursed completely 
by the social insurance fund. He explained this problem:  
I had only one set of original invoices of medical expenses. If I 
submitted to the social insurance fund, their standards are stricter 
than P&I Clubs, so my manager said it is better to claim the medical 
expenses from the P&I Club. Overall, the compensation I received 
from social insurance is much less than from the P&I Club. Anyway, 
I did not have much confidence in the social insurance at the 
beginning, and it is no wonder their compensation is too small. 
(SF_XM_W) 
The issues regarding Work-related Injury Insurance claims are complicated 
and varied. The first issue is the inequality confronted by freelancers and 
employees. Crew agencies usually only arrange social insurance for their 
long-term high-ranking officers, and refuse to arrange social insurance for 
their ratings and temporary workers. These non-employee seafarers can be 
upset about such unequal treatment. Secondly, the mobile nature of seafarers’ 
job opportunities can reduce the security effects of social insurance, because 
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their contribution cannot be continued when they move to another province 
to work for a new crew agency. Finally, due to the minimum contributions 
made by some crew agencies, the social insurance compensation available for 
seafarers is much lower than shipowner’s liability insurance compensation, 
which may discourage seafarers from continuing their social insurance 
schemes. 
7.3.3 Disputes and Resolution  
1. Lawyers and dispute resolution  
Most injured seafarers stated that they preferred to negotiate with their crew 
agencies than to bring their claims to local labour arbitration tribunals or 
maritime courts. This reluctance of seafarers is caused by various concerns. 
The first one is seafarers’ uncertainty of a positive claim result and anxiety 
about judicial costs. SF_XM_H explained why he did not choose to employ 
a lawyer while seeking help from judicial institutions:  
There were some lawyers tried to contact me but I thought in my case 
to hire a lawyer was not worthy. Our crew agency already has a so-
called reasonable and legal standard. To hire a lawyer and sue the 
company might not improve the compensation so much, but I would 
have to pay extra service fee to the lawyer.  
In some cases, seafarers hired lawyers and were ready for litigation, but were 
convinced by their crew agency managers to give it up. SF_SQ_Z explained 
how he was convinced to dismiss his lawyer:  
When I returned home from the hospital, the company refused to send 
me sick pay. I hired a lawyer from Beijing. The lawyer tried to 
negotiate with my manager, but the company still refused to pay. This 
Lawyer was capable and he contacted ITF successfully and reported 
my case to ITF. I did not know how my lawyer achieved this, but it did 
create significant pressure on the company. The company contacted 
me urgently, agreed to give me sick pay, but the condition was to 
withdraw my claim from ITF and to dismiss my lawyer. […] At that 
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moment, I did not want to get into difficulties with my companies so I 
trusted the company. But later on, the company broke their promise 
and still refused to pay me disability compensation. Seven years 
passed, I am still fighting for my compensation. 
SF_SQ_Z was cheated by his crew agency. He trusted the crew agency and 
the shipowner so he dismissed his lawyer and withdrew his claim from ITF. 
However, the company’s deception was unexpected. This kind of strategy 
employed by crew agencies is not unusual. SF_QD_H shared a similar 
experience: 
 ‘After receiving our lawyer letter, the company called me. The 
company first advised me that I should not hire a lawyer to address 
the dispute and the shipowner was offended got angry already. They 
said the shipowner would compensate me if I dismissed the lawyer 
and would consider offering me working opportunity in the future. 
Later, the company threatened me that if I continued to take legal 
approach, they would blacklist me, and no other crew agency would 
hire me in the future.’  
Based on the accounts of SF_SQ_Z and SF_QD_H, when they determined to 
hire a lawyer to address their disputes, the first strategy of their crew agencies 
is to persuade and/or threaten them so that they dismiss their lawyers. Their 
crew agencies were happy to make a promise of compensation on condition 
that they dismissed their lawyers. However, such oral promises are not easy 
to substantiate and are frequently broken. If seafarers refused to dismiss their 
lawyers, some crew agencies refused to negotiate with them. SF_XZ_H 
explained this problem:  
My company told me that they would not talk to my lawyer and would 
only negotiate the damages with me. I went to the company. They 
agreed to compensate me CNY 40,000 but paid me CNY 20,000 first. 
The rest would be paid half year later. I took this offer without 
consulting my lawyer’s opinion because I wanted to work for my 
company so I just accept their offer. 
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The lawyer (ML_QD_C) advised that the final agreed compensation was 
lower than that which would have been awarded in the court. However, due 
to SF_XZ_H’s desire to work for the company in the future, he gave up part 
of his compensation claim without consulting his lawyer in order to maintain 
a good ‘relationship’ with the company.   
2. Rights defence activities  
As discussed in Chapter 6, rights defence activities adopted by claimants for 
death compensation included petition, occupation and demonstration are. 
However, in the cases of injury damage claims, these resistance measures 
were not found. A major factor preventing seafarers from arguing too fiercely 
with management was fear of being ‘blacklisted’ by crew agencies. Seafarers’ 
dependence on their crew agencies for working opportunities at sea 
discourages them from pursuing or going through with any legal action for 
their rights and entitlements.   
However, sometimes, seafarers adopt an online defence strategy when 
claiming injury damages. Through online searching, this study found that 
many posts of injured seafarers are mainly aiming to obtain legal advice rather 
than accusing their crew agencies as harshly as the online petitions of death 
compensation. Online right defences by the bereaved are to attract public 
attention to creating pressures for crew agencies and shipowners through 
governments’ intervention, while the online defences by the injured mainly 
seek advice from other netizens. SF_HF_G explained her purpose of 
publishing online rights defence posts:  
The company was warm at the beginning but later completely 
changed the tune after two years, when they believed our claim were 
time-barred legally. The company ignored us, so I decided to post my 
stories online. Some people replied that the claim was time-barred, 
and I could just accept this bad luck. Some people suggested 
whistleblowing or reporting to media to attract more public attention 
and then the government would intervene our claim. Although I would 
like to draw more public attention to make my claim become an online 
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incident, this is not realistic considering my capability so I continued 
to seek advice on different websites, including gate websites and legal 
service websites. 
After noting her post, one professional “posts-manipulating” company 
contacted her to offer a commercial ‘online activism’ service. SF_HF_G 
described why she refused the idea of ‘online activism’:  
I only receive a few replies to my posts and no replies at all in some 
seafarers’ online communities. It was frustrating, but later a person 
contacted me and informed that they could initiate an online activism 
for me at the price of thousands Yuan. They would post my stories on 
the most influential website, such as Tengxun and Weibo to create a 
large impact on cyberspace and to put the company to shame. I 
thought this idea over and over. My husband is injured and his one 
ear cannot hear, but should I initiate an online activism to discredit 
the company? My husband has worked for this company for years, 
and I do not want to ruin the company’s reputation, so I told that 
person even if I needed an online activism service, I would only tell 
my real story. The person replied, unless I agreed to discredit the 
company with exaggeration, the online activism would not succeed. 
Therefore, I refused their offer, because I just want to solve the 
problem of compensation, and I do not want to stigmatise the 
companies. So far, I have not disclosed the companies’ names online.’  
The account of SF_HF_G indicates the struggle of seafarer claimants; on one 
hand, they are eager to seek their injury compensation, but on the other hand, 
although they are treated unfairly by their crew agencies. They are not willing 
to take a revenge by attacking their companies online because of their 
conscience. Even though SF_HF_G realised the companies cheated her 
husband, she held fast to her moral standards and would not stigmatise the 
companies. Their previous employment relationship hinders injured seafarers 
in defending their rights. Loyalty and dedication to their crew agencies may 
not disappear automatically following companies’ unfair treatment of them. 
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This mental state prevents many seafarers from taking full advantage of 
online right defence strategies. 
3.  Judicial litigation  
a. Low persecution rate and obstacles to initiating 
judicial litigation for seafarers 
Judicial litigation is the last resort for seafarer claimants. Among the cases of 
injuries studied in this research, only five interviewees eventually raised 
lawsuits against crew agencies and shipowners. The past employment 
relationship with crew agencies may reduce seafarers’ determination to take 
legal activity against their companies, which may explain the lower rate of 
litigation. SF_QZ_Z described his psychological struggle when he gave up 
litigation:  
I have a close friend who is a lawyer. When he heard how the company 
treated me unfairly in compensation, he drafted all the legal 
documents for me and encouraged me to sue them. We collected all 
the evidence and just one-step from submitting the litigation to the 
court. But I changed my mind. I had worked for the company about 
twenty years as a rating. Although the company did not regard me as 
an employee in the compensation standards, I identified myself as a 
member of the company. Emotionally I did not want to sue them. 
Because of my giving up, my friend was extremely disappointed with 
me. He said how you could bear this unfair treatment: no sick pay, 
limited compensation lower than national minimum standards. He 
said no workplace injury victim on land would suffer this silently as 
you. 
SF_QZ_Z was torn between fighting for his rights and maintaining his loyalty 
to the company In arriving at the decision to take legal action for injury 
compensation, seafarers face two difficult choices; to proceed with litigation 
and damage their reputation with their employer or to refrain from any court 
proceedings and trade their entitlements for good relations and the hope of 
future employment with the shipowner or crewing agency. Faced with this 
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dilemma, if maintaining loyalty to the company is more valuable to the 
seafarer, they have to suppress their legitimate rights and entitlement to 
compensation (see Figure 7).  
   
Figure 6: The conflict between loyalty and right defence 
Fear of the cost of litigation is another reason when seafarers sometimes 
choose not to sue their companies. Litigation costs depend on the claim 
selected; that is a claim for work-related injury or personal injury. The former 
is cheaper (CNY 5-10), but the latter may result in higher awards of 
compensation. SF_HF_G explained how she overcame the unnecessary fear 
of litigation costs:  
In the beginning, nobody told me about the litigation cost and I 
borrowed some money from parents-in-law to prepare the lawsuits. 
Someone replied my post online told me to be brave to sue the 
company, and the litigation fee was only CNY 5 (50p). I heard many 
people complained the litigation was not affordable for our average 
citizens. When we heard this complaint, we dared not to visit the court. 
It was CNY 5, which was shockingly cheap. Then I started to sue the 
company. Without this information online about litigation fee, I would 
not dare to submit the lawsuit. The maritime court indeed only 
charged me CNY 5. 
The identity of 
seafarer and the 
loyalty to the 
company.
The seafarer's 
individual rights.
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SF_HF_G was encouraged by an anonymous person online to sue the 
company for a work-related injury. Currently, in the maritime courts the cost 
to the seafarer of initiating this kind of labour dispute is CNY 10 (GBP 1). 
However, if the seafarer sues the company for personal injury, the litigation 
fee will be calculated according to the claim amounts. For example, 
SF_XZ_Z claimed CNY 160,000 for his injury, and he was charged CNY 
1,300 according to personal injury litigation fee standards 80 . Freelance 
seafarers without any evidence of their employment have to pay higher 
litigation fee to begin legal proceedings against their companies than 
seafarers with formal contracts. Accordingly, it is more difficult financially 
for freelancing seafarers to sue their companies.  
b. The aids and supports to seafarers’ litigation  
Loyalty to companies and worries about lawsuit cost are two obstacles for 
injured seafarers seeking legal remedies against their companies. On the other 
hand, some factors encourage seafarers to sue their companies. Access to 
professional legal knowledge and external assistance was available to all five 
seafarers who resort to legal remedies. SF_SQ_Z and SF_HH_W hired their 
own lawyers to initiate litigation against their companies. SF_HF_G and 
SF_XZ_Z used the online community to seek help. SF_HF_G met an 
anonymous legal consultant online, who turned out to be a maritime judge. 
With this consultant’s advice, she successfully submitted her litigation. 
SF_XZ_Z sought help through a seafarers’ online community and found a 
professional maritime lawyer to help him and obtain his damages through 
judicial mediation. In one case, the company agreed to pay damages to a 
claimant within the scope of liability insurance, but the P&I Club refused the 
company’s reimbursement for compensation claims. To obtain compensation 
from the insurer, he was encouraged by his company to sue the company itself. 
With a judicial decision, the P&I Club had to honour the insurance 
                                                 
80
 The current litigation fee standards for personal injuries are: CNY 100-500 
for the claim of damages less than CNY 5,0000; if the damages claimed more 
than CNY50,000 less than CNY 100,000, 1% extra litigation fee will apply, 
if the damages claimed more than CNY 100,000, additional 0.5% litigation 
fee will be added.  
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compensation to the shipowner. With his company’s approval, he found a 
public legal assistant as his attorney to initiate the litigation.  
Table 17: The litigation results of the seafarers’ claims 
Name 
Injury/ 
Disability 
The 
type/position 
of seafarer 
Legal assistance 
Forum for 
jurisdiction Results 
SF_SQ_Z Grade 10 
International 
(Engine 
mechanic) 
Professional lawyer Tianjin 
Settlement 
through 
judicial 
mediation 
SF_HH_W Grade 10 
Costal 
(Captain) 
Professional 
Lawyer 
Tianjin 
Settlement 
through 
judicial 
mediation 
SF_FZ_L Grade 8 
International 
(Second 
Engineer) 
Public legal 
assistance 
Xiamen 
Settlement 
through 
judicial 
mediation 
SF_HF_G Grade 10 
International 
(Cook) 
Online legal 
assistance 
Wuhan 
No longer 
prosecute 
the matter 
SF_XZ_Z Grade 10 
Coastal 
(Able 
Seaman) 
Online legal 
assistance/reference 
Xiamen 
Settlement 
through 
judicial 
mediation 
Through comparing these five seafarers’ experiences, it can be noted that 
external professional legal assistance is important in the decision to initiate 
litigation. This assistance can be obtained from professional lawyers, online 
rights defence activities, or public legal aid.   
c. Challenges during the litigation  
Chapter 4 described some of the procedural challenges of litigation for 
seafarers. These challenges are rooted in the design of Chinese civil 
procedures. They add to many non-procedural challenges for seafarers, such 
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as verbal/emotional attacks from defendants, insurers’ intervention, 
difficulties in producing evidence, and the judicial culture of mediation. 
An injured seafarer’s wife reported that her problem in seeking justice was 
due to the lack of awareness of special maritime jurisdiction: 
When the manning company refused to pay my husband’s medical fee, 
I had no idea where to go to seek help. My husband was sent to a 
Hong Kong vessel through a Shanghai company, but all his contracts 
were signed with a Nanjing company. I wanted to sue them, but I 
didn’t know which court I could go to. Local courts and Work-related 
Injuries Committees in Shanghai and Nanjing were not willing to 
accept our claims, but they didn’t tell me where I could seek help. 
(SF_HF_G) 
In the case where the owner and/or manager of the ship is/are registered 
abroad, the service of papers to the defendant is usually very challenging. One 
seafarer reported: 
After several rounds of negotiation with the manning company, I 
finally decided to bring my claim to the maritime court. However, the 
court told me that they need time to serve the shipowner, which is in 
Taiwan. They did not say how long that would take. I have waited 
almost two years now and have not got any update information.  
(SF_SQ_Z, a seafarer suffering fracture of thighbone on a vessel 
flagging Hong Kong flag owned by a Taiwanese company). 
Verbal and emotional attacks from defendants during court hearings do not 
challenge seafarers’ claims and evidence substantively but provoke and insult 
seafarer plaintiffs. Taking SF_HF_G’s experiences of court hearing as an 
example:  
The manning companies’ attitudes were still hostile in the court. All 
their attacks were oral but not evidence. They insulted us with some 
ridiculous blames and it became a kind of fight or quarrel in the court. 
They blamed that we delayed my husband’s treatment and then 
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argued we should not use a medicine liquid. We rebutted that it was 
doctor’s prescription. Most of these attacks were nonsense. Because 
of his hearing loss, my husband’s emotion is not very stable and easy 
to be irritated. We just tried to ignore the companies’ nonsense. 
Another attorney ML_QD_C reported a similar situation he faced in the court 
in the case of one seafarer:  
The defendant lawyer was aggressive and blamed my client was 
injured due to his fault. He argued that the shipowner should not 
compensate my client and on the contrary my client should 
compensate all the medical expenses to the shipowner. My client just 
got mad in the court. The defendant lawyer’s strategy was to make my 
client out of control, although the tribunal would accept none of these 
arguments. 
Through the accounts of SF_HF_G and ML_QD_C, it can be noted that some 
defendants (shipowners and crew agencies) devise strategies to attack 
seafarer plaintiffs during court hearings, with the sole aim of irritating 
plaintiffs and causing them to react and misbehave.  
Seafarer’s litigation against crew agencies and shipowners usually involves 
P&I Clubs’ interests as well. As per the business custom, shipowners’ 
attorneys are recommended by P&I Clubs and attorney fees are paid by P&I 
Clubs rather than shipowners. As a result, the attorney is responsible to the 
P&I Club’s instruction. In this situation, seafarer plaintiffs and their attorneys 
have to confront the crew agency, shipowner, and P&I club together in the 
litigation. These three parties’ opinions may not be entirely consistent, which 
increases the complexity of the litigation. In the case of SF_FZ_L, his 
shipowner agreed to compensate. However, because the P&I Club would not 
approve the shipowner’s compensation plan, this seafarer had to sue the 
shipowner to obtain his compensation. In the litigation process, a key piece 
of evidence (judicial disability appraisal conclusion) was challenged by an 
attorney who had been appointed by the P&I Club. He explained the 
difficulties he faced with the attorney: 
  
 
 
229
The insurance company (P&I Club) created a lot of troubles for me. 
In the beginning, the insurance company ignored me and never 
communicated with us. The superintendent of my company suggested 
me to hire a lawyer to have a litigation. […] The insurance company 
found an expert to challenge my recovery period and refused to pay 
me five-month sick pay. Their expert insisted I should be recovered in 
one month, but I had stayed in the hospital for more than one month. 
The insurance company also challenged my disability appraisal and 
asked me to do that again in another institution appointed by them. 
The insurance company’s expert was ridiculous and according to his 
opinion the insurance company should compensate me nothing. They 
never trusted me and argued all my evidence were forged. 
In this case, the shipowner and his P&I club had a dispute regarding the 
compensation reimbursement. P&I Club’s strict control of seafarers’ personal 
injuries compensation is commercially motivated; that is to protect the 
interests of member shipowners affiliated to the Club. Even though one 
shipowner may agree to compensate his seafarer, P&I Clubs still conduct an 
independent examination of seafarers’ claims. As a result, the seafarer’ claim 
in this particular case was investigated repeatedly and stringently. Due to a 
lack of trust, the Club's attitude regarding the seafarer’s evidence was hostile, 
placing him in a difficult position. 
The production of effective and adequate evidence is a major challenge for 
seafarers in the cases of litigation. With limited access to their records of work, 
a major challenge is to prove their employment relationship with their crew 
agency and shipowner. This is particularly the case for coastal seafarers who 
have not signed a written contract with their shipowners. In court, without 
evidence of employment relationship, a tribunal cannot recognise their 
employee status. Indirect evidence may be provided in the form of service 
records (seamen’s books), which can attest to seafarers’ periods of duty on 
board. However, some agencies retain seamen’s books to reduce their 
seafarer turnover. In this situation, it is extremely challenging to prove past 
service on board. The estimate of future medical expenses is another 
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challenge for seafarers in court. SF_HF_G explained the difficulties of 
establishing future medical fees:  
Because my husband still needs further medical treatment so we have 
to calculate an amount of the medical expense we claimed. However, 
the time of the surgery is unpredictable and how much following-up 
treatment would be needed is uncertain. I sought help from many 
hospitals to ask could they estimate a possible future medical cost for 
us but the doctors said they could not help. 
Without a doctor’s statement of future medical expenses as evidence, 
seafarers’ compensation claims for medical treatment yet to be undertaken 
cannot be fully supported by the court. There are also difficulties in 
establishing degrees of disability, which increases of the cost of maritime 
litigation for seafarers as well. SF_HF_G explained the problem she faced:  
‘The judge told me I should invite the experts who issued the disability 
appraisal conclusion as witnesses to answer defendants’ queries 
during the hearing. These experts were in Xuancheng, Anhui, but the 
maritime court is at Wuhan, Hubei. I had to pay all the travelling and 
accommodation expense to two experts. The experts agreed to present 
at the tribunal first because they thought the court was nearby. When 
they learned the court was in Wuhan, they were unwilling to travel, 
because it is a long journey. 81  Producing evidence was the most 
challenging part for me in the litigation, to be frank.’   
Producing adequate evidence is crucial to establish a compensation claim for 
seafarers. With limited financial resources and capability, providing evidence 
is a significant challenge for seafarer plaintiffs.  
As shown in the table above, four of five court cases were settled during the 
hearing. Most injury claims are not solved by judgements. The long 
established mediation culture in Chinese courts has complicated effects on 
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 It takes more than 8 hours by coach from Xuancheng, Anhui, to Wuhan, 
Hubei.  
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seafarers’ rights protection. The mediation culture refers to Chinese judge’s 
preference of mediating disputes rather than making a judgement, which is a 
special judicial culture formed in an unstable and changing social and legal 
environment. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are conflicting legislative and 
judicial rules regarding seafarers’ injury compensation. Furthermore, 
seafarers’ ability to produce evidence is limited. To settle the dispute through 
judicial mediation is a practical compromise considering the legal context, 
judicial practice and seafarers’ needs. The advantages of mediation include 
shortening the litigation timeframe, reducing financial and mental pressures 
caused by litigation to seafarer plaintiffs and avoiding risks confronted by 
judges in relation to judgements. However, the settlement of disputes through 
judicial mediation normally means that seafarer plaintiffs have to sacrifice 
part of their compensation in compromise. SF_HH_W explained his 
experience of being persuaded by the judge to reduce the amount of his claim:  
The judge told me that my shipowner’s son was involved in another 
traffic accident. The shipowner was also under considerable financial 
pressure, so the judge suggested me to consider the shipowner’s 
difficulties to reduce my compensation amount. I thought although my 
shipowner harmed me deeply but I would not hurt him. His son injured 
another person in the car accident also was a punishment for him. But 
I still reckon the judge has some special relationship with my 
shipowner, otherwise why he always tried to persuade me to claim 
fewer damages? 
SF_HH_W’s account indicates a clear disadvantage of judicial mediation. It 
is possible that shipowners bribe judges to achieve a result. The application 
of judicial mediation in seafarers’ injury litigation may reduce the reliability 
of maritime courts. On the one hand, this means that judicial precedents are 
not open to the public and this increases the difficulty for seafarers in 
predicting their litigation results in advance. On the other hand, the increased 
use of mediation also undermines motivation to promulgate unified and 
definite laws and regulations to determine seafarers’ entitlements. The likely 
outcomes from litigation become less transparent and more unpredictable 
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because they are subject to mediation rather than an officially promulgated 
compensation standard.  
The lack of formal judicial judgements is a result of the conflicts in Chinese 
law regarding seafarers’ workplace injury compensation (see Chapter 4) and 
the judicial preferences for mediation over judgement. In most cases, seafarer 
plaintiffs and company defendants are able to achieve agreement, and 
tribunals issue an enforceable judicial document to ensure both parties honour 
their promises. However, in some cases, the defendant company does not 
accept mediation because of their P&I Clubs’ requirements. SF_HF_G 
described why they could not achieve a settlement of the dispute through 
judicial mediation:  
The maritime judge was friendly and tried to settle our dispute 
through mediation. But the manning company was not cooperative, 
and they said their insurers would not accept judicial mediation. Only 
a court judgement can be taken. The judge would like to have a 
mediation but the company refused, so my claim now is still pending. 
As discussed above, seafarer plaintiffs’ ability to collect evidence is much 
weaker than crew agencies and shipowners. So in many cases, the evidence 
provided by seafarers is not sufficient to establish their claims. It is risky for 
a tribunal to base their judgement on inadequate evidence, because once a 
party appeals, then the first-trial judges’ competence may be called into 
question.  
If a defendant company refuses to accept mediation, and the seafarer plaintiff 
cannot produce sufficient evidence of his service on board, the cause-effect 
relationship between his injury and his service cannot be established. As a 
consequence, the tribunal would not support the plaintiff’s claims. In the case 
of SF_HF_G, because she could not establish a claim of personal injury in 
tort with insufficient evidence, the judge suggested that her claim was 
withdrawn and reintroduced when sufficient evidence became available.  
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Maritime judicial litigation is the last resort for seafarer victims of workplace 
accident in claiming compensation. This approach is challenging in relation 
to requirements for legal knowledge and evidence. Judicial mediation is a 
compromise approach to providing seafarers, the vulnerable party, some 
remedies considering their loss and their limited capability to produce 
evidence. However, such processes carry a risk of judicial corruption. 
Moreover, the overuse of mediation in seafarers’ injury claims makes 
standards of compensation more difficult to establish. The transparency and 
uniformity of seafarers’ rights in law are thereby further eroded.  
Summary  
This chapter has examined the problems, challenges and difficulties for 
seafarers when they seek medical treatment following a work-related accident. 
Specifically, the discussion has explored the experience of injured Chinese 
seafarers involved in compensation claims. The analysis has further 
highlighted the obstacles faced when seafarers negotiate legal recognition of 
their injuries and while seeking legal remedies or compensation through 
labour administrative authorities and maritime courts. The analysis of 
different seafarers’ experiences indicates that differences in ownership and 
differences in seafarers’ contracts, can significantly influence entitlements to 
compensation when workplace accidents arise. Large scale state-owned 
shipowners can provide seafarers with timely and efficient assistance in 
obtaining medical care, while small scale private shipowners are more likely 
to compromise their seafarers’ well-being to ensure the operation of a ship if 
they cannot find a replacement when injuries occur. In the Chinese shipping 
market, some shipowners and crew agencies prefer flexible and precarious 
employment forms when engaging seafarers. In this way, employers can 
control their human resource costs. However, the research findings suggest 
that, such employment practices affect injured seafarers’ well-being 
negatively. In practice, the replacement of an injured seafarer takes longer 
under this regime and profitability may be prioritised over the welfare of 
individual crew members. With no stable reserve of seafarers, the shipowner 
will highly probably risk their crew’s life to ensure their business profits. 
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Formally employed seafarers generally have better compensation schemes 
than freelancers without formal employment contracts. Seafarers with a 
formal employment contract can be supported by their crew agencies in 
obtaining compensation from the social insurance fund. Meanwhile, 
freelancing seafarers do not receive equivalent support. Ratings are usually 
in this category because they are regarded as freelancers by companies no 
matter how long they have served, which puts them in a vulnerable position 
throughout their career.  
When seafarers cannot achieve their rights through negotiations with their 
companies and after seeking help from administrative authorities, the results 
are usually unsatisfactory. According to seafarers’ accounts, local 
governmental authorities are not interested in regulating shipowners and crew 
agencies, due to their largely foreign ownership structure. Local 
administrative authorities can easily use ‘foreign-ownership’ to avoid 
jurisdiction over seafarers’ claims and frequently fail to refer seafarers to the 
correct court; that is either the Maritime Safety Administration or Maritime 
Courts. The negative attitude of local administrative authorities towards 
seafarers’ claims does not only frustrate and discourage seafarers’ motivation 
to pursue rights defence but also it constitutes a waste of seafarers’ precious 
time and money. Without an explicit instruction provided to seafarers seeking 
help from competent authorities, local administrative authorities create extra 
difficulties for seafarer claimants. Moreover, the publicly funded Work 
Capacity Assessment Committees refused to appraise disability for seafarers 
if their companies do not endorse the application. This also places seafarers 
in a disempowered position. This institutional regime strengthens companies’ 
power and weakens seafarers’ power in obtaining core evidence for work-
related injury compensation.  
As a last resort for injured seafarers, maritime judicial litigation, is a difficult 
and challenging approach. Without standardised and unified legislative and 
judicial opinion, their claims are mostly settled by court mediation on a case 
by case basis. Furthermore, their claims can be delayed if shipowners’ 
representatives employ tactics to frustrate the proceedings. Maritime 
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litigation regimes are designed with the rationale that plaintiffs and defendant 
are of equal status so they should have equivalent procedural rights. However, 
as this evidence shows individuals are generally weaker than corporations, 
and in such case, they are substantially disadvantaged. 
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Chapter Eight: Discussion  
Introduction 
In order to answer the research question which asks whether Chinese 
seafarers and surviving families suffer additional harm as a result of existing 
compensation processes, the thesis has explored experiences of Chinese 
seafarers or surviving families making claims for compensation following 
workplace accidents Three key findings emerge from the research examining 
this experience detailed in the previous chapters. First, it demonstrates that 
Chinese seafarers are not entitled to equal rights as ‘workers’ in Chinese 
labour law framework. Secondly, different shipping companies (ocean-going 
and coastal; state-owned and non-state owned) have adopted different 
organisational policies, with many companies failing to cover their legal 
liabilities. This leads to the third key finding which indicates that as a result, 
seafarers and their surviving families suffer considerable additional harm 
when negotiating for compensation with shipping companies or when 
resorting to administrative and judicial remedies.  
This research reveals that at every stage of the claim process, the majority of 
the interactions injured seafarers/surviving families have with employers, 
workers’ compensation institutions and maritime courts are negative. The 
experiences of Chinese seafarers support the previous argument that workers 
have demeaning, humiliating and shameful experiences when claiming 
compensation following workplace accidents (Strunin and Boden, 2004; 
Kilgour et al., 2015; Lippel, 2007; Lippel, 1999; Matthews et al., 2012; 
Matthews et al., 2016). Drawing on empirical evidence, this study supports 
the thesis that the additional harm suffered by victims of workplace accidents 
during claim processes is an international problem, caused by structural 
deficiencies of compensation systems. Chinese seafarers reported their 
experiences of mistrust, disrespect, stigmatisation, claim suppression, and 
payment delays. These experiences are similar to the workers’ experiences 
identified by studies conducted in Canada, Australia and the United States. 
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Furthermore, the experiences of Chinese seafarers are related to structural 
issues in corporate management and the Chinese legal framework. 
This chapter discusses the main results of the research. The findings are 
interpreted under four themes related the secondary harm suffered by Chinese 
seafarers: inequality; exclusion from organisational management; 
marginalisation from public law remedies; and isolation. The contribution of 
these findings to the knowledge of experiences of victims in making 
compensation claims will be discussed. The deficiencies of the Chinese 
compensation systems, management of shipping companies and Chinese 
public governance are critically evaluated at the end of the chapter.  
8.1 Inequality 
The harm suffered by Chinese seafarers has distintictive features compared 
to land based workers. This disntictiveness is related to their incomplete 
workers’ rights in law. Discrimination in legal entitlements exists between 
foreign-related seafarers and land-based workers. In addition, different 
groups of seafarers are exposed to diverse extents of harm. The different 
extents of harm are related to the ownership of their companies, their rank 
and the nature of their employment contracts. Arguably, this complex 
structure of inequality faced by Chinese seafarers makes their claim 
experiences even more damaging than the experiences of migrant and 
precarious workers reported in previous studies (Sun and Liu, 2014, Sampson, 
2013a, Premji et al., 2010, Underhill et al., 2011, Dacanay and Walters, 2011, 
Quinlan and Mayhew, 1999).  .  
8.1.1 Inequalities between seafarers and other workers under Chinese 
law 
This research finds that Chinese seafarers’ access to Work-related Injury 
Insurance is more restricted than that of other Chinese workers. More than 
half of Chinese seafarers are not covered by the Work-related Injury 
Insurance (Chen et al. 2014). Most of the participants in the study reported 
that they did not receive any compensation from Work-related Injury 
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Insurance Funds. As a result of this insuficient coverage, seafarers have 
limited institutional supports in their claim process. 
No-fault based workers’ compensation is widely believed to be more 
‘therapeutic’ in addressing the harm caused by industrial accidents than fault-
based tort compensation (Wexler, 1990, Lippel, 2007, Clayton, 1997b, Purse, 
1998, Kiselica et al., 2004). No-fault based social insurance compensation 
can increase the chance of success for injured workers to achieve tort law 
damages by providing basic maintenance for victims (Lewis et al., 2006). 
Correspondingly, without the access to no-fault based workers’ compensation, 
workers are unlikely to receive timely remedies following workplace 
accidents. As shown by this study and previous research (Chen et al. 2014), 
a majority of seafarers are unable to obtain no-fault based compensation 
following the accidents, since their employers refused to contribute to the 
social insurance scheme. Compared to the workers covered by social security 
schemes, physical pains and financial losses are more likely to be suffered by 
these seafarers.  
It is a common problem in China that employers refuse to insure their workers 
against work-related injuries. However, as I outline below, the distinctive 
vulnerability of seafarers is a legally constructed discrimination, which was 
confirmed by a Supreme Court Judicial Reply with binding effects 
nationwide (see also Chapter 4). In the situation where an employer refuses 
to contribute the work-related injury insurance, seafarers have to bear the risk 
by themselves while other workers are still entitled to claim compensation 
either from their employers or the social insurance fund. This is a unique 
problem suffered by Chinese seafarers from other workers examined by 
earlier studies.  
Previous studies show that gender, race and nationality are contributing 
factors for workers to be treated discriminatively by social insurance 
institutions (Storey, 2008; Premji et al., 2010; Lippel, 2007), while 
occupation-based discrimination constructed by law is rarely noticed. Under 
Chinese law, employers are able to exercise substantial control over seafarers. 
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The Supreme Court Judicial Reply [(2011) MSTZ No. 4] confirmed that 
when there is no express labour contract between a crew agency and a seafarer 
and the seafarer is dispatched to a foreign vessel, the seafarer is not entitled 
to worker’s rights under Chinese labour law. The relationship between the 
seafarer and the manning company is regarded as a ‘civil agreement’. In this 
relationship, seafarers are no longer recognised as workers protected by 
Chinese labour law, but instead, they are considered to be an ‘equal party’ 
with shipowner and manning company, who should not claim entitlement to 
social security benefits. In contrast, if a land-based worker is in a similar 
situation, he/she will still have an independent approach to seek compensation 
and the social insurance fund will cover the payment first and then claim it 
back from employers by exercising the right of subrogation (See Table 17).  
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Table 18: Work-related Injury Insurance Treatment for seafarers and land-based 
workers 
 
The nature 
of 
employment 
Compensation 
entitlements of 
WIIR 
Liable parties to 
WIIR 
compensation 
Dispute 
resolution 
approaches 
Burden of proof 
Seafarers 
covered 
by WRII 
Labour 
contract Apply WIIR Fund 
Labour 
Arbitration 
Committees 
and 
Maritime 
Courts 
The facts of work-
related injuries, 
medical expenses82, 
and disability degrees 
Land 
workers 
covered 
by WRII 
Labour 
contract Apply WIIR Fund 
Labour 
Arbitration 
Committees 
and Civil 
Courts 
The facts of work-
related injuries, 
medical expenses, and 
disability degrees 
Seafarers 
not 
covered 
by WRII 
Presumed 
civil contract Not apply 
Not apply 
 
Maritime 
Courts 
The existence of 
working activities on a 
specific vessel; the 
work-relatedness of the 
injury; the loss 
(including medical fee 
and disability degrees); 
whether the injury is 
caused by the 
negligence of 
shipowners or third 
parties. 
Land 
workers 
not 
covered 
by WRII 
Presumed 
labour 
contract 
Presumably 
apply 
The employers, 
manpower 
agencies, and the 
Social Insurance 
Fund 
Labour 
Arbitration 
Committees 
and Civil 
Courts 
The existence of labour 
relationships, The facts 
of work-related 
injuries, medical 
expenses, and 
disability degrees. 
 
8.1.2 Inequalities among seafarers 
 (1) Coastal Seafarers and International Seafarers 
Chinese legal scholars tend to categorise Chinese coastal seafarers as 
‘domestic workers’ and do not recognise problems with their compensation 
claims (Chen and Hao, 2012; Wang, 2009). However, this study shows that 
coastal seafarers may in fact confront a worse situation than international 
seafarers in claim processes. Subject to different crew management styles, 
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 In practice, usually the medical expenses of seafarers are covered by 
shipowners’ liability insurers, because the WIIR fund’s coverage standards 
are low. 
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coastal seafarers’ employment is more informal and less regulated than 
international seafarers. One-third of coastal seafarer claimants do not have a 
written employment contract. In contrast, as required by the Maritime Labour 
Convention (2006), the majority of international seafarers have written 
agreements (Chen et al. 2014). With regards to personal accident insurance, 
82% of international seafarers are covered while only 55% of coastal 
seafarers are insured (Chen et al. 2014). Coastal shipowners are less likely to 
arrange Work-related Injury Insurance for their seafarers than international 
ship managers. The liability insurance coverage arranged by coastal 
shipowners is much lower than by international shipowners. As a result, 
coastal seafarers receive much lower compensation than international 
seafarers (see Table 17).  
Consistent with the argument by Lewis and Morris (2012) that the availability 
and coverage of liability insurance determine whether and the extent to which 
victims can be compensated, the low compensation amounts for coastal 
seafarers results from insufficient insurance coverages. In addition, 
ambiguous liability assignment between shipowners and managers of same 
nationalities indicates an inadequate inspection in the Chinese coastal 
shipping sector. Coastal seafarers still have to face the uncertainty of 
compensation liability caused by the ‘affiliation’ management practice (see 
5.1.2.3). Furthermore, working in their home labour market, the low coverage 
of Work-related Injury Insurance among coastal seafarers reflects a fact that 
the enforcement of workers’ compensation in coastal shipping sector is 
inadequate.  
(2) Seafarers working for state-owned and non-state owned 
shipowners 
The extent to which seafarers can be compensated is related to the ownership 
of their employers. In this research, Chinese State-owned shipowners insured 
their seafarers with both Work-related Injury Insurance and P &I liability 
insurance, which could ensure their seafarers to receive sufficient damages 
(see 5.1.1). However, most of the foreign shipowners that were included in 
the study could not cover their maximum liabilities with P &I liability 
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insurance. The insurance coverage of Chinese private shipowners was the 
lowest, which was far below their liabilities. Therefore, seafarers working for 
Chinese state-owned companies are more likely to have sufficient insurance 
cover than seafarers working for non-state owned shipowners.  
This inequality is a result of the privatisation reforms: the ‘iron rice bowl’ 
(permanent full-time jobs) was ‘broken’, and seafarers became ‘free workers’ 
in the labour market (Zhao, 2002). The monopoly of state-owned enterprises 
ended. Private and foreign shipowners became employers (Zhao, 2011). The 
reform was highly praised, with some scholars predicting that the number of 
Chinese seafarers working on foreign vessels would increase tremendously 
(Wu, 2004; Wu et al., 2006). However, this research reveals that working for 
non-state owned shipowners, Chinese seafarers are more likely to receive 
lower and less secure compensation payments following workplace accidents 
than their counterparts working for state-owned shipowners.  
This inequality experienced by Chinese seafarers is related to different 
attitudes of employers towards their responsibilities to workplace accident 
victims. It is well-known that as a result of neo-liberal reform in China, 
Chinese seafarers are subject to complex and diverse employment standards 
(Wu et al. 2006), but the resulting inequality among workers serving 
employers of different ownerships has been underestimated in previous 
empirical studies. Indeed perceptions among Chinese seafarers regarding 
such inequality, including fears of being under compensated following an 
accident, may be one reason why many Chinese seafarers are unwilling to 
work on foreign vessels. This also might contribute to the explanation of why 
the volume of Chinese seafarers working on foreign ships is much lower than 
was expected by the global shipping industry (Zhao et al., 2016; Tang et al., 
2015). Limited English proficiency, low compatibility with foreign corporate 
norms, and the semi-closeness of Chinese market have all been previously 
identified as common reasons why Chinese seafarers’ participation in the 
global market is limited, and the retention rate is low. However, foreign 
shipowners’ management strategies over Chinese seafarers were rarely 
critically examined. This study indicates that insufficient insurance cover of 
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foreign shipowners may decrease Chinese seafarers’ interests in working for 
foreign shipowners.  
 (3) The hierarchy in compensation schemes 
Occupational hierarchy is another factor contributing to seafarers’ unequal 
compensation. This study shows that, foreign shipowners differentiated 
compensation standards according to rank (see 5.1.1). The higher the rank is, 
the more compensation will be available, which is consistent with the 
hierarchy culture on board (Sampson, 2013b, Alderton et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, this research has not noticed this type of inequality in Chinese 
shipping companies, including both state-owned and privately owned. The 
disability compensation schemes of Chinese shipowners is completely 
determined by the disability degree and available insurance compensation.  
As a result of the foreign shipowners’ hierarchical compensation schemes, 
junior officers and ratings are likely to be undercompensated. Drawing on the 
low insurance schemes established by the companies, the legal entitlements 
of ratings and junior officers are more likely to be infringed compared to 
captains and senior offices. (see 5.1.1). In this research, many ratings working 
for foreign employers reported not obtaining adequate compensation and sick 
pay. They expressed their resentments against unequal treatments (e.g. 
SF_QZ_Z).  
Chinese law adopts national average wage to ascertain death compensation 
rather than considering the actual income of the deceased. Since the law does 
not differentiate compensation standards according to victims’ identities, 
Chinese shipowners do not establish their compensation schemes according 
to the rank of the seafarer. Additionally, ‘same compensation amounts for 
death in one accident’ is a Chinese distinct judicial culture and confirmed by 
Tort Law (2010), and Chinese victims resist the imposition of hierarchical 
compensation schemes. In the case of SF_FJ_Z, where 13 crew were killed 
in one marine casualty, regardless of seafarers’ ranks, many bereaved families 
wished to achieve ‘same compensation amounts for death in one accident’ 
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and to resist the attempt to impose differential amounts of compenation for 
junior and senior officers according to the manning agreement. 
 (4) Rural and Urban seafarers 
The inequality in law between rural seafarers and urban seafarers has been a 
lengthy discussion in the Chinese legal commentary. In the dispute resolution 
process, the legal inequality between rural and urban seafarers can have 
considerable influence on their final compensation results. As mentioned 
above, the initiation of the same compensation amounts for death in one 
accident is challenging the discrimination against rural residents in tort cases. 
Nevertheless, different compensation standards for rural and urban identities 
still exist. When a rural seafarer suffers a similar disability as an urban 
seafarer, they are entitled to lower damages (see Chapter 4, Table 13). From 
this perspective, the legal compensation standards provide less favourable 
results for rural seafarers than urban ones. This also reflects wider Chinese 
discrimination against rural residents (Li, 2008).  
8.2 Exclusion from organisational management  
The sufferings experienced by Chinese seafarers are associated with the lack 
of worker participation in management. In safety management literature, 
workers representation in the management have been found to be a significant 
element of effective safety management (Bhattacharya, 2009, Clarke, 2013). 
Other forms of workers representation, including collective bargaining in 
welfare and rights negotiation, are important ways of ensuring workers’ rights. 
This research noticed that Chinese seafarers were not well represented in 
management process and decision making regarding their welfare and rights 
following workplace accidents. In fact, they were excluded from 
organisational management. Moreover, the research participants reported that 
their rights to information were not respected by their managers. 
Chapter 5 showed that Chinese seafarers’ interests were not represented in 
the negotiation of compensation standards. As previous studies show, if 
workers are represented by a union, firms are required to accept collective 
bargaining, which gives employees a mechanism to affect some corporate 
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actions (John et al., 2015; Kuruvilla et al., 2002). However, this study 
indicated, in the case of foreign-related placement of seafarers, the insurance 
coverage, medical period, disability and death compensation standards are 
subject to negotiations between manning companies and shipowners, in 
which seafarers are not involved. Although many crew managers 
(MC_XM_L, MC_XM_S, MC_QD_Z) expressed their support of higher 
compensation standards for their seafarers, they also reported that if they 
insisted on higher standards of damages, they would lose their potential 
clients to their competitors. As a result, seafarers do not have any control over 
their work-related injury treatment and their needs are likely to be sacrificed 
to ensure the profit of manning companies. This supports the argument that 
seafarers are made vulnerable workers by the ‘prioritisation of profit over 
safety by the actors that engage and control their labour’ and by “their 
weakness as collective actors in relation to capital” (Walters and Bailey, 
2013: , p 216) 
Many seafarers said that they were not informed of their rights and 
compensation schemes before the accident and in some cases, after the 
accident. Their employers refused to disclose any information about 
compensation schemes. The analysis of seafarers’ employment contracts in 
this study shows that most of the contracts did not contain any details of 
compensation schemes (see 7.4.1). Although the regulatory framework 
confirmed that seafarers are entitled to know this information, in this research, 
some managers refused to provide it. Even when accidents happen, some 
crew managers use the excuse of ‘commercial secrets’ to reject bereaved 
families’ access to information about compensation schemes (see 5.2.3). This 
problem is rooted in the lack of worker representation in Chinese manning 
companies.  
Seafarers’ needs are largely ignored by management teams. The analysis in 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that the organisational management was widely 
established for risk control, but seafarers’ needs in relation to harm sustained 
as the result of injury or ill-health suffered when such controls fail were 
ignored. For example, seafarers working on non-state-owned ships, have to 
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pay medical expenses by themselves first and then claim reimbursement (see 
section 5.2.2). The research participants criticised this practice as it forced 
them to give up necessary medical treatment under financial pressures. The 
practice of limiting medical period is another example in which seafarers’ 
health needs are ignored. By imposing a liability period of between three 
months to two years, shipowners and their insurers can effectively avoid 
liabilities to victims’ long-term medical expenses. In some cases, the injured 
seafarers suffered permanent disability caused by the early termination of 
medical care. 
The ‘black box’ claim handling practice causes mistrust between seafarers 
and companies. In some companies, seafarers’ request for information about 
injury compensation for workplace accidents met with intimidation from 
managers. Not only were seafarers not informed about their rights, but also 
they were unable to track the status of their claims. It is shipowners and their 
insurers who decide the results of claims, and manning companies are in 
charge of communicating the progress and outcome with seafarers. An earlier 
study shows that insurers replace claim handlers frequently to avoid any 
sympathy for injured workers (Lippel, 2007). In China, the division of claims 
management of decision making and communication has a similar effect to 
estranging seafarers from the decision-making processes regarding their 
claims. All 42 seafarer interviewees complained about the lack of information 
supports in the claim handling process.  
In the United States, Strunin and Boden (2004) found that claimants were 
either not receiving any information or being provided too much information 
beyond their understanding. However, the most common problem for Chinese 
seafarers was that they could not access enough information from their 
organisation. Storey (2008) points out that between 1970 and 1985, a great 
number of Canadian workers complained that ‘the entire claim and appeal 
was blanketed in secrecy, as injured workers were not permitted to see their 
files’ (p.105). Chinese seafarers confront similar problems within their 
organisations. Storey (2008) and Strunin and Boden (2004) focus more on 
workers covered by public workers’ compensation system, but this research 
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finds that many Chinese seafarers had to obtain compensation through their 
shipowners’ liability insurance schemes, which was controlled by private 
companies rather than public insurance funds. As a result, the information 
Chinese seafarers can access is far more limited than western workers, since 
these private companies can refuse to open this information.  
The lack of transparency faced by Chinese seafarers, when compared to the 
experience of Canadian workers, is more complicated. Canadian workers are 
aware of the institutions in charge of their claims (Lippel, 2007). However, 
many Chinese seafarers were not aware which institution was handling their 
compensation claim (see 6.3.2). Some interviewees ‘had no idea who should 
be the defendant’ (see 6.3.1). This difference indicates that Chinese seafarers 
face a fragmented management chain of their claims, which is rooted in their 
fragmented employment relationship (see 4.2). Within a fragmented 
management chain, this research identifies the problem that crew agencies 
misappropriate the insurance payment (see 5.2.3.5). Compared to Canadian 
workers’ direct interaction with Workers’ Compensation Boards, Chinese 
seafarers experience more conflicts with different managers and even 
deception by some crew agencies (see 7.3.3). 
In welfare states, when precarious workers cannot obtain remedies from 
workers’ compensation system, the medical costs may be ‘shifted’ from 
employers’ burden to taxpayers’ burden (national health service) (Quinlan 
and Mayhew, 1999). However, in the cases of Chinese seafarers, they have to 
cover their medical expenses themselves, because there is no free health 
service in China and the national health insurance refuse to cover any 
treatment for work-related injuries. Unlike precarious workers in the West, 
injured Chinese seafarers have to suffer tremendous financial pressures of 
medical expenses. Thus, they are more fragile compared to workers in welfare 
states.  
The above comparisons of American, Canadian and Australian land-based 
workers as highlighted by the findings of earlier research suggests that 
Chinese workers in the shipping industry are experiencing more difficulties 
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and have fewer rights in their claim process. Furthermore, as previous studies 
show, in the no-fault based workers’ compensation system, companies 
conducted private policing, stigmatisation and claim suppression to reduce or 
avoid compensation payment (Kirsh and McKee, 2003; Lippel, 2007; Strunin 
and Boden, 2004; Sager and James 2005). Chinese seafarers’ experiences 
reveal a similar capital and labour conflict as in previous studies (see Chapter 
6 and 7). However, in Chinese shipping sector, the information source is 
mainly controlled by companies (see 5.2.3) while in the cases of Western 
workers, the information is controlled by public institutions. This difference 
means Chinese seafarers are subject to a stronger control by their employers 
than the Western workers in previous studies. This explains why interviewees 
in this research reported more resentments towards their companies than 
public institutions (see Chapter 6 and 7), while for Western workers, a 
majority of complaints are about public institutions.  
8.3 Marginalisation from administrative and judicial 
remedies 
8.3.1 Marginalisation from administrative remedies 
Accident victims in this study reported that some public institutions (such as 
Labour Bureaus) refused to accept and hear their workplace injury disputes. 
There are three possible contributing factors to this problem. The first one is 
the law does not clarify the administrative jurisdiction over maritime 
workplace accidents. Some labour authorities insisted that Work-related 
Injury Insurance should not apply to workplace injuries occurring outside 
Chinese territories, in particular when the shipowner was a foreign company, 
such as the case of SF_SQ_Z, in which both the Labour administration and 
labour arbitration committee refused to accept and hear his compensation 
claim.  
Secondly, the current evidence rules do not consider the working conditions 
in the shipping industry. In this research, many seafarers could not provide 
the evidence requested by the Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation, so 
the administrative authorities refused to accept their cases. For example, the 
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evidence to prove the existence of a labour relationship is necessary to obtain 
the recognition of work-related injuries, but many coastal seafarers do not 
have written labour contracts with their shipowners/ship managers. Therefore, 
they cannot prove the existence of labour relationships. The precariousness 
of seafarers’ employment relationships has increased the difficulties for 
Chinese seafarers to apply for Work-related Injury Insurance.  
A third possible explanation is that the one-year time bar of work-related 
injury recognition is too short. Unlike most land-based workers whose 
workplace is often within a reasonable radius of their homes and labour 
bureaus, the location of seafarers’ workplace accident, the city of shipping 
company/manning company and the city of seafarers’ residence are in 
different locations. To submit the applications, some seafarers have to travel 
several thousand miles to the labour administrative authority with jurisdiction. 
This geographical distance prolongs the claim process and increases financial 
pressures suffered by victims. Additionally, considering the ‘black box’ 
management of some companies, a one-year time bar can be used in favour 
of companies to avoid being inspected by administrative authorities.  
Many scholars have argued that Chinese seafarers should be entitled to claim 
Work-related Injury Insurance (Zhang, 2002, Wang, 1995), but in practice, 
their rights cannot be enforced due to the lack of institutional supports. 
Chinese seafarers become marginalised claimants in the workers’ 
compensation systems. The additional harm suffered by Chinese seafarers is 
exacerbated by this problem. The marginalisation of seafarers in workers’ 
compensation have not been reported by previous studies, and this problem 
is connected with the historical ignorance of seafarers relationship with 
labour law. Although in some states, seafarers are gradually covered by the 
social security system, such as in the UK, the experiences of Chinese 
seafarers indicate that further policy supports are necessary to provide 
seafarers equal remedies under labour law.  
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8.3.2 Challenges in judicial proceedings  
Maritime litigation is the last resort to solve the labour disputes of seafarers. 
In China, maritime courts are the only reliable institutions for seafarers to 
seek justice. However, in the maritime legal proceedings, Chinese seafarers 
suffer additional harm caused by the procedural challenges.  
Traditional judicial procedures based on tort law failed to ensure justice and 
welfare for victims of workplace accidents (Clayton, 1997a, Cane and Atiyah, 
2006). However, for many Chinese seafarers, maritime litigation is still their 
last resort to obtain compensation and restore justice. The victims in the West 
usually worry about how to obtain sufficient compensation and supports from 
public workers’ compensation funds (Hackler et al., 2010, Lippel, 2007, 
Strunin and Boden, 2004). However, Chinese seafarers still have to resort to 
litigation as the only means of the compensation.  Chinese maritime courts 
would not follow the notorious ‘unholy trinity’ to deny seafarers’ rights to 
compensation, and adopt a friendly presumed negligence principle to help 
seafarers to establish their claims. Nevertheless, judicial procedures cannot 
be simplified for seafarers as workers’ compensation system. When seeking 
justice through maritime courts, seafarers still have to face series of 
challenges. 
Firstly, maritime legal professionalism preventing seafarers’ access to justice. 
From many seafarers’ perception, professional maritime legal service is not 
accessible. In this research, when asked about seeking professional lawyers’ 
service, seafarers usually had two concerns. One group worried that lawyers’ 
fees would be too expensive to afford, so they dared not to initiate litigation. 
The other group, who tried to initiate litigation, complained about the 
difficulty with hiring a competent maritime lawyer (see 7.4.3). The latter 
problem reflects the imbalance between shipowners and seafarers. As 
maritime lawyers reported, conflicts of interests was an obstacle for them to 
represent seafarers in judicial procedures. This means that if a maritime law 
firm is representing another case for the seafarer’s shipowner, the lawyers of 
that firm cannot represent the seafarer. Considering the significant influence 
of P&I clubs and shipowners on maritime law firms’ business and seafarers’ 
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limited ability to afford the associated legal fees, professional maritime 
lawyers are frequently reluctant to represent seafarers.  
Secondly, additional pressures are reported by seafarers during the litigation 
proceedings. The procedural issues, such as overseas service, prolong the 
time length of litigation (see 4.3.2). The foreign company is also entitled to 
apply for an extension to prepare notarized and legalised documents and 
evidence. Domestic civil litigations must be closed within six months, but 
foreign-related ones are not subject to this time limit. Inevitably, Chinese 
international seafarers have to face even more prolonged legal procedures if 
compared to domestic claimants, which means they have to suffer longer term 
of mental pressures than domestic claimants. 
Thirdly, the inconsistency of litigation thresholds is another challenge for 
seafarers. There are two approaches for seafarers to launch maritime litigation: 
one is to claim work-related injury compensation, and the other is to claim 
tort law compensation. However, different courts have different standards in 
deciding whether to accept certain cases. The Shanghai Maritime Court 
refused to accept seafarers’ claims based on work-related injury 
compensation, but only accept personal injury claims based on tort. Ningbo, 
Wuhan, and Guangzhou all have accepted claims based on work-related 
injuries. Although the fact of the accident is same, the proof requirements are 
completely different, the chaotic case management system has meant some 
seafarers unable to proceed their cases. Taking SF_HF_G’s case as an 
example, in the absence of a maritime lawyer’s instructions, the claimant 
failed to differentiate two approaches, and the judge suggested that the claim 
should be withdrawn and re-submitted, which cased extra financial pressure 
and mental distress for the claimant. 
Corresponding to the studies in the West, one of the prominent problem for 
Chinese seafarers is their marginalised status when seeking remedies from 
public institutions. In the studies of Canadian land-based workers, the 
workers’ compensation is criticised due to its lack of transparency, failure to 
hear workers’ needs and opinions, discrimination against women workers 
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and/workers from ethnic minorities (Premji et al., 2010; Lippel, 2007; Lippel 
et al., 2007).But Chinese seafarers are a group of workers subject to foreign-
relatedness, agency recruitment and job insecurity, and are not treated equally 
as ‘workers’ in labour law. Unlike Canadian workers’ experiences of injury 
compensation claims, most Chinese seafarers struggle to find a public 
institution to accept and hear their claims. Being largely excluded from no-
fault based public workers’ compensation system, maritime courts have 
become the last resort for Chinese seafarers. Subject to maritime law 
procedures, which are designed for equal parties involved such as commercial 
disputes between companies, with limited legal knowledge and financial 
resources seafarers cannot sustain the prolonged waiting time associated with 
these proceedings. Unlike American lawyers’ motivation to ‘chase the 
ambulance’ to claim penalty damages for their clients on a ‘no win, no fee’ 
principle, Chinese maritime lawyers do not have strong interests to work for 
injured seafarers because of the concerns about creating conflicts of interests 
with shipowners and their P&I clubs with whom many law firms are already 
associated. Compared to tort law claimants, who are usually viewed as more 
vulnerable groups than workers’ compensation claimants, Chinese seafarers 
receive fewer support than tort claimants in obtaining professional legal 
service. Chinese seafarers have fewer institutional protection than Western 
and even Chinese domestic workers, which explains why they have to face 
more challenges than other groups of workers.  
8.4 Isolation 
The poor experiences seafarer claimants have is also connected with their 
isolated social status. The isolation of seafarers has been well documented in 
academia, including the isolation of working environment and the isolation 
of their communities from society (Oldenburg et al., 2010, Sampson and 
Thomas, 2003). Sampson (2013) points out how the transmigrant seafarers in 
Northern Germany were subject to both exclusions from places of work and 
exclusion from social space as a result of poverty and fear of harassment. The 
isolation of Chinese seafarers in their homeland is different from the isolation 
confronted by transmigrant workers in Germany. The isolation of seafarers in 
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China are caused by the legally constructed discrimination. Furthermore, 
independent trade unions are not permitted in Chinese political environment, 
which further reduce the possibility for seafarers to formulate a collective 
power to defend their rights. The limitation of seafarers’ freedom of 
association, and unequal treatments in law make Chinese seafarers isolated 
and discriminated in their homeland after they left the isolated working 
environment at sea.  
In addition to the reality of social and legal isolation of seafarers, isolating 
strategies can be used intentionally by companies to disempower seafarers. 
This isolating strategy adopted by companies can be explained from two 
angles. The first is attaching a political stigma of ‘social unstable element’ to 
evoke police interest and subsequent control over claimants’ behaviour. (see 
6.3.2). The second strategy is to divide the collective power of the surviving 
families, in particular, the killed seafarer’s parents and spouses (SF_TJ_Z, 
SF_NJ_C and SF_JN_X). In the second situation, the rights of widows and 
children is further threatened by their internal family tensions. These claim 
suppression practices have not been identified by previous studies. This 
research reveals the immoral and unethical conducts of companies can 
happen when management becomes the sole power to control workers’ claims.  
Working in an isolated environment at sea with limited internet access 
(Sampson and Ellis, 2015), seafarers’ access to legal knowledge is limited. 
Being disconnected from society, it is also difficult for seafarers to maintain 
and develop their social networks and accumulate social capital. Many 
seafarers reported that, after having their claims being rejected by their 
companies, they had no idea where they could submit a complaint or how to 
go about seeking redress. They have tried several administrative institutions 
and were rejected, including local government petition letter office, Labour 
administration institution, and maritime safety administration. Afterwards, 
they could not afford to pursue any further compensation claim-related efforts.  
Long term isolation from society limits seafarers’ knowledge, their social 
network development and social capital accumulation. As a result, compared 
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to land-based workers, the power of imbalance between seafarers and 
companies are more prominent. In the cases of Chinese seafarers, as reported 
by victims, the isolating strategies of companies makes them further 
vulnerable. From this perspective, this research illustrates the negative impact 
of the isolation of seafarers for their rights protection, which proves that 
special regulatory efforts are necessary to ensure an equitable protection of 
maritime transport workers.   
Summary 
Compared to workers’ experiences of claiming compensation for workplace 
trauma in developed countries, Chinese seafarers are far more disempowered. 
Firstly, mental trauma caused by confronting death, injury, peril and 
environmental stress is recognised as workers’ compensation coverage in 
Australia and North America (Lippel 1989, Des Butler 2002, Lippel et al. 
2010). However, mental trauma is not recognised as damage in Chinese law 
and Chinese seafarers are still struggling to seek compensation for their work-
related physical trauma. Secondly, rehabilitation has been established as an 
essential part of workers’ compensation system in Australia, Canada and 
some regions of the United States (Purse 2000, Roberts-Yates 2003, Roberts-
Yates 2006). In contrast, there is no rehabilitation regime for Chinese 
seafarers. For many seafarers, injury and disability mean the termination of 
their career at sea since they are not able to pass the occupational health 
examination. The rehabilitation tasks, including career track change, are 
regarded as victims’ individual responsibilities. Thirdly, how to preserve 
workers’ dignity during compensation process (Lippel 2012, Lippel 1999) 
and how to identify and respect victims’ needs (Quinlan et al. 2015), through 
academic studies, have attracted attentions from policy makers and the public. 
In China, many seafarers’ compensation claims are accepted by government 
institutions and these labour disputes are still relying on direct individual 
negotiations with companies. Inevitably, the adversarial nature of this 
negotiation is more severe than in workers’ compensation application process 
in the West. Fourthly, female gender, migrant status and ethnic backgrounds 
are known to impact negatively on workers’ ability to access to compensation 
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(Lippel 1999, Lippel 2003b, Storey 2008, Premji et al. 2010, Quinlan and 
Mayhew 1999). The analysis of the findings in this study showed that Chinese 
seafarers, due to their occupational characteristics of mobility and foreign-
related employment, have been excluded and discriminated in the current 
Chinese legal frameworks. Through legal research, it is found that Chinese 
seafarers cannot have equal legal entitlements as other workers. This 
occupation-based legal discrimination has created considerable difficulties 
for seafarers to access a proper institution to seek justice or recourse. Fifthly, 
the growth of precarious and flexible employment in labour markets has been 
criticised as eroding current workers’ compensation systems by downgrading 
flexible/precarious workers’ rights. The findings of Chinese seafarers’ 
experiences of claims activities can support this argument. As voyage-based, 
agency-led, temporary and precarious workers, Chinese seafarers’ 
experiences illustrate how precarious workers are ignored in legal 
frameworks, excluded from companies’ compensation claims management 
practices and further marginalised even in their home countries.    
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Conclusion  
This concluding chapter summarises the main findings from the study and 
highlights how this research contributes to the understanding of seafarers’ 
workplace injury compensation claims both in China and in the shipping 
industry. This chapter revisits the research question which this thesis has 
sought to address, identifies the theoretical contributions of this study and 
acknowledges some of the limitations of the research process. The final 
section discusses the policy implications of the research and suggests how 
further research is essential for a better understanding of this topic. 
Workplace injuries are the result of modern industrial risks. In the shipping 
industry, seafarers are exposed to higher levels of work-related risks. Thus 
seafarers’ compensation is a crucial issue for a large group of maritime 
transport workers. Traditionally, to alleviate the physical and financial 
suffering of working people, publicly funded non-fault based compensation 
systems were established to cover medical expenses and provide financial 
supports for workers and their families. With the tax-form contribution from 
employers or the compulsory employer liability insurance, this system aims 
to mitigate the tension between capital and labour caused by disputes arising 
from compensation liabilities (Cane and Atiyah, 2006, Clayton, 1997). Tort-
liability based compensation is not eliminated for workers in many countries 
and is still regarded as a complementary remedy approach for the victims. 
Workers’ compensation and tort liability based compensation constitute two 
primary remedies for workplace accident victims. However, despite these two 
remedies, there are still on-going criticisms of the limited nature of remedies 
and the anti-therapeutic effects of the procedures in current institutions. 
Critics in many parts of the world question the effectiveness and efficiency 
of compensation systems and identify the anti-therapeutic effects (additional 
harm) arising from the claim process. In addition to internal deficiencies, 
external social changes, including those relating to globalisation, privatisation 
reforms and neo-liberal deregulation and the growth of precarious 
employment, have brought new challenges for workers’ compensation 
programmes. 
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Seafarers are the epitome of global working people and toil under precarious, 
flexible and fragmented employment relationships. They can be said to be 
frequently marginalised by national labour protection regimes. Chinese 
seafarers’ claims activities occur in the context of both a globalised shipping 
industry and national legal protection systems. Thus their experiences, to a 
large extent, can reflect both the impacts of globalisation and neo-liberal 
reform on state regulatory power and social justice. While previous studies 
have attempted to investigate the effectiveness of workers’ compensation 
against the background of neo-liberal deregulation reform through examining 
claimants’ experiences, little attention has been paid to workers in the global 
maritime transport industry who are mostly citizens of developing countries.  
In this context, this research was initiated to examine Chinese seafarers’ 
compensation claim activities following workplace accidents. The research 
question this thesis has addressed is whether Chinese seafarers have suffered 
additional harm from the compensation claim process following workplace 
accidents. The literature review, drawing mainly on studies on shore-based 
workers’ experiences of compensation claims following workplace accidents, 
revealed that workers’ needs are usually unmet by compensation systems and 
workers frequently suffer additional harm from compensation claim process. 
It further highlighted how employers’ adversarial attitudes, lack of 
transparency of administrative process, and social stigma exacerbate the 
vulnerabilities of claimants (Storey, 2008, Kirsh et al., 2012, Lippel, 2003b). 
Precarious and flexible employment relationships erode the protective 
coverage of workers’ compensation (Underhill et al., 2011, Quinlan and 
Mayhew, 1999). These arguments guided this study to investigate Chinese 
seafarers’ experiences of compensation claims to analyse potential additional 
harm suffered by Chinese seafarers. 
Key findings 
This section presents the main findings from the study and the theoretical 
contribution of these findings. The findings show that Chinese 
seafarers/surviving families suffer significant additional harm during the 
claim process. Chapter 4 introduced and critically evaluated current Chinese 
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legislative frameworks regarding workplace injuries and the claims of 
seafarers. The main empirical findings chapters 5-7 addressed the research 
question from three perspectives the organisational management of 
workplace injuries/claims of seafarers, surviving families’ experiences of 
work-related death/disappearance compensation claims; and injured seafarers’ 
experiences of compensation claims. This section will synthesize the 
empirical findings to address the research question of whether Chinese 
seafarers have suffered additional harm from the compensation claim process 
following workplace accidents from three angles: (1) additional harm rooted 
in organisational management policies and practices; (2) whether surviving 
families/injured seafarers find the legal instruments adequate and friendly to 
use or not; (3) whether surviving families/injured seafarers suffer additional 
difficulties and harm from the negotiation and other dispute resolution 
process.   
Claim Suppression from organisational management 
In the interaction between victims and corporate management: 
seafarers/surviving families’ humanitarian requests were not respected in the 
claim management process. In the context of third party crew management, 
seafarers and families shared similar experiences of being ignored by 
shipowners and crew agencies. In post-accident communication, families 
were deeply hurt by the arrogant and self-centred attitudes of some 
shipowners’ representatives: neither did they receive condolence or sympathy 
from the shipowner directly, nor did they receive sufficient assistance in body 
salvage, preserving and transporting remains.  
An additional obstacle for claimants was caused by the unwillingness of crew 
agencies to disclose the identity of shipowners for fear of losing clients, which 
gave rise to highly adversarial situations. Being continuously rebuffed by the 
crew agency, surviving families sometimes became so irritated that they 
developed violent resistance to crew managers. Inevitably, this caused them 
greater distress. 
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The imbalance of legal knowledge and professional information disempowers 
surviving families in the process of negotiation. Due to a lack of legal 
information and professional assistance, families are often not able to 
effectively defend their compensation claims against shipowners’ challenges. 
Furthermore, in the context of power imbalance, surviving families are more 
likely to be mistreated, and stigmatised. Financially, some have to accept 
instalments of compensation instead of lump sum payments and to sign 
agreements to release shipowners from future liabilities. Widows’ rights are 
also sometimes infringed by their in-laws, and some crew agencies are good 
at inciting family conflicts to weaken the solidarity amongst claimants.  
As a result of the ordeal suffered during the claim processes, surviving 
families describe having have experienced many mental and physical health 
problems, including insomnia, long-term depression, weight loss, high blood 
pressure and heart attack caused/intensified by the anger resulting from the 
neglect and ill-treatment by shipowners’ representatives.  
In cases where seafarers had been injured, treatment was subject to support 
from shipowners and crew agencies. Many seafarers said that their medical 
care was delayed by shipowners, that treatment periods were limited, and that 
they had to pay for the treatment themselves. As a result, some seafarers 
reported giving up treatment early and were left with permanent disabilities. 
Therefore, their careers at sea were terminated. Seafarers working for 
domestic private shipowners are more likely to suffer poor medical supports, 
and seafarers working for state-owned shipowners were more likely to 
receive higher and more comprehensive medical supports. 
In the process of claiming disability compensation, seafarers suffered unfair 
treatment from their shipowners and crew agencies. Most frequently, their 
employers refused to assist with the recognition of disabilities as work-related 
by the labour bureaus and thus their rights to Work-related Injury Insurance 
were not realised. In disputes, seafarers reported being blamed for their 
injuries by crew agencies and were accused of causing trouble and financial 
loss for their shipowners. Being cheated by crew agencies was also reported 
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as when companies pretended to offer compensation, but simply acted to 
delay the claim for over a year to make it time-barred for action.   
Shipowners reported crew injury as a significant financial risk to their 
operation which could be transferred through insurance. However, the 
fragmented nature of ship ownership and management produced a situation 
where shipowners, managers and crew agents all sought to avoid liability and 
hold each other responsible for compensation payments to victims of 
industrial accidents. 
The lack of workers’ participation in the formulation of the rights, treatment 
and compensation standards is one reason that seafarers find it challenging to 
secure their rights. When shipping companies and manning companies 
negotiate workplace accidental loss management strategies, seafarers are 
excluded from the process thus the insurance coverage and amount are 
usually not disclosed to seafarers in advance. The lack of transparency breaks 
the mutual trust between seafarers and managers, which leaves seafarers in a 
further vulnerable position. 
Insufficient legal protection  
Legally speaking, there are two approaches for seafarers in claiming their 
damages after workplace accidents: one is to seek compensation from Work-
related Injury Insurance Fund, and the other is to claim damages from their 
shipowners by tort law. The empirical findings of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 prove 
the insufficiencies and limitedness of these two legal protective approaches.  
One core problem is the insufficient coverage of the Work-related Injury 
Insurance over seafarers. In foreign and private shipping companies, 
managers reported that due to human resource costs, they only arranged social 
insurance for some seafarers. Once workplace accidents occurred, seafarers 
who were not covered by the Work-related Injury Insurance, could not obtain 
the no-fault based workers’ compensation. Moreover, their permanent 
workplace injuries were not recognised as work-related disability and were 
not appraised according to work-related disability standards from labour 
authorities. In the absence of such appraisal, tort litigation was difficult. The 
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insufficient coverage of Work-related Injury Insurance among seafarers not 
only infringed seafarers’ rights to access social insurance compensation but 
also obstructed the establishment of effective compensation claims through 
tort law.  
In relation to compensation claims pursued via tort law, a major inadequacy 
relates to the ceiling of a compensation that may be awarded (CNY 800,000). 
With rapid economic growth and increases in living expenses, seafarer 
earnings have increased. CNY 800,000 no longer corresponds with the 
earning losses suffered by many seafarers when their maritime careers are 
terminated due to accidental trauma. In 2013, this limitation of liability was 
abolished83, however, the permanent harm caused by this disreputable regime 
to the seafarers and surviving families could never be recovered. 
Due to the complexities of the system in China, the difficulties in obtaining 
information and the lack of available legal advice and support relating to 
which jurisdictions apply, the one-year time-bar for workplace injury claims 
is too short. The short time-bar becomes a legal barrier leading to many 
seafarers’ claims being excluded. Due to the lack of the legal knowledge and 
the limitation of mobility during their medical treatment, many research 
participants had failed to initiate their complaints in front of the labour 
bureaus and/or maritime courts before their claims had expired. Furthermore, 
shipowners and crew agencies did not offer seafarers advice relating to time 
limits, since their liabilities would be reduced or diminished if seafarers’ 
claims expired. The findings presented here show that this regime further 
exacerbated the vulnerability of seafarers following workplace accidents (see 
7.3.3). 
In foreign-related maritime tort litigation procedures, seafarer victims 
confronted more procedural obstacles than domestic workers. They have 
faced new problems in the globalisation era: where to find their overseas 
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 The limitation of liability CNY 800,000 was abolished on January 1st, 2013, 
when I conducted my fieldwork but most of my interviewees were subject to 
this ceiling because their accidents occurred before 2013.  
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employers and how to ensure the “presence” of defendants in maritime 
litigation. Participants revealed that they might wait more than two years for 
overseas service of legal papers to liable shipowners (see 4.3.2.4.b). Unlike 
domestic tort trials subject to a six-mouth time limit, foreign-related tort 
litigation is not subject to any time limits (see 4.3.2.4.b). However, this can 
be disadvantageous to seafarers as their claims may drag on for years. 
Drawing on seafarers’ experiences and the accounts of managers, the limited 
enforcement of the Work-related Injury Insurance has caused significant 
inconvenience and impediments for seafarers in obtaining recognition and 
appraisal of their work-related disability. Furthermore, to protect the 
development of the shipping industry which brings benefits to China, certain 
legal regimes seem inclined to protect shipowners and limit claimants’ rights. 
The design of foreign-related civil procedures increased the uncertainty faced 
by the seafarers in litigation. Accordingly, for Chinese seafarers, substantive 
legal protection is limited, and the design of civil procedures is not very user-
friendly for claimants.  
Anti-therapeutic effects (additional harm) rooted in administrative and 
judicial procedures  
Seafarers were found to be largely marginalised from administrative and 
judicial remedies, which exacerbated the additional damage they suffered in 
the claim process. In theory, administrative and judicial remedies should act 
to resort social justice to victims of workplace accidents. As the agencies of 
a state, public institutions can and arguably should serve as a ‘mediator’ 
between workers and capital to ensure industrial conflict is controlled and 
resolved. However, drawing on the experiences of the claimants in this study, 
it would appear that Chinese public institutions fail to achieve to mediate 
industrial conflicts and ensure social justice for the seafarer victims of 
workplace accidents.  
Seafarers and surviving families commonly reported the disappointment 
about the administrative authorities' refusal to accept seafarers' claims. 
Drawing on seafarers’ accounts, it seems that governmental institutions, 
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including Labour Bureaus, Maritime Safety Authorities, Municipal and 
Provincial Petition Offices and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are not willing to 
accept compensation claims or provide instruction and assistance for injured 
seafarers or surviving families in making such claims. Furthermore, some 
authorities with jurisdiction, such as local Labour Bureaus and Petition 
Offices, use the excuse that seafarers’ claims are foreign-related to evade their 
responsibilities.  
It was clear from the findings from the research that the adversarial 
procedures of maritime litigation are a major source of additional harm in 
China. In the adversarial court hearings, victims experienced verbal abuse 
attacking their integrity and victim blaming strategies designed to irritate 
victims and make them react negatively during court hearings and undermine 
their chances of success. Continuously challenging the authenticity of 
disability appraisals was another strategy adopted by shipowners and their 
insurers. Such challenges are permitted in civil procedures, but for victims, 
this increased the length of a dispute and caused implications for costs and 
time. 
The research evidence that has been presented shows how administrative and 
judicial remedies have become further ordeals full of disappointments and 
suffering for claimants. These results may explain the low litigation rate 
among claimants of 42 cases of fatalities and injuries, only six claimants 
resorted to maritime litigations. Moreover, none of the claimants reported that 
they had received substantial assistance from administrative authorities in 
their dispute resolution, while the frequent feedback from those seeking 
assistance from the governments was that they were ‘unhelpful’ or ‘useless’. 
Some claimants simply never received a response from government officials 
or arrogant replies, such as ‘your cousin’s death was not a big deal.’ Instead 
of providing remedies for claimants, such representatives from the 
administrative authorities created further disappointment and suffering for 
seafarers.    
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Theoretical implications  
It has been argued that workers' compensation should be extended to all 
working people and all societies that regard themselves to be civilised 
(Quinlan and Mayhew 1999). This research revealed the significant 
restrictions to workers' compensation in China. The ordeals that research 
participants suffered during the compensation claim processes indicates that 
currently the rights of working people are not secured, and that formal social 
institutions frequently fail to adequately compensate their loss and pain (Sun 
and Liu 2014).  
The empirical findings support the earlier theoretical argument that the 
established conflict between capital and labour demonstrated elsewhere also 
imposes adversarial tendencies on the workers' compensation claim processes 
in contemporary China. Chinese seafarers and their families suffer 
complicated, diverse and severe harm and pain, which is not limited to the 
loss and damages arising from injuries and disabilities. The corporate 
management regimes and hostile attitudes to claimants suppress and infringe 
victims’ rights to know about and to obtain reasonable and timely damages. 
This places additional psychological problems and a range of other 
difficulties on seafarers, such as irreversible disability and financial loss. This 
study has explicitly exposed the links between compensation payments and 
corporate ownership and a transnational justice stage as China moves from a 
planned economy to market economy. State-owned shipowners have 
relatively sound compensation schemes for their workers, while non-state-
owned enterprises usually fail to fulfil their legal obligations towards injured 
workers and surviving families. Different forms of capital-labour conflict 
indicate a policy dilemma faced by China: to continue the privatisation reform 
is a long-term policy, but this policy may create more market players may not 
honour obligations under labour law. 
The empirical findings show how the lack of regulation of corporate conduct 
by public institutions exacerbates this problem, which creates secondary harm 
for the victims. This supports the arguments in the existing literature 
regarding the anti-therapeutic effects of workers' compensation. Meanwhile, 
  
 
 
265
this study extends the reach of this theory by analysing the practical 
consequences of the transplant of workers' compensation from the West to 
China. The research suggests this “transplant” is currently unsatisfactory and 
legal assistance for injured workers is insufficient As a result, the anti-
therapeutic effects widely exist in claimants’ interaction with both 
administrative and judicial institutions.  
Previous studies show that precarious workers and immigrants are subject to 
second rate treatment in OHS Management and workers’ compensation 
(Quinlan and Mayhew, 1999, Lippel, 2007). The experiences of Chinese 
seafarers and families further supports this argument. Drawing on seafarers’ 
experiences, this research reveals that precarious workers’ rights cannot be 
ensured through the traditional workers’ compensation system in China. 
Furthermore, seafarers suffer significant extra harm as the result of the 
attitude of their crew agencies and employers. In the absence of adequate 
legal protection, the imbalance in power between workers and employers is 
further exacerbated. The risk assignment between employers and working 
people can be argued to be unfair in this situation.  
To sum up, the study has generated some significant empirical findings at 
different levels. The results show that following workplace accidents, 
Chinese seafarers or their surviving families suffer considerable secondary 
harm in the compensation claim process. Compared to the experiences of 
western workers addressed by previous studies, Chinese seafarers’ 
experiences seem even more complicated and arduous. This is primarily a 
result of the lack of social insurance coverage in fragmented and casual 
employment relations and claim suppression by management (shipowners 
and crew agencies). Furthermore, the state is not effective in regulating the 
convert foreign-related employment relationship of many seafarers, and it 
fails to adequately protect the victims of industrial accidents rights to justice.  
Limitation of this study 
As with most doctoral studies, this research is not free from limitations. 
Limited time, financial resources and human resources have inevitably 
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restricted the scope and depth of the study. This section will explore some 
associated limitations.  
I conducted the study in two stages: July 14th to September 16th, 2013, 64 
days, and November 27th, 2013 to January 16th, 2014, 50days. To identify 
potential interviewees, I contacted various stakeholder groups, including 
shipping companies, manning companies, maritime courts, seamen cyber 
communities, maritime law firms, marine insurers, P&I Club correspondents, 
maritime colleges, Maritime Safety Administrations, public legal aid 
departments and official trade unions. Regarding geographical scope, I 
travelled across 12 of China’s 14 provinces covering 18 cities in total. 42 
interviews were conducted with seafarers and their family members, and 33 
interviews were conducted with informants from the shipping industry and 
public institutions. The 114-day field work generated rich qualitative data. In 
addition to collecting data through interviews and institutional documents, I 
was lucky to have had the rare opportunity to observe a negotiation between 
a seafarer’s surviving family members, their shipowners and their lawyers. 
Travel costs were one of my major constraints in conducting the fieldwork. 
With limited funding, I was not able to go to more Chinese cities or to stay 
longer and explore more seafarers’ experiences in the towns I visited. At the 
end of my fieldwork, I had to give up two interviews with widows in 
Shandong due to budgetary limitations. I communicated with them through 
telephone and online chat instead, but compared to face to face interviews, 
the data generated through phone and online chat were found to be limited.  
In addressing the research question, I have involved different “players” in my 
research. However, I was unable to interview a trade union representative. 
Unlike western trade unions, Chinese trade unions are government sponsored 
and are rarely involved in handling claims on the frontline and their roles are 
more similar to that of a policy maker, so in some respects the impact of this 
omission is limited. Due to my identity as a PhD student from a western 
university, some officials, in particular, those from governments, refused to 
accept my research invitation which restricted the data scope. Trade unions 
and public legal aid departments rejected my research request because they 
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believed that my research could harm the image of China in international 
society. The Chinese Seamen and Construction Workers’ Union drafted a 
collective bargaining agreement for seafarers aiming to unify the 
occupational injury compensation standards. It would undoubtedly have been 
useful to analyse this document.  
Compensation claim activities are prolonged and complicated and they 
involve the activities of different stakeholders. Due to the limited resources I 
was able to allocate in the fieldwork, some interviewees’ claim activities 
might have further developed after my data collection was complete and these 
experiences would not have been captured as a result.  
Finally, I need to acknowledge the impact of limitations regarding sampling. 
Due to the restricted access to injured seafarers and their surviving families, 
I had to adopt a purposive theoretical sampling strategy to recruit research 
participants. The selection of manning and shipping companies was also 
based on convenience. For many companies, information on organisational 
policies concerning workplace injuries is of a sensitive nature so my choice 
of companies was very limited. I endeavoured to cover coastal and 
international shipping companies and corporations with different ownership: 
foreign-invested, Chinese state-owned and privately owned. Although some 
companies were reluctant to provide complete information about their 
organisational policies, I gained unrestricted access from one P&I club 
correspondent, one law firm and one shipping company. However, the 
conclusion regarding corporate management drawn upon cases from a limited 
number of companies and therefore presents a partial picture, which may not 
be representative of other companies.  
It is reasonable to say the findings of this study have demonstrated the 
characteristics of Chinese seafarers’ experiences of compensation claims and 
revealed the general factors influencing seafarers’ compensation claim results 
following workplace accidents under the current legal and industrial contexts 
in China. However, bearing in mind the limitations of this research, it is 
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possible that other seafarers may be facing additional challenges which are 
not reflected in this study.  
Policy Implications and Further Research Agenda   
This research was conducted between 2012 and 2016, a fast-changing period 
regarding seafarers’ rights protection legislation. The Maritime Labour 
Convention (2006), an international legal instrument aiming to achieve global 
governance over seafarers’ rights protection came into force in 2013. China 
ratified it in 2015, and it will be enforced on 12th November 2016. This 
convention should be expected to have some impacts on the issues discussed 
in this research.  
The research revealed a series of regulatory deficiencies that exist in 
addressing seafarers’ compensation claims in China. Drawing on the findings 
from the thesis, further policy development should be considered (1) to 
establish explicit jurisdiction over seafarers’ compensation claims; (2) to 
ascertain precise and reasonable compensation standards for the work 
disabilities and fatalities of seafarers with the consideration of seafarers’ 
actual income level; (3) simplify the claim procedures and reduce claimants’ 
burden of proof; (4) to reduce the adversarial nature of the dispute resolution 
process; (5) to clarify the obligations of employers, including shipping and 
manning companies; and (6) to ensure adequate regulatory power over 
companies’ hostile conduct in the negotiation process. Regarding how to 
introduce new legal policy instruments, further studies have to be carried out 
to decide the extent of the reform or change. The effects and risks of the 
reform measure would also need to be carefully examined. 
Furthermore, the future contribution of the Maritime Labour Convention 
(2006) to the protection of seafarers following workplace accidents remains 
unknown. The Convention reasserts existing standards, working conditions 
and rights for international seafarers. Regarding seafarers’ rights following 
workplace accidents, the Convention re-states it is the shipowners who bear 
the liability for expenses relating to workplace accidents. The flag state shall 
adopt law and regulations to ensure seafarers are entitled to no less than 16 
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weeks’ medical care as well as partial or whole wages of no less than 16 
weeks following the accident (Regulation 4.2). However, the Convention 
fails to regulate over the issues regarding seafarers’ earning loss arising from 
disability or surviving families’ living maintenance following the death of 
seafarers. Therefore, the enforcement of the Maritime Labour Convention 
might not substantially improve seafarers’ entitlements and rights following 
workplace accidents according to Chinese law.  
Nevertheless, the Maritime Labour Convention has adopted certain technical 
measures to improve seafarers’ rights to knowledge. The Maritime Labour 
Convention provides that all seafarers should have access to an efficient, 
adequate and accountable system for finding employment on board. From the 
perspective of evidence collection, this measure should ensure seafarers’ 
rights to full disclosure of their contractual rights following workplace 
accidents. To a certain extent, this action may reduce the problems for 
seafarers in securing compensation according to employment agreements. 
Further studies are necessary to explore the effectiveness of this measure 
regarding seafarers’ rights protection following workplace accidents. 
In Regulation 4.5 of the MLC, the Convention provides that each member 
state should ensure that all seafarers and, to the extent provided for in its 
national law, their dependants have access to social security protection no less 
favourable than shore-based workers and to establish fair and efficient 
procedures for the settlement of disputes. As the supply state of seafarers, this 
research shows that the lack of equitable and efficient dispute resolution in 
China has created a significant obstacle to justice. To enforce the Convention, 
whether the Chinese authority should introduce new dispute resolution 
regimes or conduct reforms on current maritime judicial and administrative 
system remains in question. If there are changes to the remedial system, then 
further studies would be necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
relevant institutional changes. 
In addition to China, many South-East Asian countries and Eastern European 
countries such as the Philippines, India and Poland are important suppliers of 
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seafarers. However, injured seafarers’ experiences in these countries are still 
largely unknown. Further studies looking at the major supply states are 
necessary because this knowledge can inform the next stages of the 
development of global governance in order to promote the sustainable and 
responsible development of the global shipping industry.   
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Appendix A Legal Instruments   
 
 
Regulation on Work-Related Injury Insurance (2010 Revision)[Effective]  
工伤保险条例(2010 修订) [现行有效] 
 
 
Issuing authority: State Council Document Number: 
Order No.375 of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China 
Date issued: 12-20-2010 Level of Authority: Administrative Regulations 
Area of law: Trade Unions 
  
 
   
   
 
      
Regulation on Work-Related Injury Insurance 
(Promulgated by Order No.375 of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China on April 27, 2003, amended according to the Decision of 
the State Council on Amending the Regulation on Work-Related Injury 
Insurance on December 20, 2010) 
  
工伤保险条例 
（2003 年 4 月 27 日中华人民共和国国务
院令第 375 号公布 根据 2010 年 12 月
20 日《国务院关于修改〈工伤保险条
例〉的决定》修订） 
Chapter I General Provisions   第一章 总  则 
Article 1 This Regulation is formulated to guaranteeing the employees who 
are injured from accidents arising from work or who suffer from 
occupational diseases to obtain medical care and economic compensation, 
promoting the prevention and occupational recovery from work-related 
injuries, and dispersing the work-related injury risks of employers. 
  
  第一条 为了保障因工作遭受事故
伤害或者患职业病的职工获得医疗救治
和经济补偿，促进工伤预防和职业康
复，分散用人单位的工伤风险，制定本
条例。 
Article 2 Enterprises, public institutions, social organizations, private non-
enterprise entities, foundations, law firms, accounting firms, and other 
organizations as well as individual industrial and commercial households 
hiring laborers (hereinafter referred to as “employers”) within the territory of 
the People's Republic of China shall, in accordance with this Regulation, 
purchase work-related injury insurance, paying work-related injury 
insurance premiums for all their employees or hired laborers (hereinafter 
  
  第二条 中华人民共和国境内的企
业、事业单位、社会团体、民办非企业
单位、基金会、律师事务所、会计师事
务所等组织和有雇工的个体工商户（以
下称用人单位）应当依照本条例规定参
加工伤保险，为本单位全部职工或者雇
工（以下称职工）缴纳工伤保险费。 
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referred to as “employees”). 
Employees of enterprises, public institutions, social organizations, private 
non-enterprise entities, foundations, law firms, and other organizations as 
well as laborers hired by individual industrial and commercial households 
within the territory of the People's Republic of China shall have the right to 
enjoy the work-related injury insurance benefits in accordance with this 
Regulation. 
中华人民共和国境内的企业、事业单
位、社会团体、民办非企业单位、基金
会、律师事务所、会计师事务所等组织
的职工和个体工商户的雇工，均有依照
本条例的规定享受工伤保险待遇的权
利。 
Article 3 The work-related injury insurance premiums shall be collected and 
paid in accordance with the provisions in the “Interim Regulation on the 
Collection and Payment of Social Insurance Premiums” regarding the 
collection and payment of basic pension insurance premiums, basic 
medical insurance premiums, and unemployment insurance premiums. 
  
  第三条 工伤保险费的征缴按照
《社会保险费征缴暂行条例》关于基本
养老保险费、基本医疗保险费、失业保
险费的征缴规定执行。 
Article 4 The employers shall announce the relevant information on buying 
work-related injury insurance within the scope of the entity. 
The employers and the employees shall abide by the relevant laws and 
regulations on safe production and prevention and treatment of 
occupational diseases, implement the rules and standards on safety and 
health care, prevent work-related injury accidents, avoid and reduce harms 
from occupational diseases. 
When an employees from a work-related injury, the employers shall take 
measure to have the injured employee cured in time. 
  
  第四条 用人单位应当将参加工伤
保险的有关情况在本单位内公示。 
用人单位和职工应当遵守有关安全生产
和职业病防治的法律法规，执行安全卫
生规程和标准，预防工伤事故发生，避
免 和 减 少 职 业 病 危 害 。 
职工发生工伤时，用人单位应当采取措
施使工伤职工得到及时救治。 
Article 5 The social insurance administrative department under the State 
Council shall be responsible for the work of nationwide work-related injury 
insurances. 
The social insurance administrative department of each local people's 
government at or above the county level shall be responsible for the work 
of work-related injury insurance within its own jurisdiction. 
The social insurance handling institutions (hereinafter referred to as 
handling institutions) established by the social insurance administrative 
department under the State Council in accordance with the relevant 
provisions shall specifically undertake the affairs in respect of work-related 
injury insurances. 
  
  第五条 国务院社会保险行政部门
负 责 全 国 的 工 伤 保 险 工 作 。 
县级以上地方各级人民政府社会保险行
政部门负责本行政区域内的工伤保险工
作 。 
社会保险行政部门按照国务院有关规定
设立的社会保险经办机构（以下称经办
机构）具体承办工伤保险事务。 
Article 6 the social insurance administrative department and other 
departments shall, if formulating policies or standards concerning work-
related injury insurances, solicit opinions from the representatives of the 
trade union organizations and employers. 
  
  第六条 社会保险行政部门等部门
制定工伤保险的政策、标准，应当征求
工会组织、用人单位代表的意见。 
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Chapter II Work-Related Injury Insurance Fund   第二章 工伤保险基金 
Article 7 The work-related injury insurance fund shall be composed of the 
work-related injury insurance premiums paid by the employers, the interest 
on the work-related injury insurance fund and other funds legally included 
in the work-related injury insurance fund. 
  
  第七条 工伤保险基金由用人单位
缴纳的工伤保险费、工伤保险基金的利
息和依法纳入工伤保险基金的其他资金
构成。 
Article 8 The rate of the work-related injury insurance premiums shall be 
determined in compliance with the principles of basing collection on 
expenditure and balancing the income and expenditure. 
The state shall determine differential premium rates for different industries 
in light of their respective likelihood of work-related injuries, and set forth a 
number of different premium rates for each industry in light of the use of the 
work-related injury insurance premiums, occurrence rate of work-related 
injuries, etc. The differential premium rates for different industries and the 
different premium rates within each industry shall be decided by the social 
insurance administrative department under the State Council, and be 
subject to the approval of the State Council before promulgation and 
implementation. 
The handling institution in a region subject to overall planning shall, in light 
of the information on the employers' use of work-related injury insurance 
premiums and the occurrence rate of work-related injuries, etc., apply the 
corresponding grade of premium rate for the industry to determine the 
premium rate of the employers. 
  
  第八条 工伤保险费根据以支定
收、收支平衡的原则，确定费率。 
国家根据不同行业的工伤风险程度确定
行业的差别费率，并根据工伤保险费使
用、工伤发生率等情况在每个行业内确
定若干费率档次。行业差别费率及行业
内费率档次由国务院社会保险行政部门
制定，报国务院批准后公布施行。 
统筹地区经办机构根据用人单位工伤保
险费使用、工伤发生率等情况，适用所
属行业内相应的费率档次确定单位缴费
费率。 
Article 9 The social insurance administrative department under the State 
Council shall have regular knowledge of the revenue and expenditures of 
the work-related injury insurance funds in all overall planning areas 
throughout the country, and shall put forward a timely plan for adjustment 
of the differential premium rates for different industries and the different 
premium rates within each industry, which shall be subject to the approval 
of the State Council before promulgation and implementation. 
  
  第九条 国务院社会保险行政部门
应当定期了解全国各统筹地区工伤保险
基金收支情况，及时提出调整行业差别
费率及行业内费率档次的方案，报国务
院批准后公布施行。 
Article 10 The employers shall pay work-related injury insurance premiums 
on time, and individual employees do not have to pay the work-related 
injury insurance premiums. 
The amount of work-related injury insurance premiums paid by the 
employers shall be the product of multiplying the total amount of wages of 
the employees in the employers by the premiums rate of the employers. 
For any industry which has difficulty in paying work-related injury insurance 
premiums on the basis of the total wages, the specific methods for paying 
  
  第十条 用人单位应当按时缴纳工
伤保险费。职工个人不缴纳工伤保险
费 。 
用人单位缴纳工伤保险费的数额为本单
位职工工资总额乘以单位缴费费率之
积 。 
对难以按照工资总额缴纳工伤保险费的
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work-related injury insurance premiums shall be prescribed by the social 
insurance administrative department under the State Council. 
行业，其缴纳工伤保险费的具体方式，
由国务院社会保险行政部门规定。 
Article 11 Work-related injury insurance funds shall be gradually managed 
under provincial overall planning. 
For trans-regional industries and industries with large production mobility, 
the employers may buy work-related injury insurances in region subject to 
overall planning by a relatively concentrative means. The specific 
measures shall be formulated by the social insurance administrative 
department under the State Council jointly with the competent departments 
of the relevant industries. 
  
  第十一条 工伤保险基金逐步实行
省 级 统 筹 。 
跨地区、生产流动性较大的行业，可以
采取相对集中的方式异地参加统筹地区
的工伤保险。具体办法由国务院社会保
险行政部门会同有关行业的主管部门制
定。 
Article 12 Work-related injury insurance funds shall be deposited into a 
designated financial account of social security fund, and shall be used to 
pay work-related injury insurance benefits, work ability appraisal fees, fees 
for publicity and training with respect to work-related injury prevention and 
other fees as prescribed in this Regulation, as well as other expenses used 
for work-related injury insurance as prescribed in laws and regulations.  
The social insurance administrative department under the State Council 
shall, jointly with the departments of public finance, health administration, 
production safety supervision and administration, etc. under the State 
Council, formulate specific measures for the drawing ratio, use and 
administration of work-related injury prevention fees. 
No entity or individual may use work-related injury insurance funds to make 
investment operations, build or rebuild office places, or grant bonuses, or 
misappropriate such funds for other purposes. 
  
  第十二条 工伤保险基金存入社会
保障基金财政专户，用于本条例规定的
工伤保险待遇，劳动能力鉴定，工伤预
防的宣传、培训等费用，以及法律、法
规规定的用于工伤保险的其他费用的支
付 。 
工伤预防费用的提取比例、使用和管理
的具体办法，由国务院社会保险行政部
门会同国务院财政、卫生行政、安全生
产 监 督 管 理 等 部 门 规 定 。 
任何单位或者个人不得将工伤保险基金
用于投资运营、兴建或者改建办公场
所、发放奖金，或者挪作其他用途。 
Article 13 A certain proportion of reserve among the work-related injury 
insurance fund shall be remained for the paying of the treatment of work-
related injury insurances on major accidents in the regions subject to overall 
planning; if the reserve is not enough to pay the said treatment, the people's 
government of the region subject to overall planning shall pay the remaining 
sum. The specific proportion of the reserve among the total amount of the 
fund and the measures on using the reserve shall be provided for by the 
people's government of the province, autonomous region, or municipality 
directly under the Central Government. 
  
  第十三条 工伤保险基金应当留有
一定比例的储备金，用于统筹地区重大
事故的工伤保险待遇支付；储备金不足
支付的，由统筹地区的人民政府垫付。
储备金占基金总额的具体比例和储备金
的使用办法，由省、自治区、直辖市人
民政府规定。 
Chapter III Determination of Work-Related Injuries   第三章 工伤认定 
Article 14 A employees shall be ascertained to have suffered from work-
related injury if:   
  第十四条 职工有下列情形之一
的，应当认定为工伤： 
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1.he is injured from an accident within the working hours and the working 
place due to his work; 
  
（一）在工作时间和工作场所内，因工
作原因受到事故伤害的； 
2.he is injured from an accident within the working place before or after the 
working hours for doing preparatory or finishing work related to his job;   
（二）工作时间前后在工作场所内，从
事与工作有关的预备性或者收尾性工作
受到事故伤害的； 
3.he suffers from violence or other unexpected injury within the working 
hours and working place due to implementation of his duties; 
  
（三）在工作时间和工作场所内，因履
行工作职责受到暴力等意外伤害的； 
4.he suffers from an occupational disease;   （四）患职业病的； 
5.his whereabouts are unknown due to his injury or accident during his trip 
for performing his duties; 
  
（五）因工外出期间，由于工作原因受
到伤害或者发生事故下落不明的； 
6.he is injured in traffic accident for which he is not principally responsible 
or in an urban rail transit, passenger ferry or train accident on his way to or 
back from work; 
  
（六）在上下班途中，受到非本人主要
责任的交通事故或者城市轨道交通、客
运轮渡、火车事故伤害的； 
7.other circumstances provided for in laws and administrative regulations 
under which work-related injuries shall be ascertained.   
（七）法律、行政法规规定应当认定为
工伤的其他情形。 
Article 15 An employee shall be regarded to have suffered from the work-
related injury if:   
  第十五条 职工有下列情形之一
的，视同工伤： 
1.during the working hours and on the post, he dies from a sudden disease 
or dies within 48 hours due to ineffective rescue;   
（一）在工作时间和工作岗位，突发疾
病死亡或者在 48 小时之内经抢救无效死
亡的； 
2.he is injured when dealing with an emergency or providing disaster relief 
or in other activity for maintaining the state benefits or public benefits; or 
  
（二）在抢险救灾等维护国家利益、公
共利益活动中受到伤害的； 
3.he served in the army and became disabled due to war or duties, and has 
obtained the certificate of revolutionary disabled armyman, but recrudesces 
from the past injury after working in the employing entity. 
Where an employee is under the circumstance in Item (a) or (b) of the 
preceding paragraph, he may enjoy the treatment of work-related injury 
insurances in accordance with the relevant provisions of the present 
regulation; where an employee is under the circumstance in Item (c) of the 
  
（三）职工原在军队服役，因战、因公
负伤致残，已取得革命伤残军人证，到
用 人 单 位 后 旧 伤 复 发 的 。 
职工有前款第（一）项、第（二）项情
形的，按照本条例的有关规定享受工伤
保险待遇；职工有前款第（三）项情形
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preceding paragraph, he may enjoy the treatment of work-related injury 
insurances other than the lump-sum disability subsidy in accordance with 
the relevant provisions in the present regulation. 
的，按照本条例的有关规定享受除一次
性伤残补助金以外的工伤保险待遇。 
Article 16 An employee who conforms to the provisions of Article 14 or 
Article 15 of this Regulation shall neither be determined nor be regarded to 
have suffered a work-related injury if:   
  第十六条 职工符合本条例第十四
条、第十五条的规定，但是有下列情形
之一的，不得认定为工伤或者视同工
伤： 
1. He intentionally commits a crime;   （一）故意犯罪的； 
2. He is under the influence of alcohol or drugs; or    （二）醉酒或者吸毒的； 
3. He injures himself or commits suicide.   （三）自残或者自杀的。 
Article 17 where an employee is injured from an accident or is diagnosed 
or assessed in accordance with the Law on Prevention and Treatment of 
Occupational Diseases to have an occupational disease, the employers 
shall, within 30 days as of the day when the accident injury is occurred or 
when he is diagnosed or assessed to have contracted the occupational 
disease, file an application for ascertainment of the work-related injury to 
the social insurance administrative department in the region subject to 
overall planning. Under special circumstances, the time limit for application 
may be properly extended, subject to the approval of the social insurance 
administrative department. 
Where an employers fails to file an application for ascertainment of a work-
related injury in accordance with the preceding paragraph, the worker who 
suffered from the injury or his close relative, or the trade union organization 
may, within one year as of the day when the accident injury is occurred or 
when the employee is diagnosed or assessed to have the occupational 
disease, directly file the application for ascertainment of the work-related 
injury to the social insurance administrative department of the region 
subject to overall planning where the employers is located. 
The matter for which the work-related injuries shall be ascertained by the 
social insurance administrative department at the provincial level as 
provided for in Paragraph 1 of the present article, shall be handled by the 
social insurance administrative department at the level of city divided into 
districts at the locality of the employers in compliance with the principle of 
territory. 
Where an employers fails to file an application for ascertainment of a work-
related injury within the time limit provided for in Paragraph 1 of the present 
  
  第十七条 职工发生事故伤害或者
按照职业病防治法规定被诊断、鉴定为
职业病，所在单位应当自事故伤害发生
之日或者被诊断、鉴定为职业病之日起
30 日内，向统筹地区社会保险行政部门
提出工伤认定申请。遇有特殊情况，经
报社会保险行政部门同意，申请时限可
以 适 当 延 长 。 
用人单位未按前款规定提出工伤认定申
请的，工伤职工或者其近亲属、工会组
织在事故伤害发生之日或者被诊断、鉴
定为职业病之日起1年内，可以直接向用
人单位所在地统筹地区社会保险行政部
门 提 出 工 伤 认 定 申 请 。 
按照本条第一款规定应当由省级社会保
险行政部门进行工伤认定的事项，根据
属地原则由用人单位所在地的设区的市
级 社 会 保 险 行 政 部 门 办 理 。 
用人单位未在本条第一款规定的时限内
提交工伤认定申请，在此期间发生符合
本条例规定的工伤待遇等有关费用由该
用人单位负担。 
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article, the expenses for the treatment of the injury, etc. during this period, 
which conform to the present regulation, shall be borne by the employers. 
Article 18 Whoever files an application for ascertainment of a work-related 
injury shall submit the following documents:   
  第十八条 提出工伤认定申请应当
提交下列材料： 
1. the application form for ascertainment of the work-related injury;   （一）工伤认定申请表； 
2. the documents proving the existence of the labor relation (including de 
facto labor relation) with the employers; and    
（二）与用人单位存在劳动关系（包括
事实劳动关系）的证明材料； 
3.the certificate of medical diagnosis or the certificate of diagnosis of the 
occupational disease (or the assessment report on diagnosis of the 
occupational disease). 
The application form for ascertainment of a work-related injury shall include 
such basic information as the time, place, reason of the accident, and 
extent of the employee's injury, etc.. 
Where the applicant for ascertainment of a work-related injury fails to 
provide complete documents, the social insurance administrative 
department shall notify the application in writing in one time of all the 
documents needed to be supplemented for the ascertainment of the work-
related injury. The social insurance administrative department shall accept 
the application after the applicant has supplemented the documents as 
required by the written notification. 
  
（三）医疗诊断证明或者职业病诊断证
明书（或者职业病诊断鉴定书）。 
工伤认定申请表应当包括事故发生的时
间、地点、原因以及职工伤害程度等基
本 情 况 。 
工伤认定申请人提供材料不完整的，社
会保险行政部门应当一次性书面告知工
伤认定申请人需要补正的全部材料。申
请人按照书面告知要求补正材料后，社
会保险行政部门应当受理。 
Article 19 The social insurance administrative department may, after 
accepting an application for ascertainment of a work-related injury, 
investigate and verify the accident injury upon the needs in examination, 
while the employers, the employees, the trade union organization, the 
medical treatment institution and other relevant departments shall provide 
assistance. The occupational disease shall be diagnosed and the diagnosis 
dispute shall be assessed in accordance with the relevant provisions in the 
Law on Prevention and Treatment of Occupational Diseases. With respect 
to the certificate of diagnosis of the occupational disease or the assessment 
report on diagnosis of the occupational disease which is obtained in 
accordance with the law, the social insurance administrative department for 
labor security shall no longer investigate or verify it. 
Where an employee or his relative believes that an injury is work-related, 
while the employer does not believe so, the latter shall bear the burden of 
proof. 
  
  第十九条 社会保险行政部门受理
工伤认定申请后，根据审核需要可以对
事故伤害进行调查核实，用人单位、职
工、工会组织、医疗机构以及有关部门
应当予以协助。职业病诊断和诊断争议
的鉴定，依照职业病防治法的有关规定
执行。对依法取得职业病诊断证明书或
者职业病诊断鉴定书的，社会保险行政
部 门 不 再 进 行 调 查 核 实 。 
职工或者其近亲属认为是工伤，用人单
位不认为是工伤的，由用人单位承担举
证责任。 
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Article 20 The social insurance administrative department shall, within 60 
days upon acceptance of an application for determination of a work-related 
injury, make a decision on determination of the work-related injury and 
notify the employee applying for determination of a work-related injury or 
his close relative and his employer in writing.  
For an accepted application for determination of a work-related injury which 
has clear facts and explicit obligations and rights, the social insurance 
administrative department shall make a decision on determination of the 
work-related injury within 15 days. 
Where a decision on determination of a work-related injury needs to be 
made on the basis of the conclusion of a judicial organ or relevant 
competent administrative department, the time limit for making a decision 
on determination of a work-related injury shall be suspended during the 
period in which the judicial organ or relevant competent administrative 
department has not yet made a conclusion. 
Where a functionary of the social insurance administrative department has 
any interest relationship with the applicant for determination of a work-
related injury, he shall withdraw. 
  
  第二十条 社会保险行政部门应当
自受理工伤认定申请之日起 60 日内作出
工伤认定的决定，并书面通知申请工伤
认定的职工或者其近亲属和该职工所在
单 位 。 
社会保险行政部门对受理的事实清楚、
权利义务明确的工伤认定申请，应当在
15 日 内 作 出 工 伤 认 定 的 决 定 。 
作出工伤认定决定需要以司法机关或者
有关行政主管部门的结论为依据的，在
司法机关或者有关行政主管部门尚未作
出结论期间，作出工伤认定决定的时限
中 止 。 
社会保险行政部门工作人员与工伤认定
申请人有利害关系的，应当回避。 
Chapter IV Work Capability Assessment   第四章 劳动能力鉴定 
Article 21 Where an employee who suffered from a work-related injury 
becomes disabled and his work capability is impacted after he has been 
cured to be comparatively stable with his injury, his work capability shall be 
assessed. 
  
  第二十一条 职工发生工伤，经治
疗伤情相对稳定后存在残疾、影响劳动
能力的，应当进行劳动能力鉴定。 
Article 22 Work capability assessment shall refer to the assessment by 
grade of the extent of work capability obstruction and of self-care 
obstruction. 
The work capability obstruction is divided into ten disability grades, with 
Grade 1 to be the severest, and Grade 10 the most lenient. 
The self-care obstruction is divided into three grades: complete inability to 
self-care, most inability to self-care and partial inability to self-care. 
The standards for work capability assessment shall be made by the social 
insurance administrative department under the State Council jointly with the 
administrative department for health and other departments under the State 
council. 
  
  第二十二条 劳动能力鉴定是指劳
动功能障碍程度和生活自理障碍程度的
等 级 鉴 定 。 
劳动功能障碍分为十个伤残等级，最重
的 为 一 级 ， 最 轻 的 为 十 级 。 
生活自理障碍分为三个等级：生活完全
不能自理、生活大部分不能自理和生活
部 分 不 能 自 理 。 
劳动能力鉴定标准由国务院社会保险行
政部门会同国务院卫生行政部门等部门
制定。 
Article 23 The application for work capability assessment shall be filed by 
the employers, the employee who suffered from the work-related injury or 
his close relative to the work capability assessment committee at the level 
of city divided into districts, accompanied by the decision on ascertainment 
  
  第二十三条 劳动能力鉴定由用人
单位、工伤职工或者其近亲属向设区的
市级劳动能力鉴定委员会提出申请，并
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of the work-related injury and the relevant documents on medical treatment 
of the employee's work-related injury. 
提供工伤认定决定和职工工伤医疗的有
关资料。 
Article 24 The work capability assessment committee of a province, 
autonomous region, or municipality directly under the central Government 
or the work capability assessment committee at the level of city divided into 
districts shall be composed of the representatives from the social insurance 
administrative department, the administrative department for health, the 
trade union organization, the handling institution of the province, 
autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government 
or those at the level of city divided into districts and the representatives from 
employers. 
The work capability assessment committee shall set up a database of 
medical and sanitary experts. The medical and sanitary professionals listed 
in the database shall meet the following conditions: 
  
  第二十四条 省、自治区、直辖市
劳动能力鉴定委员会和设区的市级劳动
能力鉴定委员会分别由省、自治区、直
辖市和设区的市级社会保险行政部门、
卫生行政部门、工会组织、经办机构代
表 以 及 用 人 单 位 代 表 组 成 。 
劳动能力鉴定委员会建立医疗卫生专家
库。列入专家库的医疗卫生专业技术人
员应当具备下列条件： 
1. have the qualification to hold senior professional medical and sanitary 
post; 
  
（一）具有医疗卫生高级专业技术职务
任职资格； 
2. grasp the relevant knowledge on work capability assessment; and   （二）掌握劳动能力鉴定的相关知识； 
3. have good professional moralities.   （三）具有良好的职业品德。 
Article 25 The work capability assessment committee at the level of city 
divided into districts shall, after receipt of the application for work capability 
assessment, randomly take out 3 or 5 relevant experts from the database 
of medical and sanitary experts to from an expert group, which shall give 
assessment opinions. The work capability assessment committee at the 
level of city divided into districts shall upon the assessment opinions of the 
expert group, make a conclusion of work capability assessment on the 
workers suffering from work-related injuries; and may, if necessary, entrust 
a qualified medical treatment institution to assist in the relevant diagnosis. 
The work capability assessment committee at the level of city divided into 
districts shall, within 60 days as of receipt of the application for work 
capability assessment, make a conclusion on the work capability 
assessment. If necessary, the time limit for making the conclusion of work 
capability assessment may be extended by 30 days. The conclusion of 
work capability assessment shall be timely served to the entity and 
individual applying for assessment. 
  
  第二十五条 设区的市级劳动能力
鉴定委员会收到劳动能力鉴定申请后，
应当从其建立的医疗卫生专家库中随机
抽取 3名或者 5名相关专家组成专家组，
由专家组提出鉴定意见。设区的市级劳
动能力鉴定委员会根据专家组的鉴定意
见作出工伤职工劳动能力鉴定结论；必
要时，可以委托具备资格的医疗机构协
助 进 行 有 关 的 诊 断 。 
设区的市级劳动能力鉴定委员会应当自
收到劳动能力鉴定申请之日起 60 日内作
出劳动能力鉴定结论，必要时，作出劳
动能力鉴定结论的期限可以延长 30 日。
劳动能力鉴定结论应当及时送达申请鉴
定的单位和个人。 
  
 
 
297
Article 26 Where an employers or individual who applies for assessment 
refuses to accept the assessment conclusion made by work capability 
assessment committee at the level of city divided into districts, it/he may, 
within 15days as of receipt of the assessment conclusion, apply to the work 
capability assessment committee of the province, autonomous region, or 
municipality directly under the Central Government for a second 
assessment. The conclusion of work capability assessment made by the 
work capability assessment committee of the province, autonomous region, 
or municipality directly under the Central Government shall be final. 
  
  第二十六条 申请鉴定的单位或者
个人对设区的市级劳动能力鉴定委员会
作出的鉴定结论不服的，可以在收到该
鉴定结论之日起 15 日内向省、自治区、
直辖市劳动能力鉴定委员会提出再次鉴
定申请。省、自治区、直辖市劳动能力
鉴定委员会作出的劳动能力鉴定结论为
最终结论。 
Article 27 The work capability assessment shall be carried out objectively 
and impartially. If any member of the work capability assessment committee 
or any expert participating in the assessment has an interest in any party 
concerned, he shall withdraw. 
  
  第二十七条 劳动能力鉴定工作应
当客观、公正。劳动能力鉴定委员会组
成人员或者参加鉴定的专家与当事人有
利害关系的，应当回避。 
Article 28 If, after 1 year as of the day when the conclusion of work 
capability assessment is made, an employee who suffered from a work-
related injury or his close relative, the employers or the handling institution 
considers the disability is changed, any of them may apply for re-
examination and re-assessment of the work capability. 
  
  第二十八条 自劳动能力鉴定结论
作出之日起1年后，工伤职工或者其近亲
属、所在单位或者经办机构认为伤残情
况发生变化的，可以申请劳动能力复查
鉴定。 
Article 29 The time limit for the work ability appraisal committee to make re-
appraisal or review the appraisal in accordance with Articles 26 and 28 of 
this Regulation shall be governed by Paragraph 2 of Article 25 of this 
Regulation. 
  
  第二十九条 劳动能力鉴定委员会
依照本条例第二十六条和第二十八条的
规定进行再次鉴定和复查鉴定的期限，
依照本条例第二十五条第二款的规定执
行。 
Chapter V Treatment of Work-Related Injury Insurances   第五章 工伤保险待遇 
Article 30 Where an employee is injured from an accident or suffers from 
an occupational disease due to his work and needs to be treated, he may 
enjoy the medical treatment of work-related injuries. 
An employee having his work-related injury treated shall see the doctor in 
a medical treatment institution that has entered into a service agreement 
with the employers, and may in case of emergency, first go to a nearby 
medical treatment institution for emergency treatment. 
If the expenses needed in treating a work-related injury conform to the 
catalogue of the diagnosis and treatment items for insured work –related 
injury, the medicine catalogue for insured work-related injuries and the 
standards of hospitalization service for insured work-related injuries, such 
expenses shall be paid from the work-related injury insurance fund. The 
catalogue of the diagnosis and treatment items for insured work-related 
  
  第三十条 职工因工作遭受事故伤
害或者患职业病进行治疗，享受工伤医
疗 待 遇 。 
职工治疗工伤应当在签订服务协议的医
疗机构就医，情况紧急时可以先到就近
的 医 疗 机 构 急 救 。 
治疗工伤所需费用符合工伤保险诊疗项
目目录、工伤保险药品目录、工伤保险
住院服务标准的，从工伤保险基金支
付。工伤保险诊疗项目目录、工伤保险
药品目录、工伤保险住院服务标准，由
国务院社会保险行政部门会同国务院卫
生行政部门、食品药品监督管理部门等
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injuries, the medicine catalogue for insured work-related injuries, and the 
standards of hospitalization service for insured work-related injuries shall 
be provided by the social insurance administrative department under the 
State Council jointly with the administrative department for health, the 
administrative department for drug supervision, etc. under the State 
Council. 
Food subsidies for an employee who is hospitalized for a work-related injury 
and the travel, lodging and board expenses required for an employee who 
suffered a work-related injury to seek medical treatment outside an overall 
planning area with the attestation issued by a medical treatment institution 
and upon approval of the handling institution shall be paid out of the work-
related injury insurance funds, and the specific standards for the payment 
from funds shall be prescribed by the people's governments in the overall 
planning areas. 
An employee who suffered from a work-related injury shall not enjoy the 
medical treatment of work-related injuries if he has a disease from non-
work-related injury treated, but shall comply with the measures on basic 
medical insurances. 
The expenses for an employee who suffered a work-related injury to go to 
a medical treatment institution which has entered into a service agreement 
with his employer for rehabilitation from the work-related injury shall, if 
meeting the relevant provisions, be paid from the work-related injury 
insurance funds. 
部 门 规 定 。 
职工住院治疗工伤的伙食补助费，以及
经医疗机构出具证明，报经办机构同
意，工伤职工到统筹地区以外就医所需
的交通、食宿费用从工伤保险基金支
付，基金支付的具体标准由统筹地区人
民 政 府 规 定 。 
工伤职工治疗非工伤引发的疾病，不享
受工伤医疗待遇，按照基本医疗保险办
法 处 理 。 
工伤职工到签订服务协议的医疗机构进
行工伤康复的费用，符合规定的，从工
伤保险基金支付。 
Article 31 Where an administrative reconsideration or administrative lawsuit 
occurs after the social insurance administrative department makes a 
decision on determination of a work-related injury, the payment of medical 
expenses to the employee who suffered a work-related injury for medical 
treatment of the work-related injury shall not be suspended during the 
period of administrative reconsideration or administrative lawsuit. 
  
  第三十一条 社会保险行政部门作
出认定为工伤的决定后发生行政复议、
行政诉讼的，行政复议和行政诉讼期间
不停止支付工伤职工治疗工伤的医疗费
用。 
Article 32 An employee who suffered from a work-related injury may, if in 
the need of daily life or employment, be installed with artificial limb, 
orthopedic device, artificial eye, false tooth or equipped with wheelchair or 
other auxiliary devices upon confirmation by the work capability 
assessment committee. The necessary expenses shall be paid from the 
work-related injury insurance fund according to the standards provided for 
by the state. 
  
  第三十二条 工伤职工因日常生活
或者就业需要，经劳动能力鉴定委员会
确认，可以安装假肢、矫形器、假眼、
假牙和配置轮椅等辅助器具，所需费用
按照国家规定的标准从工伤保险基金支
付。 
Article 33 Where an employee is injured from an accident or suffers from 
an occupational disease due to his work or needs to suspend his work for 
medical treatment of the work-related injury, his original remuneration of 
wages and welfares shall, during the period of suspension of work but 
  
  第三十三条 职工因工作遭受事故
伤害或者患职业病需要暂停工作接受工
伤医疗的，在停工留薪期内，原工资福
利待遇不变，由所在单位按月支付。 
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reservation of salary, remain unchanged and be paid on a monthly basis by 
the entity that employs him. 
The period of suspension of work but reservation of salary shall usually not 
exceed 12 month. If the injury is heavy or the case is particular, the said 
period may be properly extended upon confirmation by the work capability 
assessment committee at the level of city divided into districts, provided 
that the extended period shall not exceed 12months. After the disability of 
a worker who suffered from a work-related injury is graded, his original 
remuneration shall be suspended from payment, and he shall enjoy the 
disability treatment in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
present chapter. If the worker still needs to be treated after the expiry of the 
period of suspension of work but reservation of salary, he shall continue 
enjoying the medical treatment for work-related injury. 
Where an employee who suffered from a work-related injury but is unable 
to care himself needs to be cared during the period of suspension of work 
but reservation of salary, the responsibility shall remain with the entity that 
employs him. 
停工留薪期一般不超过 12 个月。伤情严
重或者情况特殊，经设区的市级劳动能
力鉴定委员会确认，可以适当延长，但
延长不得超过 12 个月。工伤职工评定伤
残等级后，停发原待遇，按照本章的有
关规定享受伤残待遇。工伤职工在停工
留薪期满后仍需治疗的，继续享受工伤
医 疗 待 遇 。 
生活不能自理的工伤职工在停工留薪期
需要护理的，由所在单位负责。 
Article 34 Where the disability of an employee who suffered from a work-
related injury has been graded and his life is confirmed by the work 
capability assessment committee to be in need of care, the fee for taking 
care of his life shall be paid by month from the work-related injury insurance 
fund. 
The fee for care of life shall be paid by 3 different grades, namely, complete 
inability to self-care, most inability to self-care and partial inability to self-
care, with the standards of which to be separately 50%, 40% or 30% of the 
monthly average wages of each employee in the region subject to overall 
planning in the preceding year. 
  
  第三十四条 工伤职工已经评定伤
残等级并经劳动能力鉴定委员会确认需
要生活护理的，从工伤保险基金按月支
付 生 活 护 理 费 。 
生活护理费按照生活完全不能自理、生
活大部分不能自理或者生活部分不能自
理3个不同等级支付，其标准分别为统筹
地区上年度职工月平均工资的 50%、
40%或者 30%。 
Article 35 Where an Employee's disability due to his work is assessed to 
fall in Grade 1 to 4, the labor relation shall be retained, and he shall 
withdraw from his post and enjoy the following treatments: 
  
  第三十五条 职工因工致残被鉴定
为一级至四级伤残的，保留劳动关系，
退出工作岗位，享受以下待遇： 
1. A lump-sum disability subsidy shall be paid from the work-related injury 
insurance funds according to the disability grade at the following rates: for 
an employee at the first grade of disability, 27 months of his own wage shall 
be paid; for an employee at the second grade of disability, 25 months of his 
own wage; for an employee at the third grade of disability, 23 months of his 
own wage; and for an employee at the fourth grade of disability, 21 months 
of his own wage; 
  
（一）从工伤保险基金按伤残等级支付
一次性伤残补助金，标准为：一级伤残
为27个月的本人工资，二级伤残为25个
月的本人工资，三级伤残为 23 个月的本
人工资，四级伤残为 21 个月的本人工
资； 
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2. The disability allowance shall be paid by month from the work-related 
injury insurance fund at the following rated: for the first grade of disability, 
90% of his own wage shall be paid; for the second grade of disability, 85% 
of his own wage shall be paid; for the third grade of disability, 80% of his 
own waged shall be paid; and for the fourth grade of disability, 75% of his 
own wage shall be paid. If the actual amount of the disability allowance is 
lover than the lowest local wage rate, the difference shall be supplemented 
from the work-related injury insurance fund. 
  
（二）从工伤保险基金按月支付伤残津
贴，标准为：一级伤残为本人工资的
90%，二级伤残为本人工资的 85%，三
级伤残为本人工资的 80%，四级伤残为
本人工资的 75%。伤残津贴实际金额低
于当地最低工资标准的，由工伤保险基
金补足差额； 
3. If an employee who suffered a work-related injury has reached the 
retirement age and has gone through the retirement formalities, he shall be 
suspended from being paid the disability allowance, and shall enjoy the 
basic endowment insurance benefits in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the state. If the basic endowment insurance benefits are lower 
than the disability allowance, the difference shall be made up from the work-
related injury insurance funds. 
Where an employee's disability due to work is assessed to fall in Grade 1to 
4, the employer and the individual worker shall, based on the disability 
allowance, pay the basic medical insurance premium. 
  
（三）工伤职工达到退休年龄并办理退
休手续后，停发伤残津贴，按照国家有
关规定享受基本养老保险待遇。基本养
老保险待遇低于伤残津贴的，由工伤保
险 基 金 补 足 差 额 。 
职工因工致残被鉴定为一级至四级伤残
的，由用人单位和职工个人以伤残津贴
为基数，缴纳基本医疗保险费。 
Article 36 Where an employee's disability due to work is assessed to fall in 
Grade 5 or 6, he shall enjoy the following treatments:   
  第三十六条 职工因工致残被鉴定
为五级、六级伤残的，享受以下待遇： 
1. A lump-sum disability subsidy shall be paid from the work-related injury 
insurance funds according to the disability grade at any of the following 
rates: for an employee at the fifth grade of disability, 18 months of his own 
wage shall be paid; and for an employee at the sixth grade of disability, 16 
months of his own wage shall be paid; 
  
（一）从工伤保险基金按伤残等级支付
一次性伤残补助金，标准为：五级伤残
为18个月的本人工资，六级伤残为16个
月的本人工资； 
2. His labor relation with the employer shall be reserved, and the employer 
shall arrange a proper post for him. If the post is difficult to be arranged, the 
employer shall pay the disability allowance by month at the following rates: 
for the fifth grade of disability, 70% of his own wage shall be paid; for the 
sixth grade of disability, 60% of his own wage shall be paid, and the 
employer shall pay all social insurance premiums payable in accordance 
with the provisions. If the actual amount of disability allowance is lower than 
the lowest local wage rate, the difference shall be supplemented by the 
employer. 
Upon the request of an employee who suffered a work-related injury, the 
employment relationship between the employee and his employer may be 
rescinded or terminated, a lump-sum work-related injury medical subsidy 
shall be paid out of the work-related injury insurance funds, and the 
  
（二）保留与用人单位的劳动关系，由
用人单位安排适当工作。难以安排工作
的，由用人单位按月发给伤残津贴，标
准为：五级伤残为本人工资的 70%，六
级伤残为本人工资的 60%，并由用人单
位按照规定为其缴纳应缴纳的各项社会
保险费。伤残津贴实际金额低于当地最
低工资标准的，由用人单位补足差额。 
经工伤职工本人提出，该职工可以与用
人单位解除或者终止劳动关系，由工伤
保险基金支付一次性工伤医疗补助金，
由用人单位支付一次性伤残就业补助
金。一次性工伤医疗补助金和一次性伤
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employer shall pay a lump-sum disability employment subsidy. The specific 
standards for the lump-sum work-related injury medical subsidy and the 
lump-sum disability employment subsidy shall be prescribed by the 
people's governments of the provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities directly under the Central Government. 
残就业补助金的具体标准由省、自治
区、直辖市人民政府规定。 
Article 37 Where an employee's disability due to work is assessed to fall in 
Grade 7 to 10, the employee shall enjoy the following benefits:   
  第三十七条 职工因工致残被鉴定
为七级至十级伤残的，享受以下待遇： 
1. A lump-sum disability subsidy shall be paid to him from the work-related 
injury insurance funds according to the disability grade at the following 
rates: for an employee at the seventh grade of disability, 13 months of his 
own wage shall be paid; for an employee at the eighth grade of disability, 
11 months of his own wage; for an employee at the ninth grade of disability, 
9 months of his own wage; and for an employee at the tenth grade of 
disability, 7 months of his own wage; 
  
（一）从工伤保险基金按伤残等级支付
一次性伤残补助金，标准为：七级伤残
为13个月的本人工资，八级伤残为11个
月的本人工资，九级伤残为9个月的本人
工资，十级伤残为 7 个月的本人工资； 
2. If a labor or employment contract is terminated upon expiry, or an 
employee himself requests for rescinding the labor or employment contract, 
a lump-sum work-related injury medical subsidy shall be paid to the 
employee from the work-related injury insurance funds, and the employer 
shall pay to the employee a lump-sum disability employment subsidy. The 
specific standards for the lump-sum work-related injury medical subsidy 
and the lump-sum disability employment subsidy shall be provided by the 
people's governments of the provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities directly under the Central Government. 
  
（二）劳动、聘用合同期满终止，或者
职工本人提出解除劳动、聘用合同的，
由工伤保险基金支付一次性工伤医疗补
助金，由用人单位支付一次性伤残就业
补助金。一次性工伤医疗补助金和一次
性伤残就业补助金的具体标准由省、自
治区、直辖市人民政府规定。 
Article 38 Where an employee who suffered from a work-related injury but 
recrudesces from the past injury, and is confirmed to be in need of cure, he 
shall enjoy the treatment of work-related injuries provided for in Articles 30, 
32 and 33 of the present regulation. 
  
  第三十八条 工伤职工工伤复发，
确认需要治疗的，享受本条例第三十
条、第三十二条和第三十三条规定的工
伤待遇。 
Article 39 If an employee dies from work, his close relative may, in 
accordance with the following provisions, draw from the work-related injury 
insurance fund the funeral subsidy, the pension for supporting the relatives 
and the lump-sum subsidy for death from work: 
  
  第三十九条 职工因工死亡，其近
亲属按照下列规定从工伤保险基金领取
丧葬补助金、供养亲属抚恤金和一次性
工亡补助金： 
1. The funeral subsidy shall be 6 months of the average monthly wage of 
the employee in the preceding year in the region subject to overall planning.   
（一）丧葬补助金为6个月的统筹地区上
年度职工月平均工资； 
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2. The pension for supporting the relatives shall be paid at a certain 
proportion of the employee's wage to the relatives who has no work 
capabilities and whose main living expenses came from the employee who 
died from work, with the rates to be as follows: 40% per month for the 
spouse, 30% per month for other relatives, and 10% per month per person 
in addition for the lone aged or orphans. The verified sum of pensions for 
supporting the relatives shall not be more than the wage of the employee 
who died from work. The specific scope of the supported relatives shall be 
provided for by the social insurance administration department under the 
State Council; 
  
（二）供养亲属抚恤金按照职工本人工
资的一定比例发给由因工死亡职工生前
提供主要生活来源、无劳动能力的亲
属。标准为：配偶每月 40%，其他亲属
每人每月 30%，孤寡老人或者孤儿每人
每月在上述标准的基础上增加 10%。核
定的各供养亲属的抚恤金之和不应高于
因工死亡职工生前的工资。供养亲属的
具体范围由国务院社会保险行政部门规
定； 
3. The rate for the lump-sum subsidy for death from work shall be 20 times 
the average per capita disposable income of national urban residents in the 
previous calendar year. 
Where a disabled employee dies from a work-related injury within the 
period of suspension of work but reservation of salary, his close relatives 
may enjoy the treatments provided for in Paragraph 1 of the present article. 
Where an employee of the firsts to fourth grade of disability dies after the 
expiry of the period of suspension of work but reservation of salary, his 
close relatives may enjoy the treatments provided for in Items (1) and (2) 
of Paragraph 1 of the present article. 
  
（三）一次性工亡补助金标准为上一年
度全国城镇居民人均可支配收入的 20
倍 。 
伤残职工在停工留薪期内因工伤导致死
亡的，其近亲属享受本条第一款规定的
待 遇 。 
一级至四级伤残职工在停工留薪期满后
死亡的，其近亲属可以享受本条第一款
第（一）项、第（二）项规定的待遇。 
Article 40 The disability allowance, the pension for supporting the relatives, 
and the fee for care of life shall be adjusted from time to time by the social 
insurance administrative department of the region subject to overall 
planning in light of the situation of the average wages of the employees and 
change in living expenses, etc.. The adjustment measures shall be 
provided for by the people's government of the province, autonomous 
region or municipality directly under the Central Government. 
  
  第四十条 伤残津贴、供养亲属抚
恤金、生活护理费由统筹地区社会保险
行政部门根据职工平均工资和生活费用
变化等情况适时调整。调整办法由省、
自治区、直辖市人民政府规定。 
Article 41 Where an employee's whereabouts are known due to an accident 
during his trip for performing his duties or due to his dealing with an 
emergency or providing disaster relief, he shall still be paid the wages within 
3 months as of the month in which the accident occurred, and be 
suspended from payment of wages as of the fourth month, instead, his 
relatives supported by him shall be paid the pension for supporting the 
relatives by month from the work-related injury insurance fund. He who is 
straitened in life may be prepaid 50% of the lump-sum subsidy for death 
from work. If the employee is declared by the people's court to have died, 
the matter shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions in Article 37 
of the present regulation on death of employee of work. 
  
  第四十一条 职工因工外出期间发
生事故或者在抢险救灾中下落不明的，
从事故发生当月起3个月内照发工资，从
第4个月起停发工资，由工伤保险基金向
其供养亲属按月支付供养亲属抚恤金。
生活有困难的，可以预支一次性工亡补
助金的 50%。职工被人民法院宣告死亡
的，按照本条例第三十九条职工因工死
亡的规定处理。 
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Article 42 Where an employee who suffered from a work-related injury is 
under any of the following circumstances, he shall be suspended from 
enjoying the treatment of work-related injury insurances: 
  
  第四十二条 工伤职工有下列情形
之一的，停止享受工伤保险待遇： 
1.he has lost the conditions to enjoy the treatment;   （一）丧失享受待遇条件的； 
2.he refuses to accept the work capability assessment; or   （二）拒不接受劳动能力鉴定的； 
3.he refuses to be cured; or   （三）拒绝治疗的。 
Article 43 Where an employer is divided, merged or transferred, the 
succeeding entity shall bear the original employer's liability for the work-
related injury insurances; if the original employer has bought the work-
related injury insurances, the succeeding entity shall make the registration 
of modification on work-related injury insurances in the local handling 
institution. 
Where an employer applies contracted management, the liability for the 
work-related injury insurances shall be borne by the entity with which the 
employee has a labor relation. 
Where an employee who is temporarily transferred is injury from a work 
accident, the original employer shall bear the liability for work-related injury 
insurances, but may stipulate with the entity in temporary need of the 
employee on the compensation measure. 
Where an enterprise is bankrupt, the expenses for work-related injury 
insurances benefits which should be paid by the entity shall be allotted and 
paid in accordance with the law at the time of bankruptcy liquidation. 
  
  第四十三条 用人单位分立、合
并、转让的，承继单位应当承担原用人
单位的工伤保险责任；原用人单位已经
参加工伤保险的，承继单位应当到当地
经办机构办理工伤保险变更登记。 
用人单位实行承包经营的，工伤保险责
任由职工劳动关系所在单位承担。 
职工被借调期间受到工伤事故伤害的，
由原用人单位承担工伤保险责任，但原
用人单位与借调单位可以约定补偿办
法 。 
企业破产的，在破产清算时依法拨付应
当由单位支付的工伤保险待遇费用。 
Article 44 Where an employee who is sent abroad for work is required by 
the law of the destination country or region to buy the local work-related 
injury insurances, such local work-related injury insurances shall be bought, 
and his domestic relation of work-related injury insurances shall be 
suspended; while if the local work-related injury insurances cannot be 
bought, his domestic relation on work-related injury insurance shall not be 
suspended. 
  
  第四十四条 职工被派遣出境工
作，依据前往国家或者地区的法律应当
参加当地工伤保险的，参加当地工伤保
险，其国内工伤保险关系中止；不能参
加当地工伤保险的，其国内工伤保险关
系不中止。 
Article 45 Where an employee suffers from a second work-related injury, 
he shall enjoy the treatment of disability allowance in light of the newly 
ascertained disability grade if he is entitled by the provisions to enjoy the 
disability allowance. 
  
  第四十五条 职工再次发生工伤，
根据规定应当享受伤残津贴的，按照新
认定的伤残等级享受伤残津贴待遇。 
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Chapter VI Supervision and Administration   第六章 监督管理 
Article 46 The handling institution shall, when specifically undertaking the 
affairs on work-related injury insurance, implement the following duties:   
  第四十六条 经办机构具体承办工
伤保险事务，履行下列职责： 
1. to collect work-related injury insurance premiums in accordance with the 
provision of the people's government of the province, autonomous region, 
or municipality directly under the Central Government; 
  
（一）根据省、自治区、直辖市人民政
府规定，征收工伤保险费； 
2. to check the total amount of the wages of the employers and the number 
of the employees, to make registration of work-related injury insurances, 
and to be responsible for preserving the records of the employers' payment 
of fees and the employees' enjoying the treatment of work-related injury 
insurances; 
  
（二）核查用人单位的工资总额和职工
人数，办理工伤保险登记，并负责保存
用人单位缴费和职工享受工伤保险待遇
情况的记录； 
3. to carry out investigations and statistics of the work-related injury 
insurances; 
  
（三）进行工伤保险的调查、统计； 
4. to manage the expenditure of the work-related injury insurance fund in 
accordance with the provisions; 
  
（四）按照规定管理工伤保险基金的支
出； 
5. to verify the treatment of work-related injury insurances in accordance 
with the provisions; and 
  
（五）按照规定核定工伤保险待遇； 
6. to provide the employees who suffered from work-related injuries or their 
close relatives with consulting service gratuitously. 
  
（六）为工伤职工或者其近亲属免费提
供咨询服务。 
Article 47 The handling institution shall conclude service agreement with 
the medical treatment institutions and the auxiliary devices supply 
institutions upon equal negotiation, and shall announce the name list of the 
medical treatment institutions and auxiliary devices supply institutions with 
which it has concluded service agreements. The specific measures shall 
be formulated by the social insurance administrative department under the 
State Council separately with the administration department for health 
under the State Council or the department of civil affairs under the State 
Council, etc.. 
  
  第四十七条 经办机构与医疗机
构、辅助器具配置机构在平等协商的基
础上签订服务协议，并公布签订服务协
议的医疗机构、辅助器具配置机构的名
单。具体办法由国务院社会保险行政部
门分别会同国务院卫生行政部门、民政
部门等部门制定。 
Article 48 The handling institutions shall, pursuant to the agreements and 
the relevant catalogues and standards of the state, check the use of the 
  
  第四十八条 经办机构按照协议和
国家有关目录、标准对工伤职工医疗费
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medical expenses, recovery expenses and auxiliary device expenses of the 
workers who suffered from work-related injuries, and shall settle the 
expenses in full amount on time. 
用、康复费用、辅助器具费用的使用情
况进行核查，并按时足额结算费用。 
Article 49 The handling institution shall regularly announce the information 
on income and expenditure of the work-related injury insurance fund, and 
timely propose suggestions to the social insurance administrative 
department regarding the adjustment of the premium rates. 
  
  第四十九条 经办机构应当定期公
布工伤保险基金的收支情况，及时向社
会保险行政部门提出调整费率的建议。 
Article 50 The social insurance administrative department and the handling 
institution shall regularly consult the opinions from the employees who 
suffered from work-related injuries, the medical treatment institutions, the 
auxiliary devices supply institutions, and all walks of life so as to improve 
the work of work-related injury insurances. 
  
  第五十条 社会保险行政部门、经
办机构应当定期听取工伤职工、医疗机
构、辅助器具配置机构以及社会各界对
改进工伤保险工作的意见。 
Article 51 The social insurance administrative department shall supervise 
and inspect in accordance with the law the collection and payment of work-
relates injury insurance premiums as well as the payment of the work-
related injury insurance fund. 
The financial department and the auditing organ shall supervise in 
accordance with the law the income and expenditure and management of 
the work-related injury insurance fund. 
  
  第五十一条 社会保险行政部门依
法对工伤保险费的征缴和工伤保险基金
的 支 付 情 况 进 行 监 督 检 查 。 
财政部门和审计机关依法对工伤保险基
金的收支、管理情况进行监督。 
Article 52 Any organization or individual has the right to report the illegal 
acts related to work-related injury insurances. The social insurance 
administrative department shall timely investigate the offense reports, deal 
with them in accordance with the provisions, and keep confidential for the 
offense reports. 
  
  第五十二条 任何组织和个人对有
关工伤保险的违法行为，有权举报。社
会保险行政部门对举报应当及时调查，
按照规定处理，并为举报人保密。 
Article 53 The trade union organization shall maintain in accordance with 
the law the lawful rights and interests of the employees who suffered from 
work-related injuries, and supervise the employers' work of work-related 
injury insurances. 
  
  第五十三条 工会组织依法维护工
伤职工的合法权益，对用人单位的工伤
保险工作实行监督。 
Article 54 Where an employee and the employer is in dispute over the 
treatment of work-related injuries, the dispute shall be settled in accordance 
with the relevant provisions on settling labor disputes. 
  
  第五十四条 职工与用人单位发生
工伤待遇方面的争议，按照处理劳动争
议的有关规定处理。 
Article 55 Under any of the following circumstances, the relevant entity or 
individual may apply for administrative reconsideration in accordance with 
  
  第五十五条 有下列情形之一的，
有关单位或者个人可以依法申请行政复
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the law or initiate an administrative lawsuit before the people's court in 
accordance with the law: 
议，也可以依法向人民法院提起行政诉
讼： 
1. An employee, his close relative or his employer that applies for 
determination of a work-related injury refuses to accept the decision not to 
accept the application for determination of a work-related injury; 
  
（一）申请工伤认定的职工或者其近亲
属、该职工所在单位对工伤认定申请不
予受理的决定不服的； 
2. An employee, his close relative or his employer that applies for 
determination of a work-related injury refuses to accept the conclusion on 
work-related injury determination; 
  
（二）申请工伤认定的职工或者其近亲
属、该职工所在单位对工伤认定结论不
服的； 
3. An employer refuses to accept the rate for payment of premiums as 
determined by the handling institution; 
  
（三）用人单位对经办机构确定的单位
缴费费率不服的； 
4. A medical treatment institution or an assisting device supply institution 
that has entered into a service agreement with an employer considers that 
the handling institution fails to perform the relevant agreement or 
provisions; or 
  
（四）签订服务协议的医疗机构、辅助
器具配置机构认为经办机构未履行有关
协议或者规定的； 
5. An employee who suffered a work-related injury or his close relative has 
any objection against the work-related injury insurance benefits verified by 
the handling institution. 
  
（五）工伤职工或者其近亲属对经办机
构核定的工伤保险待遇有异议的。 
Chapter VII Legal Liabilities   第七章 法律责任 
Article 56 Where any entity or individual violates Article 12 of the present 
regulation by misappropriating the work-related injury insurance fund, and 
a crime is constituted, it/he shall be subject to criminal liabilities in 
accordance with the law; if no crime is constituted, it/he shall be imposed 
upon administrative sanctions or disciplinary sanctions in accordance with 
the law. The misappropriated fund shall be recovered by the social 
insurance administrative department, and be included in the work-related 
injury insurance fund; the confiscate illegal proceeds shall be turned in to 
the state treasury in accordance with the law. 
  
  第五十六条 单位或者个人违反本
条例第十二条规定挪用工伤保险基金，
构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任；尚不
构成犯罪的，依法给予处分或者纪律处
分。被挪用的基金由社会保险行政部门
追回，并入工伤保险基金；没收的违法
所得依法上缴国库。 
Article 57 Where any functionary of the social insurance administrative 
department is under any of the following circumstances, he shall be 
imposed upon administrative sanctions in accordance with the law; if the 
  
  第五十七条 社会保险行政部门工
作人员有下列情形之一的，依法给予处
分；情节严重，构成犯罪的，依法追究
刑事责任： 
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case is serious enough to constitute a crime, the offender shall be subject 
to criminal liabilities in accordance with the law: 
1. He refuse to accept an application for ascertainment of a work-related 
injury without any justifiable reason, or practices fraud to ascertain 
unqualified persons of work-related injury as workers of work-related injury; 
  
（一）无正当理由不受理工伤认定申
请，或者弄虚作假将不符合工伤条件的
人员认定为工伤职工的； 
2. He fails to appropriately take custody of the evidential materials in 
application for ascertainment of work-related injuries, thus causing the 
relevant evidence lost; or 
  
（二）未妥善保管申请工伤认定的证据
材料，致使有关证据灭失的； 
3. He takes properties from a party concerned.   （三）收受当事人财物的。 
Article 58 Where a handling institution has any of the following acts, the 
social insurance administrative department shall order it to put right, and 
impose disciplinary sanctions in accordance with the law upon the directly 
responsible persons in charge and other liable persons; if the case is 
serious enough to constitute a crime, the offender shall be subject to 
criminal liabilities according to law; if the handling institution causes any 
economic loss to a party concerned, it shall bear the liability for 
compensation in accordance with the law: 
  
  第五十八条 经办机构有下列行为
之一的，由社会保险行政部门责令改
正，对直接负责的主管人员和其他责任
人员依法给予纪律处分；情节严重，构
成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任；造成当
事人经济损失的，由经办机构依法承担
赔偿责任： 
1.It fails to preserve in accordance with the provisions the records of the 
employers' payment of fees and the employees' enjoying the treatment of 
work-related injury insurances; 
  
（一）未按规定保存用人单位缴费和职
工享受工伤保险待遇情况记录的； 
2.It does not verify the treatment of work-related injury insurances in 
accordance with the provisions; or 
  
（二）不按规定核定工伤保险待遇的； 
3.It takes properties from a party concerned.   （三）收受当事人财物的。 
Article 59 Where a medical treatment institution or an auxiliary devices 
supply institution does not provide services pursuant to the service 
agreement, the handling institution may rescind the service agreement. 
Where a handling institution does not settle the expense in full amount on 
time, it shall be ordered by the social insurance administrative department 
to get right; the medical treatment institution and the auxiliary devices 
supply institution may rescind the service agreement. 
  
  第五十九条 医疗机构、辅助器具
配置机构不按服务协议提供服务的，经
办 机 构 可 以 解 除 服 务 协 议 。 
经办机构不按时足额结算费用的，由社
会保险行政部门责令改正；医疗机构、
辅助器具配置机构可以解除服务协议。 
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Article 60 Where an employer, or an employee who suffered a work-related 
injury or his close relative fraudulently obtains work-related injury insurance 
benefits, or a medical treatment institution or an assisting device supply 
institution fraudulently obtains the expenditure of the work-related injury 
insurance funds, the social insurance administrative department shall order 
it or him to refund the money, and impose a fine of two up to five times the 
sum fraudulently obtained; if the circumstances are serious and a crime is 
constituted, the violator shall be subject to criminal liabilities according to 
law. 
  
  第六十条 用人单位、工伤职工或
者其近亲属骗取工伤保险待遇，医疗机
构、辅助器具配置机构骗取工伤保险基
金支出的，由社会保险行政部门责令退
还，处骗取金额 2 倍以上 5 倍以下的罚
款；情节严重，构成犯罪的，依法追究
刑事责任。 
Article 61 Where an organization or individual engaging in work capability 
assessment is under any of the following circumstances, it/he shall be 
ordered by the administrative department for labor security to get right, and 
be imposed upon a fine of not less than 2000 yuan but not more than 10000 
yuan; if the case is serious enough to constitute a crime, the offender shall 
be subject to criminal liabilities according to law: 
  
  第六十一条 从事劳动能力鉴定的
组织或者个人有下列情形之一的，由社
会保险行政部门责令改正，处 2000 元以
上1万元以下的罚款；情节严重，构成犯
罪的，依法追究刑事责任： 
1.it/he provides false assessment opinions;   （一）提供虚假鉴定意见的； 
2.it/he provides a false certificate of diagnosis; or   （二）提供虚假诊断证明的； 
3.it/he takes properties from a party concerned.   （三）收受当事人财物的。 
Article 62 Where an employer which should purchase work-related injury 
insurance according to this Regulation fails to do so, the social insurance 
administrative department shall order it to purchase within a prescribed time 
limit and pay work-related injury insurance premiums payable, and impose 
a daily late fee at the rate of 0.05% of the outstanding amount; and if the 
employer fails to pay the premiums within the time limit, a fine of one up to 
three times the outstanding amount shall be imposed upon it. 
If any employee of an employer which should purchase work-related injury 
insurance according to this Regulation fails to do so suffers a work-related 
injury, the employer shall pay the expenses according to the items and 
rates of work-related injury insurance benefits as provided for in this 
Regulation. 
After the employer has purchased work-related injury insurance and made 
up the work-related injury insurance premiums and late fees payable, the 
expenses newly incurred shall be paid from the work-related insurance 
funds and by the employer in accordance with this Regulation. 
  
  第六十二条 用人单位依照本条例
规定应当参加工伤保险而未参加的，由
社会保险行政部门责令限期参加，补缴
应当缴纳的工伤保险费，并自欠缴之日
起，按日加收万分之五的滞纳金；逾期
仍不缴纳的，处欠缴数额 1倍以上 3倍以
下 的 罚 款 。 
依照本条例规定应当参加工伤保险而未
参加工伤保险的用人单位职工发生工伤
的，由该用人单位按照本条例规定的工
伤保险待遇项目和标准支付费用。 
用人单位参加工伤保险并补缴应当缴纳
的工伤保险费、滞纳金后，由工伤保险
基金和用人单位依照本条例的规定支付
新发生的费用。 
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Article 63 Where, as in violation of Article 19 of this Regulation, an employer 
refuses to assist the social insurance administrative department in 
investigating and verifying an accident, the social insurance administrative 
department shall order it to make rectifications and impose a fine of 2,000 
up to 20,000 yuan upon it. 
  
  第六十三条 用人单位违反本条例
第十九条的规定，拒不协助社会保险行
政部门对事故进行调查核实的，由社会
保险行政部门责令改正，处 2000 元以上
2 万元以下的罚款。 
Chapter VIII Supplementary Provisions   第八章 附  则 
Article 64 The total amount of wages as mentioned in the present regulation 
shall refer to the total amount of labor remuneration directly paid by an 
employer to all its employees. 
Someone's own wage as mentioned in the present regulation shall refer to 
the average monthly wage of a worker of work-related injury during the 12 
months before he is injured from an accident or suffers from an 
occupational disease. If someone's own wage is higher than 300% of the 
average wage of each worker in a region subject to overall planning, his 
wage shall be calculated as 300% of the said average wage; while if 
someone's own wage is lower than 60% of the average wage of each 
worker in a region subject to overall planning, his wage shall be calculated 
as 60% of the said average wage. 
  
  第六十四条 本条例所称工资总
额，是指用人单位直接支付给本单位全
部 职 工 的 劳 动 报 酬 总 额 。 
本条例所称本人工资，是指工伤职工因
工作遭受事故伤害或者患职业病前 12 个
月平均月缴费工资。本人工资高于统筹
地区职工平均工资 300%的，按照统筹地
区职工平均工资的 300%计算；本人工资
低于统筹地区职工平均工资 60%的，按
照统筹地区职工平均工资的 60%计算。 
Article 65 Where a civil servant, or a staff member of a public institution or 
a social organization which is governed analogically by the Civil Servant 
Law is injured in an accident due to work or suffers an occupational 
disease, his employer shall pay the expenses. The specific measures shall 
be prescribed by the social insurance administrative department under the 
State Council jointly with the public finance department under the State 
Council. 
  
  第六十五条 公务员和参照公务员
法管理的事业单位、社会团体的工作人
员因工作遭受事故伤害或者患职业病
的，由所在单位支付费用。具体办法由
国务院社会保险行政部门会同国务院财
政部门规定。 
Article 66 Where a worker in an entity without business license or having 
not been registered or recorded in accordance with the law or if an entity 
whose business license has been revoked in accordance with the law or 
which is revoked from registration or record is injured from an accident or 
suffers from an occupational disease, the entity shall pay compensation in 
a lump sum to the close relatives of the disabled or died worker, with the 
rate of compensation not lower than the treatment of work-related injury 
insurances provided for in the present regulation. The employing entity shall 
not use child labor. Where an employing entity uses any child laborer and 
causes injury or death thereto, it shall pay compensation in a lump sum to 
the child laborer or his close relative, with the rate of compensation not 
lower than the treatment of work-related injury insurances provided for in 
the present regulation. The specific measures shall be provided for by the 
  
  第六十六条 无营业执照或者未经
依法登记、备案的单位以及被依法吊销
营业执照或者撤销登记、备案的单位的
职工受到事故伤害或者患职业病的，由
该单位向伤残职工或者死亡职工的近亲
属给予一次性赔偿，赔偿标准不得低于
本条例规定的工伤保险待遇；用人单位
不得使用童工，用人单位使用童工造成
童工伤残、死亡的，由该单位向童工或
者童工的近亲属给予一次性赔偿，赔偿
标准不得低于本条例规定的工伤保险待
遇。具体办法由国务院社会保险行政部
门 规 定 。 
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administrative department for labor security under the State Council. 
Where the close relative of a disabled or died worker provided for in the 
preceding paragraph, or a child laborer provided for in the preceding 
paragraph or his close relative is in dispute with the employing entity over 
the compensation amount, the dispute shall be settled in accordance with 
the relevant provisions on settling labor disputes. 
前款规定的伤残职工或者死亡职工的近
亲属就赔偿数额与单位发生争议的，以
及前款规定的童工或者童工的近亲属就
赔偿数额与单位发生争议的，按照处理
劳动争议的有关规定处理。 
Article 67 The present regulation shall come into force on January 1, 2004. 
If the workers who are injured from accidents or suffer from occupational 
diseases prior to the enforcement of the present regulation have still not 
finished the ascertainment of work-related injuries, they shall comply with 
the present regulation. 
  
  第六十七条 本条例自 2004 年 1 月
1 日起施行。本条例施行前已受到事故伤
害或者患职业病的职工尚未完成工伤认
定的，按照本条例的规定执行。 
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Announcement of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of 
China 
The "Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court of Some Issues 
concerning the Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation 
for Personal Injury", which was adopted at the 1299th meeting of the 
Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court on December 4, 2003, 
is hereby promulgated, and shall come into force on May 1, 2004. 
  
中华人民共和国最高人民法院公告 
《最高人民法院关于审理人身损害赔偿
案件适用法律若干问题的解释》已于２
００３年１２月４日由最高人民法院审
判委员会第１２９９次会议通过。现予
公布，自２００４年５月１日起施行。 
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December 26, 2003 
Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court of Some Issues concerning 
the Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal 
Injury 
(Adopted at the 1299th meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme 
People's Court on December 4, 2003; Interpretation No. 20 [2003] of the 
Supreme People's Court) 
In order to correctly try the cases on compensation for personal injury, 
lawfully protect the legitimate rights and interests of the parties, we hereby 
give our interpretation as follows regarding the relevant issues concerning 
the application of law in accordance with the "General Principles of Civil 
Law of the People's Republic of China" (hereinafter referred to as the 
General Principles of Civil Law) and the "Civil Litigation Law of the People's 
Republic of China" (hereinafter referred to as the Civil Litigation Law) and 
other relevant laws:  
二 00 三 年 十 二 月 二 十 六 日 
最高人民法院关于审理人身损害赔偿案
件 适 用 法 律 若 干 问 题 的 解 释 
（2003 年 12 月 4 日最高人民法院 
审判委员会第 1299 次会议通过 法释
[2003]20 号 ） 
为正确审理人身损害赔偿案件，依法保
护当事人的合法权益，根据《中华人民
共和国民法通则》以下简称民法通则、
《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》以下简
称民事诉讼法等有关法律规定，结合审
判实践，就有关适用法律的问题作如下
解释：  
Article 1 Where an obligee to compensation brings a lawsuit due to an injury 
to his life, health or body, claiming compensation for property losses or 
psychological injuries against the obligor to compensation, the people's 
court shall accept the lawsuit. 
An "obligee to compensation" mentioned in the present Article means a 
victim who directly suffers from personal injury due to a tort or any other 
cause of injury, or a person in need of maintenance and upbringing for 
which the victim is obligated in accordance with law, or a close relative of 
the deceased victim. 
An "obligor to compensation" mentioned in the present Article means a 
natural person, legal person or other organization that shall bear civil 
liabilities in accordance with the law for the tort or any other cause of injury 
committed by himself/itself or by any other person. 
  
  第一条 因生命、健康、身体遭受
侵害，赔偿权利人起诉请求赔偿义务人
赔偿财产损失和精神损害的，人民法院
应 予 受 理 。  
本条所称“赔偿权利人”，是指因侵权行为
或者其他致害原因直接遭受人身损害的
受害人、依法由受害人承担扶养义务的
被扶养人以及死亡受害人的近亲属。  
本条所称“赔偿义务人”，是指因自己或者
他人的侵权行为以及其他致害原因依法
应当承担民事责任的自然人、法人或者
其 他 组 织 。  
  
Article 2 Where a victim has any intent or negligence for the occurrence or 
enlargement of the same injury, the liabilities of the obligor to compensation 
may be mitigated or exempted in accordance with Article 131 of the General 
Principles of Civil Law. However, if the tortfeasor causes injury to another 
person by intent or major negligence, while the victim only has generic 
negligence, the liabilities of the obligor to compensation shall not be 
mitigated. 
If, when Paragraph 3 of Article 106 of the General Principles of Civil Law is 
applied to determine the liabilities of an obligor to compensation, the victim 
is found to have any major negligence, the liabilities of the obligor to 
compensation may be mitigated. 
  
  第二条 受害人对同一损害的发生
或者扩大有故意、过失的，依照民法通
则第一百三十一条的规定，可以减轻或
者免除赔偿义务人的赔偿责任。但侵权
人因故意或者重大过失致人损害，受害
人只有一般过失的，不减轻赔偿义务人
的 赔 偿 责 任 。  
适用民法通则第一百零六条第三款规定
确定赔偿义务人的赔偿责任时，受害人
有重大过失的，可以减轻赔偿义务人的
赔 偿 责 任 。  
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Article 3 Where two or more persons cause an injury to others by joint intent 
or joint negligence, or their injurious acts are directly combined and result 
in the same injury consequence even if there is no joint intent or joint 
negligence, a joint tort shall be constituted, and the tortfeasors shall bear 
joint liabilities in accordance with Article 130 of the General Principles of 
Civil Law. 
Where two or more persons have no joint intent or joint negligence, but 
separately commit several acts that are indirectly combined and result in 
the same injury consequence, they shall bear corresponding compensation 
liabilities respectively in appropriate proportions upon the extent of their 
faults or the reasons of such injury. 
  
  第三条 二人以上共同故意或者共
同过失致人损害，或者虽无共同故意、
共同过失，但其侵害行为直接结合发生
同一损害后果的，构成共同侵权，应当
依照民法通则第一百三十条规定承担连
带 责 任 。  
二人以上没有共同故意或者共同过失，
但其分别实施的数个行为间接结合发生
同一损害后果的，应当根据过失大小或
者原因力比例各自承担相应的赔偿责
任 。  
  
Article 4 Where two or more persons jointly commit any act endangering 
the personal safety of any other person and result in any injury, they shall 
bear joint liabilities in accordance with Article 130 of the General Principles 
of Civil Law in the case that the actual injuring person is unable to be 
determined. Where anyone who is suspected to have caused the joint 
danger can prove that the injury consequence is not caused from his act, 
he shall bear no compensation liabilities. 
  
  第四条 二人以上共同实施危及他
人人身安全的行为并造成损害后果，不
能确定实际侵害行为人的，应当依照民
法通则第一百三十条规定承担连带责
任。共同危险行为人能够证明损害后果
不是由其行为造成的，不承担赔偿责
任 。  
  
Article 5 Where an obligee to compensation brings a lawsuit against some 
of the joint tortfeasors, the people's court shall add other joint tortfeasors 
as joint defendants. Where the obligee to compensation abandons his 
litigation claims against some of the joint tortfeasors in the process of 
litigation, other joint tortfeasors shall not bear joint liabilities for the share of 
compensation that ought to be previously borne by the defendants against 
whom the abandoned litigation claims were proposed. If the scope of 
liabilities is difficult to be determined, all the joint tortfeasors shall be 
putatively deemed to bear equal liabilities. 
The people's court shall inform the obligee to compensation of the legal 
consequence of his abandonment of the litigation claims, and shall state 
such abandonment in the legal documents. 
  
  第五条 赔偿权利人起诉部分共同
侵权人的，人民法院应当追加其他共同
侵权人作为共同被告。赔偿权利人在诉
讼中放弃对部分共同侵权人的诉讼请求
的，其他共同侵权人对被放弃诉讼请求
的被告应当承担的赔偿份额不承担连带
责任。责任范围难以确定的，推定各共
同 侵 权 人 承 担 同 等 责 任 。  
人民法院应当将放弃诉讼请求的法律后
果告知赔偿权利人，并将放弃诉讼请求
的 情 况 在 法 律 文 书 中 叙 明 。  
  
Article 6 Where a natural person, legal person or any other organization 
who engages in the business of hotel, catering or entertainment, etc. or 
carries out other social activities, fails to perform the security guaranty 
obligation within a reasonable scope, and thus causes any other person to 
suffer from a personal injury, and the obligee to compensation claims 
against the obligor for bearing corresponding compensation liabilities, the 
people's court shall support such claim. 
Where a third person's tort results in an injury, he shall bear the 
  
  第六条 从事住宿、餐饮、娱乐等
经营活动或者其他社会活动的自然人、
法人、其他组织，未尽合理限度范围内
的安全保障义务致使他人遭受人身损
害，赔偿权利人请求其承担相应赔偿责
任 的 ， 人 民 法 院 应 予 支 持 。  
因第三人侵权导致损害结果发生的，由
实施侵权行为的第三人承担赔偿责任。
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compensation liabilities. If the obligor for security guaranty has any fault, he 
shall bear corresponding supplementary compensation liabilities within a 
scope of his capacity to prevent or stop such injury. The obligor for security 
guaranty may, after bearing the liabilities, claim compensation from the third 
person. If the obligee to compensation brings a lawsuit against the obligor 
for security guaranty, he shall regard the third person as a joint defendant, 
unless the third person is unable to be determined. 
安全保障义务人有过错的，应当在其能
够防止或者制止损害的范围内承担相应
的补充赔偿责任。安全保障义务人承担
责任后，可以向第三人追偿。赔偿权利
人起诉安全保障义务人的，应当将第三
人作为共同被告，但第三人不能确定的
除 外 。  
  
Article 7 Where a school, kindergarten or other educational institution 
lawfully obligated for educating, managing and protecting minors fails to 
perform the relevant obligations within the scope of its duties, and thus 
causes a minor to suffer from a personal injury, or causes a personal injury 
to any other person via the minor, it shall bear compensation liabilities 
matching its fault. 
Where a third person's tort causes a minor to suffer from a personal injury, 
he shall bear the compensation liabilities. If the school, kindergarten or 
other educational institution has any fault, it shall bear corresponding 
supplementary compensation liabilities. 
  
  第七条 对未成年人依法负有教
育、管理、保护义务的学校、幼儿园或
者其他教育机构，未尽职责范围内的相
关义务致使未成年人遭受人身损害，或
者未成年人致他人人身损害的，应当承
担 与 其 过 错 相 应 的 赔 偿 责 任 。  
第三人侵权致未成年人遭受人身损害
的，应当承担赔偿责任。学校、幼儿园
等教育机构有过错的，应当承担相应的
补 充 赔 偿 责 任 。  
  
Article 8 Where the legal representative, responsible person or any 
employee of a legal person or any other organization causes an injury to 
others in his implementation of duties, the said legal person or organization 
shall bear the civil liabilities in accordance with Article 121 of the General 
Principles of Civil Law. If any of the aforementioned persons commits an 
act irrelevant to his duties, and thus causes an injury to others, he himself 
shall bear the compensation liabilities. 
The causes of compensation governed by the "State Compensation Law" 
shall be handled in accordance with the "State Compensation Law". 
  
  第八条 法人或者其他组织的法定
代表人、负责人以及工作人员，在执行
职务中致人损害的，依照民法通则第一
百二十一条的规定，由该法人或者其他
组织承担民事责任。上述人员实施与职
务无关的行为致人损害的，应当由行为
人 承 担 赔 偿 责 任 。  
属于《国家赔偿法》赔偿事由的，依照
《 国 家 赔 偿 法 》 的 规 定 处 理 。  
  
Article 9 Where an employee causes an injury to others when carrying out 
an employment activity, the employer shall bear the compensation 
liabilities; if the employee causes the injury due to his intent or major 
negligence, he shall bear joint compensation liabilities along with the 
employer. The employer may, when bearing the joint compensation 
liabilities, claim compensation from the employee. 
"Carrying out an employment activity" as mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph means carrying out a production or business activity or any other 
labor service activity within a scope of authorization or instructions of the 
employer. If the employee's act exceeds the scope of authorization, but is 
embodied in a form of performing duties or is internally relating to the 
  
  第九条 雇员在从事雇佣活动中致
人损害的，雇主应当承担赔偿责任；雇
员因故意或者重大过失致人损害的，应
当与雇主承担连带赔偿责任。雇主承担
连带赔偿责任的，可以向雇员追偿。  
前款所称“从事雇佣活动”，是指从事雇主
授权或者指示范围内的生产经营活动或
者其他劳务活动。雇员的行为超出授权
范围，但其表现形式是履行职务或者与
履行职务有内在联系的，应当认定为“从
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performance of duties, it shall be ascertained as "carrying out an 
employment activity". 
事 雇 佣 活 动 ” 。 
  
Article 10 Where an undertaker causes an injury to a third person or to 
himself when completing certain work, the hirer shall bear no compensation 
liability. However, if the hirer has any negligence on his order, instruction or 
selection, he shall bear corresponding compensation liabilities. 
  
  第十条 承揽人在完成工作过程中
对第三人造成损害或者造成自身损害
的，定作人不承担赔偿责任。但定作人
对定作、指示或者选任有过失的，应当
承 担 相 应 的 赔 偿 责 任 。  
  
Article 11 Where an employee suffers from a personal injury when carrying 
out an employment activity, the employer shall bear the compensation 
liabilities. If a third person out of the employment relationship causes a 
personal injury to the employee, the obligee to compensation may claim 
against either the third person or the employer for bearing the 
compensation liabilities. The employer may, after bearing the 
compensation liabilities, claim compensation from the third person. 
Where an employee suffers from a personal injury due to an accident on 
safety production when carrying out an employment activity, and the 
contract letting party or the subcontract letting party knows or ought to know 
that the employer undertaking the contract or subcontract has no 
corresponding qualifications or safety production conditions, the contract 
letting party or the subcontract letting party shall bear joint and several 
compensation liabilities with the employer. 
The present Article shall not apply to the labor relationships or work-related 
injury insurances which should be governed by the "Regulation on Work-
Related Injury Insurance". 
  
  第十一条 雇员在从事雇佣活动中
遭受人身损害，雇主应当承担赔偿责
任。雇佣关系以外的第三人造成雇员人
身损害的，赔偿权利人可以请求第三人
承担赔偿责任，也可以请求雇主承担赔
偿责任。雇主承担赔偿责任后，可以向
第 三 人 追 偿 。  
雇员在从事雇佣活动中因安全生产事故
遭受人身损害，发包人、分包人知道或
者应当知道接受发包或者分包业务的雇
主没有相应资质或者安全生产条件的，
应 当 与 雇 主 承 担 连 带 赔 偿 责 任 。  
属于《工伤保险条例》调整的劳动关系
和工伤保险范围的，不适用本条规定。  
  
Article 12 Where a laborer of an employing entity which is required by law 
to be under the overall planning on work-related injury insurance, suffers 
from a personal injury due to a work-related injury accident, and the laborer 
or his close relative brings a lawsuit to the people's court claiming against 
the employing entity for bearing civil compensation liabilities, he shall be 
informed to handle the matter in accordance with the "Regulation on Work-
Related Injury Insurance". 
Where a laborer suffers from a personal injury due to the tort of a third 
person other than the employing entity, and the obligee to compensation 
claims against the third person for bearing the civil compensation liabilities, 
the people's court shall support such claim. 
  
  第十二条 依法应当参加工伤保险
统筹的用人单位的劳动者，因工伤事故
遭受人身损害，劳动者或者其近亲属向
人民法院起诉请求用人单位承担民事赔
偿责任的，告知其按《工伤保险条例》
的 规 定 处 理 。  
因用人单位以外的第三人侵权造成劳动
者人身损害，赔偿权利人请求第三人承
担民事赔偿责任的，人民法院应予支
持 。  
  
Article 13 Where a helper provides another person with labor services 
gratuitously, and causes an injury to others when carrying out the work, the 
  
  第十三条 为他人无偿提供劳务的
帮工人，在从事帮工活动中致人损害
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helped party shall bear the compensation liabilities. If the helped party 
clearly refuses the work, he shall bear no compensation liability. While if 
the helper has any intent or major negligence, and the obligee to 
compensation claims against the helper or the helped party to bear joint 
liabilities, the people's court shall support such claim. 
的，被帮工人应当承担赔偿责任。被帮
工人明确拒绝帮工的，不承担赔偿责
任。帮工人存在故意或者重大过失，赔
偿权利人请求帮工人和被帮工人承担连
带 责 任 的 ， 人 民 法 院 应 予 支 持 。  
  
Article 14 Where a helper suffers from a personal injury due to the work, 
the helped party shall bear compensation liabilities. If the helped party 
clearly refuses the work, he shall bear no compensation liability; but may 
be required to make supplementary payments within the scope of his 
benefits. 
Where a helper suffers from a personal injury due to the tort of a third 
person, the third person shall bear the compensation liabilities. If the third 
person cannot be determined or has no capacity of compensation, the 
helped party may be required to make appropriate supplementary 
payments. 
  
  第十四条 帮工人因帮工活动遭受
人身损害的，被帮工人应当承担赔偿责
任。被帮工人明确拒绝帮工的，不承担
赔偿责任；但可以在受益范围内予以适
当 补 偿 。    
帮工人因第三人侵权遭受人身损害的，
由第三人承担赔偿责任。第三人不能确
定或者没有赔偿能力的，可以由被帮工
人 予 以 适 当 补 偿 。 
  
Article 15 Where any obligee to compensation who suffers from a personal 
injury for the purpose of maintaining the legitimate rights and interests of 
the state, collectivity or any other person claims against the beneficiary for 
making appropriate supplementary payments within the scope of his 
benefits due to the fact that there is no tortfeasor, the tortfeasor cannot be 
determined or the tortfeasor has no capacity of compensation, the people's 
court shall support such claim.  
  
  第十五条 为维护国家、集体或者
他人的合法权益而使自己受到人身损
害，因没有侵权人、不能确定侵权人或
者侵权人没有赔偿能力，赔偿权利人请
求受益人在受益范围内予以适当补偿
的 ， 人 民 法 院 应 予 支 持 。  
  
Article 16 Under any of the following circumstances, Article 126 of the 
General Principles of Civil Law shall apply, and the owner or caretaker shall 
bear the compensation liabilities, unless he can prove that he has no fault:  
  
  第十六条 下列情形，适用民法通
则第一百二十六条的规定，由所有人或
者管理人承担赔偿责任，但能够证明自
己没有过错的除外：  
(1) a road, bridge, tunnel or any other artificial building injures someone due 
to a blemish in maintenance or management;  
  
（一）道路、桥梁、隧道等人工建造的
构筑物因维护、管理瑕疵致人损害的；  
(2) a piled-up article rolls or slides down or collapses, and injures someone;  
  
（二）堆放物品滚落、滑落或者堆放物
倒塌致人损害的；  
(3) a tree falls down or is broken or a fruit drops, and injures someone.  
Where, in the event of a circumstance in Item (1) of the preceding 
paragraph, an injury occurs due to a defect in design or construction, the 
  
（三）树木倾倒、折断或者果实坠落致
人 损 害 的 。  
前款第（一）项情形，因设计、施工缺
陷造成损害的，由所有人、管理人与设
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owner and the caretaker shall bear joint liabilities together with the designer 
or constructor. 
计 、 施 工 者 承 担 连 带 责 任 。  
  
Article 17 All expenses paid by a victim suffering from a personal injury for 
medical treatment and his income loss due to missed working time, 
including the medical expenses, the loss in income due to missed working 
time, the nursing expenses, the traffic expenses, the accommodation 
expenses, the board expenses in hospital, and necessary expenses for 
nutrition, shall be compensated by the obligor to compensation. 
Where the victim becomes disabled due to an injury, the necessary 
expenses he has paid for additional needs in his living and his income loss 
due to his inability to work, including the compensation for disability, the 
expenses of aid for disability, the living expenses of the persons in need of 
his maintenance and upbringing, the necessary healing expenses that 
actually occurred for healing and nursing, continuing treatment, the nursing 
expenses, and the follow-up treatment expenses, shall also be 
compensated by the obligor to compensation. 
Where the victim has died, the obligor to compensation shall, in addition to 
compensating the relevant expenses prescribed in Paragraph 1 of the 
present Article according to the facts of rescue and treatment, compensate 
the funeral expenses, the living expenses of the persons in need of the 
victim's maintenance and upbringing, the death compensation expenses, 
the traffic expenses and accommodation expenses paid by the victim's 
relatives for funeral matters and their income loss due to missed working 
time, as well as other reasonable expenses. 
  
  第十七条 受害人遭受人身损害，
因就医治疗支出的各项费用以及因误工
减少的收入，包括医疗费、误工费、护
理费、交通费、住宿费、住院伙食补助
费、必要的营养费，赔偿义务人应当予
以 赔 偿 。  
受害人因伤致残的，其因增加生活上需
要所支出的必要费用以及因丧失劳动能
力导致的收入损失，包括残疾赔偿金、
残疾辅助器具费、被扶养人生活费，以
及因康复护理、继续治疗实际发生的必
要的康复费、护理费、后续治疗费，赔
偿 义 务 人 也 应 当 予 以 赔 偿 。  
受害人死亡的，赔偿义务人除应当根据
抢救治疗情况赔偿本条第一款规定的相
关费用外，还应当赔偿丧葬费、被扶养
人生活费、死亡补偿费以及受害人亲属
办理丧葬事宜支出的交通费、住宿费和
误 工 损 失 等 其 他 合 理 费 用 。  
  
Article 18 Where the victim or a close relative of the decedent suffers from 
a psychological injury, and the obligee to compensation claims to the 
people's court for consolation money for psychological injury, the 
"Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court of Some Issues concerning 
Determining the Compensation Liabilities for Psychological Injury Due to 
Civil Tort" shall apply in the determination. 
The right to request consolation money for the psychological injury shall not 
be transferred or succeeded, unless the obligor to compensation has 
promised in writing to make money compensation, or the obligee to 
compensation has brought a lawsuit to the people's court. 
  
  第十八条 受害人或者死者近亲属
遭受精神损害，赔偿权利人向人民法院
请求赔偿精神损害抚慰金的，适用《最
高人民法院关于确定民事侵权精神损害
赔偿责任若干问题的解释》予以确定。  
精神损害抚慰金的请求权，不得让与或
者继承。但赔偿义务人已经以书面方式
承诺给予金钱赔偿，或者赔偿权利人已
经 向 人 民 法 院 起 诉 的 除 外 。  
  
Article 19 The medical expenses shall be determined on the basis of the 
vouchers issued by the medical institution on medicine expenses and 
hospital expenses, etc., as well as in combination with the medical records, 
the diagnose proof and other relevant evidence. Where the obligor to 
compensation has any dissent on the necessity or rationality of the 
treatment, it shall assume the corresponding obligation for providing 
  
  第十九条 医疗费根据医疗机构出
具的医药费、住院费等收款凭证，结合
病历和诊断证明等相关证据确定。赔偿
义务人对治疗的必要性和合理性有异议
的 ， 应 当 承 担 相 应 的 举 证 责 任 。  
医疗费的赔偿数额，按照一审法庭辩论
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evidence. 
The compensation amount of medical expenses shall be determined on the 
basis of the actual amount up to the end of debate in the court of the first 
instance. With regard to the necessary healing expenses for recovering the 
functions of the injured human organ through exercises, the appropriate 
face-lifting expenses and other follow-up treatment expenses, the obligee 
to compensation may bring a lawsuit separately after they have actually 
occurred. However, the inevitable expenses determined on the basis of the 
medical proof or expert conclusion may be compensated along with the 
medical expenses that have occurred. 
终结前实际发生的数额确定。器官功能
恢复训练所必要的康复费、适当的整容
费以及其他后续治疗费，赔偿权利人可
以待实际发生后另行起诉。但根据医疗
证明或者鉴定结论确定必然发生的费
用，可以与已经发生的医疗费一并予以
赔 偿 。  
 
Article 20 The loss in income due to missed working time shall be 
determined in light of the victim's missed working time and his usual 
income. 
The missed working time shall be determined on the basis of the proof 
issued by the medical institution where the victim is treated. If the victim 
misses his working time continuously due to disability caused by an injury, 
the missed working time may be calculated up to the day before the 
disability is determined. 
Where the victim has fixed income, his loss in income due to missed 
working time shall be calculated according to the income actually reduced. 
However, if the victim has no fixed income, his loss in income due to missed 
working time shall be calculated on the basis of his average income during 
the latest three years. If the victim is unable to provide evidence to prove 
his average income during the latest three years, his loss in income due to 
missed working time may be calculated by referring to the average wages 
of the employees in the same or similar industry at the locality of the case-
accepting court of the last year. 
  
  第二十条 误工费根据受害人的误
工 时 间 和 收 入 状 况 确 定 。  
误工时间根据受害人接受治疗的医疗机
构出具的证明确定。受害人因伤致残持
续误工的，误工时间可以计算至定残日
前 一 天 。  
受害人有固定收入的，误工费按照实际
减少的收入计算。受害人无固定收入
的，按照其最近三年的平均收入计算；
受害人不能举证证明其最近三年的平均
收入状况的，可以参照受诉法院所在地
相同或者相近行业上一年度职工的平均
工 资 计 算 。  
  
Article 21 The nursing expenses shall be determined in light of the usual 
income of the nursing personnel, the number of nursing personnel and the 
nursing period. 
Where the nursing personnel have any income, their income shall be 
calculated by referring to the provisions on the loss in income due to missed 
working time. If the nursing personnel have no income or any nurse is 
employed, the said income shall be calculated by referring to the 
remuneration rates of the local nurses engaging in the labor services of the 
same class of nursing. There shall be one nursing person in principle. But 
if there are clear opinions of the medical institution or appraisal institution, 
they may be regarded as the reference to determine the number of nursing 
personnel. 
The nursing period shall be calculated up to the time when the victim has 
recovered his capability of taking care of himself. If the victim is unable to 
  
  第二十一条 护理费根据护理人员
的收入状况和护理人数、护理期限确
定 。  
护理人员有收入的，参照误工费的规定
计算；护理人员没有收入或者雇佣护工
的，参照当地护工从事同等级别护理的
劳务报酬标准计算。护理人员原则上为
一人，但医疗机构或者鉴定机构有明确
意见的，可以参照确定护理人员人数。 
护理期限应计算至受害人恢复生活自理
能力时止。受害人因残疾不能恢复生活
自理能力的，可以根据其年龄、健康状
况等因素确定合理的护理期限，但最长
不 超 过 二 十 年 。 
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recover his capability of taking care of himself due to disability, a 
reasonable nursing period may be determined in light of such factors as his 
age and health, etc., provided that the period shall not exceed 20 years. 
Where the victim needs to be nursed after determination of his disability, 
the nursing class shall be determined in light of the extent of his 
dependence on the nursing and in combination with the equipment of aid 
for disability.  
受害人定残后的护理，应当根据其护理
依赖程度并结合配制残疾辅助器具的情
况 确 定 护 理 级 别 。  
  
Article 22 The traffic expenses shall be calculated on the basis of the 
expenses that actually occurred to the victim and his necessary 
accompanying carers due to medical treatment or due to hospitalization in 
another hospital. The traffic expenses shall be proved with formal tickets, 
and the relevant documents shall conform with the place, time and 
frequency of medical treatment, and the number of persons, as well. 
  
  第二十二条 交通费根据受害人及
其必要的陪护人员因就医或者转院治疗
实际发生的费用计算。交通费应当以正
式票据为凭；有关凭据应当与就医地
点 、 时 间 、 人 数 、 次 数 相 符 合 。  
  
Article 23 The board expenses in hospital may be determined by referring 
to the rates of board subsidies for business trip for ordinary functionaries of 
local state organs. 
Where it is indeed necessary for a victim to be treated in another place of 
the country, or the victim is unable to be in hospital due to any objective 
reason, the reasonable proportion of the accommodation expenses and 
board expenses that actually occurred to the victim himself and his 
accompanying carers shall be compensated. 
  
  第二十三条 住院伙食补助费可以
参照当地国家机关一般工作人员的出差
伙 食 补 助 标 准 予 以 确 定 。  
受害人确有必要到外地治疗，因客观原
因不能住院，受害人本人及其陪护人员
实际发生的住宿费和伙食费，其合理部
分 应 予 赔 偿 。  
  
Article 24 The expenses for nutrition shall be determined in light of the 
victim's situation of injury or disability and with reference to the opinions of 
the medical institution. 
  
  第二十四条 营养费根据受害人伤
残情况参照医疗机构的意见确定。  
  
Article 25 The compensation for disability shall be calculated on the basis 
of the extent of the victim's inability to work or the grade of injury or 
disability, in light of the per capita disposable income of the urban residents 
or the per capita net income of the rural residents at the locality of the case-
accepting court of the last year, for a period of 20 years as of the day when 
the disability is determined. However, if the victim is at the age of 60 or 
over, the period shall be deducted by one year for each year of age added. 
If the victim is at the age of 75 or over, the period shall be calculated as 5 
years. 
Where the victim becomes disabled due to an injury but his actual income 
is not reduced, or the grade of his injury or disability is not heavy but his 
employment is affected due to occupational impediments, the 
compensation for disability may be adjusted accordingly. 
  
  第二十五条 残疾赔偿金根据受害
人丧失劳动能力程度或者伤残等级，按
照受诉法院所在地上一年度城镇居民人
均可支配收入或者农村居民人均纯收入
标准，自定残之日起按二十年计算。但
六十周岁以上的，年龄每增加一岁减少
一年；七十五周岁以上的，按五年计
算 。  
受害人因伤致残但实际收入没有减少，
或者伤残等级较轻但造成职业妨害严重
影响其劳动就业的，可以对残疾赔偿金
作 相 应 调 整 。  
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Article 26 The expenses for aid for disability shall be calculated in light of 
the reasonable expense rates of common applicable devices. If it is 
required particularly by the condition of injury, the corresponding 
reasonable expense rates may be determined by referring to the opinions 
of the aid-equipping institution. 
The period of using the aid before change and the time limit for 
compensation may be determined by referring to the opinions of the aid-
equipping institution.  
  
  第二十六条 残疾辅助器具费按照
普通适用器具的合理费用标准计算。伤
情有特殊需要的，可以参照辅助器具配
制机构的意见确定相应的合理费用标
准 。  
辅助器具的更换周期和赔偿期限参照配
制 机 构 的 意 见 确 定 。 
  
Article 27 The funeral expenses shall be calculated in light of the per capita 
monthly average wage of the employees at the locality of the case-
accepting court of the last year, and at the total amount of six months of 
such wage. 
  
  第二十七条 丧葬费按照受诉法院
所在地上一年度职工月平均工资标准，
以 六 个 月 总 额 计 算 。  
  
Article 28 The living expenses for a person in need of maintenance and 
upbringing shall be calculated on the basis of the extent of the victim's 
inability to work, and in light of the per capita consumption expenditures of 
the urban residents and the per capita annual living consumption 
expenditures of the rural residents at the locality of the case-accepting court 
of the last year. If the person in need of maintenance and upbringing is a 
minor, the period shall be calculated up to the age of 18. If the person in 
need of maintenance and upbringing has no ability to work or no other 
source of income, the period shall be calculated as 20 years. However, if 
the victim is at the age of 60 or over, the period shall be deducted by one 
year for each year of age added. If the victim is at the age of 75 or over, the 
period shall be calculated as 5 years.  
A person in need of maintenance and upbringing means a minor to whom 
the victim is lawfully obligated for maintenance and upbringing, or an adult 
close relative of the victim, who has lost the ability to work and has no other 
source of income. If the person in need of maintenance and upbringing may 
be maintained and brought up by any other person, the obligor to 
compensation may only compensate the proportion that the victim shall 
bear in accordance with the law. Where there are more than one person in 
need of maintenance and upbringing, the accumulative annual 
compensation amount in total shall not exceed the amount of per capita 
consumption expenditures of urban residents of the last year or the amount 
of per capita annual living consumption expenditures of rural residents of 
the last year. 
  
  第二十八条 被扶养人生活费根据
扶养人丧失劳动能力程度，按照受诉法
院所在地上一年度城镇居民人均消费性
支出和农村居民人均年生活消费支出标
准计算。被扶养人为未成年人的，计算
至十八周岁；被扶养人无劳动能力又无
其他生活来源的，计算二十年。但六十
周岁以上的，年龄每增加一岁减少一
年；七十五周岁以上的，按五年计算。  
被扶养人是指受害人依法应当承担扶养
义务的未成年人或者丧失劳动能力又无
其他生活来源的成年近亲属。被扶养人
还有其他扶养人的，赔偿义务人只赔偿
受害人依法应当负担的部分。被扶养人
有数人的，年赔偿总额累计不超过上一
年度城镇居民人均消费性支出额或者农
村 居 民 人 均 年 生 活 消 费 支 出 额 。  
  
Article 29 The compensation for death shall be calculated for 20 years in 
light of the per capita disposable income of the urban residents or the per 
capita net income of the rural residents at the locality of the case-accepting 
court of the last year. However, if the victim is at the age of 60 or over, the 
  
  第二十九条 死亡赔偿金按照受诉
法院所在地上一年度城镇居民人均可支
配收入或者农村居民人均纯收入标准，
按二十年计算。但六十周岁以上的，年
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period shall be deducted by one year for each year of age added; if the 
victim is at the age of 75 or over, the period shall be calculated as 5 years.  
龄每增加一岁减少一年；七十五周岁以
上 的 ， 按 五 年 计 算 。  
  
Article 30 Where the obligee to compensation provides evidence to prove 
that the per capita disposable income of the urban residents or per capita 
net income of the rural residents at his domicile or habitual residence is 
higher than the rates at the locality of the case-accepting court, the 
compensation for disability or death may be calculated in light of the 
relevant rates at his domicile or habitual residence. 
The relevant rates for calculating the living expenses of the person in need 
of maintenance and upbringing shall be determined pursuant to the 
principles in the preceding paragraph. 
  
  第三十条 赔偿权利人举证证明其
住所地或者经常居住地城镇居民人均可
支配收入或者农村居民人均纯收入高于
受诉法院所在地标准的，残疾赔偿金或
者死亡赔偿金可以按照其住所地或者经
常 居 住 地 的 相 关 标 准 计 算 。  
被扶养人生活费的相关计算标准，依照
前 款 原 则 确 定 。  
  
Article 31 The people's court shall, in accordance with Article 131 of the 
General Principles of Civil Law and Article 2 of the present Interpretation, 
determine the actual amount of compensation for all property losses in 
Article 19 through Article 29. 
The compensation for material injury as determined in the preceding 
paragraph and the consolation money for psychological injury as 
determined in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article 18 shall be paid in a 
lump sum in principle. 
  
  第三十一条 人民法院应当按照民
法通则第一百三十一条以及本解释第二
条的规定，确定第十九条至第二十九条
各 项 财 产 损 失 的 实 际 赔 偿 金 额 。  
前款确定的物质损害赔偿金与按照第十
八条第一款规定确定的精神损害抚慰
金 ， 原 则 上 应 当 一 次 性 给 付 。 
  
Article 32 If, in excess of the determined nursing period, the duration for 
payment of expenses for aid or payment of compensation for disability, the 
obligee to compensation brings a lawsuit to the people's court requesting 
continuing payment of nursing expenses, expenses for aid or 
compensation for disability, the people's court shall accept the case. If the 
obligee to compensation indeed needs to continue to be nursed or be 
equipped with the aid, or has no ability to work or no source of income, the 
people's court shall rule that the obligor to compensation continue paying 
the relevant expenses for 5 to 10 years. 
  
  第三十二条 超过确定的护理期
限、辅助器具费给付年限或者残疾赔偿
金给付年限，赔偿权利人向人民法院起
诉请求继续给付护理费、辅助器具费或
者残疾赔偿金的，人民法院应予受理。
赔偿权利人确需继续护理、配制辅助器
具，或者没有劳动能力和生活来源的，
人民法院应当判令赔偿义务人继续给付
相 关 费 用 五 至 十 年 。  
  
Article 33 Where an obligor to compensation requests the compensation 
for disability, the living expenses for the person in need of maintenance and 
upbringing, or the expenses of aid for disability by means of regular 
payment, it shall provide corresponding guaranty. The people's court may, 
in light of the capacity of the obligor to compensation to make payment and 
the guaranty he provides, determine the relevant expenses to be paid at 
regular intervals. However, the expenses that have occurred prior to the 
end of the debate in the court of the first instance, the compensation for 
  
  第三十三条 赔偿义务人请求以定
期金方式给付残疾赔偿金、被扶养人生
活费、残疾辅助器具费的，应当提供相
应的担保。人民法院可以根据赔偿义务
人的给付能力和提供担保的情况，确定
以定期金方式给付相关费用。但一审法
庭辩论终结前已经发生的费用、死亡赔
偿金以及精神损害抚慰金，应当一次性
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death and the consolation money for psychological injury, shall be paid in 
a lump sum.  
给 付 。  
  
Article 34 The people's court shall clarify in the legal documents the time 
and method of regular payment, and the rates of each installment. If the 
relevant statistical datum is changed during the period of execution, the 
amount to be paid shall be adjusted accordingly. 
The regular payment shall be made in light of the actual duration when the 
obligee to compensation is living, and shall not be limited by the relevant 
time limit for compensation as mentioned in the present Interpretation. 
  
  第三十四条 人民法院应当在法律
文书中明确定期金的给付时间、方式以
及每期给付标准。执行期间有关统计数
据发生变化的，给付金额应当适时进行
相 应 调 整 。  
定期金按照赔偿权利人的实际生存年限
给付，不受本解释有关赔偿期限的限
制 。  
  
Article 35 The "per capita disposal income of urban residents", "per capita 
net income of rural residents", "per capita consumption expenditures of 
urban residents", "per capita annual living consumption expenditures of 
rural residents", and "average wages of employees" mentioned in the 
present Interpretation, shall be determined according to the relevant 
statistical data of the province, autonomous region, municipality directly 
under the Central Government, special economic zone, or city directly 
under state planning of the last year, which were promulgated by the 
government statistical department. 
"The last year" means the last statistical year prior to the end of debate in 
the court of first instance. 
  
  第三十五条 本解释所称“城镇居民
人均可支配收入”、“农村居民人均纯收
入”、“城镇居民人均消费性支出”、“农村
居民人均年生活消费支出”、“职工平均工
资”，按照政府统计部门公布的各省、自
治区、直辖市以及经济特区和计划单列
市 上 一 年 度 相 关 统 计 数 据 确 定 。  
“上一年度”，是指一审法庭辩论终结时的
上 一 统 计 年 度 。  
  
Article 36 The present Interpretation shall come into force on May 1, 2004. 
The cases of the first instance on compensation for personal injury, which 
were accepted after May 1, 2004, shall be governed by the present 
Interpretation. The cases on compensation for personal injury, for which the 
effective rulings have been made and which are retried in accordance with 
the law, shall not be governed by the present Interpretation. 
In case any content in a judicial interpretation that came into force prior to 
the present Interpretation's promulgation and entry into force is inconsistent 
with the present Interpretation, the present Interpretation shall prevail. 
  
  第三十六条 本解释自２００４年
５月１日起施行。２００４年５月１日
后新受理的一审人身损害赔偿案件，适
用本解释的规定。已经作出生效裁判的
人身损害赔偿案件依法再审的，不适用
本 解 释 的 规 定 。  
在本解释公布施行之前已经生效施行的
司法解释，其内容与本解释不一致的，
以 本 解 释 为 准 。 
 
  
  
 
© Copyright Chinalawinfo Co., Ltd  
database@chinalawinfo.com  
 
 
  
 
 
322
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
323
Appendix B: Ethics Approval Letter  
 
  
 
 
324
Appendix C: Research Access and Reference Letter  
 
  
  
 
 
325
Appendix D: Research Information Sheet and Consent 
Form  
 
 
Research Funding Information 
 
This Research is funded by the Nippon Foundation at the Seafarers 
International Research Centre (SIRC), Cardiff University. 
You can get in touch with me by the following contacts information at any 
time: 
Name of the Researcher: Desai Shan 
Mobile Number: 07712660445 
Email address: ShanD@cf.ac.uk 
Address: SIRC, Cardiff University, 52 Park Place, Cardiff, Wales, CF10 3AT 
 
Thank you very much!  
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
Seafarers’ occupational injuries compensation system 
and 
reform suggestions in the context of China 
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
I am Desai Shan, a PhD student from Cardiff University, Seafarers 
International Research Centre. Now I am sincerely invite you to take 
part in a research project regarding seafarers’ compensation system for 
work-related injuries in China, which is funded by the Nippon 
Foundation and Cardiff University. Before you decide to join, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask me if there is 
something unclear or if you like to learn more information. Thank you 
very much for reading the following information. 
1. The purpose of this research 
The aim of this research is to find how Chinese seafarers claim compensation 
for their work-related injuries and to explore their actual experiences of the 
claiming process in China. This research include several aspects: how much 
compensation amount the seafarers and their families can actually get after 
the occupational injuries happening, how long and how many procedures 
need to be processed before the final compensation being paid, and what are 
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their actual experiences of the claiming process and the compensation amount 
and. In this research, the difficulties and problems confronted by Chinese 
seafarers during compensation claims will be studied and analysed. Through 
academic publishing, this research may encourage more people to concern 
about seafarers’ occupational welfare improvement in China and worldwide.  
2. Do I have to participate in this research? 
Taking part in this research is completely voluntary, and refusal to take part 
will involve no penalty or loss of benefits for you. If you decide to take part, 
please read this information sheet carefully and you will be asked to sign a 
consent form. Even you have decided participate in this research, you are still 
free to withdraw at any time, without penalty or loss of benefits, and without 
providing a reason. 
3. What will happen if I participate in this research? 
You will receive an interview about your experience of claiming 
compensation for occupational injuries about one hour. Any problems or 
difficulties you met in the legal procedures and daily life changes after the 
work-related injuries accidents happen can be discussed if you are willing to. 
Please be kindly reminded that some of the interview questions require you 
to recall the stressful claim experience. If you feel uncomfortable to talk about 
it, please feel free to stop me at any time.  With your permission the 
conversation will be recorded and be transcribed later. The information 
recorded will not include any of your personal information.  
4. Will my participation in this research be kept confidential? 
All information collected from you will be kept strictly confidential. Any 
information about you will have your name and address removed so that you 
cannot be recognized from it. Audio and audio transcripts of the interviews 
will only be accessible to me and my supervisors in this research. The audio 
and audio transcripts will be used for academic research, including my PhD 
thesis and further studies which may be published as academic works. They 
will not be used for any other non-academic purpose. With your consent, the 
  
 
 
328
anonymized transcripts of interviews will also be accessible for 
relevant researchers for genuine academic research purposes in the 
future. You will be offered a draft of the interview transcript and you will 
have an opportunity to revise it if you wish. 
5. Further contact information 
If you feel necessary, you can contact me or my supervisor after the interview 
through the following contact information: 
Name of the Researcher: Desai Shan 
Mobile Number: 44 (0)7712660445 
Email address: ShanD@cf.ac.uk 
Address: SIRC, Cardiff University, 52 Park Place, Cardiff, Wales, CF10 3AT 
Name of the Supervisor: Prof. Helen Sampson 
Email address: SampsonH@cf.ac.uk 
Tel +44 (0)29 2087 4475 / 4620 
Address: SIRC, Cardiff University, 52 Park Place, Cardiff, Wales, CF10 
3AT 
Thank you very much for your participation in this research! 
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Research Consent Form 
Seafarers’ occupational injuries compensation system 
and 
reform suggestions in the context of China 
 Please tick to confirm 
1)  I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for 
the above study.    
2) I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions 
and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
3) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my legal 
rights being affected.  
4) I understand that relevant information collected from will be kept 
strictly confidential and only for academic use.  
5) I agree to participate in the above research study.  
Name of Participant_________ 
Date__________Signature_____________  
Name of researcher________ 
Date__________Signature_____________ 
When complete, 1 copy is for the participant; 1 copy is for researcher use. 
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调研信息简介 
  
中国海员工伤赔偿法律实践及改革建议 
 
尊敬的先生／女士， 
您好！ 
本人，单德赛，系英国卡迪夫大学国际海员研究中心的博士研究生，
现特别邀请您参与一项有关中国海员工伤赔偿法律实践方面的研究，
本项研究旨在了解中国海员工伤赔偿事宜的组织与处理，以及海员及
家属在工伤赔偿过程中的实际境遇，并基于此对现有问题提出相应的
学者建议。英国卡迪夫大学与日本财团为本项研究的赞助方。在您决
定是否参加本研究之前，请您仔细阅读以下信息，了解本项研究的目
的以及可能涉及的内容。如果您认为需要，可以和其他人商量讨论。
如果您需要了解更多的信息，或者说明有任何您觉得不清楚的地方，
您可以随时询问我。 
非常感谢您的合作！ 
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1. 本项研究的目的 
本研究旨在了解中国海员进行工伤赔偿过程的组织与运作，探讨中国
海员在工伤赔偿过程中实际经历。研究问题主要包括如下几个方面：
出现海员因工受伤事件后，赔偿流程会涉及哪些利益相关方，赔偿流
程如何组织运作，海员或其家人在工伤事故发生后实际得到的工伤待
遇；海员或其家人在得到最终赔款之前所经历了多少程序，经历了多
长时间；海员或其家人对于索赔过程的实际体会与感受如何。在本项
研究中，将会中国海员在索赔过程中经历的实际问题进行研究与分析。
通过学术发表，本研究可能鼓励更多的人致力于在中国乃至世界范围
内探讨如何提高海员因工受伤赔偿案件的处理效率，减少在此过程中
可能出现的矛盾冲突，促进海员权利以及福利的切实保障与提高。 
2. 我必须参与本项研究吗？ 
参与本项研究是在完全自愿的前提下进行的，拒绝参与本项研究不会
对您带来任何的不利影响。如果您决定参与本项研究，请仔细阅读本
简介，您也需要签署一份参与研究的同意书。即使您已经决定参与本
研究，您依然有权利在任何时间撤回您的同意，退出本研究，这不会
给您带来任何的损失或者不利，而且您退出研究也不需要提供任何理
由。 
3. 如果我决定参与研究，会经历什么程序呢？ 
您将会接受一个为时一小时左右的关于海员工伤赔偿实践问题的访谈。
如果您愿意，任何在您所了解的有关（1）处理海员工伤事宜的流程组
织，（2）您在处理海员工伤案件中的感受与经历，（3）在处理海员
工伤赔偿过程中遇到的问题和困难都可以进行讨论。请特别注意的是，
有一些访谈问题涉及到的海员索赔经历，可能对于您来说，会带来压
力和不适，如果对讨论这些话题感觉不舒服，您可以随时打断我。在
您的许可下，我们的谈话将被录音，录音内容将不会涉及您任何的个
人信息。 
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4. 我参与本次研究是否将进行保密？ 
在研究中，所有从您这里采集的信息都将采取严格的保密。任何涉及
到您姓名与地址的信息都将会从记录中移除，确保您的身份不会在本
研究中被识别。在本项研究中，只有本人与本人的两位导师可以接触
访谈录音以及录音文稿。录音与录音文稿仅限于学术目的使用，包括
本人的博士论文写作，或者将来可能发表的学术论文。所有访谈录音
不会被用于非学术研究目的。在您的许可下，秉承真正学术目的的研
究人员也将可以接触音频文稿（文稿中全部使用匿名或者化名，不会
有任何涉及您身份的信息），从事相关的科学研究。您也可以审阅访
谈录音文稿的初稿，并且如果您愿意，也可以在文稿上进行相应的修
改。 
6. 联络信息 
如果您认为有需要，在访谈结束之后，您可以通过以下方式联系本人
与本人导师： 
研究生姓名：单德赛 
手机: 44 (0)7712660445 （英国） 
+86 18503179152 （中国） 
电子邮箱：ShanD@cf.ac.uk 
       Shandesai009@hotmail.com 
通讯地址：SIRC, Cardiff University, 52 Park Place,  
Cardiff, Wales, CF10 3AT 
导师姓名: Prof. Helen Sampson 海伦辛普森 教授 
电子邮箱: SampsonH@cf.ac.uk 
电话号码：+44 (0)29 2087 4475 / 4620 
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通讯地址: SIRC, Cardiff University, 52 Park Place, Cardiff, 
Wales, CF10 3AT 
 
非常感谢您对于本次研究的参与！ 
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Research Consent Form 
参与研究同意书 
中国海员工伤赔偿法律实践及改革建议 
 Please tick to confirm 请在方框中打勾确认 
1)  I confirm that I have read and understand the 
information sheet for the above study.    
本人确认已经阅读并了解上述调研信息简介中的内容。 
2) I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
本人获得了考虑上述信息，询问问题的机会，并且相关问题得到了满
意的答复。 
3) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, 
without my legal rights being affected.  
本人获悉参与本项研究是完全自愿的，并且本人有权在任何时候，无
须提供任何理由撤出该项研究，并且撤回参与不会影响本人任何的法
律权利。 
4) I understand that relevant information collected from me will 
be kept strictly confidential and only for academic use.  
本人获悉所有从本人出收集的信息都将严格保密，并仅用于学术研究
目的。 
5) I agree to participate in the above research study.  
本人同意参与该项研究。  
（研究参与人姓名）       （日期）     （签名）    
     （研究人员签名）     （日期）     （签名）      
本同意书一式两份，一份研究参与人留存，一份研究人员留存。  
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Appendix E: Interview Schedules 
Injured seafarers and surviving families 
Part I: Personal Background Information  
1. Can you briefly talk about yourself, where are you from? 
2. How long have you (or your husband/father/brother) worked as a 
seafarer? 
3. Can you talk about your (or your husband/father/brothers) 
education/training backgrounds? 
4. What is your position (the position of your husband/father/brother) on 
board? 
a. Recruitment approach 
b. The ownership of the company 
c. The type of the contract (permanent, fixed-term, voyage-based 
or no written agreement) 
d. Whether social security, work-related injury insurance, safety 
training and equipment are provided by the company? 
Part II: Experiences of the accident 
5.  Could you talk about the accident (the accident of your 
husband/father/brother)? 
a. When and where did it happen, on board/on land/at the 
harbour; Chinese territorial sea/high sea/foreign territorial 
area  
b. the name, flag, type of the vessel   
c. the working tasks are undertaken before the accident occurred 
6. (Injured seafarers) Could you talk about the first aid/emergency 
treatment received following the accident? 
a. The responses of captain, shipowner, and colleagues 
b. Who arranged and paid for the medical treatment 
c. Any replacement arranged or you had to keep working on 
board 
d. Any repatriation arranged? 
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e. When you were in the hospital, were there anyone taking care 
you? 
f. How do you find these treatments, helpful, supportive or not? 
g. Could you describe the feeling then? 
7.  (surviving family members) Could you talk about the situation after 
the accident? 
a. Who noticed you about the accident? 
b. Any search or rescue arranged? 
c. Were you permitted to attend the accident site? 
d. Body transport/ash transport 
e. Did the company help with the funeral? 
f. Do you find the company supportive and helpful or not, and 
why? 
g. Could you describe the feeling then, in particular about the 
company’s attitudes and supports? 
8. Would you like to give a comment about the supports provided by 
your company after the accident? 
9. Could you tell me some changes happened to you after the accident? 
Part III: Experiences of Claim Processes  
10. Could you tell me about the claim process? 
a. Did you have compensation standards in your contract? If no, 
how did you find out a compensation standard? 
b. When did you start to claim and how did you make this 
decision? 
c. Who did you choose to claim against? 
i. Crew agencies or shipowners? 
d. How did they respond? 
i. Did you have any difficulties in communicating about 
your damages? 
ii. Did you obtain the information and supports you need? 
iii. Could you describe your feeling when negotiating with 
the company? 
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11. Did you receive disability appraisal and could you briefly talk about 
this experience? 
i. When and where? 
ii. Who arranged it for you? 
iii. Who paid for it? 
iv. Are you satisfied with the result or not, and why? 
12. Did you claim work-related injury insurance compensation? 
i. If yes, can you talk about your experiences of this 
claim? 
ii. Are you satisfied with the final payment from Work-
related Injury Insurance Fund? 
13. Did the company purchase any commercial insurance for you? 
a.  If yes, can you tell me how do you claim the compensation 
from the insurers? (time consumed of insurance claim, 
amounts of actual payment, insurer’s service)  
14. Have the P&I Clubs contacted you to negotiate the compensation? 
a.  If yes, can you tell me the experience of negotiating with them? 
b. Was it helpful to have them to solve your dispute? 
15. For victims who launched litigations: 
a.  What was the primary reason for you to decide to initiate the 
lawsuit? 
b. Did you choose the maritime court or civil court? 
c. How much litigation fee do you need to pay for the claim to 
the court? 
d. Did you find the litigation affordable or not? 
e. How did you feel about the efficiency of the legal process? 
f. Was there any opportunity for you to consider mediation by 
the court, if yes, did you find the medication result is fair or 
not? 
16. For victims who quitted their claims: 
a.  What was the main barrier for you to continue your claim?  
b. Could you tell me your feeling after you quit the claim? 
c. Were there any further challenges/difficulties you met? 
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d. How did you overcome them? 
17. How much compensation amount did you get in total?  
a. Do you know how the amount was calculated?  
b. Were you paid by P&I Clubs directly or by your employer? 
c. Was the payment in time? 
18. Are you satisfied with this outcome? Do you think the further legal 
action is necessary or not? 
19. About supports received: 
a. Did you hire a lawyer? Why or why not? 
b. How much do you need to pay for the lawyers’ service? 
c. How did you feel about the lawyers’ service? 
d.  Did they explain the questions you concerned about?  
e. Do you satisfied with their explanations? 
f. How do you feel about these prices, affordable or not, worthy 
or not? 
g. Did you apply legal aid from the government? If yes, did you 
find them supportive and helpful?  
20. Could you tell something about the influence of the claim on your life?  
a. Do your family members support your decision to file the 
claim to the labour arbitration committee/courts? 
b. How did you cope with your finance? 
c. Did you suffer any mental or physical pains caused by 
negotiation with companies and litigation? (encourage 
elaboration) 
Part IV Other issues 
21. Did you know there are two sets of the Chinese compensation systems 
for seafarers’ injuries? Tort liability compensation and Work-related 
Injury Insurance (Introduce briefly).  
a. How do you feel about this kind of difference?  
b. And if you can choose, which one do you prefer? 
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22.  Did you think about other ways to claim the money besides the 
litigation, such as labour arbitration, negotiation with companies, or 
reporting this accident to the local government or newspapers? 
23. Finally, do you have any comments for the improvement of this whole 
claim process and legal procedures, do you want to get any particular 
kind of assistance, or do you have any comments on the current legal 
regulations?          
24. Any questions or comments for me? 
 
Crew Managers  
1. What kind of manning service does your company mainly focus?  
a. Directly employ seafarers or playing as the agent for 
shipowners only? 
b. For Chinese shipowners/foreign shipowners? 
c. For ocean-going vessels/coastal vessels? 
2. How many contracts/agreements are involved to supply a seafarer on 
board 
a. With shipowners/ship operators 
b. With seafarers 
3. What kind(s) of contract(s) do you use when employ/hire a seafarer? 
a. Labour contract or service contract? 
b. Voyage employment agreement/long-term employment 
agreement 
c. Which contract/agreement contain the compensation 
standards?  
4.  How do you manage the risk of seafarers’ occupational casualties’ 
compensation in advance? 
a. Work-related injury insurance (social security), commercial 
life insurance 
b. shipowners’ liability insurance according to the manning 
agent agreement  
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c. any differences between seafarers on Chinese vessels and 
foreign vessels 
5. Are there any different treatments towards to seafarers? 
a. Any difference between self-employed seafarers and 
seafarers on hire? 
b. Any difference between seafarers dispatched on foreign 
vessels and seafarers sent on Chinese ships? 
6. Are there any commercial pressures caused by the recent legal 
requirements of arranging social insurance for seafarers? How do 
you deal with the cost increase?  
7. Once the casualties accidents happen, how do you deal with the 
accident?   
a. At what stage will you be involved and what roles do you 
play?  
b. How did you manage the accident? 
i. emergency medical service, and who pay it 
ii. arrange further medical treatment 
iii. arrange disability assessment (judicial assessment or 
labour assessment) 
iv. salary payment during the treatment period 
v. anything else 
c. any different arrangements regarding seafarers on foreign 
vessels and Chinese vessels 
8.  Can you tell me when will the claim process formally start? What 
are the procedures?    
a. How to decide whether a claim is qualified to be 
compensated?  
b. Disability appraisal (work capacity assessment committee or 
judicial appraisal committee) 
c. Calculation standards: if there are conflicts between different 
criteria, which one to choose and why? 
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d. The responsible parties involved in negotiations (e.g. 
Shipowner, P&I clubs, wrongdoers (such as the opposite 
shipowner in collision), lawyers) 
e. Manning agent’s roles during the claim process 
f. Common conflicts between seafarers claimants and the 
responsible parties 
9.  How did you manage the conflicts with seafarers? 
a.  Can you give me some examples? 
b. Can you share some challenges you have met? 
10. How long would the claim process take generally? 
a. Any difference between severe injuries/slight wounds; 
injuries/deaths 
11. What is your opinion about current legal provision regarding 
workplace injuries of seafarers? 
12. Any comments or questions? 
 
Interview Schedules: P&I managers of Shipowners  
1. Can you please tell me about the business scope of your company 
a. international transport/coastal transport,  
b. the nationality of your fleet (Chinese or FOC, why choose FOC),  
c. the size of your fleet and crew?  
2. How do you manage the relationship with seafarers? 
a. any agreement with your crew? 
b.  any safety management liabilities to seafarers? 
c.  any insurance arrangement to seafarers  
3. In terms of workplace injuries, what would you address accidents/claims? 
a.  how to assign responsibilities to your manning 
companies/crew agencies? (Work-related injury insurance, commercial 
insurance and P&I liability)  
 b  how to ascertain compensation standards 
4. Can you describe your work following workplace accident? 
 a.  medical service 
 b.  repatriation 
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 c.  sick pay 
 d. insurance claim management 
5. Do you need to confront seafarers in the accident/claim management 
process? 
6. How did you manage the conflicts with seafarers, if there are any? 
d.  Can you give me some examples? 
e. Can you share some challenges you have met? 
7. How long would the claim process take generally? 
f. Any difference with severe injuries/slight wounds; injuries/deaths 
8. What is your opinion about current legal provision regarding 
workplace injuries of seafarers? 
9. Any comments or questions? 
Maritime Lawyers  
1. Can you briefly introduce the types of seafarers’ claims you have handled 
before? 
a. Any difference in the application of law regarding foreign related and 
domestic seafarers 
b. How do you manage this difference? 
2. What are the parties involved in the claim dispute?  
a. what are their attitudes? 
b. what are the common conflicts in the dispute? 
3. Which side do you usually represent?  
a. what are the advantages/disadvantages to representing seafarers 
4. What kinds of claims are frequently raised by the seafarer?  
 a. if represent shipowners, how would you respond their claims 
 b. if represent seafarers, what would you do to support their claims 
5. What is your opinion about current legal rules and regulation? 
a. Can you describe the impact of the abolition of the Specific Provisions of 
the Supreme People’s Court for Trials on Foreign-related Personal Injuries 
and Death at Sea (1992-2012) 
6. How do you deal with the application of different legal rules in calculating 
the compensation (when representing seafarers/shipowners)? 
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 a. Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2011) 
 b. The Supreme People’s Court of Issues Concerning the Application 
of Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury (2004) 
7. How do you address different disability appraisal approaches (when 
representing seafarers/shipowners)?  
 a. Work Capacity Assessment  
 b. Judicial assessment committees 
8. What is the common method to solve this dispute? 
9. According to your past experiences, how long would the claim last? 
 a. by negotiation  
 b. by litigation  
10. What is your opinion about current legal provision regarding workplace 
injuries of seafarers? 
11. Any comments or questions? 
P&I Club Correspondents  
1. Can you briefly introduce the types of seafarers’ claims you have handled 
before? 
2. What are the parties involved in the claim dispute?  
a. what are their attitudes? 
b. what are the common conflicts in the dispute? 
3. What kinds of claims are usually raised by the seafarer, and how do you 
respond their claims 
4. What is your opinion about current legal rules and regulation? 
a. Can you describe the impact of the abolition of the Specific Provisions of 
the Supreme People’s Court for Trials on Foreign-related Personal Injuries 
and Death at Sea (1992-2012) on shipowners? 
5. How do you deal with the application of different legal rules in calculating 
the compensation? 
 a. Work-related Injury Insurance Regulation (2011) 
 b. The Supreme People’s Court of Issues Concerning the Application 
of Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury (2004) 
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6. How do you address different disability appraisal results provided by 
seafarers? 
 a. Work Capacity Assessment  
 b. Judicial assessment committees 
7. What is the common method to solve this dispute? 
8. How did you manage the conflicts with seafarers, if there are any? 
 Can you give me some examples? 
Can you share some challenges you have met? 
9. What is your opinion about current legal provision regarding workplace 
injuries of seafarers? 
10. Any comments or questions? 
Maritime Judges 
In terms of workplace injury cases at sea, do you have any working categories, 
and what would be standard for the categorisation?  
Domestic or foreign related 
The parties involved in the litigation (who would the seafarers sue): 
Manning company 
Shipowners 
Ship managers 
3. Who would be termed as ‘employer’ in the case of seafarers’ claims, in 
your opinion? 
a. manning company 
b. shipowners 
c. any differences between foreign-related cases and domestic cases 
4. According to your opinion, what are applicable law and regulations to 
seafarers’ workplace injury claims? 
a. in history, how many legal changes have occurred and what are the impacts 
of them? 
b. Can you describe the impact of the abolition of the Specific Provisions of 
the Supreme People’s Court for Trials on Foreign-related Personal Injuries 
and Death at Sea (1992-2012) on your trial practices (discuss separately in 
cases of death, slight wounds and severe injuries)? 
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c. After the Maritime Labour Convention (2006) came into force, do you 
think this convention will cause any changes for the trial of seafarers’ claims? 
d. from your point of view, are there any improvement could be made to 
reform the current legal framework and why? 
Is there a concurrence of tort claim and work-related injury insurance claim? 
How do you differentiate these two claims? 
How do you ascertain whether there is a ‘labour relationship/employment 
relationship’ to establish the work-related injury insurance claim? 
What are the requirements for seafarers/surviving families to initiate a claim 
at your court? 
To initiate a work-related injury insurance claim? 
To start a tort claim? 
5. According to your observation, what are the common challenges for 
seafarers when starting the claim? 
6. In term of the evidence criteria, are there any different in establishing tort 
claim and work-related injury claim? 
7. According to your opinion, which assessment is suitable for the disability 
appraisal of seafarers? 
a. Work Capacity Assessment  
 b. Judicial assessment committees 
8. Can you introduce the compensation standards you have used in the trials 
of seafarers’ claims? 
a. In the tort claim, how to ascertain the income loss of seafarers (by basic 
wages or actual wages)?  
b. How to determine mental damages in seafarers’ claims? 
9. Would you like to share some experiences of judging seafarers’ claims? 
a. Challenges in communicating with plaintiffs and defendants 
b. Organising mediation 
c. Saerving legal papers to foreign shipowners 
10. Do you have some advice for seafarers or surviving families? 
11. Any other suggestions for seafarers’  protection, legislation, social 
supports or other aspects? 
12. Any other questions or comments 
  
 
 
346
Appendix F: Lists of Research Participants 
Seafarer Interviewees 
No. ID Gender Position Types of seafarers Disability level/situation 
1 SF-TJ-Z(widow) Female C/E Foreign shipowner, FOC Death 
2 SF-TJ-G Male AB State-owned enterprise, Chinese flag Grade 9 (ankle bone broken) 
3 SF-SQ-Z Male AB Foreign shipowner, FOC Grade 10 (leg bone broken) 
4 SF-QD-H Male OS Actual Chinese shipowner, FOC Grade 10 (skull broken) 
5 SF-XM-H Male Fitter Foreign shipowner, FOC Grade 7 (loss of an eye) 
6 SF-XM-W Male C/E Foreign shipowner, FOC Grade 8 (loss thumb + index finger) 
7 SF-XM-L Male S/E Actual Chinese Shipowner, FOC Grade 10 rib broken 
8 SF-CQ-H Male S/E Private enterprise, Chinese flag leg bone broken 
9 SF-HZ-C Male T/O 
cadet 
Foreign shipowner, FOC Grade 10 loss of partial finger 
10 SF-DL-S Male Chef Actual Chinese shipowner, FOC hip bone broken 
11 SF-CZ-W Male captain private enterprise, Chinese flag radius broken 
12 SF-SD-D (uncle) Male Seaman private enterprise, Chinese flag death (ship sinking) 
13 SF-XMJM-Z Male C/O Foreign shipowner, FOC carpus broken 
14 SF-FZ-Q Male C/O Chinese shipowner, Chinese flag carpus broken 
15 SF-GD-X(daughter) Female Captain Private enterprise, Chinese flag Death (ship sinking) 
16 SF-QZ-L Male Oiler Foreign shipowner, HK flag Grade 9  
17 SF-QZ-L (son) Male Chef Foreign shipowner, FOC Grade 7 (detachment of retina ) 
18 SF-HNZZ-S Male Bosun Foreign shipowner, FOC leg bone broken 
19 SF-FJ-Z (bother) Male AB Foreign shipowner (Singapore), FOC death 
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20 SF-QZ-L Male AB State-owned enterprise, Chinese flag Grade 7 
21 SF-LN-L Male cadet private enterprise, Chinese flag leg bone broken 
22 SF-QZ-Z Male carpenter Foreign shipowner, FOC Grade 7,hand bone and lumbar vertebra broken 
23 SF-QZ-J Male C/O Actual Chinese shipowner, FOC Foe loss 
24 SF-HF-G(wife) female chef Foreign shipowner, FOC Deaf 
25 SF-NT-C(cousin) male T/O Foreign shipowner, FOC disappearance on board 
26 SF-NT-W male C/O Private enterprise, Chinese flag Grade 10 foe loss 
27 SF-NT-G male T/O Private enterprise, Chinese flag shinbone broken 
28 SF-NT-F(daughter) male Captain Foreign shipowner, FOC death (shot by pirates) 
29 SF-HN-Y(aunt) Female AB Private enterprise, Chinese flag death (ship sinking) 
30 SF-JS-H male C/E State-owned enterprise employee poisoning sulfuretted hydrogen 
31 SF-NT-Y(wife) female S/E Foreign shipowner, FOC Grade 10 ring finger loss 
32 SF-NT-X male Cadet State-owned enterprise, Chinese flag head hurt 
33 SF-NT-Y male S/E HK shipowner, FOC Grade 9 index finger loss 
34 SF-NJ-H male C/O Foreign shipowner, FOC Grade 10 loss of four teeth 
35 SF-NJ-C(widow) female C/E Actual Chinese shipowner, FOC death (during crane operation) 
36 SF-QG-L male AB HK shipowner, FOC leg bone broken 
37 SF-XZ-Z male OS private enterprise, Chinese flag shinbone broken 
38 SF-XZ-T male S/O Foreign shipowner, FOC ulna broken 
39 SF-XZ-H male C/O Foreign shipowner, FOC Grade 9 
40 SF-NJ-X male T/E Private enterprise, Chinese flag shinbone broken 
41 SF-QD-W(nephew) male OS private enterprise, Chinese flag Death (ship sinking) 
42 SF-HB_L Male OS Private enterprise, Chinese flag Shinbone broken 
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Professional Interviewees 
No. ID Institution Position 
1 CH_BJ_W Marine Insurance Broker P&I correspondent 
2 CH_GZ_K Marine insurance company Manager of claims handling sector 
3 CH_XM_L Marine Insurance Broker General manager (P&I 
correspondent) 
4 MC_GZ_P Ship management company HR manager 
5 MC_QD_Y Manning company (joint venture) Deputy manager 
6 MC_QZ_S State-owned manning company Deputy General Manager 
7 MC_TJ_C Private Manning Agency Manager 
8 MC_XM_H State Owned manning company Deputy General Manager 
9 MC_XM_L State owned manning company Crew Manager 
10 MC_XM_LX State Owned manning company Crew Manager 
11 MC_NJ_Z Private Manning Agency Crew Manager (legal counsel) 
12 MC_NJ_D Private Manning Agency General Manager 
13 MC_XM_S Private manning company General Manager 
14 MJ__TJ_L Maritime Court Registration Branch 
15 MJ_GZ_W Maritime Court Admiralty tribunal 
16 MJ_GZ_X Maritime Court Admiralty tribunal 
17 MJ_GZ_Y Maritime Court Admiralty tribunal 
18 MJ_GZ_Z Maritime Court Admiralty tribunal 
19 MJ_QD_Z Maritime Court Admiralty tribunal 
20 MJ_XM_C Maritime court Admiralty tribunal 
21 MJ_XM_H Maritime court Admiralty tribunal 
22 MJ_XM_Y Maritime court Admiralty tribunal 
23 ML_GZ_C Maritime Lawyer Attorney (Partner) 
24 ML_GZ_L Maritime Lawyer Attorney 
25 ML_GZ_Z Maritime Lawyer Attorney 
26 ML_GZ-S Maritime Lawyer Attorney 
27 ML_QD_C Maritime Lawyer Attorney 
28 ML_XM_L Maritime Lawyer Attorney (Partner) 
29 ML_XM_Y Maritime Lawyer Attorney  
30 SM_NJ_Y Private shipping management 
company 
Shipping manager 
31 SO_GZ_H Shipping company (owners) Chief of the P&I claim department 
32 SO_DH_W Private shipowner Deputy General Manager 
33 SO_TJ_W Oil industry Shipping Company HR manager 
 
 
 
 
